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Abstract 
The wider social responsibility of scientists has received theoretical 
discussion but little previous empirical research. To elucidate the construct, this 
thesis investigated scientists‟ attitudes, values and beliefs about social 
responsibility, with a focus on Promethean gene technologies. The thesis 
articulates a framework for the construct domain and develops and validates a 
set of new measures related to scientific social responsibility.  
Five technology fuelled, social and ecological, existential threats to Earth 
are identified, establishing the need for an increased ethic of social 
responsibility for the scientific endeavour and scientists in an age of 
Promethean technologies. The power of developing gene technologies and their 
social and moral implications are examined, followed by a discussion of 
relevant normative, meta-ethical and applied ethics theories. Next, Kohlberg‟s 
(1969) cognitive moral development theory, Rest‟s (1979) theory of moral 
behaviour, and Schwartz‟s (1992) theory of personal value orientation are 
discussed as a psychological context for scientific social responsibility. The 
few empirical studies addressing the issue are reviewed. 
Original empirical contributions are presented in two studies. Study 1 is 
an explorative, qualitative research project using face-to-face, in-depth, 
unstructured interviews to investigate a purposive sample of scientists‟ (N = 
22) beliefs about the social role of science, and scientists, in research and 
technology development. The participants all worked in the field of genetic 
engineering, or studied its social or ecological impacts. From a data-driven, 
manifest, thematic analysis, three themes emerged, each with several sub-
themes: doing public good (sub-themes: benefit/harm, knowledge, 
technologies, and foresight); engagement (sub-themes: informing society, 
becoming informed, and integrity) and; compliance (sub-themes: scientific 
norms, business norms, laws and regulations, societal mores, and personal 
values). A theoretically-driven, latent, thematic analysis, examined the 
normative and meta-ethical reasoning underlying participants‟ manifest 
positions. Evidence was found for normative ethical reasoning (i.e., 
deontological, teleological and virtue ethics) and a range of meta-ethical 
approaches (i.e., ethical relativism, conventionalism, objectivism, moral 
absolutism, subjectivism, emotivism, and cultural relativism). From Study 1 
items were proposed for two measures of social responsibility based on the first 
two stages of Rest‟s model of moral behaviour. 
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Study 2, a quantitative survey of scientists from six New Zealand Crown 
Research Institutes (N = 733, 40.9% female), used a nomological network of 
39 hypothesised directional relationships (correlations) to help infer construct 
validity to five new instruments related to social responsibility: moral 
awareness, moral judgement regarding personal behaviour, technological 
optimism, attitude to the commercialisation of science, and attitude to the 
democratisation of science. Five existing instruments also comprised the 
nomological network: the four Schwartz higher-order value dimensions and a 
concurrent criterion, general attitude to genetic engineering. Exploratory factor 
analysis was used to select items for single factor instruments and confirmatory 
factor analysis to purify the instruments‟ dimensionality, followed by reliability 
analyses. Four new instruments demonstrated good psychometric properties. 
Twenty-seven of 39 hypothesised correlations were significant in the right 
direction (at the Bonferroni adjusted p < .001 level), providing initial support 
for the new instruments‟ construct validities and study results regarding 
participants‟ attitudes, beliefs and values towards conducting socially 
responsible Promethean science.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The purpose of the current work is to consider the social and moral 
responsibilities of science and scientists in an age of Promethean technology. 
Empirical research into scientists‟ wider social responsibilities is almost non-
existent and the domain poorly defined (McCormick, Boyce, & Cho, 2009; 
Pimple, 2002; Prpic, 1998; Weil, 2002). In Study 1, the domain of scientific social 
responsibility is explored and a framework developed through qualitative 
interviews with scientists. Study 2 uses a quantitative survey to develop five new 
psychometric instruments to measure related aspects of scientists‟ attitudes to 
social responsibility. Both studies examine scientists‟ attitudes to social 
responsibility regarding their research. A secondary purpose is to examine 
scientists‟ moral attitudes to a relatively new and developing Promethean science 
of enormous potential power: gene science and technology. This is examined in 
both the qualitative and quantitative studies. This is a mixed method study in the 
interdisciplinary academic field known as science, technology and society studies 
or STS studies (Hackett, Amsterdamska, Lynch, & Wajcman, 2008; Spiegel-
Rosing & de Solla Price, 1977).  
Science, Technology and Society Studies 
Science, Technology and Society‟ (STS) studies is a field of scholarship 
examining the social processes that underpin research, science and technology 
(Amsterdamska, 2008; Solomon, 2008), including their consequences for society 
(e.g., Barben, Fisher, Selin, & Guston, 2008; Hedgecoe & Martin, 2008). STS 
studies the sociology of scientific knowledge, science policy, science 
communication and dialogue, and public engagement in science (Hackett, 2008). 
STS studies recognise that science is a human activity influenced by human 
values. Society decides what research is to be done and what science gets funded 
(Hackett, et al., 2008). Social processes and values determine which science is 
supported and how it is used. The assessment of science is influenced by human 
values (Lowe, 2010).  
Because the governance of science is value-laden, STS studies acknowledge 
that science itself is a value-laden endeavour (Wajcman, 2008). STS examines the 
relationship between science and society, including such issues as whose voices 
dominate and whose voices should be included (and why) in decision-making 
regarding science, as well as related important issues, such as the democratisation 
of science (Bucchi & Neresini, 2008; Hackett, 2008; Irwin, 2008), the 
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commercialisation of science (Krimsky, 2004; Mirowski & Sent, 2008; Nowotny, 
Scott, & Gibbons, 2003), societal trust in science (Critchley, 2008; Irwin, 2008; 
Rampton & Stauber, 2001), and scientists‟ responsibilities to society (Johnson & 
Wetmore, 2008; Ziman, 1998). An important insight of STS studies is that much 
damage and confusion can result from the application of narrow disciplinary 
knowledge to part of a system without considering the other causally linked 
components of the local and global systems (Lowe, 2010). In researching 
scientists‟ attitudes towards their moral responsibility to society, it is importance 
to consider the current impacts of science and technology on society. This is 
necessary to convey the context, in which the science/society moral responsibility 
issue is currently set, and the importance and urgency of the issue. 
The Impacts of Science and Technology on the Modern World 
The development and practice of science and technology has been a major 
causal component of the exponential rise in human population, the rise of 
civilisations, and (in general) the betterment of conditions for human wellbeing 
and prosperity (Morgan, 1877; Nolan & Lenski, 2006; White, 1959). Indeed, 
some people believe that science is so important to society that the claim is made 
that “Science Made the Modern World, and it‟s science that shapes modern 
culture” (Shapin, 2008, p. 433). Agricultural technology enabled increased food 
production, which enabled corresponding increases in human population 
(Hopfenberg & Pimentel, 2001; Nolan & Lenski, 2006), and the development of 
civilisation (Toffler, 1980; White, 1959).  
As Toffler (1980) describes it, the second great wave of civilisation, the 
industrial revolution, began in the 17
th
 -18
th
 century. Copernicus, Galileo, 
Descartes, Bacon, Newton, Hook, Boyle, Leibnitz and their contemporaries 
started to formalise the scientific method (Achinstein, 2004). A multitude of new 
technologies were discovered and dispersed on a wide scale. Perhaps, most 
importantly, first, with the development of the steam engine, and later, the 
development of the internal combustion engine, humanity discovered how to 
release and use the energy of fossil fuels, enabling animal and human labour to be 
replaced by machines (Pimentel & Pimentel, 1996; White, 1959). Fossil fuels 
enabled vastly increased intensification of food production, and thus enabled the 
continued exponential growth of human population (Hopfenberg & Pimentel, 
2001).  
Despite the obvious and acknowledged positive benefits of science and 
technology, humanity‟s current possession and use of technology, to provide the 
consumer products and comforts of the modern western lifestyle, now threatens 
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the very existence of our own species, multitudes of other species of life, and the 
ecosystems of our planet, on which all biota depend (Flannery, 2009; Suzuki, 
2010). The peer reviewed scientific evidence for this statement is prolific, 
growing exponentially, and rationally undeniable (e.g., Anderson & Bows, 2008; 
Bostrom, 2002; Caldeira & Wickett, 2003; Carpenter, et al., 2008; Carter, Deutch, 
& Zelikow, 1998; Commoner, 1966; Costanza, 1989; Dainton, 1971; Diamond, 
2005; Dirzo & Raven, 2003; Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, 2009; Hall & Klitgaard, 2006; Hopfenberg & Pimentel, 2001; 
Huesemann, 2001; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007; Jackson, 
2008; Joy, 2000; Katz, 2001; Kharecha & Hansen, 2008; Laurance, 2001; Leakey 
& Lewin, 1996; Lovelock, 2006; Lubchenco, 1998; Meadows, Meadows, 
Randers, & Behrens III, 1972; Meadows, Randers, & Meadows, 2004; Meier, et 
al., 2007; Met Office Hadley Centre, 2009; Nobel Laureates, 2001, 2007; 
Pimentel & Pimentel, 2006, 1996; Rapp, 1995; Raven, 2002; Rees, 2003; 
Rockström, et al., 2009; Schellnhuber, 2009; Serageldin, 2002; Sherwood & 
Huber, 2010; Small & Jollands, 2006; Smil, 2008; Tainter, 1988; Union of 
Concerned Scientists, 1992; United Nations Environment Programme, 2002a; 
Vermeer & Rahmstorf, 2009; Vitousek, Ehrlich, Ehrlich, & Matson, 1986; 
Wackernagel & Rees, 1996; Werth & Avissar, 2002; Willis & Bhagwat, 2009; 
Worm, et al., 2006; Youngquist, 1999).  
Five technology fuelled crises threatening Gaia 
Human use of technology gives rise to at least five potentially catastrophic 
crises that are currently threatening humanity and the stability of earth‟s 
ecosystem services. These threats are over-population, resource depletion, 
pollution, social inequity, and human malevolence. In the current work the term 
Gaia is used as Lovelock (1979/2000, p. ix) defined it “the entire surface of the 
Earth including life is a self-regulating entity.” This definition includes humans. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the human social and moral crises enabled by 
development of technology (i.e., the exacerbation of social inequity and human 
malevolence), fall under the general rubric of consequences for Gaia.  
Over-population 
Over-population is both a contributory cause of the other crises and a crisis 
in itself. World population is still expanding and estimated to hit a peak of about 
9.2 billion around 2050, after which it is projected to start declining (UN 
Population Division/DESA, 2008). Although the earth might be capable of 
carrying this many people, it cannot do so at the current consumption rates of the 
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western world, it cannot do so without more efficient use of fresh water and soil 
resources, and it cannot do so without oil, or a suitable energy substitute, to fuel 
food production and distribution (Brown, 2008; Cohen, 2003; Hopfenberg & 
Pimentel, 2001; Meadows, et al., 1972; Meadows, et al., 2004; Pimentel & 
Pimentel, 2006; Raven, 2002; Rockström, et al., 2009; Serageldin, 2002; Smil, 
1997; Wackernagel & Rees, 1996). In the year 2000, 3% of the known remaining 
oil reserves were consumed (Chow, Kopp, & Portney, 2003). Oil discovery is a 
fraction of current use (Brown, 2008). At current rates of consumption, practically 
obtainable oil will be depleted in 30-40 years. Without oil, and assuming a healthy 
western diet for all, according to some of the world‟s foremost experts, the Earth 
can feed 2-3 billion people, much less if everyone were to have an American 
lifestyle (Cohen, 1995, 2003; Erhlich & Ehrlich, 1990; McCluney, 2004; 
Meadows, Meadows, & Randers, 1992; Pimentel & Pimentel, 2006, 1996; 
Pimentel, Pimentel, & Karpenstein-Machan, 1999; Smil, 2008). The inevitable 
Malthusian crunch is fast approaching. 
Resource depletion 
Resource depletion is a function of the number of people on the planet and 
our technological power to extract and consume the earth‟s resources. Potentially 
catastrophic resource depletion threats currently include: energy, water, land and 
soil, forests, species diversity and food. Again, the scientific evidence is prolific, 
growing and indisputable.  
Energy. Oil provides 95% of all energy humans use; renewable resources 
currently provide about 2.6% (Chow, et al., 2003). The easy to obtain half of all 
known oil reserves have already been used. However, the rate of use continues to 
escalate. Without cheap oil, energy poverty will beset humanity (Bentley, 2002; 
Chow, et al., 2003; Gotton, 2001; Hall, 2004; Hall & Klitgaard, 2006; Howden, 
2007; Meadows, et al., 2004; Peet, 1992; Raven, 2002; Smil, 2008; Wackernagel 
& Rees, 1996; Youngquist, 1999).  
Water. Humans already capture and use over half of the planets fresh water 
supplies. Water shortages are predicted to be a global problem in the 21
st
 century 
(Avissar & Werth, 2005; Brown, 2008; Gleick, 2003; Raven, 2002; Rockström, et 
al., 2009; United Nations Environment Programme, 2002b, 2009; Vorosmarty, et 
al., 2004).  
Land and soil. Soil erosion is occurring at up to 300 times the rate of natural 
renewal. This represents an immense problem for future food production 
(Fedoroff, et al., 2010; Lal, 2007; Meier, et al., 2007; Pimentel & Sparks, 2000; 
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Raven, 2002; Steinfeld, Wassenaar, Castel, Rosales, & Haan, 2006; Stocking, 
2003; Wackernagel & Rees, 1996).  
Forests. Forest are the lungs of the Gaia; breathing in carbon dioxide and 
releasing oxygen. They are an important mechanism of climate regulation. They 
are being decimated at unprecedented rates (Avissar & Werth, 2005; Butler, 2006; 
Cox, et al., 2004; Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2009; 
Maslin, Malhi, Phillips, & Cowling, 2005; Nepstead, 2007; Rockström, et al., 
2009; Soares-Filho, et al., 2006; Werth & Avissar, 2002). 
Species diversity. Life, on land, in the oceans, and in the air is becoming 
extinct at 1000 to 10,000 times the background rates of the past 60 million years. 
Biologists are referring to this phenomenon as the sixth great mass extinction 
event. Previous extinction events had natural causes; the current event is caused 
by humans (Carpenter, et al., 2008; Dirzo & Raven, 2003; IUCN, 2009; Jackson, 
2008; Leakey & Lewin, 1996; May, Lawton, & Stork, 1991; Pimm, Russell, 
Gittleman, & Brooks, 1995; Willis & Bhagwat, 2009; Worm, et al., 2006).  
Food. Over-population, depletion of oil, water, land and soil, and climate 
change, present significant new problems for the production of adequate supplies 
of food (Basset-Mens, Small, Paragahawewa, Langevin, & Blackett, 2009; 
Borlaug, 1997; Brown, 2008; Fedoroff, et al., 2010; Hopfenberg & Pimentel, 
2001; Lal, 2007; Lappe, Collins, & Rosset, 1998; Meadows, et al., 2004; Pimentel 
& Pimentel, 2006, 1996; Real Time Statistics Project, 2009; Serageldin, 2002; 
Smil, 1997, 2008; Steinfeld, et al., 2006; Stocking, 2003; West, 2010) 
Under current patterns of consumption, and exacerbated by population and 
economic growth, these resources are all critically threatened and expected by 
eminent authorities to reach critical biological tipping points within the next 20-
100 years (Brown, 2008; Flannery, 2009; Meadows, et al., 1992; Raven, 2002; 
Serageldin, 2002).  
Pollution 
Planetary pollution is a function of global population, consumption rates and 
disposal practices (Williams, 2005). Pollution occurs on land, in the atmosphere 
and in the oceans (Bell & Davis, 2001; Griffith, Duncan, Riggan, & Pellom, 1989; 
Hamer, 2003; Herat, 2009; Huesemann, 2001; Schwartz, 1994; Steinfeld, et al., 
2006; Thompson, Swan, Moore, & vom Saal, 2009; Wong, et al., 2007). Although 
there is a wide range of different types of serious pollution, carbon pollution of 
the atmosphere and the oceans, primarily caused by fossil fuel use, is perhaps the 
most dangerous pollution threat to the majority of life on earth. Carbon pollution 
of the atmosphere, leads to global warming, climate change, sea level rise, polar 
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ice melt, and ocean acidification (Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; 
Kharecha & Hansen, 2008; Matthews, Gillett, Stott, & Zickfeld, 2009).  
If the remaining fossil fuels are burned, under a business as usual scenario, 
climate models predict that global warming could make more than half of the 
planet uninhabitable for mammals due to heat stress within 300 years (Sherwood 
& Huber, 2010). In the shorter term, climate change is predicted to have negative 
consequences for food production and the spread of disease vectors (e.g., 
Anderson & Bows, 2008; Carpenter, et al., 2008; Fedoroff, et al., 2010; Gleick, et 
al., 2010; Hamilton, 2010; Hansen, et al., 2008; Hasselmann, et al., 2003; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007; Oreskes, 2004; Rajan, 2006; 
United Nations Environment Programme, 2009).  
Sea level rise is predicted to remove valuable agricultural land from 
production and make many major coastal cities uninhabitable. It is estimated that 
sea level rise, due in part to heat expansion of the oceans, but mostly due to polar 
ice melt (caused by rising global temperature), will make hundreds of millions of 
people climate refugees during the current century (Chen & Li, 2007; Goodstein, 
Huntington, & Euskirchen, 2010; Hansen, 2007; Hasselmann, et al., 2003; 
Pritchard, Arthern, Vaughan, & Edwards, 2009; Schuur, et al., 2009; Vermeer & 
Rahmstorf, 2009).  
Social Inequity  
The fourth looming crisis, an issue of human morality, is social inequity. 
One to two billion people are undernourished; Serageldin (2002) claimed 40,000 
people die of hunger related causes each day. In contrast, 1.1 billion people are 
overweight and 340 million are obese. According to Serageldin (2002, p. 55) 
“20% of the world‟s population consumes 85% of the world‟s income, the 
remaining 80% live on 15%, with the bottom 20% living on 1.3% of the world‟s 
income”. Thirty years ago the wealthiest 20% were 30 times richer than the 
poorest 20% (Serageldin, 2002). Recently, Meadows et al. (2004) estimated this 
ratio is now 82:1. Social inequity is rapidly increasing in scope and severity. 
Poverty and ill-health go hand in hand. Great disparity exists between health 
indicators for the developed and developing worlds including: quality of life, 
disability, life expectancy and infant mortality (Mascie-Taylor & Karim, 2003). 
Current medical research practice continues to exacerbate this disparity (Resnik, 
2004). According to Resnik (2004, p. 43) “less than 10% of the world‟s 
biomedical R&D funds are dedicated to addressing problems that are responsible 
for 90% of the world‟s burden of disease”. Climate change will have its most 
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profound negative health impacts on the poor (Costello, et al., 2009; Jay & 
Marmot, 2009; McMichael, Friel, Nyong, & Corvalan, 2008). 
Small and Jollands (2006) claimed social inequity will provide a breeding 
ground for justifiable, malevolent, retaliatory action using new and emerging 
technologies – future wars and terrorism. Similar sentiments were expressed in a 
statement called “The Next Hundred Years” issued in December 2001 on the 100th 
Anniversary of the Nobel prizes. The statement was signed by 110 Nobel 
Laureates.  
The most profound danger to world peace in the coming years will stem not 
from the irrational acts of states or individuals but from the legitimate 
demands of the world‟s dispossessed. Of these poor and disenfranchised the 
majority live a marginal existence in equatorial climates. Global warming, 
not of their making but originating with the wealthy few, will affect their 
fragile ecologies most. Their situation will be desperate, and manifestly 
unjust. It cannot be expected, therefore, that in all cases they will be content 
to await the beneficence of the rich. If, then, we permit the devastating 
power of modern weaponry to spread through this combustible human 
landscape, we invite a conflagration that can engulf both rich and poor. The 
only hope for the future lies in co-operative international action, legitimized 
by democracy. It is time to turn our backs on the unilateral search for 
security, in which we seek to shelter behind walls. Instead we must persist 
in the quest for united action to counter both global warming and a 
weaponised world. These twin goals will constitute vital components of 
stability as we move toward the wider degree of social justice that alone 
gives hope of peace….As concerned citizens we urge all governments to 
commit to these goals which constitute steps on the way to the replacement 
of war by law. To survive in the world we have transformed we must learn 
to think in a new way. As never before, the future of each depends on the 
good of all. (Nobel Laureates, 2001 para. 1) 
Human malevolence 
Nearly fifty years ago, the psychologist Carl Jung, made the following 
insightfully statement about the human condition: 
Our intellect has created a new world that dominates nature and has 
populated the world with monstrous machines. . . .His (sic) genius shows 
the uncanny tendency to invent things that become more and more 
dangerous, because they represent better and better means of wholesale 
suicide. . . .In spite of our proud domination of nature, we are still her 
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victims, for we have not even learned to control our own nature. Slowly but, 
it appears, inevitably, we are courting disaster. (Jung, 1964, p. 18) 
The fifth crisis facing humanity is human malevolence: oppression, 
violence, terror and war. In the first half of the 20th century, 187 million people 
perished in the two world wars and their aftermath. According to Rees (2003) the 
20th century was possibly the first in which more human lives were lost due to 
war and human atrocity than through natural disasters. In the 1980s, the world‟s 
nuclear stockpile was equivalent to 10 tonnes of TNT for every person in 
America, Russia and Europe.  
In a technologically advanced world, state condoned and mandated evil has 
competition from a far more diverse and intangible set of perpetrators – terrorists. 
While nuclear technology is still beyond terrorists‟ capacity, it may not always be 
so. However, the September 11 event demonstrated the potential of non-military 
technologies to be used for malevolent purposes. Technologies which have equal 
potential to be used for good or be weaponised in some manner are referred to as 
„dual-use technologies‟ (Carter, 1989). Many of the powerful new and emerging 
technologies have this dual-use capacity. In the future, perhaps the most probable, 
and possibly the most fearsome, weapons of choice for terrorists will be chemical 
or biologically engineered agents (Preston, 2010; Rees, 2003).  The biggest threat 
is seen from biological weapons which will become more readily available 
technically, and impossible to control using traditional policies. Preston (2010, pp. 
3, slide 4) claimed that “For terrorists, bioweapons provide the ultimate in 
stealthy, asymmetrical warfare, and are well-suited to both clandestine 
development and employment.” 
The knowledge and technology to develop and produce biological and 
chemical weapons can be found in medical and hospital laboratories, chemical 
factories, and agricultural research facilities (Preston, 2010; Rees, 2003). The 
development and use of such weapons is not confined to nation states; thousands 
of much smaller, less wealthy groups and organisations, even single individuals 
could conceivably deploy such weapons (Preston, 2010; Rees, 2003).  The 
possibility of their use will continue to increase with the passage of time as the 
number of groups and individuals who have access to the necessary technological 
knowledge and resources continue to grow. Technological progress and 
convergence increases the ease of development, access, use, and the efficiency 
and effectiveness of these types of weapons (Rees, 2003; Small & Jollands, 2006).  
Small and Jollands (2006) argued that, given the above conditions, and 
combined with the evident range of human moral behaviour, over time, the 
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probability of this kind of malevolent event approaches certainty. As Sir Martin 
Rees, President of the British Royal Society, stated:  
We are entering an era when a single person can, by one clandestine act, 
cause millions of deaths or render a city uninhabitable for years, and when a 
malfunction in cyberspace can cause havoc worldwide to a significant 
segment of the economy: air transport, power generation, or the financial 
system. (Rees, 2003, p. 61) 
Categories of threat, values, and the perception of moral issues 
The evidence accumulated by ecological and environmental scholars 
indicates society‟s current technological trajectory is on a collision course with 
the planet‟s ecosystems limits (e.g., Brown, 2008; Flannery, 2009; Meadows, et 
al., 1992; Meadows, et al., 2004; Pimentel & Pimentel, 2006, 1996; Raven, 2002; 
Suzuki, 2010; Wackernagel & Rees, 1996). The current biophysical and social 
crises are a direct result of how humans have chosen to use technology in the past, 
up until the present day. Some of these threats could potentially see the demise of 
humanity and the rest of the mammals (Sherwood & Huber, 2010). Such global 
terminal risks, with the potential to imperil human civilisation for all time to 
come, are characterised by Bostrom (2002) as existential risks. Most existential 
risks facing Gaia today result from human use/misuse of technology (Bostrom, 
2002). 
These five identified potential crises fall under two general categories of 
threats to Gaia: environmental threats and social threats. Without human 
possession of science and technology these threats could not exist in their present 
form. Therefore, an essential part of the social and moral responsibilities of the 
science community and scientists involves being aware of, and sensitive to, 
environmental and social issues and using scientific knowledge to address these 
known threats. The social issues associated with the potential crises are largely 
ones of equity, justice, fairness and human evil, all of which relate strongly to 
morality and human values. 
 Research has found that values are related to attitudes to the environment 
and perception of environmental issues (Beckmann & Kilbourne, 1997; 
Beckmann, Kilbourne, Van Dam, & Pardo, 1997; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Stern 
& Dietz, 1994; Stern, Dietz, Kalof, & Guagnano, 1995). Values are also related to 
concern about social issues (Schwartz, 2006; Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & 
Kalof, 1999), moral reasoning (Abdolmohammadi & Baker, 2006; Crilly, 
Schneider, & Zollo, 2008; Fritzsche & Oz, 2007; Helkama, et al., 2003; Lan, 
Gowing, McMahon, Rieger, & King, 2008; Lan, Gowing, Rieger, McMahon, & 
 10 
 
King, 2010) and moral behaviour (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Hitlin, 2003; 
Schwartz, 2006). Therefore, it is proposed that personal values will be related to 
scientists‟ attitudes to social and moral responsibility in research and 
development. The nature of this relationship will be explored further and specific 
hypotheses proposed in a latter chapter. 
Promethean technologies 
If we wish to avert or ameliorate the looming crises and develop and 
maintain socially and ecologically sustainable systems, then society must take a 
new approach to the governance and use of science and technology (Bunge, 1977; 
Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008). This is especially so because, despite the “extreme 
power which we possess today” (Jonas, 1985, p. 23), a new crop of technologies, 
currently in development, will further, vastly increase human power over nature 
(de Grey, 2004, 2007; Drexler, 1986; Gibson, et al., 2010; Good, 1965; 
Henderson, 2010; Joy, 2000; Kurzweil, 2001, 2005; Lavine, Voss, & Coontz, 
2007; Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2008; Small & Jollands, 
2006). If we continue to use these new technologies with the same lack of 
forethought in regard to the wellbeing of Gaia, as we have used the technologies 
we already possess, the crises currently threatening will likely be greatly 
exacerbated and new ones introduced (Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 2005). 
In the current work, these new, powerful technologies will be referred to as 
Promethean technologies (Prometheus means forethought), in recognition of the 
god-like power, over both the social and physical worlds, with which they endow 
us, and the necessity for forethought in their application (Henderson, 2010; Jonas, 
1985; Joy, 2000; Slaughter, 2007; Small, 2003; Small & Jollands, 2006). 
Promethean technologies include: nuclear and quantum technologies, gene and 
biotechnologies, information and communication technologies, artificial 
intelligence, virtual reality technologies, nanotechnologies, robotics, human 
machine interfaces and prosthetic devices, cyborg technologies, cognitive and 
neuro-technologies, and of course, weapons of mass destruction. Small and 
Jollands (2006) claimed that these technologies, particularly in convergence, will 
give humanity unprecedented god-like power over six primary dimensions of 
nature: time, space, energy, matter, life and consciousness. 
Depending upon how we use these technologies, they have the potential to 
accelerate, ameliorate, halt, or, in the most optimistic scenarios, even reverse the 
looming ecological and social crises (Jonas, 1985). Thus, technology, while 
opening up a range of new possible futures, does not itself necessitate any 
particular future, but rather, it is what society, and the various groups and 
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individuals that compose society, chose to do with the coming Promethean 
technologies that will determine the realised future from a wide range of 
possibilities. Along with technological governance, an understanding of human 
nature, individual and social behaviour and morality, is a necessary component to 
understanding the probable impacts of new technologies on both humans and the 
rest of Gaia (Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2001; Small & Jollands, 2006). This suggests 
that scientists‟ awareness of their social and moral responsibilities to society will 
be enhanced by knowledge of human nature and an awareness of the range of 
human behaviour at the individual, social and political levels.  
Three ways humans cause harm using technology 
Not all the problems or possible harms associated with humanity‟s use of 
Promethean technology qualify as existential threats, or are as dire as the five 
identified crises – these are existential threats that, by virtue of the magnitude of 
the potential harm, demand deep and immediate consideration (Jonas, 1985). 
Many lesser harms to individuals, groups, or society as a whole, or other issues of 
moral import may also arise from the use and misuse of technology.  Small and 
Jollands (2006) identified three main ways in which humans cause harm via the 
use of technology. These are: accidental, incidental and malevolent.  
Small and Jolland (2006) defined accidental causes as “the harmful effects 
of technology on the environment, humans, and other species of life that are 
unforeseen and arise unexpectedly from the complex and intricately 
interconnected causal network that we call nature” (p. 348). While these are by 
definition unknown at the time, with hindsight problems such as global warming, 
ozone depletion, and species extinction were in this category in the past. 
However, the fact that unexpected, harmful social and moral consequences may 
arise from the application of new technologies, suggests that, an important social 
and moral responsibilities of scientists, and the science community, is to foresight 
possible harmful consequences of new knowledge and technologies under 
development.  
Social responsibility would suggest a precautionary approach where 
harmful possibilities are indicated, and also engagement with the public to inform 
them of the potentials and to participate in dialogue with them regarding the 
appropriate action to take, including legal and regulatory procedures. Thus, we 
could say that scientists have a duty of public care or an obligation to seriously 
consider what the possible negative consequences of new knowledge and 
technology could be. Because foresight lacks the certainty of hindsight, it is 
inevitable that some harmful consequences will only be discovered in hindsight. 
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This fact suggests that ongoing monitoring of the consequences of Promethean 
technologies is also an important social responsibility of science and scientists. 
Incidental causes of technological harm were defined as “those technologies 
whose detrimental effects were known or foreseeable when the technology was 
developed or which were once accidental and of which we have since become 
aware…. we may nonetheless choose to use the technology for various reasons 
anyway” (Small & Jollands, 2006, p. 349). Leaded petrol was used for many years 
despite the known detrimental effects to human health (Green, 2001). Global 
warming is currently in this category – although we have been aware of it for 
three decades, we have, as yet, made no meaningful response.  Social and moral 
responsibility in such cases should involve engagement with the public regarding 
the cost/benefits of the beneficial and harmful effects for the impacted groups in 
society, to enable society to make informed decisions, rather than merely leaving 
it to the vagaries and inequities of market forces.  
Malevolent causes were defined as “the case where we are not only aware 
that the outcomes of a particular use of a technology will be harmful to humans, 
animals or the environment, but we use the technology precisely for this reason” 
(Small & Jollands, 2006, p. 350). Examples include conventional, atomic, 
chemical, and biological weapons. Morally appropriate behaviour on the part of 
scientists would be to refrain from participation in the development of 
technologies whose principle purpose is malevolent and to warn the rest of 
humanity when others are working on such projects.  
These deliberations on the way in which human use of technology can lead 
to harm suggest possible elements of an ethic of social and moral responsibility 
for scientists. These are: a duty of public care, foresighting possible harmful 
consequences, engaging in dialogue and deliberation with the public regarding the 
certainties and uncertainties and potential uses and abuses of Promethean 
technologies, taking a precautionary approach in cases where uncertainty is 
present, maintaining long-term monitoring of Promethean technologies for 
unexpected and unintended consequences, and refraining from participation in 
research which has dubious moral intent (e.g., weapons of mass destruction). An 
important related question is: what do the public think about science, scientists 
and their social and moral role in society? Public attitudes provide us with an 
understanding of the social and moral expectations placed on science and 
scientists. This question is addressed in the next section. 
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Societal concerns regarding science and technology 
The public are also concerned about the impacts of science and technology 
and about scientists‟ moral responsibilities to society. The UK House of Lords 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, in the 2000 report on Science and 
Society, identified a public crisis of confidence in science and technology – 
particularly in areas making rapid advances such as biotechnology and 
information technology (Irwin, 2001). The report emphasised the importance of 
public confidence and trust in science and identified a new mood for dialogue 
suggesting that direct engagement with the public over science-based policy 
should be a normal and integral part of the process rather than merely an optional 
add-on (Irwin, 2001). Calls for public engagement in dialogue about the direction 
of science policy reflect a democratic ideology which is sometimes referred to as 
„democratisation of science‟.   
Confirming the House of Lords assertions, a Guardian/ICM poll indicated 
that scientists had lost the trust of the public, with only one in three believing what 
scientists say. With regard to cutting edge technologies, belief in the assertions of 
scientists was even lower, with only 16% believing scientists regarding the safety 
of GM food and 13% accepting their word regarding cloning (Freedland, 1999). 
Similar public distrust towards the biotech industry itself has also been noted 
(Hill, 1999). The credibility and social authority of science and scientists are 
questioned by the public. Wynne (1980, p. 190) claimed the question that the 
public asks in relation to risk in science and technology is: “Who controls the 
scale, distribution and reversibility of the risk - is it an agent I understand, and 
trust? What is the meaning of the proposed risk and the nature of the alternative 
courses of action?” In a similar vein, Hagendijk (2001), claimed  
Qualitative studies also suggest that the public is not so much risk averse but 
distrustful of scientists and regulators who do not seem to take the concerns 
of citizens seriously and deny uncertainty with respect to new 
biotechnological options that emerge. (Hagendijk, 2001, p. 26) 
Wildavski and Dake (1990) claimed that trust (or lack of it) and the 
perceived credibility (or lack thereof) of institutions was an important factor 
underlying public perceptions of risk and acceptance of new technologies. Trust is 
strongly dependent upon past experience (Lodorfos, Mulvana, & Temperley, 
2006). There have been a number of well-known and spectacular instances of the 
unintended or unforeseen negative effects of science and technology (Tenner, 
1996), irresponsible social actions by corporations (Bowie & Duska, 1990; 
Cavanagh & McGovern, 1988; Donaldson, 1992; Hurt & Robertson, 1998; 
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Michalos, 1995; Tenner, 1996), and unwarranted scientific optimism regarding 
technological developments (Green, 2001; Krier & Gillette, 1985; Tenner, 1996; 
Ticky, 2004).  
For example, in a recent article in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association (JAMA), it was claimed that the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), which is noted for its strict controls on the release of new drugs, 
frequently makes mistakes about the safety of new medications. The authors of 
the article found that, between 1975 and 1999, of the 548 new medications 
approved, fully 20% were later found to have serious or life threatening effects 
and had to be withdrawn from the market. The authors concluded that the safety 
of new products cannot be known with certainty until a drug has been on the 
market for many years (Lasser, et al., 2002). Again, this suggests the need for, and 
value of, ongoing monitoring of the effects of Promethean technologies. 
Thus, caution (if not distrust) on the part of the public regarding new and 
powerful technologies, primarily being developed by multinational corporations, 
may well be the public‟s most rational approach. Nonetheless, because of the 
technological nature of modern risks (Cutter, 1993), Beck (1992) claimed that 
science was the principal social institution trusted as competent to make 
knowledge claims about risk. While trust, or the lack of it, is increasingly being 
seen as an important issue by policy makers, the generally proposed response of 
improved communication strategies misses the main point (Marris, Wynne, 
Simmons, & Weldon, 2002).  
According to Marris et al. (2002), building and maintaining trust requires 
not just public relations strategies, but behavioural changes on the part of 
regulators, scientists and industry. To be trusted they must demonstrate, over 
prolonged periods of time, ethical and social responsibility. This requires 
demonstrating adequate risk management, admitting past errors, admitting 
uncertainty and factoring it into decision-making, being transparent about how 
decisions are made, and punishing irresponsible behaviour by members of their 
ranks (this list from Marris et al. suggests important aspects of the public 
engagement component of scientists‟ social and moral responsibilities). Most 
importantly, it requires demonstrating that the views of the public are understood, 
valued, and are truly taken into account in decision-making, rather than being 
ridiculed, marginalised, or merely paid lip service (Marris, et al., 2002).  
According to a study of the Spanish public, values play an important role in 
policy making and technology policy should be guided by precaution, that is, 
“While the consequences of a new technology are not well known, action has to 
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be guided by caution and the technology‟s use should be controlled in order to 
protect health and the environment” (Lujan & Todt, 2007, p. 106). Three-quarters 
of the sample supported this statement of the precautionary principle while only 
6% rejected it. The study also showed that the Spanish public considered that 
scientists‟ conclusions can be influenced by economic pressures, in particular, the 
interests of research sponsors. The researchers concluded “for future technology 
development and regulation, policy has to respond clearly and unambiguously to 
social demands for precaution…. Current and future European policy initiatives 
will have to respond to such public demands in order to find acceptance and create 
trust” (p. 108). 
Trust in institutions and experts plays an important role in the perception of 
risk and responses to risk communication (Lang, O'Neill, & Hallman, 2003; 
Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2005). Belief in information 
from institutions, regulators and scientists is dependent upon the credibility of, 
and trust in, the source (Drottz-Sjoberg, 2000; Hunt & Frewer, 2001; Lidskog, 
2001; Slovic, 1993). Trust in university and public funded scientists, has been 
found to be higher than trust in industry or privately funded scientists, in some 
studies (e.g., Critchley, 2008). Thus, the increasing commercialisation of science 
(Cohen, Duberley, & McAuley, 1999; Krimsky, 2004; Nowotny, et al., 2003) is 
likely to adversely affect public trust in science. It is claimed that 
commercialisation, and the resulting focus on intellectual property, challenges the 
idea of science as a public good and the open publication of research (Nowotny, et 
al., 2003). Krimsky (2004) claimed that commercialisation of science will result 
in reduced academic freedom, erosion of ethical standards, and that scientists will 
lose their independent status.   
Research indicated that the New Zealand public are reasonably trusting of 
scientists in the abstract (i.e., not in connection with a particular issue). Hipkins, 
Stockwell, Bolstad, and Baker (2002) found that the NZ public expressed greater 
trust in public-sector scientists than in industry scientists (72% and 62% 
respectively rated as quite or very trustworthy). However, by contrast, in a 
random sample of the New Zealand public (N = 1684), Small, Parminter and 
Fisher (2005) found that, regarding information about a particular controversial 
area of science, genetic engineering, 41% either disagreed or strongly disagreed 
that scientists could be trusted. Only 24% agreed or strongly agreed that scientists 
could be trusted on this issue, while a further 34% were either neutral or did not 
know. The disparity between the levels of trust in scientists by the New Zealand 
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public in these two studies suggests that the context or trust issue may affect the 
public‟s willingness to trust experts.  
A survey (N = 1839) of UK public attitudes to science, conducted on behalf 
of The Office of Science and Technology and the Wellcome Trust in 2000, also 
confirmed the public‟s concern about science and technological developments 
(The Office of Science and Technology and The Wellcome Trust, 2000). On the 
positive side, 75% agreed they were „amazed by the achievements of science‟, 
68% agreed that „science and technology are making our lives healthier, easier 
and more comfortable‟, while 84% agreed „scientists and engineers make a 
valuable contribution to society‟.  
However, only 43% agreed that „the benefits of science are greater than the 
harmful effects‟, 17% disagreed with the remainder being undecided. Forty-one 
percent considered that „the speed of development in science and technology 
means that it cannot be properly controlled by Government‟, 36% believed that 
„science is out of control and there is nothing we can do to stop it‟ and 61% 
believed „science is driven by business – at the end of the day it‟s all about 
money.‟ Fifty-six per cent agreed that „scientists seem to be trying new things 
without stopping to think about the risks‟ and 70% of the British public agreed 
that „rules will not stop researchers doing what they want behind closed doors.‟ 
Sixty-nine percent considered that „scientists should listen more to what ordinary 
people think.‟  
Another survey (N = 1001), conducted in 2002 and commissioned by the 
British Royal Society, about public attitudes to science, investigated the science 
issues of most concern to the public (The Royal Society, 2002). Seventy-four 
percent of respondents worried about bioweapons, 70% worried about global 
warming, 60% worried about genetic engineering of food and animals, 53% 
worried about nuclear power, 46% worried about xenotransplantation, 40% 
worried about gene therapy and 28% worried about stem cell research. In this 
study 53% of respondents agreed with the assertion, „the funding of scientific 
research is becoming too commercialised‟ (27% disagreed), and 53% agreed that, 
„I want more influence over the type of scientific research that is done‟ (32% 
disagreed). In response to this MORI survey, Paul Nurse, Nobel laureate and chair 
of the Royal Society‟s Science in Society initiative, is quoted as saying: “Clearly 
there is a need for scientists to explain more clearly to the public how science is 
funded and regulated and for a greater dialogue between scientists and the public” 
(O'Neill, 2002). 
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In March 2002, a National Forum for Science was held at the Royal Society 
in London for the purpose of understanding the decline in public confidence of 
science and to find ways of improving it. The delegates included: scientists, 
politicians, special interest groups, and the general public. Four general themes 
were identified: 
 applied science is uncontrolled and guided by vested interests, „new frontier‟ 
science is inadequately regulated, and the public feel powerless to influence 
science on ethical grounds; 
 the public wants more transparency about scientific information, they believe 
that information is limited to power groups such as scientists, corporates and 
government – none of which they can trust; 
 the media, the chief source of public information, seems to play a confused 
role – oscillating between hype and scaremongering or acting as advocates for 
scientists 
 science education needs to change – both to increase public knowledge and to 
attract more researchers. 
The forum concluded that scientists should be trained in communicating 
with the public, that citizen juries should be set up to give the public more 
influence on government decisions regarding science policy, and that 
organisations such as the Royal Society should provide information about science 
and make the public aware of scientific discoveries (Starling, 2002).  
To sum, although, in general, the public strongly supported science and 
scientists, they had a number of concerns regarding the practice and consequences 
of science. These included concerns about scientists‟ moral behaviour in the 
laboratory and scientists‟ willingness (or lack of) to engage with the public and 
listen to their opinions. The public were concerned about potential harms created 
by science, the directions and governance of science, and the current lack of 
transparency. They were uneasy about the influence of commercialisation on 
science, considering that when science is for profit rather than for public good, 
issues of social and moral responsibility may be neglected.  
The public were keen to have increased engagement with science and 
increased participation in setting the scientific research agenda. The issues that 
concerned the public were issues regarding the wider social and moral 
responsibilities of science and scientists. Social responsibility in research behoves 
scientists to address these public concerns. As yet, there has only been piecemeal 
response from the scientific community and the notion of the social 
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responsibilities of science and scientists remains unclearly defined and has not 
been operationalised (Hackett, 2002; Pimple, 2002; Weil, 2002).  As previously 
noted, one response to some of these public concerns is that governments and 
scientific bodies are suggesting the increased democratisation of science (Irwin, 
2001; Irwin & Wynne, 1996). 
A New Ethical Relationship Between Science and Society 
In the past two decades a number of authors have called for a new ethical 
relationship between science and society with an increased science-society 
interface and greater public participation in science and science governance 
(Cournand, 1977; Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; House of Lords Select Committee 
on Science and Technology, 2000; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Lenk, 1983; Nicholas, 
1999b; Petrinovich, 1999; Ravetz, 2006; Walter & Richards, 1998; Ziman, 1998, 
2001). Prominent scientists have been warning of the dangers of powerful new 
technologies since the 1950s, and urging a precautionary approach to 
technological development and use (Abelson, 1970; Allhoff, 2009; Bradshaw & 
Bekoff, 2001; Commoner, 1966; Costanza, 1989; Dainton, 1971; Joy, 2000; 
Rotblat, 1999; Russell & Einstein, 1955; Sakharov, 1981; Ziman, 2001).  
Science is the pursuit of knowledge about the natural world and the social 
world. Technology is the application of scientific knowledge for the purpose of 
manipulating and controlling the natural and social worlds. Science and 
technology are socially embedded practices. Ethics is the analysis of human 
actions and practices in order to determine their rightness or wrongness, 
particularly in relation to moral principles, duties, obligations, and rights. 
Technology extends the range of possible human actions and practices 
(Heidegger, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008). Therefore, the practice of 
science and technology by scientists and technologists, and their use and 
application by society are open to ethical analysis and evaluation.  
As science penetrates deeper into the mysteries of nature, and the power of 
technology to manipulate and control physical and social reality increases, the 
social and moral consequences of technology become more ubiquitous and far 
reaching throughout space, time and society (Cournand, 1977; Lenk, 1983; 
Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 2005; Small & Jollands, 2006; Ziman, 1998). As a 
consequence, many scholars have argued that the resulting technological 
extension of the scope of the effects of human action warrants an extended ethic 
concerned with the future of humankind, other creatures dependent on human 
power, and the dignity of nature (Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 1983; 
Petrinovich, 1999; Potter, 1971; Small & Jollands, 2006).  
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Scientists, as the discoverers of scientific knowledge and the inventors of 
technology are an essential component of the science society interface. Scholars 
have proposed that as science and technology increase in power, scientists have 
correspondingly increased social responsibility to society, including foresighting 
the possible implications for society and engaging with the public about the 
governance of science and the acceptable applications of scientific knowledge and 
technology (Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2001; Cournand, 1977; Cournand & Meyer, 
1976; Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 1983; Lubchenco, 1998; Rotblat, 1999; Russell & 
Einstein, 1955; Sakharov, 1981; Small & Mallon, 2006; Ziman, 1998). As 
Petronovich  (1999, p. 6) states: “Proactive discussions of the moral implications 
of developing technologies must take place before political, commercial, and legal 
imperatives force society to seek quick moral fixes.” 
Kenneth Pimple (2002) in an effort to provide a comprehensive organising 
scheme for the responsible conduct of research (RCR) claimed that three 
important questions need to be asked regarding the ethics of a research project or 
product: “(A) Is it true? (B) Is it fair? (C) Is it wise? To answer these questions he 
identifies six domains of research ethics: scientific integrity (is it true); 
collegiality, protection of human subjects, animal welfare, and institutional 
integrity (is it fair?) and social responsibility (is it wise?). Pimple notes that the 
Core Instructional Areas identified by the U.S. Public Health Service do not 
address the question of scientists‟ responsibilities to the larger society (i.e., is it 
wise?). Along with others (e.g., Cournand, 1977; Hackett, 2002; Prpic, 1998; 
Weil, 2002; Ziman, 1998), he noted that this issue has received far less attention 
than ethical issues internal to the practice of science.  
Pimple (2002), considering the reasons for this “disturbing gap” (p. 198) 
claimed: “there is no consensus on the social responsibility of science or scientists 
(aside from those considerations covered by the other five domains, such as basic 
competence and truthfulness)” (p. 198). He observed that addressing social 
responsibility is complicated by the fact that while the other five domains “focus 
on what an individual scientist can do….no scientist is responsible for setting the 
research agenda for the nation or the world” (p. 198). Nonetheless, he pointed out 
that while “no one scientist can bear the burden alone, it is true that each scientist 
has an obligation to carry some part of the burden…. clearly science as an 
institution and scientists as a group do have such a moral obligation” (p. 198).  
The aim of the current work is to shed some light on this under researched 
area and address Pimple‟s “disturbing gap.” This is done by examining scientists‟ 
attitudes, values and beliefs about the nature of the science community‟s social 
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and moral responsibilities to society, and scientists‟ personal social and moral 
responsibilities regarding technological development and application by society. 
Additionally, the related STS studies constructs of scientists‟ attitudes to the 
commercialisation of science, their attitudes to the democratisation of science and 
their belief in technological optimism are examined in the current work.  
Empirical Ethics and Post-Normal Science 
The original empirical work reported in this thesis is a mixed method study 
(Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007), that is, it involves both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods (i.e., Qual-Quant – data from the qualitative 
research, conducted first, while independently meaningful, also provides an input 
into the quantitative research). The current work also borders an area of ethics 
research known as empirical ethics (Borry, Schotsmans, & Dierickx, 2005). 
Empirical ethics is a recent development in ethics arising primarily from the 
medical and bioethics fields. The aim of empirical ethics is to use both descriptive 
and normative approaches to analyse ethical issues, thus adding context sensitivity 
to the analysis of ethical issues (Musschenga, 2005; van der Scheer & 
Widdershoven, 2004).  
In order to do empirical ethics, methodologies from the social sciences such 
as qualitative and quantitative research techniques are used to provide 
scientifically robust descriptive knowledge of the ethical beliefs of a range of 
interested stakeholders, which, in combination with analytical moral theory, 
contributes to a normative ethical analysis (Molewijk, Stiggelbout, Otten, Dupuis, 
& Kievit, 2004; Small, 2007b; van der Scheer & Widdershoven, 2004). 
Empirical ethics is one tool that may be used to understand and enhance the 
science-technology/society interface. It may also be regarded as a science based 
technique (i.e., an appropriate technology) that may assist with the 
implementation of Post-Normal Science through the scientific exploration of 
public attitudes, beliefs and values regarding issues of contention. Post-Normal 
Science refers to a methodology that involves the inclusion of an extended peer 
community to engage in dialogue regarding decisions to be made on science 
issues in which the facts are uncertain, values are in dispute, the stakes are high 
and decisions urgent (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Gallopín, Funtowicz, O'Connor, 
& Ravetz, 2001; Ravetz, 2006). The five identified crises facing Gaia belong to 
this category. 
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Research Objectives and Studies Conducted  
In the current work two original studies were conducted. The first is a 
qualitative exploration of the attitudes, values and beliefs of 22 New Zealand 
scientists regarding their social responsibility in research and the moral role of 
science in society. While the primary focus was on the construct of social 
responsibility in research, because two thirds of participants were genetic 
engineers, and the the other had conducted research examining the impacts of 
genetic engineering through their own disciplinary lens, the issue of social 
responsibility regarding gene technology was a secondary, specific technological 
focus. The objectives of Study 1 were: 
Objective 1a)  To ascertain what scientists understand as being their 
wider social and moral responsibilities to society in research and technological 
development (i.e., to map the domain of scientific social responsibility from the 
perspective of the scientist) and to explicate the moral reasoning processes 
scientists use to determine and navigate these responsibilities. Gene technologies 
provided a focus for examples and discussion.  
Objective 1b) To obtain information to propose items for the 
development of new instruments to measure scientists’ attitudes to social 
responsibility in research (the instruments will be refined and further developed 
in Study 2). The first social responsibility instrument measures scientists’ 
awareness of the moral role and responsibilities of the institution of science to 
society (moral awareness). The second social responsibility instrument measures 
scientists’ attitudes to their personal social responsibilities to society when 
conducting scientific research (moral judgment). Additionally, information for 
items for the development of two other new instruments, to measure the related 
constructs of attitudes to the democratisation and commercialisation of science, 
was also sought. These instruments formed part of a nomological network 
designed to help infer their construct validity. 
Objective 1a is intended to address the nature (domain) of scientists‟ social 
responsibilities, about which Pimple (2002) claimed there was no consensus. 
Some data from Study 1 have been previously published at academic conferences 
(Small, 2008, 2009; Small & Mallon, 2004), and in a peer reviewed journal 
(Small & Mallon, 2006). The focus of Small and Mallon‟s (2004, 2006) work was 
on commercialisation of science, democratisation of science and public trust in 
science. The focus of Small‟s (2008, 2009) work was on the responsibility of 
science to society and scientists‟ social responsibility. 
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The second original study is a quantitative survey of New Zealand 
scientists‟ (N = 733) attitudes, values and beliefs regarding personal moral 
responsibility and the ethical responsibilities of the science community with 
particular reference to the Promethean technology of gene science. Study 2 
examined the scale items proposed in Study 1 and tested the psychometric 
properties of the two new instrument developed to measure scientists‟ attitudes to 
social responsibility in research, and the new instruments to measure the related 
constructs of scientists‟ attitudes to the democratisation of science, and the 
commercialisation of science. A fifth new instrument, designed to measure 
scientists‟ degree of technological optimism and also be part of the nomological 
network, and was developed in Study 2 with items derived from academic 
literature. Study 2 included testing hypothesised relationships between these five 
related constructs, Schwartz‟s (1992) four higher-order value dimensions, and  
general attitudes to genetic engineering (Small, et al., 2005). These ten constructs 
formed a nomological network and a partial theory of scientific social 
responsibility. 
The primary objectives of Study 2 were: 
Objective 2a) To refine and develop the proposed items into 
psychometrically robust research instruments and use them to measure: 
scientists’ attitudes to social responsibility in the practice of scientific research 
and technological development, and scientists’ attitudes to constructs that are 
hypothesised to be related to these attitudes as antecedent variables (i.e., personal 
value orientation and technological optimism) and as consequent variables 
(attitude to the democratisation of science, and attitude to the commercialisation 
of science). 
Objective 2b) To test the construct validity of the new instruments by 
embedding them in a nomological network of hypothesised relationships between 
the various constructs and testing these hypotheses.  
The survey also measured scientists‟ general moral attitude towards a 
particular set of Promethean technologies, genetic engineering (GE) - a subset of 
gene technologies. An instrument developed by Small et al. (2005) was used for 
this purpose. This instrument is used as a concurrent criterion in the nomological 
network. At the same time as the scientists‟ survey was conducted, a survey of the 
New Zealand public measured their general moral attitude to GE using the same 
instrument (Small, 2005a). Thus, the second study also briefly compares New 
Zealand scientists‟ moral attitudes to GE with those of the New Zealand public. 
The secondary objectives of Study 2 were: 
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Objective 2c) To measure and explicate New Zealand scientists’ moral 
attitude to GE and its relationship to their attitude to social responsibility. 
Objective 2d) To compare moral attitudes to GE between the New Zealand 
public and New Zealand scientists.   
The following schematic, Figure 1.1, gives an overview of the primary 
research constructs and their hypothesised antecedent and consequent 
relationships. Specific hypotheses comprising the nomological network, along 
with their rationales are proposed in later chapters. Some data from the Study 2 
survey have been previously published at academic conferences (Small, 2005b, 
2006, 2007a; Small & Botha, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Social responsibility in scientific research: antecedent and 
consequent variables studied in this thesis. 
Thesis Overview 
This is a thesis conducted in the interdisciplinary field of Science, 
Technology and Society Studies (STS). It has philosophical, psychological and 
empirical ethics components.  Chapter 1, through a discussion of some potential 
social and ecological crises arising from human use of technology, has argued a 
need for an extended ethic regarding the development of Promethean 
technologies. Evidence of public concern regarding the moral consequences of 
science and technology has also been presented. Environmental impacts and 
social justice were identified as primary areas of social and moral concern for 
responsible science. The original empirical research to be presented in the current 
work has been briefly outlined above. Below is a chapter-by-chapter overview of 
the thesis.  
Technological Optimism 
 
Schwartz higher-order values 
Values 
Attitude to Scientific Social 
Responsibility  
 
Democratisation of Science 
 
Commercialisation of Science 
  
General moral attitude to genetic engineering 
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Chapter 2 provides an overview of the potential of one Promethean science: 
gene technology. This chapter considers some of the technologies and 
applications that are currently emerging from modern gene science, touching on 
some of the ethical issues that are raised, and indicating the vast potential gene 
technology has for social and moral impacts on society. This reinforces the need, 
established in Chapter 1, for an extended ethic of social and moral responsibility 
for scientists, and provides background knowledge for Studies 1 and 2, which 
include investigation of scientists‟ attitudes to gene science and genetic 
engineering. 
Chapter 3 presents a literature overview of philosophical theories relevant to 
the examination of social responsibility including normative moral theories, meta-
ethical theories, and relevant applied ethics fields, such as environmental ethics, 
bioethics and technoethics. Next, some concepts necessary to the understanding of 
social responsibility in an age of Promethean technologies are explicated. These 
are: existential risk, the precautionary principle and, technological optimism. 
Then, psychological theories of ethical behaviour, with a particular focus on 
cognitive moral development and personal value orientation are discussed. In 
particular, Kohlberg (1969) and Rest‟s (1979, 1986) theories of moral 
development and behaviour, and Schwartz‟s (1992) theory of the structure of 
human values, are reviewed and the relationship of the four higher-order value 
dimensions to scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility in research is examined. 
Fifteen experimental hypotheses forming part of the nomological network are 
proposed in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature regarding 
scientists‟ social responsibilities in research and technological development. First, 
the perspectives of some eminent physicists, physicians and ecologists regarding 
the need for an extended ethic of social responsibility for scientists are surveyed, 
and the historical „code of scientists‟ reviewed. Then, the few empirical studies 
investigating scientists‟ attitudes to their wider social responsibilities are 
reviewed. A further fifteen experimental hypotheses forming part of the 
nomological network are proposed in Chapter 4.  
Chapter 5 considers some methodological issues regarding the development 
of the new instruments, the concept of nomological networks and their use in the 
construct validation of psychometric instruments and related theory is explicated. 
Next, an additional nine hypotheses which describe the relationships between the 
five new research instruments, the four higher-order Schwartz value dimensions, 
and the concurrent criterion, general attitude to genetic engineering, are proposed. 
 25 
 
This gives a total of 39 hypotheses which comprise and complete the relationships 
in the nomological network. Then, the research model is visually explicated 
through a series of diagrams showing the relationships between the various 
research constructs. Finally, some philosophical, methodological and reporting 
issues relevant to mixed methods research are discussed, with a primary focus on 
qualitative research. 
Chapter 6 is Study 1, the qualitative investigation of scientists‟ beliefs about 
the social and moral role of science and scientists in scientific research and 
technological development. This study involved in-depth interviews with 22 New 
Zealand scientists and provides rich descriptions of their beliefs, their concerns 
and conflicting insights about social responsibility and some aspects of gene 
technology. Thematic analysis is used to develop a framework for the domain of 
scientific social responsibility. Study 1 also examines the participating scientists‟ 
moral reasoning processes about social responsibility and aspects of gene 
technology. Extensive quotes are employed to tell the story in their own words 
and, where applicable, due to the high functioning intellect of the participants, to 
analyse their own perceptions and some of their conflicting attitudes, values and 
beliefs.  
 Chapter 7 is Study 2, the quantitative study of scientists‟ attitudes to social 
responsibility in research and the related constructs of personal values, 
technological optimism, commercialisation of science, democratisation of science, 
and attitudes to genetic engineering. In this chapter five new instruments are 
developed and their psychometric properties analysed: first exploratory factor 
analysis was used to select instrument items and then confirmatory factor analysis 
was used to refine item selection and test scale dimensionality. In the final stage 
of instrument development, reliability analyses were conducted. Next, the 
attitudes, beliefs and values of scientists regarding social responsibility, 
technological optimism, commercialisation of science, and democratisation of 
science, as measured by the new instruments, are briefly explicated. Additionally, 
their attitude to GE was examined and compared with the attitude of the New 
Zealand public. 
Chapter 8 draws conclusions, notes study strengths and limitations, and 
suggests areas for further research. To conclude the Introduction, an extensive 
passage from Jane Lubchenco‟s 1997 Presidential Address to the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), is quoted. This passage 
from Lubchenco eloquently and authoritatively summarises the rationale for the 
current research. 
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I see the need for a different
 
perspective on how the sciences can and should 
advance and also
 
return benefit to society. This different perspective is 
firmly
 
embedded in the knowledge of specific, identifiable changes 
occurring
 
in the natural and social worlds around us. These changes are
 
so 
vast, so pervasive, and so important that they require our
 
immediate 
attention…. 
[W]e now live on a human-dominated planet. The growth of the 
human population and the growth in amount of resources used are altering 
Earth in unprecedented ways….The resulting changes [to the natural world] 
are relatively well documented but not generally appreciated in their totality, 
magnitude, or implications….  
We are modifying physical, chemical, and biological systems in
 
new 
ways, at faster rates, and over larger spatial scales than
 
ever recorded on 
Earth. Humans have unwittingly embarked upon
 
a grand experiment with 
our planet. The outcome of this experiment
 
is unknown, but has profound 
implications for all of life on Earth….  
The challenges
 
for society are formidable and will require substantial 
information,
 
knowledge, wisdom, and energy from the scientific 
community. Business
 
as usual will not suffice…. Although these services 
[ecosystem services] are essential to human societies, their continued 
existence has been taken for granted. Never before
 
have human actions so 
threatened their provision….  
Science is the pursuit of knowledge about how the world works, a 
pursuit with an established process for inquiry, logic, and
 
validation. 
Scientists engage in science because we are curious
 
about why things are the 
way they are, we relish the fun and challenges
 
of problem-solving, and we 
wish to contribute something useful
 
to current and future generations. 
Society supports science because
 
doing so in the past has brought benefits 
and doing so now is
 
expected to provide more. Traditional roles of science 
have been
 
to discover, communicate, apply knowledge, and to train the next
 
generation of scientists…. 
A different application of scientific knowledge is emerging
 
as equally 
important in today's world: knowledge to inform policy
 
and management 
decisions…. Many of the choices facing society are moral and ethical ones, 
and scientific information can inform
 
them. Science does not provide the 
solutions, but it can help
 
understand the consequences of different 
choices….  
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It is time for the scientific community to take responsibility
 
for the 
contributions required to address the environmental and
 
social problems 
before us, problems that, with the best intentions
 
in the world, we have 
nonetheless helped to create. It is time
 
for a re-examination of the agendas 
and definitions of the "grand
 
problems" in various scientific disciplines.
  
We can no longer afford to have the environment be accorded 
marginal status on our agendas. The environment is not a marginal
 
issue, it 
is the issue of the future, and the future is
 
here now. On behalf of the Board 
of AAAS, I invite you to participate
 
vigorously in exploring the relationship 
between science and society
 
and in considering a new Social Contract for 
Science as we enter
 
the Century of the Environment.
 
 (Lubchenco, 1998, pp. 
491-497)
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Chapter 2 – Gene Science: A Promethean Technology 
Our knowledge and ability to control biological processes, of our own and 
other species, has increased dramatically in the past 100 years. Knowledge and 
technologies from physics and chemistry provided the tools to investigate 
biological processes at a molecular and atomic level. Evolutionary theory, 
Mendel‟s laws of inheritance, the discovery of DNA, the mapping of the human 
genome, genetic engineering, gene therapy, genetic enhancement, cloning, stem 
cell therapies, epigenetics, synthetic biology and life extension research, offer 
powerful new insights into the nature of life, and the development of technologies 
to manipulate living organisms.  
Although genetic technologies are here considered as the prime example of 
a Promethean technology, it is only one of a set of similarly powerful technologies 
with potential for significant physical, ecological, social and moral impacts on 
Gaia. Some of these technologies will enable us to change not only the world but 
also our own nature; they are heralded as issuing in the age of transhumanism and 
the rise of the posthuman (Kurzweil, 1999; Vinge, 1993; Warwick, n.d.). Bostrom 
(2003, What is Transhumanism? Para. 1) defined transhumanism as “The 
intellectual and cultural movement that affirms the possibility and desirability of 
fundamentally improving the human condition through applied reason, especially 
by developing and making widely available technologies to eliminate aging and to 
greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities.”  
The Human Genome Project 
The first draft of the human genome (90% complete) was published in 2001 
and the full sequence completed and published in 2003. The Human Genome 
Project (HGP) achieved three major goals. First, it sequenced the order of all the 
2.9 billion base pairs in the genome. Second, it developed maps locating genes for 
major sections of all our chromosomes. Third, it produced „linkage maps‟ 
enabling inherited traits to be tracked over generations. Francis Collins, the 
director of the HGP described the results and meaning of the project: 
It's a history book - a narrative of the journey of our species through time. 
It's a shop manual, with an incredibly detailed blueprint for building every 
human cell. And it's a transformative textbook of medicine, with insights 
that will give health care providers immense new powers to treat, prevent 
and cure disease. (Cited by National Human Genome Research Institute, 
2009, para. 6)  
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It took ten years and cost more than $US1 billion to sequence the first 
human genome. The project was expected to take much longer. However, the 
development of new technologies enabled its early completion. Since the project 
first began in 1993 the science and technology to sequence genomes has 
undergone exponential development (Margulies, et al., 2005). Recently, a 
Californian company, Complete Genomics, sequenced another human genome for 
$US1,700 in less than a week (Fox, 2009). Sequencing the genome only marks a 
beginning – it will take many decades (and massive computer power) to 
understand how the approximately 20,500 genes in the human genome (National 
Human Genome Research Institute, 2009) interact with one another to produce 
over two hundred thousand different proteins (Gribbin, 2002).  
It is important to note that a great deal is still not understood about how the 
genome actually works. For example, contrary to the last hundred years of 
scientific belief, it has recently been shown that Mendel‟s Laws, while 
fundamentally correct, are not absolute and exceptions occur (Lolle, Victor, 
Young, & Pruitt, 2005). The concept of inherited acquired characteristics was, for 
a long time, considered biological and scientific heresy, but the new science of 
epigenetics provides evidence of a Lamarkian mechanism for the inheritance of 
phenotypic characteristics (Jablonka & Raz, 2009). A dozen years ago molecular 
biologists designated long stretches of organisms‟ genomes as „junk DNA‟ 
claiming that these non-coding segments served no purpose. Recent research has 
shown important roles for „junk DNA‟ (Nowacki, et al., 2009), demonstrating the 
hubris of this assumption.  It now appears that „junk DNA‟ plays a vital role in 
evolution (in particular enabling the fast genetic adaptation to changing 
environmental circumstances) and it will be crucial for the refining of GE 
techniques and for gene therapy (Feng, Naiman, & Cooper, 2009; Vinces, 
Legendre, Caldara, Hagihara, & Verstrepen, 2009). New evidence also suggests 
that the recombinant DNA repeats (rDNA), previously thought of as „junk DNA‟ 
are essential for repairing the damage caused by factors such as UV light (Ide, 
Miyazaki, Maki, & Kobayashi, 2010). 
Individual genomic sequencing could soon become a routine part of medical 
care as the technology becomes faster and cheaper. Genomic sequencing will 
eventually be a useful tool for medical diagnosis, prognosis and pharmacological 
prescription.  Pharmacogenomics is a new science at the intersection of 
pharmaceuticals and genomics which studies the interaction between individual 
genetics and the body‟s reaction to drugs. In the future, drugs could be tailored to 
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individual needs based upon a person‟s own genetic makeup (Human Genome 
Project Information, 2008).  
Ethical issues around individual genomic sequencing include privacy of the 
sequenced individual‟s data, adequacy of consent, stereotyping and stigmatisation, 
inclusion and differential benefits, and cultural and community-specific concerns 
(Foster & Sharp, 2006). Concerns exist regarding ownership of the genome and 
the question of who may have access to the information and what use they may 
make of it. For example, if potential employers or insurance companies have 
access to the data, employment opportunities may be denied and insurance cover 
rejected, if the genomic information indicates a predisposition to debilitating or 
deadly conditions such as cancer, Parkinson‟s disease etc. (Robertson, 2003). 
Another important issue with implications for the practice of science, the 
dissemination of scientific knowledge, and for medical practice, is the question of 
patenting genes and gene sequences (Schacht, 2006). Many companies that have 
discovered the function of a particular gene have lodged patent applications over 
the genes (Ho, 2000). In the year 2000, over 6000 gene patents had been granted 
with over 1000 of these specifically related to human genes and more than 20,000 
gene patents were pending at that time (Grisham, 2000).  
While commercial biotech companies are strongly in favour of being able to 
patent genes, claiming that it is necessary in order to fund research and innovation 
(Schacht, 2006), many scientists and scientific bodies are opposed.  Some in the 
research community claims that patenting slows the progress of science by 
restricting open access and use of the genes in further research (Andrews, 2002; 
Small & Mallon, 2006). Physicians and patients also claim that patenting of genes 
restricts patients‟ access to medical care (Leonard, 2002; Wadman, 2010). Others 
are strongly opposed to patenting genes on the principle that „no one should be 
able to patent life‟ and that genes are products of nature and are merely discovered 
by humans and, therefore, should not be patentable (Ho, 2000; Wadman, 2010). 
Some object that the „patenting of life‟ “turns organisms, including human parts, 
into saleable commodities” (Ho, 2000, p. 30). The topic of gene patenting remains 
controversial and undecided from a legal perspective (Wadman, 2010). The 
patenting of genes will continue to pose legal, social, moral and economic issues 
for some time to come. 
Fertility   
Technology is helping us control the fertility of our own and other species. 
On one hand, 20th Century contraceptive technologies enabled infertility when 
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desired, on the other, technologies such as in vitro fertilisation (IVF) help the 
infertile reproduce. Artificial insemination is common practice in agriculture as 
are other technologies for the manipulation of reproduction. Amongst humans, 
egg harvesting and womb rental for surrogacy are becoming more common and 
generating a host of social and ethical questions (Waldby, 2009). Perhaps one day 
it will be possible for an embryo to be conceived and grown to full term entirely 
outside of a female body. 
Opening up further new reproductive vistas, researchers have shown that it 
is possible to produce viable and fertile bi-maternal mice – that is, mice which 
share the genes of two mothers – with no paternal input (Kawahara, et al., 2007). 
Bi-maternal mice are smaller, lighter in weight, have a stronger immune system 
and live up to a third longer than male/female mice offspring (Kawahara & Kono, 
2009). In the future, this technology applied to humans could make males 
redundant, and the resulting humans may be genetically superior. 
Gene Technologies  
Genetic engineering  
The breeding of promising individuals over generations in order to create 
desirable phenotypic characteristics in plants and animals has long been practiced 
in horticulture and animal husbandry. This is a relatively slow process with 
progressive changes made over many generations, not by nature or natural 
selection, but by human intervention in the evolutionary progress of the species. 
Racehorses, dogs and the staple grains are prime examples of centuries and even 
millennia of breeding to slowly bend nature to the aesthetic tastes and teleological 
desires of humans (Silver, 1998). 
With the discovery of recombinant DNA technology, humans have gained 
the power to make changes to an organism‟s genome in a single generation. 
Genetic engineering (GE) involves the chemical addition or deletion of a specific 
gene from an organism‟s genome in order to bring about a desired change in the 
organism‟s phenotype. With this process, organisms can have current 
characteristics enhanced or removed and even entirely new characteristics, not 
naturally evident in the organism‟s species, added. Thus, a gene from one species 
(or a synthetic analogue of the gene) may be spliced into the genome of the same 
or a different species, or even an organism from a different biological kingdom, 
giving the new GE organism phenotypic characteristics from the donor species 
(Silver, 1998; Small, 2004a, 2004b). 
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In this way GE can create organisms with desired attributes much more 
quickly than through traditional breeding (i.e. in a single generation). This 
amounts to a speeding up of evolution in a direction decided by humans. This also 
differs from normal evolution, and animal and plant husbandry, in that the new 
organism does not co-evolve over time with the other organisms in its 
environment. Another difference between GE and selective breeding is that 
organisms can be created that could not possibly have come about naturally, as 
organisms generally cannot breed with others from different species or kingdoms.  
Proponents see great hope for the common good of humanity in GE 
technology, and often claim that the technology will be needed to produce enough 
food to feed the future world population (Borlaug, 1997; Fedoroff, et al., 2010; 
Ortiz, 1998).  A recent report by the British Royal Society claimed that the world 
needs genetically engineered crops to minimise environmental impacts and 
increase food yields to meet the challenge of feeding another 2.3 billion people by 
2050 (The Royal Society, 2009). Another recent article in the journal Science, 
makes similar claims (Fedoroff, et al., 2010). Noting that many important crops 
have sharp declines in production (20-30%) once the temperature exceeds 30 
degrees Celsius, they claimed global warming will drastically reduce production 
in tropical and sub-tropical zones by the mid-21st Century causing food scarcity.  
Both groups of scientists believed a radical rethink of agriculture is required 
to develop crops that are heat, salt and drought tolerant and that do not need the 
current high levels of chemicals and fertilisers. Genetic engineering is their 
preferred radical strategy. They claimed GE will be necessary in order to produce 
crops at current production levels, let alone the production levels required for an 
increasing population by 2050 (Fedoroff, et al., 2010; The Royal Society, 2009). 
Given the likelihood of significant future temperature increases, water shortages, 
salinity and degraded soil conditions in many of the world‟s major growing 
regions (Brown, 2008), genetic engineering appeals to these advocates as an 
appropriate research strategy to enable continued production of major crops in 
changing environments.  
Advocates of GE claim that the technology is safe. In 2008, GE crops were 
grown on 300 million acres worldwide. It is claimed that GE crops have been 
consumed for over 13 years without any incident (Fedoroff, et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, production has increased and so have farmers‟ profits, while 
pesticide and herbicide use has been reduced and the use of no-till method of 
agriculture (helpful for reducing soil erosion) increased (Fedoroff, et al., 2010).  
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GE may also be able to increase the effectiveness of plants to extract 
necessary minerals for growth (such as nitrogen and phosphorus) enabling them to 
be grown on poorer quality soils using less fertiliser (West, 2010). One concern 
associated with these types of changes is that these alterations improve the fitness 
of plants, and if these new super-fit traits were to spread to weedy relatives, 
through horizontal gene transfer, super-weeds could also result.  
Another beneficial potential of GE is the enhancement of nutritional 
qualities of crops.  For example, the much heralded golden rice is engineered to 
contain extra beta-carotene which converts to vitamin A when consumed by 
humans; many people in developing countries, where rice is the primary staple, 
suffer from vitamin A deficiency (Tang, Qin, Dolnikowski, Russell, & Grusak, 
2009). Foods with genetically enhanced health qualities or with healthy additives 
are referred to as functional foods and the science of developing them and 
studying the relationship between food plant genes, health and the individual 
human genome is called nutrigenomics.  
Currently GE is being used to engineer micro-organisms and bacteria 
(particularly for the production of medicines such as insulin, factor 9 clotting 
agent, human growth hormone, etc.), plants and animals for both food production 
and the production of medicines (Small, 2004b). An example of a potential GE 
food animal is the „eco-friendly‟ GE pig, engineered to contain bacteria which 
help pigs remove phosphate from their food, thus stopping it from passing through 
into the environment where it causes harm to life in streams and rivers (Golovan, 
et al., 2001). Pigs have also been genetically engineered, for medical purposes, to 
contain human genes so that their organs will not provoke such a strong immune 
system rejection when used for xenotransplantation - the replacement of failing 
human organs with those from animals (White, Langford, Cozzi, & Young, 1995). 
Genetic engineering for medical purposes is considerably more acceptable 
to the general public than GE of food crops (Frewer & Shepherd, 1995; Hamstra 
& Smink, 1996; Small, et al., 2005). „Farmaceuticals‟ is the term given to 
medicines produced by GE plants or animals. It is hoped that numerous medicines 
will be able to be grown in plants and/or animals and refined more cheaply than 
through current techniques (Giddings, Allison, Brooks, & Carter, 2000). A 
biotech company, SemBioSys, has submitted an Investigational New Drug 
application for safflower-produced recombinant human insulin to the U.S. FDA 
(SemBioSys, 2008). Phase I and II clinical were initiated in December 2008. 
Edible vaccines (e.g., potatoes, tomatoes, bananas etc) are being developed for a 
range of diseases (e.g., cholera, measles, malaria, hepatitis B, type 1 diabetes etc) 
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and are proposed as a logistically simpler resolution of the problem of getting 
vaccines to those in need in developing countries (Chowdhury & Bagasra, 2007; 
Levi, 2000).   
In New Zealand, AgResearch Ltd has created GE cows containing a 
synthetic copy of the human myelin basic protein gene (hMBP). The aim of this 
research was the production of hMBP in the cows‟ milk in order to produce a 
reagent for research into the treatment of multiple sclerosis (Fisher, Small, Roth, 
Mallon, & Jerebine, 2005; Small & Fisher, 2005). Silk worms have also been 
genetically engineered so that they produce a form of the human protein collagen 
which scientists hope to harvest for applications such as artificial skin and wound 
dressings (Tomita, et al., 2003).  
The industrial sector also contains many potential applications for GE 
technology in terms of new methods of producing currently available materials, 
new materials with desirable qualities, and the production of chemicals and 
biofuels. For example, spider silk is stronger than steel and as resilient as kevlar, 
but it is very expensive to produce. Scientist have placed artificial versions of silk 
genes in various plants (potatoes, tobacco) and animals (goats) and, using this 
technology, hope to be able to mass produce silk protein for the development of 
new biodegradable „super-materials‟ (Scheller, Guhrs, Grosse, & Conrad, 2001). 
Gene-engineered viruses have even been used to help manufacture a „green‟ 
battery which the authors claim is capable of powering an iPod for three times as 
long as current iPod batteries (Lee, et al., 2009). 
While GE technology offers the potential to alleviate some current threats to 
humanity, critical commentators express ethical concerns about potential negative 
consequences of the practice of GE: the potential to develop dangerous organisms, 
the impossibility of reversibility once such organisms are lose in the environment, 
and the potential for negative impacts on humans, other animals and the 
environment (Antoniou, 1996; Fox, 1999; Ho, 2000; Rifkin, 1998; Straughan, 
1995b). Others criticise the technology from a deontological moral perspective; 
creating life is the province of „God‟ or nature – human attempts to usurp the role 
of God or nature are seen as committing acts of hubris – against God or nature 
(Appleby, 1999; Straughan, 1995a). 
Of particular concern to some is the possibility of human-animal chimeras 
(Robert & Baylis, 2003). They imagined a fusion between a chimp and a human. 
Robert and Baylis suggested that there might be confusion over the status of such 
a creature and that it might lead to social disorder. Savulescu (2003), on the other 
hand, argued that there might be good reasons to create human chimeras. He 
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suggested medical reasons (e.g., to confer resistance to specific diseases such as 
AIDS), to delay aging, or to enhance human capabilities (e.g., he suggests, 
elephant genes to improve memory, owl genes to enhance night vision or bat 
genes for the sense of sonar). Clearly, a range of ethical questions are opened by 
the creation of chimeras and, undoubtedly, there will be a range of different 
responses to these questions. 
Gene therapy  
It may be possible to treat human genetic disorders through GE and a related 
technology, gene therapy. GE is conducted on eggs or embryos whereas gene 
therapy is a technique that may be used to change the genome (germ-line cells i.e., 
eggs or sperm) or the somatic cells of particular organs (in vitro or in vivo) of a 
developing or already developed organism. Changes made to somatic cells using 
gene therapy are not inherited by the organism‟s descendants (Gene Therapy Net, 
2010). Gene therapy modifications, when conducted on germ-line cells, are 
inherited by the organism‟s descendants. Gene therapy uses a vector (most usually 
a disabled virus) to „infect‟ target cells with the desired gene. Genetic engineering 
has successfully produced germ-line changes in marmoset monkeys – that is, the 
genetic change was inherited by the organism‟s descendants (Sasaki, et al., 2009). 
Using such techniques hereditary diseases could be cured and eliminated from the 
germ-line and the disease potentially eliminated from a species (Gene Therapy 
Net, 2010). 
Gene therapy was successfully used to give colour vision to naturally 
colour-blind monkeys (Mancuso, et al., 2009), thus suggesting similar correction 
or enhancements to human senses using gene therapy may be possible. Gene 
therapy succeeded in curing, amongst other things, cases of „bubble boy 
syndrome‟, a progressive degenerative disease of vision called Leber congenital 
amaurosis, and a cancer of the blood called EBV lymphoma (Neimark, 2009).  
The gene therapy drug ProSavin has been found effective for treating a monkey 
analogue of Parkinson‟s disease and is currently being trialled with human 
subjects (Jarraya, et al., 2009).  
Some advocates believe gene therapy or GE might help cure a number of 
deadly hereditary diseases including cystic fibrosis, haemophilia, Tay-Sachs, 
muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis and diabetes. Gene therapy may also be 
used to activate the immune system against infectious diseases and cancers and to 
trick the body into growing new tissue to heal wounds, repair injured hearts and 
rejuvenate arthritic joints (Neimark, 2009).  
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Genetic enhancement  
Beside therapeutic GE there is also the possibility of using GE to enhance 
humans. Naturally occurring doubled muscled cattle (e.g., Belgium Blue) have 
20% extra muscle mass. This is known to be caused by a mutation on bovine 
MSTN, the myostatin coding gene (Grobet, et al., 1997). Scientists have been able 
to create double muscled GE myostatin knockout mice (McPherron, Lawler, & 
Lee, 1997). These mice have muscles 2-3 times heavier than normal mice.  While 
extremely rare in humans, at least two children are known to have this mutation 
naturally, exhibiting exceptional strength and speed (Associated Press, 2007; 
Schuelke, et al., 2004). This suggests a gene target for super-athletes and perhaps 
super-soldiers.  
Several genes have been discovered in mice which, when manipulated by 
GE, improve brain performance by stimulating nerve fibre growth, enhancing 
problem solving and memory (Routtenberg, Cantallops, Zaffuto, Serrano, & 
Namgung, 2000). Between 40-80% of variation in human intelligence is believed 
attributable to genetic factors. A genome-wide scan, involving 634 sibling pairs, 
identified two chromosomal regions (on chromosomes 2 and 6) that explain 
variation in IQ (Posthuma, et al., 2005). These genes, and the proteins they code 
for, offer clues to increasing the intellectual potential of humans or ameliorating 
the effects of diseases such as Parkinson‟s, Alzheimer‟s, autism and dyslexia.  
While considerable moral debate is associated with therapeutic GE (i.e., 
curing disease), enhancement gene technologies create even greater moral concern 
for most people. Approximately 80% of New Zealand public and a similar 
percentage of New Zealand scientists either disagreed or strongly disagreed that it 
is acceptable to genetically engineer humans in order to enhance human 
capabilities (Small, 2006). However, some ethicists argue that, if we can enhance 
humans in ways that promote human wellbeing, then we have a moral obligation 
to do so (Savulescu, 2005). Savulescu (2005) cites gene therapy experiments that 
turned lazy monkeys into workaholics and promiscuous rodents into monogamous 
ones.  
Clearly there may be debate about what counts as an enhancement, and the 
line between therapy and enhancement is easy to blur. Another concern regarding 
enhancement is: who gets it? Those who can afford it? If so, does this mean the 
wealthy will become a new and different type of human from the poor, thus 
enhancing human inequality at the genetic level? Will we evolve (under human 
direction) into multiple separate species, unable to breed with each other? Given 
the tensions that exist between races, what kind of tensions might exist between 
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separate species descended from Homo sapiens? Clearly, a range of legal, ethical 
and social issues confront genetic enhancement.  
Given the historical disregard of molecular biologists for “junk DNA” and 
our current lack of understanding of how genes interact with one another to form a 
multitude of proteins, expert assessments of the nature of genetic enhancement 
might also be deluded. Human efforts to „improve humanity‟ may well do more 
damage to our species than good. Of course, future knowledge may palliate or 
even eliminate the threat of lack of knowledge. However, completely 
understanding the human genome may take some time yet – with approximately 
2.9 billion „letters‟ the possible combinations and interactions within the genome 
are astronomical. It will be beyond human intellectual capacity – but perhaps not 
beyond the capacity of super-intelligent machines. 
Conscious evolution or eugenics?  
One issue arising from gene therapy, genetic enhancement and behavioural 
genetics is the historically sinister shadow of eugenics. Eugenics “requires that 
natural selection be replaced by intentional human control” (Hansen, Janz, & 
Sobsey, 2008, p. S105). It is clear that human command of medicine and gene 
technology now gives us the power to consciously (or unconsciously) manipulate 
the evolution of our species. The question is: should we do it, or is it too much of 
an ethical and perhaps epistemological and ontological minefield? Some specific 
issues which would require prior resolution include: 
 What might be the unintentional effects of such tinkering with human 
nature?  
 If we do it, on what medical, social, legal, financial, bases should it be 
done?  
 Should individuals be free to design their own offspring and, if so, what 
degree of freedom should be allowed? (e.g., should blind or deaf parents be 
allowed to genetically engineer their children to be blind or deaf?)  
 What are the rights of genetically engineered children?  
 Who is allowed to make decisions for them and by what authority?  
Behavioural genetics  
DeCamp and Sugarman (2004) discussed ethical concerns regarding 
behavioural genetics. This research field attempts to explain the role of genes in 
causing human behaviour as diverse as personality, intelligence, memory, fear and 
addiction. Behavioural genetics techniques are being used to research psychiatric 
illness with significant genetic discoveries published in regard to autism, 
  
38 
 
schizophrenia, dementia and depression (DeCamp & Sugarman, 2004). DeCamp 
and Sugarman identified two major areas of ethical issues in regard to behavioural 
genetics: “the conduct of behavioural genetics research; and the applications of its 
research findings” (p. 27).  
These might, respectively, be considered to be the internal research integrity 
and the wider, societal issues regarding ethical and socially responsible 
application of research results and technologies. DeCamp and Sugarman posed 
the following question regarding the socially responsible application of 
behavioural genetics “how might a genetic basis for behaviour change societal 
notions of responsibility and accountability?” (DeCamp & Sugarman, 2004, p. 
28).  
DeCamp and Sugarman (2004, p. 29) attribute the need to raise such 
questions to “the power of post-HGP techniques to yield insight into the 
complexities of human behaviour and disease”. They point out that Institutional 
Review Boards (IRBs – U.S. ethical research committees) are specifically 
prohibited from considering the long-range effects of applying knowledge gained 
from research. Summarising their conclusion, DeCamp and Sugarman claimed:  
While some of the ethical concerns in the latter category [ethical and social 
responsibility regarding research applications] are likely to be of substantial 
importance and animate considerable popular concern, they currently fall 
outside the realm of traditional research review. Determining how to deal 
with these concerns should be a focus of future scholarly work (emphasis 
added). (2004, p. 27) 
Cloning and stem cells  
Reproductive and therapeutic cloning is a process that asexually makes a 
genetically (nearly) identical twin or copy of an organism. In the process of 
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) the DNA nucleus from a female egg 
(oocyte) is removed and replaced with the DNA nucleus taken from a somatic cell 
of a donor. If the process works (failure rates are currently very high) the cell 
starts dividing and forms a blastocyst (i.e., early stage embryo where all cells are 
still pluripotent stem cells) (Human Genome Project Information, 2009).  
In the case of reproductive cloning the blastocyst is transferred into the 
uterus of a surrogate mother and born in the standard way, similar to the in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) process. In the case of therapeutic cloning the pluripotent stem 
cells are extracted from the blastocyst (thus destroying it) and the stem cells 
cultured and multiplied in vitro. Pluripotent stem cells are immortal and capable 
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of turning into any of the different types of cells from which the body is made 
(Human Genome Project Information, 2009).  
The medical potential of stem cells is significant - they may be used to 
repair damaged organs or, perhaps even, be used to grow replacement organs 
(e.g., heart, kidney, liver, bladder, skin, cartilage, etc.) for the donor, thereby 
ensuring there will be no immune system rejection (Mooney & Mikos, 1999). 
Tissue engineering, as this branch of science is called, has already had some 
successes. New bladders have been grown on collagen scaffolds from patients‟ 
own bladder cells and implanted in the patient with successful function (Atala, 
Bauer, Soker, Yoo, & Retik, 2006).  
On a non-medical tangent, biologists are experimenting with similar 
techniques to culture muscle cells, in vitro, into processed meat for human 
consumption; effectively meat without animals (Datar & Betti, 2010). Factories 
producing meat in this manner could have environmental benefits reclaiming land 
from agricultural production as well as health benefits by increasing the omega 3 
content of cultured meat. For some vegetarians it may resolve their moral 
prohibition against meat.  
It is believed that pluripotent stem cells are a potential cure for many 
currently incurable diseases or offer better prospects than current treatments. 
Animal and/or human clinical trials are now underway for a number of conditions 
including Huntington‟s disease, Parkinson‟s disease, Type 1 diabetes mellitus, 
Celiac disease, cancer, muscle damage, cardiac failure, spinal injury and 
neurological disorders (Singec, Jandial, Crain, Nikkhah, & Snyder, 2007).  
Amongst other things, stem cell therapy has been used in humans to cure 
some forms of blindness (Graham-Rowe, 2004), treat spinal cord injuries (Kang, 
et al., 2005), and heart disease (Strauer, Schannwell, & Brehm, 2009).  In guinea 
pigs, deafness has been cured by using stem cells to grow new hair cells in the 
Organ of Corti in the cochlear (Coghlan, 2005; Izumikawa, et al., 2005) and new 
teeth have been grown in mice (Yen & Sharpe, 2008), suggesting similar age 
reversal treatments for humans might be possible.  
There is considerable moral resistance to therapeutic cloning and to 
embryonic stem cells because in order to harvest the stem cell a potential life is 
destroyed. From a Kantian ethical perspective, an issue that arises regarding 
embryonic stem cells and therapeutic cloning, even if the blastocyst was not 
destroyed, is that of using human beings as means rather than treating them as 
ends in themselves (American Medical Association, 1999; Kant, 1998).  Adult 
stem cells, which are not a potential new life, and may be turned into a restricted 
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range of body cells, are not regarded as raising the same moral issues, but 
unfortunately do not exhibit pluripotency.  
More recently scientists have been learning how to induce somatic cells to 
revert to pluripotent stem cells (Yu, et al., 2007; Zhou, et al., 2009). Induced 
pluripotent stem cells (iPS for short) are not considered to be the start of a new 
organism (i.e., a clone).  They are, therefore, not considered to pose the same 
ethical problems as therapeutic cloning or embryonic stem cells (stem cells 
harvested from blastocysts created by IVF, or normal sexual reproduction, and 
hence potentially living organisms). Proof-of-principle experiments in mice have 
demonstrated the potential of iPS to repair acute myocardial infarction (Nelson, et 
al., 2009). It is probable that most stem cell therapies will eventually be carried 
out using adult stem cells or iPS in order to avert the immediate ethical issue of 
stem cell source. 
Reproductive cloning is cloning for the purposes of reproduction or creating 
a new organism. Currently, many countries, on moral grounds, outlaw human 
reproductive cloning. Many people feel that it is just wrong (deontologically) to 
create a „carbon copy‟ of an existing human. Some express concern, regarding the 
possession or lack of a “soul” of a chemically created human clone. The Catholic 
Church is strongly opposed to cloning. Pope Benedict XVI is cited as claiming 
"Human cloning is more dangerous than Weapons of Mass Destruction" (Anon, 
2004).  
Concerns regarding the moral status and potential treatment of human 
clones - as „lab rats‟ or the psychological impacts on the clone of knowing that 
s/he was created as a „duplicate‟ of some other person, give rise to psychological 
and philosophical issues of identity. The issue of commodification of humans also 
arises (Ho, 2000). For teleological moralists, questions include: under what 
circumstances (if any) would reproductive cloning of humans be acceptable?  
A major ethical issue regarding human reproductive cloning is the fact that 
it is not yet safe. While some healthy mammal clones have been born, the vast 
majority suffer from developmental problems, often resulting in spontaneous 
abortion, deformity or disability. The successful birth rate of clones implanted in 
animal surrogates is only between 1-3%. Clones who live to be born often have 
compromised immune systems, higher rates of infection, increased rates of 
tumour growth, large offspring syndrome and other debilitating disorders (Human 
Genome Project Information, 2009).  
Given the concerns with safety, and the high probability of developmental 
problems currently associated with cloning, most scientists consider it immoral to 
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attempt human reproductive cloning at present (Committee On Science 
Engineering and Public Policy, 2002). In 2001, France and Germany proposed a 
worldwide ban on reproductive cloning at the UN which has been effective since 
September 2006 (Arsanjani, 2006). However, the ethicist Strong (2005, p. 45) 
argued that, if safety issues were resolved, reproductive cloning: “is a form of 
procreative freedom and, as such, deserves respect.” He analysed the arguments 
against reproductive cloning finding them problematic and concluded that it could 
be: “ethically justifiable in at least some cases involving infertile couples” (p. 45). 
Nonetheless, a number of „renegade scientists‟ have stated their ambitions to 
produce the first human clones – including some involved with the Raelian 
„religion‟ (Rael, 2005). In 2009 Doctor Panayiotis Zavos claimed to have created 
14 cloned embryos and transplanted 11 of them into four women. No live births 
resulted but Zavos stated his intention to continue his efforts (Connor, 2009).  
Epigenetics 
Normal identical twins have identical genes but may have a different life 
history. Different environmental experiences can create epigenetic differences 
between identical twins. A study of identical twins found that 35% of twin pairs 
had significant differences in DNA methylation and histone acetylation profiles 
with the differences increasing as the twins aged. Increased differences in DNA 
methylation and histone acetylation were associated with increased differentially 
expressed genes and increased phenotypic differences in identical twins (Fraga, et 
al., 2005).  
Epigenetics is a relatively new and, as yet, poorly understood field which 
studies the impacts of environmental conditions on an individual‟s genome in 
regard to the up or down regulation of genes resulting in different phenotypic 
expression. Epigenetics also studies the heritability of such acquired phenotypic 
characteristics. Environmental conditions may switch certain genes on (up 
regulate) or off (down regulate) through a process known as DNA methylation, or 
by creating changes to chromatin structures or histone proteins (Jablonka & Raz, 
2009). Contrary to past scientific belief, it has been shown, (at least in flies), that 
epigenetic phenotypic effects caused by environmental conditions can be inherited 
by up to 13 generations of descendants. Note that it is only the methylation of the 
DNA that is changed and inherited; the actual sequence of the inherited genome 
remains unchanged. Transgenerational epigenetic effects have been shown to 
occur in both plants and animals. A recent review of the epigenetic literature 
documented over 100 cases of epigenetic transgenerational phenotype changes 
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(Jablonka & Raz, 2009). It has recently become clear that environmental factors, 
by „up‟- or „down- regulating‟ specific genes (i.e., switching the genes off or on), 
can bring about phenotypic changes in an organism.  
Synthetic biology 
“Synthetic biology aims to design and build new biological parts and 
systems or to modify existing ones to carry out novel tasks” (Parliamentary Office 
of Science and Technology, 2008, p. 1). Proponents of synthetic biology claim the 
technology offers prospects for novel methods to produce food, drugs, chemicals 
or energy, environmental biosensors, bioremedial agents to clean up pollution, 
and new therapeutic techniques. Engineering principles are used to build 
standardised interchangeable segments of DNA that can be used as biological 
building blocks to make new, or to alter existing, organisms. DNA sequences 
(potentially even whole genomes) can now be designed on computers and 
produced in chemical laboratories. It is conceivable, that in the future, entirely 
new forms of life might be created in the laboratory using the techniques of 
synthetic biology (Chopra & Kamma, 2006).  
The potential for the malevolent use of synthetic biology is clear. It is now 
possible to construct the genome of a medium-size virus in about three weeks 
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2008). In 2002, researchers 
from the University of New York constructed the poliovirus by following a recipe 
downloaded from the Internet and using synthetic gene sequences sourced from a 
mail-order supply firm. They tested the virus by injecting it into mice, which then 
became paralysed and died. Their purpose was to show how easily terrorists could 
create deadly biological weapons (Cello, Paul, & Wimmer, 2002).  
As is the case with GE, synthetic biology attracts the „do it yourself‟ 
brigade, including groups with such exciting names as: OpenWetWare 
(OpenWetWare, 2009), DIYbio (DIYbio, 2010), Biopunk (Biopunk.org, n.d.), and 
Biohack (Bishop, 2008). Synthetic biologists in California are about to launch an 
open source biological production facility called BIOFAB (International Open 
Facility Advancing Biotechnology). BIOFAB “aims to boost the ease of 
bioengineering with "biological parts" that are shared resources, standardized and 
reliable enough that they can be switched in and out of a genome like electronic 
parts in a radio” (Katsnelson, 2010).  
J. Craig Venter, who led the private research project to decipher the human 
genome, in competition with the publically funded project, had the goal of 
creating the world‟s first synthetic organism. He envisaged creating organisms 
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which have the ability to manufacture biofuels and other useful compounds. He 
considered that a “new design phase of biology” is about to begin (Grant, 2008). 
On May 21, 2010 Venter‟s team published details of the successful creation of a 
synthetic genome that began replicating and producing proteins (Gibson, et al., 
2010). This achievement is considered proof-in-principle of human created life 
forms. Although many useful organisms may be created, the possibility of 
dangerous ones being created either accidentally or deliberately is also very real. 
The Oxford University ethicist Professor Julian Savulescu, reflecting on the 
achievement of Venter‟s team said: 
Venter is creaking open the most profound door in humanity‟s history, 
potentially peeking into its destiny. He is going towards the role of a god: 
creating artificial life that could never have existed naturally. The potential 
is in the far future, but real and significant: dealing with pollution, new 
energy sources, new forms of communication. But the risks are unparalleled 
(quoted in Henderson, 2010). 
Savulescu continued: 
We need new standards of safety evaluation for this kind of radical research 
and protections from military or terrorist misuse and abuse. These could be 
used in the future to make the most powerful bioweapons imaginable. The 
challenge is to eat the fruit without the worm. (quoted in BBC News, 2010)  
Among the serious issues concerning synthetic biology are biosecurity risk, 
biosafety, intellectual property, stakeholder engagement and involvement, 
unforeseen harmful consequences, human malevolent use of the technology, and 
technological governance. 
Life extension 
Historically, mortality has separated humans from gods; except perhaps, 
until the 21st century.  The quest for immortality has been a recurring theme for 
humanity throughout recorded history– in myth, religion, literature, alchemy, and 
science. Impressive work is currently being conducted in the area of life extension 
(de Grey, 2005; Finkel, 2003). The average life span in developed countries has 
steadily increased and current projections are that someone born today could 
potentially live very much longer than the current maximum natural full term of 
around 120 years. It has long been known that calorie restriction (CR) diets can 
improve the health (in particular reduction of cancers and increased immunity), 
and extend the life of most mammals by up to 40% (Weindruch, Walford, Fligiel, 
& Guthrie, 1986). Recently a molecular level epigenetic mechanism for the effects 
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of CR has been proposed (Li, Liu, & Tollefsbol, 2009); glucose restriction 
produced increased expression of hTERT (human telomerase reverse 
transcriptase). This provides targets for drugs for life extension. 
Telomerase is an enzyme that is responsible for the formation of the 
telomere DNA sequence. This sequence forms a cap on the ends of chromosomes. 
Telomeres are responsible for maintaining genomic stability and regulating 
cellular division. As somatic cells divide the telomere sequences get shorter and 
shorter, limiting cells to a fixed number of divisions (Greider & Blackburn, 1989; 
Harley, Futcher, & Greider, 1990). Cellular senescence and eventually death 
occur when telomeres reach a critical value. Heritability of telomeres is strong 
with studies estimating it at 40-80% (Codd, et al., 2010). This is thought to be an 
important component of aging at a cellular level. Cancer cells preserve their 
telomeres no matter how many times they divide (i.e., they are immortal). Cancer 
cells have increased telomerase activity, thus suggesting a possible mechanism for 
increasing the longevity of normal cells. 
The compound resveratrol, which is found in red wine, has been shown to 
extend the life of yeast cells by about 70%. Resveratrol increases production of a 
class of enzymes called sirtuins (produced in yeast by the gene sir2). Production 
of these enzymes is also increased in yeast during calorie restriction (Howitz, et 
al., 2003). Resveratrol offers research potential for life extension drugs. Both 
calorie restriction and resveratrol appear to work through epigenetics i.e., by up- 
or down-regulating health and age related genes. 
By manipulating specific genes in various organisms scientist have been 
able to greatly increase their lifespan and their resistance to illness. Knocking out 
one copy of the insulin-like growth factor (IGF-1) gene in mice led to a 26% 
increase in lifespan (Holzenberger, et al., 2003). Adding an additional sir-2.1 gene 
(the nearest equivalent of the sir2 gene in yeast) to the genome of C. elegans (a 
nematode worm) led to a 50% increase in lifespan (Tissenbaum & Guarente, 
2001), while decreasing the activity of the daf-2 gene led to a doubling of the 
lifespan of C. elegans (Kenyon, Chang, Gensch, Rudner, & Tabtiang, 1993).  
Single genes which have significant lifespan effects in fruit flies have also 
been discovered. Mutants fruit flies with reduced activity (down-regulation) of the 
mth gene (the Methuselah gene) have a 35% increase in average lifespan and 
increased resistance to stressors such as starvation and heat (Lin, Seroude, & 
Benzer, 1998), while reduced expression of the Indy (I‟m not dead yet) gene 
doubles the fly‟s lifespan with no noticeable negative side effects (Rogina, 
Reenan, Nilsen, & Helfand, 2000).  
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Helfand & Inouye (2003, p. 276) claimed that “There is great conservation 
between different organisms suggesting that what is learned in one model system 
will be true for others.” Research with healthy centenarians (and their very old - 
91+ siblings), using genetic linkage analysis, found a region on chromosome 4, 
that contains between 100 and 500 genes, associated with extra long healthy lives 
(Puca, et al., 2001). In the past few years a handful of these genes have been 
identified as important to the aging process (Rucz, 2008). Stem cell therapies and 
gene therapies are also expected to play a significant role in life extension in terms 
of rejuvenation of aging or diseased cells and organs, elimination of genetic 
disorders, and up or down regulation of „aging‟ genes. 
The Cambridge University biogerontologist, Aubrey de Grey (2007) is a 
champion of radical life extension i.e., not just extension by a few years but by 
hundreds, even thousands, of years (of eternal youth, not the Tithonus error, as he 
referred to life extension without maintenance of youth). His approach is different 
from calorie restriction and its genetic equivalents - which are essentially a means 
of retarding aging. He proposed instead, a continuous engineering process of 
repairing damage caused to the organism by aging. He identified seven types of 
such damage and concluded that, when we can repair these types of damage, we 
will be able to give living organisms arbitrarily long life spans (de Grey, 2005). 
De Grey believed that there are people alive now who will live for 1000 
years or more. He proposed the concept of “longevity escape velocity” by which 
he means that if the first wave of rejuvenation therapies add an extra 30 years, 
during this extra 30 years, a second wave of therapies will likely be developed 
which add still more years, and so forth, until dying is essentially conquered (de 
Grey, 2004, 2005). Given the accelerating pace of biological knowledge his 
“longevity escape velocity” is a plausible (though by no means certain) 
hypothesis, though whether, or when, society will chose to allow the coming of 
the „new immortals‟, is another question. 
Gene Technologies and the Potential for Harm 
Despite having a large range of intentionally positive applications, it is also 
clear that GE, gene therapy, synthetic biology and the other technologies 
emerging from genetic science could create harm in the world through unforeseen 
and unintended side effects, through incidental effects – known side effects 
associated with positive intentional effects, or through malevolent intent (see 
Chapter 1 for a summary of the three ways in which humans cause harm through 
technology). For example, scientists experimenting with the mouse pox virus (a 
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mouse analogue of smallpox in humans) accidentally succeeded in making the 
virus much more virulent and deadly, even to mice vaccinated against the disease  
(Jackson, et al., 2001) - an unintended and unforeseen effect.  
The potential to alter human smallpox or to combine genes from different 
diseases to create super diseases for the purpose of warfare or terror is clear and 
very real (malevolent intent). It is reported that the former Soviet Union 
succeeded in using recombinant DNA techniques to combine features of smallpox 
and Ebola (Katz, 2001). As Sir Martin Rees noted, regarding biological and 
chemical weapons, “A few adherents of a death-seeking cult, or even a single 
embittered individual, could unleash an attack” (Rees, 2003, pp. 48-49). The 
possibility of creating lethal pathogens that target specific groups in society based 
on gene markers specific to that group also exists (Katz, 2001).  
Another worrying trend is DIY bioengineering. Reportedly, home hobbyists 
(often without training in the field) are conducting GE experiments from 
information and products found on the Internet and equipment constructed in 
home labs. Synthetic biology will further exacerbate this trend. Such experiments 
are conducted without regulation or control. These biohackers, as they call 
themselves, claim that the future Bill Gates of biotech could be developing a 
vaccine for cancer in their garage (Wohlsen, 2008). An equally plausible scenario 
is that synthetic organisms escaping from uncontrolled home GE labs could cause 
outbreaks of dangerous diseases and serious environmental damage.  
The issue of posthumanism poses serious ethical issues for humanity. What 
will the new humans be like? How wise will human directed evolution be? What 
will the consequences be? Vastly extended human life spans seem technologically 
imminent. A range of incidentally harmful effects of human „immortality‟ seem 
obvious and easy to predict. What might the unforeseen harmful consequences 
be? How can humanity balance the potential harms and potential benefits of 
Promethean gene technologies? 
Summary 
Gene technologies have the potential for enormous social and moral impact 
on humans, animals and the environment. Gene technology could potentially 
change humans and other species and even the nature of evolution itself. With 
these technologies mastered, humans will be able to control life, change nature to 
our own ends, change ourselves and our genomes in ways that we desire, 
eliminate many diseases, perhaps even eliminate death, design and make new 
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forms of life that never existed before, and develop a whole new range of 
biological-based industries. 
Gene technologies hold fantastic potential for public good and the benefit of 
humanity. However, they also hold fantastic potential for harm. In a worst case 
scenario, through accidental, incidental or malevolent causes, the result could be 
the demise of life on Gaia (Bostrom, 2002; Joy, 2000; Rees, 2003). Much depends 
upon what humans choose to use the technologies for. As Promethean 
technologies spread to all echelons of society, what humans choose to use these 
technologies for will be determined by the full range and extent of human nature 
and human behaviour, from the altruistic to the malevolent. A problem that will 
have to be solved, sooner rather than later, is how to stop the malevolent 
application of these technologies. This chapter has been confined to gene 
technologies, primarily because participants in Study 1 have expertise in this 
technology and, therefore, gene science is a theme running throughout this thesis.  
However, other, equally powerful technologies are currently emerging (e.g., 
nanotechnology, super-intelligent machines, neurotechnologies etc.) with similar 
potential for disruptive social and moral consequences. To avoid existential 
disaster it is imperative these Promethean technologies are responsibly developed 
and controlled.  
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Chapter 3 - Review of Theory 
This chapter reviews theoretical considerations relevant to social and moral 
responsibility in research. It consists of two parts. The first part is composed of 
three sections. The first section considers the history of the philosophical 
discussion of ethical theories and moral reasoning. The second section reviews 
some branches of applied ethics of particular relevance to science and technology. 
The purpose of these two sections is to explicate philosophical moral theories and 
practices that are useful for analysing and thinking about the issue of social and 
moral responsibility, particularly with regard to the practice and application of 
science and technology. The third section considers existential risk, the 
precautionary principle and technological optimism, issues relevant to social 
responsibility in science.  Part two of the chapter considers psychological theories 
of ethical behaviour, focussing on cognitive moral development, moral behaviour, 
and personal value orientation. 
Philosophical Background 
Normative ethics is the development and study of ethical theories to help 
guide human moral behaviour. Normative ethics is usually distinguished from 
descriptive ethics, which is the empirical study of what people believe their moral 
responsibilities and rights are and what they actually do when faced with moral 
issues. There are three main types of normative theories, each with a different 
focus. The focus of teleological ethical theories is on whether the consequences of 
an action or practice are good or bad. The focus of deontological theories is 
whether actions and practices are right or wrong for their own sake. The focus of 
virtue ethics is on what it means to be a virtuous person and how a virtuous person 
would act (Pojman, 1998c).  
Normative ethics attempts to identify or formulate rules and principles, 
duties and obligations that guide how people „ought‟ to act (and what their 
motives or intentions should be) in particular situations, and sometimes, across all 
situations.  A related field of study, meta-ethics, analyses the concepts of good 
and evil, rights and responsibilities. In the qualitative research in the current work 
(Study 1) participants‟ attitudes and values were examined for evidence of 
normative ethical reasoning and meta-ethical reasoning or assumptions. The 
instrument used to measure scientists‟ general attitude to genetic engineering 
(Study 2) includes measures to assess teleological ethical concern and 
deontological ethical concern. 
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Applied ethics is the application of normative theories as a basis for 
analysing real world ethical problems. In the past 30-40 years a number of fields 
of applied ethical studies related to science, technology, humans and society, and 
global ecosystems have emerged (Hackett, et al., 2008; Pojman, 2001b). Three of 
these applied ethical fields are briefly discussed - environmental ethics, bioethics 
/deep bioethics, and technoethics. From these fields of study, philosophers‟ 
arguments for the need for an increased ethic of social and moral responsibility on 
the part of scientists are presented.   
In addition, two concepts related to the social and moral implications of 
science and technology will be briefly introduced and discussed - technological 
optimism and the precautionary principle (Krier & Gillette, 1985). Technological 
optimism is one of the constructs in the nomological network related to social 
responsibility in science. Relationships amongst the constructs in this nomological 
network will be tested to help establish the construct validity of the new measures 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) developed in Chapters 7 of the current work. A 
number of other ethical concepts are touched upon in this chapter including the 
issue of moral perception and sensitivity (Blum, 1991; Sherwin, 2001). This 
particular philosophical issue is strongly related to psychological theories of moral 
judgment and behaviour (Rest, 1979, 1986). These discussions lead to the 
proposal of a number of experimental hypotheses to be tested in the quantitative 
study (Chapter 7). 
Normative Ethical Theories  
Teleological ethics 
Teleological theories are consequentialist in nature, holding that the moral 
value of an action, practice or rule is a function of the consequences of that action 
(Hursthouse, 2009). That is, is the effect of the act or rule (i.e., the consequent 
states of affairs of the world) good in itself? As Pojman (1998d, p. 738) stated: 
“teleological theories see only instrumental value in the acts but intrinsic value in 
the consequences.” Regarding the consequence of an act, one can ask:  how does 
it compare with the „goodness‟ of the effect of possible alternative actions, 
practices or rules in the particular situation? This implies that different states of 
the world are of different importance, or have different degrees of intrinsic value 
(Zimmerman, 2008). That is, they may either be ordered on a scale that goes from 
very evil to very good or that, at a minimum, multiple alternative end states of 
affairs, in a particular situation, may be ranked in terms of their values. Thus, for 
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teleological ethical theories one needs a method for ranking the value of different 
effects of action or practices, or states of affairs or states of the world.  
The legal system recognises gradations of illegal unethical behaviour and, as 
the crime increases in degree of evil (disvalue), punishment correspondingly 
increases in severity (Jones, 1991).  To the extent that society can reach such 
generally agreed classifications of the consequences of actions or practices (i.e., 
the resulting states of the world) suggests that consequences or states of affairs of 
the world have objective value, the degree or intensity of which is intrinsic to the 
outcome itself. This suggests the meta-ethical theory of objectivism or moral 
realism (Sayre-McCord, 2009). 
However, it is contingently true that across individuals, groups, cultures, 
and time, people may hold different moral beliefs, and on occasion, rank different 
consequent states of the world differently in terms of their magnitude of value. 
This is a descriptive thesis known as cultural relativism (Pojman, 1998d). For 
example, while modern society considers slavery evil, two centuries ago, for 
many people and nations, slavery was considered to have valued economic and 
societal consequences, and therefore, according to teleological ethics, was a 
morally acceptable practice, at least to people with these particular value 
priorities. That moral judgments and the value attributed to consequences are 
dependent upon the cultural milieu implies moral conventionalism, while the fact 
that different moral judgements can be made by different individuals, even within 
the same milieu, implies moral subjectivism (Pojman, 1998d).  
Teleological ethics is relevant to the current work in that the practice and 
application of science and technology has consequences for individuals, groups, 
society as a whole, for states of affairs and for the state of the world, as argued in 
Chapter 1. These consequences may be good or bad for Gaia, and have value or 
disvalue for society, groups and individuals. Evaluating potential consequences is 
a necessary component of foresight. Therefore, teleological ethical reasoning is 
one mechanism the science community and individual scientists can use to 
practice social and moral responsibility regarding future implications of their 
research. 
Deontological ethics  
Deontological theories deny the teleological principle. Rights, obligations, 
duties, rules and ethical principles form the basis of deontological reasoning 
(Pojman, 1998c). That is, an act or practice is right or wrong, or is an obligation 
on principle, without consideration of the real or expected consequences of the 
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act. Deontological theory holds that certain features of the act or practice itself 
have intrinsic value (Pojman, 1998d). Deontological theory has a strong and a 
weak version (Pojman, 1998b). The strong version holds that moral rules have 
universal objective validity, that there should be no exception to rules or 
principles, and that an adequate moral system will have a consistent set of 
principles which are never in conflict. This version of deontology is sometimes 
referred to as moral absolutism. The most well known proponent of this view is 
Kant, who believed that we could rationally determine such a consistent set of 
principles (Kant, 1998).  
A more moderate deontological position, championed by Ross (1998) is 
moral objectivism which “holds that moral principles have universal objective 
validity but admits that many (if not all) of its principles may be overridden by 
other principles at different times and occasions” (Pojman, 1998a, p. 18). A 
somewhat similar position is known as moral pluralism or value pluralism 
(Mason, 2008). This position holds that there are a plurality of different values but 
is not committed to either the belief of universal objective validity (i.e., moral 
realism), as Ross is, or moral subjectivism (i.e., morality is in the eye of the 
beholder), a position sometimes attributed to Nietzsche (1998). In either case the 
moral task is to discern which of the conflicting principles takes precedence in a 
particular situation. In such cases, one may, as Ross (1998) and Moore (1966) do, 
resort to moral intuitionism (the theory that the good or the right thing to do can 
be known directly via intuition) in order to determine which rule is the appropriate 
one.  
Just as we are able to discern gradations of value regarding consequential 
states of the world, we may also discern gradations of value among moral rules 
and principles, either in particular situations or in abstract consideration. Thus, in 
the abstract, most people would agree that the practice of protecting innocent 
people from harm is a rule of greater moral importance or intrinsic value than 
telling the truth. However, for a deontologist such as Ross (1998) it might be 
possible, indeed, morally good, in a particular case, to give precedence to telling 
the truth over protecting innocent people from harm.  
Deontological ethics are relevant to the current work in that science and 
technology are practices which can be evaluated against deontological moral 
principles (e.g., humans should not play God). Thus, the science community and 
individual scientists in their evaluation of their moral responsibilities to society 
should be cognizant of the deontological principles important to themselves, other 
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individuals, groups, cultures and societies, regarding particular scientific and 
technological practices. 
Virtue ethics 
Virtue ethics is usually traced back to Aristotle (Pojman, 1998d). It differs 
from teleological and deontological ethics in that its focus is on the agent rather 
than an action or its consequences, that is, it is agent-focussed rather than act-
focussed (Hursthouse, 2009). Rather than considering the sort of actions or 
practices that are right or wrong (as is the case in deontological theories) or the 
actions or practices that will bring about the most beneficial ends (as is the case in 
teleological theories), virtue ethics considers the sort of people we ought to be. 
Rather than asking: “What is the right thing to do (given these particular 
circumstances)?” the virtue ethicist asks: “What would the virtuous person do 
(given these particular circumstances)?” Or: “What is the best way for me to live 
given the particular circumstance?” (Pojman, 1998d).  
Thus, the virtuous person demonstrates characteristics or virtues (we might 
also call them values, traits, dispositions, or even habits) such that he/she 
consistently acts in a manner that leads to what Aristotle (1996) called 
eudaimonia (the ultimate practical good - personal happiness, flourishing or 
wellbeing) and consistently avoids actions that diminish eudaimonia. Aristotle 
also invoked the concept of phronesis (practical or moral wisdom - derived from 
experience and learned knowledge) in order to explain how an agent understands 
what dispositions, and actions grounded therein, lead to eudaimonia. Thus, 
according to Aristotle, life experience helps individuals to internalise the virtues 
(and thus become of virtuous character) while recognising and avoiding the vices.  
Aristotle considered virtues to be a golden mean between two extremes. For 
example, courage is the virtue of having the right amount of fear, with too little 
fear the agent is foolhardy rather than courageous and with too much fear the 
agent is cowardly. The polar opposites of cowardice and foolhardiness are 
considered vices while the golden mean between these two, courage, is considered 
a virtue. Thus, the morally virtuous person is guided by moderation and lives 
according to Aristotle‟s golden mean (Aristotle, 1996). 
Virtues, just like rules or principles, may come in conflict with one another 
and it is the task of the moral agent to use their practical wisdom and experience 
to act on the virtue that will enable them to live well and achieve excellence in 
their life. Virtue ethics is relevant to the current work in that, personal values, 
which ground important elements of an individual‟s self-identity (Feather, 1988; 
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Hitlin, 2003), including the virtues they hold important for themselves as human 
beings and as scientists, may influence the attitudes and beliefs that they hold 
regarding their responsibilities to society in research and development, and 
particular technological practices, such as genetic engineering. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic value   
Aristotle stated: “Clearly then the term „goods‟ would have two meanings, 
(1) things good in themselves and (2) things good as a means to these” (Aristotle, 
1996, pp. 9, Book I, ch. VI,). Similarly, referring to the notion of good, Moore 
(1966) stated:  
They may either assert that this unique property does always attach to the 
thing in question, or else they may assert only that the thing in question is a 
cause or necessary condition for the existence of other things to which this 
unique property does attach. (p. 21 emphasis in original) 
Moore (1966, p. 21) noted the ordinary language expression for the first 
concept is “good in itself” which he calls intrinsic value. The concept of intrinsic 
value has a relationship to both deontological and teleological moral reasoning. 
Thus, in deontological ethics certain features of the moral act itself or principle 
guiding the act are said to have intrinsic value (Pojman, 1998d). 
 Moore (1966) referred to the second concept as “value as means” (p. 21). 
This concept is commonly referred to as extrinsic value. In teleological moral 
reasoning, the action or practice, in itself, has only extrinsic value, that is, its 
value rests in the fact that it brings about certain consequences, and the ultimate 
criterion of teleological morality regarding the action or practice is the intrinsic 
value of the consequences (Pojman, 1998d).  
There is considerable variation of belief amongst philosophers as to what 
type of entity or thing can have intrinsic value. Aristotle (1996, pp. 10-11) talked 
about objects, things and goods, naming happiness (eudaimonia) as the “final 
end”. Moore (1966) used the term in regard to a number of different objects both 
concrete and abstract, qualities of objects and also states of objects. Frankena 
(1973) gave a long list of entities with intrinsic value: life, consciousness, health 
and strength, pleasures, truth, knowledge, beauty, wisdom, virtues, peace, 
freedom, and so on. Butchvarov (1989) considered that properties have intrinsic 
value, Ross (1930) believed it was facts, while Chisholm (1975) thought it was 
states of affairs.  
Beside the question of whether something is good or bad there is also the 
question of how good or bad a thing is, and how to compare the degree of value of 
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two different things. There is diversity of opinion regarding how intrinsic value is 
to be measured, and whether the intrinsic value of some goods or objects is 
incommensurable (Zimmerman, 2008).  
The concept of intrinsic value and the ability to determine preference or 
rank the intrinsic value of different states of affairs is necessary for teleological 
ethical evaluation of the consequences of an action or a practice such as a 
technology like genetic engineering. Thus, for genetic engineering, a teleological 
ethical evaluation might require determining preference of the consequences of 
using genetic engineering as opposed to the consequences of not using it, or using 
some alternative technology or practice. The concept of intrinsic value is also 
necessary for deontological evaluation of actions or technological practices 
because the rules or principles themselves are said to have intrinsic value. Where 
deontological principles or rules are in conflict it is necessary to be able to rate or 
determine preference between the principles.  
Fields of Applied Ethical Studies Relevant to Technology 
Environmental ethics   
Because human possession and use of science and technology are currently 
threatening dire consequences for ecosystems and the environment (as illustrated 
in Chapter 1), environmental ethics is a field of applied ethics particularly relevant 
to the social implications of science and technology. Traditional ethics were 
primarily anthropocentric, attributing intrinsic value only to humans. Thus, Kant 
considered that only rational beings were ends in themselves (Pojman, 2001a). In 
contrast, Rolston (2001) argued for the thesis that nature has intrinsic and 
objective value (i.e., value independent of human valuation – value objectivism). 
Schweitzer (2001) argued for a Reverence for Life, an extension of intrinsic value 
and moral concern to all of life. This point of view is called biocentric ethics.  
Ecocentric ethical theorists, such as Leopold (2001), viewed the biosphere 
holistically, believing that the environment, rather than being merely a resource 
for humans, is at the centre of value. A central concept of Leopold‟s Land Ethic is 
that “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty 
of the biotic community. It is wrong when it does otherwise” (2001, p. 125). The 
most radical version of environmental ethics is deep ecology – a term coined by 
Arne Naess (1973). Deep ecology holds that nature and natural diversity are 
intrinsically valuable (thus implying value objectivism) and “that everyone and 
everything is equally valuable as part of the whole” (Pojman p. 76), or as Naess 
(1973) termed it biospherical egalitarianism.  
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Deep ecology proposes a transpersonal gestalt psychology. That is, Naess 
argued that as humans mature, how they identify themselves widens. He 
advocates the extension of the concept of the (narrow) self to the comprehensive 
Self (with a capital S). The comprehensive Self blurs the distinction between man 
and environment and sees all things as interconnected and interdependent. A 
reduction in human population and greater protection for biodiversity are central 
tenets of deep ecology (Naess, 2001).  
Bioethics and deep bioethics   
The term bioethics was originally coined by Potter (1971, p. 1), who defined 
it as “the knowledge of how to use knowledge for the social good.” Potter 
envisaged bioethics as a multidisciplinary field, combining biology, ethics, 
humanities and social sciences with a particular orientation to the science of 
survival, choosing the moral future that we want for the world within the bounds 
of biological constraints (Potter & Whitehouse, 1998).  
Bioethics, as it has come to be practised, now subsumes the long established 
field of medical ethics. Potter‟s focus on the wider global biological survival 
issues has received little attention from bioethicists in comparison to medical 
ethics (Gaines & Juengst, 2008). More recently, Potter and Whitehouse (1998) 
have used the term „deep bioethics‟ to refer to Potter‟s original concept, linking 
the concept historically and philosophically to Arne Naess and the Deep Ecology 
movement (Naess, 1973) and Leopold‟s (1949) „Land Ethic‟ concept. 
Currently, the dominant approach to bioethics is the Four Principles 
approach developed by Beauchamp and Childress (1994). The principles are 
beneficence (doing good), non-maleficence (not doing harm), autonomy (personal 
freedom) and justice (fairness). Beauchamp and Childress claimed that these four 
principles roughly accord with our „common morality‟ and it is generally 
considered that they are sufficient to analyse and resolve most bioethical 
problems, although this assumption is disputed by some, in particular feminist 
writers, who claimed that the four principles are predominantly Western and 
masculine values (e.g., Gilligan, 1982; Noddings, 1984; Sherwin, 1992).  
The four principles approach allows for both deontological and teleological 
reasoning to be combined in the analysis of an ethical issue. The principles are 
used to analyse the consequences of an act, or of alternative acts. Thus, a four 
principles analysis of an act will consider the potential benefits and the harms of 
the act, the fairness or justice of the distribution of benefits and harms across 
affected individuals and groups (stakeholders) as well as the degree of autonomy 
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that the stakeholders had to access or avoid the benefits and harms. Beauchamp 
and Childress (1994) recognised that, in particular situations, there may be 
conflicts between these four principles. No one principle is invariably given 
precedence over any other. Rather, when there is a conflict between the principles, 
the decision maker(s) must evaluate the priority given to the principles in terms of 
the facts (or beliefs) associated with the particular situation.  
The approach is, therefore, teleological ethics combined with a „weak‟ 
version of deontological ethics. Moral reason, moral intuition or moral sentiment 
is necessary in order to determine which moral principle takes precedence under a 
particular set of circumstances. Mepham (1996, 2000) used the four principles and 
stakeholder theory to devise a qualitative tool called the „Ethical Matrix‟ for 
analysing ethical issues. The Ethical Matrix has all identified stakeholders in the 
issue on one axis and the four principles on the other axis. Specifying the benefits, 
harms, the degree of stakeholder autonomy in the situation, and the fairness or 
justice of the consequences for all the stakeholder groups, enables moral decision-
makers to clarify deontological and teleological factors relevant to their decision. 
Mepham (1996, 2000) used the Ethical Matrix to analyse the morality of food 
biotechnologies.  
Taking the Ethical Matrix as a base, Small and Fisher (2004; 2005) 
developed a quantitative tool which they named the „Ethical Valence Matrix‟. The 
concept is similar to Mepham‟s, except that rather than using descriptive 
qualitative analyses as in each of the cells of the Ethical Matrix, the Ethical 
Valence Matrix has a numerical rating of the degree of benefit, harm, autonomy or 
fairness that the issue holds for each of the stakeholder groups. By summing the 
four principle scores for a stakeholder group, a four principles ethical valence 
score regarding the issue can be derived for that stakeholder group. A quantitative 
comparison can then be made between the ethical valence scores of the 
stakeholder groups. Small and Fisher (2004; 2005) used the Ethical Valence 
Matrix to analyse scientists‟ moral attitudes and beliefs to a research project 
involving the genetic engineering of cows. 
Technoethics and the responsibilities of scientists  
Over the past 30 years, technoethics has emerged as a field of applied ethics 
that specialises in examining the ethical dimensions of technology and its impacts 
on society (Bunge, 1977; Luppicini, 2008). Luppicini (p. 5) considered “that it is 
of vital importance to encourage dialogue aimed at the ethical use of technology, 
guarding against the misuses of technology, and formulating common principles 
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to help guide new advances in technological development and application to 
benefit society.” Accepting Heiddegger‟s (1977) argument that new technologies 
enable new relationships, previously not possible, into the world, technoethics 
recognises that technology is a part of societal development creating change and 
raising new opportunities for action and ethical issues that did not previously 
exist.  
Technoethics is an interdisciplinary field which subsumes or overlaps a 
range of areas of ethical research including: computer ethics, Internet ethics, 
cyberethics, information ethics, media ethics, medical ethics, bioethics, 
engineering ethics, neuroethics, roboethics, nanoethics, professional technoethics, 
educational technoethics, environmental technoethics, and military technoethics 
(Luppicini, 2008). Its genesis was in the 1970s when Mario Bunge (1977) first 
coined the term. Although Bunge held that pure science “is intrinsically valuable, 
technology can be valuable, worthless, or evil, according to the ends it is made to 
serve. Consequently technology must be subjected to moral and social controls” 
(Bunge, 1977, p. 106). 
Bunge (1977) considered that, as professionals intimately involved with the 
development of new technology, scientists and engineers have extra social and 
moral responsibilities regarding technological innovations and their applications 
and technological progress in general. He claimed: 
The technologist must be held not only technically but also morally 
responsible for whatever he designs and executes: not only should his 
artifacts be optimally efficient but, far from being harmful, they should be 
beneficial, and not just in the short run but also in the long term. (Bunge, 
1977, p. 100) 
Bunge (1977) concluded that, like other people, technologists are personally 
responsible for what they do, subject to both praise and blame. Thus “the 
technologist is responsible not only to his employer and his profession but also to 
all those likely to be affected by his work. And his primary concern should be the 
public good” (p. 107).  
Another key figure in the development of technoethics was Hans Jonas. His 
work focuses on ethics regarding the development of new technologies and the 
way in which technology alters the power of individuals (Jonas, 1985). Thus, he 
began the preface to the English version of his 1985 book The Imperative of 
Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age by summarising 
its premise: 
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Modern technology, informed by an ever-deeper penetration of nature and 
propelled by the forces of market and politics, has enhanced human power 
beyond anything known or even dreamed of before. It is a power over 
matter, over life on earth, and over man [sic] himself; and it keeps growing 
at an accelerating pace. Its unfettered exercise for about two centuries now 
has raised the material estate of its wielders and main beneficiaries, the 
industrial “West,” to heights equally unknown in the history of mankind…. 
But lately, the other side of the triumphal advances has begun to show its 
face, disturbing the euphoria of success with threats that are as novel as its 
welcome fruits. Not counting the insanity of a sudden, suicidal atomic 
holocaust, which sane fear can avoid with relative ease, it is the slow, long-
term, cumulative – the peaceful and constructive use of worldwide 
technological power, a use in which all of us collaborate as captive 
beneficiaries through rising production, consumption and sheer population 
growth – that poses threats much harder to counter. The net total of these 
threats is the overtaxing of nature, environmental and (perhaps) human as 
well. Thresholds may be reached in one direction or another, points of no 
return, where processes initiated by us will run away from us on their own 
momentum – and towards disaster. (Jonas, 1985, p. ix) 
Jonas (1985) responded to the techno-crisis threatening nature and humans 
by developing a theory of responsibility, which he claimed had previously been 
lacking from ethics. The axiom of this theory of responsibility is: “responsibility 
is a correlate of power and must be commensurate with the latter‟s scope and that 
of its exercise” (Jonas, 1985, p. x). He went on to claim that to discharge this 
responsibility we must lengthen our foresight with a scientific futurology, by 
which he meant using scientific knowledge about cause and effect relationships to 
extrapolate and attempt to predict future states associated with technological 
development. Bradshaw and Bekoff (2001) and Small and Jollands (2006) 
claimed that any such endeavour must take account of the psychology of human 
nature, as technological impacts on Gaia arise from the application of technology 
by humans.   
However, Jonas noted that such foresight will always be uncertain and 
incomplete and proposed that: 
Consequently, an imaginative “heuristics of fear,” replacing the former 
projections of hope, must tell us what is possibly at stake and what we must 
beware of. The magnitude of those stakes, taken together with the 
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insufficiency of our predictive knowledge, leads to the pragmatic rule to 
give the prophesy of doom priority over the prophesy of bliss. (Jonas, p. x) 
He claimed that a philosophy of nature regarding “man‟s duties towards himself, 
his distant posterity, and the plenitude of terrestrial life under his dominion” was 
required to “bridge the alleged chasm between scientifically ascertainable „is‟ and 
morally binding „ought‟” (p. x).  
Jonas‟ (1985) insight, and a contention of the present thesis, is that modern 
technology changes the landscape of ethics. In the past, without Promethean 
technologies, the effects of human actions were proximally located in time and 
space and limited by their degree of control of energy and matter, as were their 
consequent impacts on human life and other conscious beings. Under such 
circumstances our moral responsibility needs to extend only as far as the effects of 
our actions. Now that humans possess sufficient power over nature as to affect the 
global conditions for human and non-human life, the far-off future and even the 
physical destiny of the planet, the framework of former ethics is no longer valid.  
Therefore, according to Jonas (1985), Promethean technology warrants a 
new extended ethic of responsibility, particularly with respect to the development, 
use and application of technology; such that responsibility corresponds to the 
potential reach of the effects of our use of a particular technology. In order to 
address the failure of past ethics to deal with the reality of today‟s world, Jonas 
proposed a new categorical imperative or supreme principle of morality: “„Act so 
that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine 
human life‟; or expressed negatively: „act so that the effects of your action are not 
destructive of the future possibility of such life‟” (p. 11). 
Another technoethicist, Moor (2005, p. 117), proposed Moor‟s Law: “as the 
social impact of technological revolutions grows, ethical problems increase.” As 
an adjunct to Moor‟s Law, Luppicini (2008, p. 16) proposed the Law of 
Technoethics “ethical rights and responsibilities assigned to technology and its 
creators increase as technological innovations increase their social impact.” 
Luppicini claimed:  
Because ethical considerations within technoethics are embedded within 
rapidly changing domains of technology, discerning ethical issues requires 
considerable effort…. research on ethics and technology focuses the 
identification of controversial practices as moral problems, followed by an 
analysis and synthesis of factual data associated with these problems. 
(Luppicini, 2008, p. 14) 
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Common to the three fields of applied ethics discussed above is the 
perception of a need for an extended ethic of value and an extended ethic of 
responsibility of science and scientists to society. Environmental ethics and deep 
bioethics make this claim due to the need to protect and preserve the environment 
and other species of life from human desecration. Technoethics also sees this 
same need, but in addition, it sees the problem facing the environment and life on 
earth as being due to human possession and use of technology, and makes the 
further claim that science, scientists, and technologists have a particular 
responsibility in this respect.  
The arguments proposed by these three fields of applied ethics form the 
underlying assumptions and the rationale for conducting the current work. The 
technoethicists claim that the nature of the extended ethic for science and 
scientists is a social responsibility to society. The question arises: What are the 
elements that comprise scientists‟ social responsibility to society? Clearly, the 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviour of scientists are crucial for the implementation of 
an extended ethic on their part. As little empirical research has previously been 
conducted in this area, an aim of the present thesis is to elucidate scientists‟ 
beliefs about the nature of their social and moral responsibilities to society (Study 
1 – Chapter 6) and their attitudes towards these responsibilities (Studies 1 and 2 – 
Chapters 6 and 7). In addition, the relationship of attitudes to social responsibility 
and a particular Promethean technology, genetic engineering, is examined (Study 
2 – Chapter 7). 
Moral Sensitivity and Perception 
The issue of moral epistemology, the problem of recognising or perceiving 
what one‟s moral responsibilities are, has been raised in philosophical literature in 
regard to moral behaviour of an agent. Blum argued: 
An agent may reason well in moral situations, uphold the strictest standards 
of impartiality for testing her moral maxims and moral principles, and be 
adept at deliberation. Yet unless she perceives their moral character 
accurately, her moral principles and skill at deliberation will be for nought 
and may even lead her astray. (Blum, 1991, p. 701) 
Blum claimed that moral sensitivity and perception are essential, though 
under-theorised, dimensions of moral agency. Building on Blum‟s argument, 
Sherwin (2001) made the further claim that “moral perception, like aesthetic 
perception, involves a type of skill that can be trained and honed” (p. 177). She 
believed that because moral perception is necessary for morally responsible 
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action, we each have a moral responsibility to develop our skills in moral 
sensitivity and perception. Noting that a number of philosophers contend that our 
ability to perceive moral elements of a situation is dependent upon having 
“emotional sensitivity to the concerns of others,” (p. 178) she sets out to provide 
insight into how moral sensitivity might be developed and enhanced.  
First, she suggested that learning and using different moral theories (i.e. 
teleological, deontological and virtue ethics), each of which can illuminate 
different moral aspects of a situation, while not being sufficient for responsible 
moral perception, can raise ethical consciousness. Second, she suggested that 
literature, by engaging our emotional and cognitive processes in fictional 
situations, can enhance moral perception and sensitivity. Third, she proposed that 
imaginative techniques such as prototypes, metaphor and narrative may enhance 
moral perception. Lastly, drawing on feminist epistemology and feminist 
philosophy of science she contended that “feminist consideration of different 
cultural practices and values is an essential tool for developing one‟s capacity at 
moral perception in a multicultural world” (p. 179). She claimed that we need to 
be able to ensure that our moral perception is cognizant of the perspectives of 
others in very different situations to ourselves.  
Sherwin‟s suggestions presuppose and advocate the value of moral 
education for sensitivity and recognition of moral issues. Other theorists have also 
suggested that education about ethical theories and relevant fields of applied 
ethics may help scientists‟ perception of the nature of their social and moral 
responsibility to society (e.g., Bebeau, Pimple, Muskavitch, Borden, & Smith, 
1995; Beckwith & Huang, 2005; Sherwin, 2001). However, Beckwith and Huang 
claimed:  
Many of us were trained to think of ourselves as working in the „ivory 
tower‟ mode – seekers of truth uncontaminated by the outside world. Few 
students of science receive as an integral part of their scientific education an 
analysis of the social impact of science and rarely is there a mention of 
social responsibility. (2005, pp. 1479-1480) 
Beckwith and Huang (2005, p. 1480) proposed that “education at the graduate 
level should include the study of the social implications of science and the 
historical instances where scientists have spoken out.” 
A number of meta-ethical theories, postulated by various philosophers have 
tried to explain the basis of moral perception. These include moral rationality 
(e.g., Kant, 1998), moral intuition (e.g., Moore, 1966, Ross, 1998), and emotivism 
(e.g., Hume, 1957, Stevenson, 1998). The value of rationality in regard to ethical 
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decision-making is clearly shown in teleological ethical arguments. The value of 
moral intuition (the idea that we just know what is good, or how to rank different 
goods) is also apparent though somewhat more difficult to justify or explain. 
Rawls (1971) claimed that “any ethical theory is bound to depend on intuition to 
some degree at many points” (p. 40). Moore (1966) justified moral intuition with 
the theory that „the Good‟ is a non-natural property, somewhat like a Platonic 
form that we intuitively recognise.  
Some authors propose that moral intuition is determined by a combination 
of cultural (i.e., from learned behaviour, particularly in childhood) and 
evolutionary derived instincts (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Ridley, 2003). Empirical 
evidence, from functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) experiments, has 
suggested a relationship between the emotions and moral decision-making 
(emotivism) and behaviour (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; 
Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Moll, et al., 2007). Humans appear to 
have two different „operating systems‟, one rational and one emotional, that 
compete sometimes and cooperate at other times (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, 
et al., 2004; Haidt, 2001; Moll, et al., 2007; Small, 2004a, 2004b). 
Empirically, if moral intuition has both an evolutionary genetic component 
and a learned component, it should demonstrate a degree of cultural relativity 
(learned) and a degree of cultural universality (inherited). To the extent that 
morality is learned, it will be subject to cultural relativism (implying moral 
conventionalism – moral principles are dependent on social or interpersonal 
agreement). To the extent that morality is inherited, it will be subject to a degree 
of cultural universality implying moral objectivism - the belief that at least some 
moral principles have universal objective validity.  
Schwartz (1992) proposed a theory of human values that is consistent with 
both cultural universality and cultural relativism. The values and their structural 
relationship appear to be universal and relatively invariant across cultures, 
whereas the level of importance placed on any particular value or set of values is 
influenced by cultural factors and varies across cultures (Schwartz, 1990; 
Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). It has already been proposed that personal values will 
be an antecedent influence on scientists‟ attitudes to social and moral 
responsibility. Specific hypotheses are proposed later in this chapter in the section 
on Schwartz Value Types. 
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Risk, Precaution, Optimism and Costanza’s Payoff Matrix  
Bostrom (2002) proposed a new class of technological risks, which he 
called existential risks. The nature of existential risks is briefly explained and a 
proposed response to existential risk, the precautionary principle, is described. 
Next, Costanza‟s pay-off matrix, a decision tool for technological policy choice, 
appropriate for existential risks, for which the probably of occurrence is highly 
uncertain, is described. The payoff matrix incorporates the concept of 
technological optimism (and technological pessimism). Technological optimism is 
discussed in regard to scientists, its effects on their perception of their social 
responsibility, and its relationship to the precautionary principle. Finally, in this 
section, two hypotheses are proposed about the relationship between technological 
optimism, the precautionary principle, and social responsibility in scientific 
research. 
Existential risks  
Bostrom (2002) categorised risk according to scope (the size of the at-risk 
population: global, local and personal) and intensity (how badly each individual in 
the group will be affected: endurable or terminal). Naming the category of global, 
terminal risk, existential risk, he defined it as: “one where humankind as a whole 
is imperilled. Existential disasters have major adverse consequences for the course 
of human civilisation for all time to come” (p. 3). Bostrom claimed that existential 
risk is a new category of risk for humans (with the exception of extremely rare 
events such as a species-destroying comet strike), first emergent in the mid-
twentieth century with the advent of nuclear weapons.  
He pointed out that these types of risk were not part of our evolutionary or 
cultural history and that we cannot rely on institutions, moral norms, social 
attitudes or previous experience with managing normal risk, to guide us in respect 
to existential risk. The reactive approach – trial and error, is unworkable in this 
situation – there is no chance to learn from error – for existential risk error is fatal. 
Existential risk requires proactive action. This requires foresight and willingness 
to take preventative action, that is, it requires a precautionary approach applied 
with forethought. Bostrom (2002) claimed that existential risk dilution is a global 
public good and, therefore, likely to be undersupplied by the market, and one 
might add, subject to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). 
The precautionary principle 
The precautionary principle is one proposed response to the risks and 
potential negative impacts of technology on society and Gaia. It may be the only 
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possible effective response to existential risk (Bostrom, 2002). The precautionary 
principle states: "when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and 
effect relationships are not fully established scientifically” (Raffensperger and 
Tickner, 1999, cited in  Kriebal, et al., 2001, p. 872). The precautionary principle 
is proposed as a guideline for decision-making. It has four main components: 
“taking preventative action in the face of uncertainty; shifting the burden of proof 
to the proponents of an activity; exploring a wide range of alternatives to possible 
harmful actions; and increasing public participation in decision making” (Kriebal, 
et al., 2001, p. 872).  
The term „precautionary principle‟ is an English translation of the German 
word Vorsorgeprinzip which might also be translated as „foresight principle‟, a 
translation which focuses on anticipatory action rather than the slightly more 
negative reactive focus of the English word „precaution‟. As previously argued, 
foresight is a necessary component of scientific social and moral responsibility 
(Jonas, 1985). Foresight is a prerequisite for teleological ethical reasoning. The 
precautionary principle is, therefore, a teleological ethical principle.  
Technological optimism and Costanza’s payoff matrix 
 Costanza (1989) designed the payoff matrix as a method for calculating the 
most appropriate policy options for society when faced with risks of very high or 
terminal intensity at the national or global level. He identified two common 
opposing attitudes regarding the real state of the world. The first was 
technological optimism and the second technological pessimism, or prudent 
pessimism, as Costanza preferred to call it. Technological optimism is the belief 
that technology can provide a solution to all the problems facing humanity and the 
global environment – that there is a „technological fix‟ for all problems. 
According to Krier and Gillette (1985), technological optimism arose as a 
response to the Limits of Growth (Meadows, et al., 1972). Optimists believe “that 
exponential technological growth will allow us to expand resources ahead of 
exponentially increasing demands” (Krier & Gillette, 1985, pp. 407, emphasis in 
original).  
 The optimists argue that, in order for an optimistic future to come to pass, 
we must believe that it is possible and act accordingly. However, as Costanza 
noted:  
This assumption allows problems of intergenerational, intragenerational, 
and interspecies equity and sustainability to be ignored (or at least 
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postponed), since they are seen to be most easily solved by additional 
growth….Energy and resource limits to growth, according to these 
paradigms, will be eliminated as they arise by clever development and 
deployment of new technology. (Costanza, 1989, p. 2) 
Since there are currently no known technological solutions for the most 
serious environmental issues facing humanity and Gaia, technological optimism is 
essentially a faith-based belief in human ingenuity to develop technologies to 
address these issues before they become overwhelming (Krier & Gillette, 1985).  
Technological pessimism, on the other hand, questions faith in the 
technological fix. Technological pessimism “assumes that technology will not be 
able to circumvent fundamental energy and resource constraints and that 
eventually economic growth will stop” (Costanza, 1989, pp. 2, emphasis in 
original).  The pessimists argue that the optimists, by continuing on the current 
growth and consumption path, will hasten resource depletion, ecosystem 
destruction and social collapse. The pessimists claim that we need to immediately 
start conserving resources and protecting the environment for the wellbeing of 
future humans. Although Costanza (1989, 2000), Daly (1996), Daly and Cobb 
(1994) and Huesemann (2001) provide robust arguments demonstrating the 
inadequacy of technological optimism, nonetheless, the dominant view of society, 
politicians and economists is still firmly wedded to technological optimism and 
the pursuit of economic growth and consumerism (e.g., World Business Council 
for Sustainable Development, 2000).  
Costanza, taking the conservative position that at best it is highly uncertain 
as to what the real state of the world is (that is, whether the optimists are right or 
the pessimists are right), made the case for a precautionary approach to policy 
making. He does this through a game theory argument based on his payoff matrix, 
which considered the payoff resulting from basing policy on the technological 
optimist‟s position versus the payoff resulting from the technological pessimist‟s 
position, when either of these two positions is the real state of the world. 
Costanza‟s payoff matrix is presented in Table 3.1 below. 
If the optimists are right, then a technological optimism policy results in the 
highest payoff for society. However, if the pessimists are right then the 
technological optimism policy will result in disaster (i.e., the collapse of 
ecological and social systems). Thus the technological optimism policy is a high 
stakes gamble between a high payoff and a disastrous payoff.   
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Table 3.1 
Payoff Matrix for Technological Optimism vs. Pessimism  
Current policy 
Real State of the World 
Optimists right Pessimists right 
Technological 
optimist policy 
High Disaster 
Technological 
pessimist policy 
Moderate Tolerable 
Costanza, 1989 
In contrast, Costanza argued that the technological pessimist policy offers 
moderate payoffs if the optimists are right about the real state of the world and 
tolerable payoffs if the pessimists are right. Accepting the technological pessimist 
policy, the gamble is between a moderate payoff and a tolerable payoff. While the 
pessimist policy does not offer the potential high payoff of the optimist policy, 
neither of its potential payoffs is as damaging as the optimists‟ potential disaster. 
The payoff matrix implies that if we do not know the real state of the world 
then the optimal game theoretic strategy is to choose the technological pessimists‟ 
policy. Precaution is, therefore, the most sensible policy in the current world 
situation. As Costanza stated, “One does not run blindly through a dark landscape 
that may contain crevasses. One assumes they are there and goes gingerly and 
with eyes wide open, at least until one can see a little better” (Costanza, 1989, pp. 
5, emphasis in original). 
The argument is convincing and has become a common theme in ecological 
economics literature. However, the optimist policy holds a powerful sway over 
human nature, because, according to Costanza‟s matrix, if technological optimism 
is the real state of the world then the payoff for adopting a technological optimist 
policy is high: we are safe to, not only maintain the status quo, but to strive for 
ever greater levels of economic growth. According to Gaskell, Eyk, Jackson and 
Veltri (2004), there is a culture of technological optimism in the U.S., and this 
helps explain the more positive attitude the American public have regarding the 
Promethean technologies of genetic engineering and nanotechnology, than their 
European counterparts. These authors noted that technological optimists are 
“more interested in science, more enthusiastic about progress, more confident in 
nature‟s ability to withstand human intervention, and more trusting of those 
involved in innovation and regulation of technology” (p. 496). 
Small and Jollands (2006) presented an argument claiming that, even if the 
real state of the world is such that the optimists are right, the payoff of policy 
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based on technological optimism is not necessarily high as proposed by Costanza, 
but rather, it is indeterminate. They argued that while the payoff could be high, it 
could also be disastrous. This is because, increasing technological development 
places increasing power over nature in the hands of a greater range of people and 
groups (i.e., over time, technological power over nature is progressively diffused 
across all echelons of society). As the number of people and groups with access to 
technologies capable of causing create harm increases, so too does the probability 
that aberrant groups or individuals will use knowledge and technology for ends 
disastrous to society and Gaia, perhaps accidentally, but equally as likely, 
malevolently. It is now recognised that in the near future, due to increasing 
technological development, even a single aberrant individual may be able to use 
technology to cause cataclysmic consequences for the rest of humanity and Gaia 
(Rees, 2003).  
It is proposed that a scientist‟s degree of technological optimism will be 
related to his/her perception of the degree of need for social responsibility in 
research: the more technologically optimistic, the less the perception of risky 
social impacts, consequently, the less importance placed on social responsibility.  
Therefore, technological optimism is one of the constructs in the nomological 
network describing social responsibility in research. As part of this work, an 
instrument will be developed to measure scientists‟ technological optimism.  
Scientists and technological optimism 
A report from the National Science Board (1977, p. 78) suggested that 
technological optimism was common amongst scientists: “a kind of naiveté 
among many scientists that leads them to believe that their science really can 
solve any problem, given enough time, money and effort.” Similarly, a study of 
the 1993 German and 1998 Austrian Technology Delphis (technological foresight 
exercises) found that self-rated top-experts in a field tended to suffer from an 
optimism bias, and the degree of optimism was positively correlated with the 
degree of self-rated knowledge (Ticky, 2004). Less specialised experts were found 
to be less optimistic than top-experts. Reinforcing the concept of technological 
optimism amongst scientists, Rollin (1996) claimed that scientists often 
underestimated the risk associated with their field of work. Ticky found that over-
optimism was due to the experts‟ involvement, and their underestimation of 
realisation and diffusion problems. While both sets of experts were over-
optimistic, business research and development experts were more optimistic than 
academic experts. 
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We might rationally expect that a scientist‟s level of technological optimism 
might bear some relationship to the degree of precaution that the scientist would 
consider necessary or advisable in the development of a new technology. If it is 
believed that technology can solve all problems and everything is going to turn 
out great, then there is no motivation or need for precaution. If a precautionary 
approach is an essential component of the practice of social responsibility in 
research, technological optimism may obscure perception of social risks and 
diminish the perceived need for social responsibility associated with science and 
technology development. Kilbourne, Beckmann, Lewis and Van Dam (2001) 
found small to medium negative relationships between belief in the technofix and 
perception of general environmental problems (r = -.22), and perception of 
specific environmental problems (r = -.20), and perception of the need for change 
to protect the environment (r = -.30) Two specific hypotheses follow this 
argument and evidence:  
H1  There will be a small to medium negative correlation between technological 
optimism and scientists‟ awareness of the need for social responsibility in 
scientific research and development.   
H2 There will be a small to medium negative correlation between technological 
optimism and scientists‟ judgments of the importance of specific personal 
behaviours to enhance social responsibility in scientific research and 
development. 
An instrument for measuring the construct of technological optimism was 
developed for the quantitative study in order to test its relationships with the other 
constructs in the nomological network.  
So far, this chapter has considered philosophical theories of ethics 
(normative and meta-ethical), and applied ethics sub-fields relevant to human 
moral behaviour, technology, and technology use. Two variables thought to be 
antecedent to scientists‟ attitude to social responsibility in research have been 
identified: personal value orientation and technological optimism. Two 
hypotheses have been proposed for testing regarding technological optimism, and 
perceptions of social issues arising from research, and judgment of importance of 
behaviours to enhance morally responsible research.  
Nearly all of the philosophical ethical concepts that have been discussed 
above are closely aligned to various psychological theories of moral behaviour. 
These connections will be evident in the section immediately below in the 
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discussion of psychological explanations of moral perception, moral judgment, 
and moral behaviour.  
Psychological Theories of Moral Judgment and Responsibility 
There is a considerable range of human activities that come under the 
scrutiny of moral and psychological analysis, from criminal or anti-social 
behaviour through compliance with moral rights, moral principles and moral 
obligations, to pro-social behaviours such as altruism and supererogation. As well 
as acts of commission, acts of omission are also open to moral analysis. 
Sometimes moral problems (dilemmas) hinge not on whether a particular act is 
ethical or unethical, but which is the best moral action of several possible 
alternatives.  
An understanding of the causes and contingencies of ethical reasoning and 
moral judgment may contribute to an understanding of how and why scientists 
adopt a particular moral stance towards a new technological practice, such as 
genetic engineering, and, more generally, to social responsibility regarding 
science and technology. Psychological theories of moral reasoning and behaviour 
generally postulate one or more of three main classes of factors or variables: 
individual factors, factors associated with the situation or context in which the 
moral issue arises, and more recently, factors which are related to the issue, action 
or practice itself. These latter are called issue-contingent factors and are theorised 
to give the issue moral intensity (Jones, 1991).  Regarding antecedents to 
scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility in research and development (a 
component of Study 2), the current work focussed on two psychological theories – 
cognitive moral development and behaviour and personal value orientation. Both 
of these theories are concerned with individual variables.  
This section first considers cognitive moral development and behaviour as 
explicated in the theories of Kolberg (1969) and Rest (1979, 1986). Cognitive 
moral development is discussed because it is an integral part of all three types of 
psychological moral theories (i.e., individual, situational and issue-contingent 
models) and its focus is the explanation of moral judgement – an essential 
component of social responsibility. Next, a theory of personal value orientation 
developed by Schwartz (1992) will be discussed. Previously, it has been 
suggested that personal value orientations are an antecedent variable to scientists‟ 
attitudes to social responsibility. The relationship between personal values and 
scientists‟ attitude to social responsibility in research will be further explicated 
and specific hypotheses proposed. 
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Cognitive moral development and moral behaviour 
Much research has been conducted in the cognitive-developmental approach 
to moral behaviour. Building upon earlier work by Piaget (1932), Kohlberg 
(1969) developed a model of the stages of individual cognitive moral 
development from middle childhood to adulthood. His model posited three broad 
levels, each composed of two stages. Moral development, according to Kohlberg, 
consists of the individual‟s invariant and irreversible sequential passage from the 
lower to higher stages. 
At the pre-conventional level (stages 1 and 2) the individual‟s moral 
reasoning is dominated by personal interest and concrete consequences (i.e., 
external rewards or punishments). At the conventional level (stages 3 and 4) 
moral reasoning is dominated by conformity to the mores of society, family or 
peers. Stage 3 reasoning relates to conformity to the mores of significant others 
while stage 4 relates to conformity to the mores of the broader society (e.g., laws). 
At the principled level (stages 5 and 6), the individual sees beyond norms and 
laws, and the authority of groups or individuals, basing moral reasoning on 
universal values or ethical principles. Individuals at this stage of moral 
development apply teleological, deontological and virtue ethics reasoning to 
moral issues. 
Rest (1979), while accepting the basic definition of stages and sequence of 
Kohlberg‟s model, criticised its simplicity – in particular the notion that 
individuals use only the stage of moral reasoning that they have currently reached. 
He proposed that individuals use various stages of moral reasoning, in varying 
degrees, depending on their overall level of moral development and the issue at 
hand. In answer to the question, “When a person is behaving morally, what must 
we suppose has happened psychologically to produce that behaviour?” Rest 
(1986) developed a very general theory of the psychological antecedents to moral 
behaviour. Rest proposed that, logically, the person must have used at least four 
basic psychological processes. 
1. Moral sensitivity or recognition of an ethical issue. The individual must have 
been able to make an interpretation of the situation with regard to: what 
actions were possible, who would be affected by each course of action (i.e., 
stakeholders), and how the stakeholders would regard the effects on their 
welfare. This is similar to the proposals of the philosophers Blum (1991) and 
Sherwin (2001) who considered that without moral sensitivity or perception 
regarding an issue, moral reasoning will either not occur or be deficient. The 
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instrument developed in the current work (Studies 1 and 2) to measure 
scientists‟ awareness of the social responsibility of science to society is 
focussed on this stage of Rest‟s psychological theory of moral behaviour. It 
does this by asking questions about the moral responsibility of science to 
society. 
2. Moral reasoning or ethical judgment. The individual must have been able to 
make a judgment about which course of action is morally right (fair, just or 
good), thus deciding which line of action ought (morally) to be taken. The 
instrument developed in the current work to measure scientists‟ judgments 
about the importance of personal behaviours believed to enhance social 
responsibility in the context of scientific research and technological 
development (Studies 1 and 2) is focussed on this stage of Rest‟s 
psychological theory of moral behaviour. It assumes that it in order to judge 
the importance of the action in their own scientific practice they have made a 
judgment about the moral status of the action. 
3. Moral commitment or ethical intention. The individual must give priority to 
ethical values above other personal values and decide to intend to do what is 
morally right. This stage of Rest‟s psychological theory of moral behaviour is 
not specifically addressed in the current work. While scientists‟ judgment of 
the importance of particular behaviours associated with social responsibility in 
research was canvassed, intentions to actually perform these behaviours in 
specific situation were not. The relationship between this psychological stage 
and the normative theory of virtue ethics is clear. The agent must not only be 
able to perceive the ethical issue and make an ethical judgment about the right 
thing to do, but the agent must also want to, and intend to, be a moral person 
and do the right thing. 
4. Moral implementation or ethical behaviour. The individual must have 
sufficient perseverance and implementation skills to follow through with their 
intention to behave ethically and to overcome any obstacles. This stage of 
Rest‟s psychological theory of moral behaviour is not addressed in the current 
work.  
Rest‟s model is visually depicted in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1. Rest's necessary psychological processes for moral behaviour. 
Rest (1986) claimed that each of these stages is conceptually distinct and 
that success at one stage does not necessarily imply success at any other stage. 
Nonetheless, his model implies that before a moral judgment can be made there 
has to be recognition of the moral issue. Because both of these constructs are 
about attitudes towards social responsibility in research they are expected to be 
strongly related. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3 There will be a large positive correlation between awareness of the need for 
social responsibility in scientific research and development and judgments 
of the importance of specific behaviours to enhance social responsibility in 
scientific research and development. 
The relationship between these two instruments (or the related constructs 
that they measure) forms part of the nomological network used to help infer their 
construct validity. 
Rest defined moral judgment as “the process by which a person arrives at a 
judgment of what is the moral thing to do in a moral dilemma” (cited in Lan, et 
al., 2010, p. 185). He claimed that empirical studies linked moral judgment to 
moral behaviour (Rest, 1986). The focus of the current work about scientists‟ 
social responsibility is on the first two stages of Rest‟s theory: moral sensitivity 
and moral judgment. Rest‟s theory of the psychological processes involved in 
moral judgment and behaviour is consistent with Ajzen and Fishbein‟s (1980) 
theory of reasoned action, and Ajzen‟s (1991) later version, the theory of planned 
behaviour. While the theory of reasoned action is not specifically a theory of 
moral behaviour, it is commonly used in the explanation of volitional behaviour. 
Moral action is usually considered to be an instance of volitional behaviour 
(although, c.f. Hume, 1957, and the meta-ethical theory of emotivism) Therefore, 
it is theoretically congruent that a theory of moral behaviour is consistent with the 
theory of reasoned action. 
Personal values and social responsibility in research 
Previous empirical research has shown that personal values (as measured, 
for instance, by the Schwartz Value Survey) are related to environmental concerns 
(Beckmann & Kilbourne, 1997; Beckmann, et al., 1997; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; 
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Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern, et al., 1995), to social concerns (Pichado, 1997; 
Schwartz, 2006; Stern, et al., 1999), to moral perception and reasoning 
(Abdolmohammadi & Baker, 2006; Crilly, et al., 2008; Fritzsche & Oz, 2007; 
Helkama, et al., 2003; Lan, et al., 2008; Lan, et al., 2010), and to moral behaviour 
(Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Hitlin, 2003; Schwartz, 2006). Perceptions of the 
morality of an action and intentions to rectify an unethical situation are influenced 
by personal values (Finegan, 1993; Glover, Bumpus, Logan, & Ciesla, 1997).  
It was argued in Chapter 1 that social and environmental impacts are 
important consequences of science and technology and, therefore, social and 
environmental awareness are important aspects of social responsibility in science 
and technological development. In this chapter, it was argued that moral 
perception is important in order to realise and understand ethical issues including 
the social and moral implications of technology. Kolberg (1969) and Rest‟s 
(1986) psychological theories of moral behaviour postulate that moral perception 
and moral judgment are important for determining the appropriate moral action or 
behaviour in a particular set of circumstances. Schwartz‟s value types have been 
empirically demonstrated to influence moral perception and moral judgement, the 
first two stages of Rest‟s model, which are the focus of the current work. 
Therefore, it is postulated that a scientists‟ personal values will be an antecedent 
influence on their attitudes to social responsibility regarding science and 
technology. 
Schwartz value types. Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) proposed that values 
represent motivational concerns regarding three crucial evolutionary, universal 
requirements of human existence: the needs of individuals as biological 
organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare 
needs of groups. Values are enduring, stable entities that are highly resistant to 
change (Rokeach, 1973). Schwartz (1992) identified five formal features of values 
that recur in the literature. These are: 1) values are concepts or beliefs, 2) values 
pertain to desired end states or behaviours, 3) values transcend specific situations, 
4) values guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and 5) values are 
ordered by relative importance.  
Similarity between the qualities of personal values, deontological, 
teleological and virtue ethics, and intrinsic and extrinsic value can be immediately 
recognised. Values, like deontological, teleological and virtue ethics, guide 
selection or moral evaluation of behaviour or events. Values are beliefs or 
concepts which pertain to desired end states (i.e., states with intrinsic value) 
which may be ordered by relative importance – teleological ethics involves beliefs 
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about, and evaluation of (an assessment of the value or importance ranking), the 
likely end states associated with particular behaviours in a particular situation 
(extrinsic value of the act). Deontological ethics involves the evaluation of 
behaviour or alternative behaviours (action or practice) against a set of conceptual 
principles (beliefs or values) which may also be ordered by relative importance. 
Just as values are considered to transcend specific situations, moral principles are 
often considered to have universal application (e.g., the meta-ethical theories of 
moral absolutism or subjective universalism). Values, like virtues, are strongly 
associated with a person‟s sense of self-identity. The concept of virtue helps 
define an individual‟s personal identity or self concept (as a virtuous person who 
seeks to do the right thing).  Similarly Hitlin (2003) and Feather (1988) argued 
that values are at the core of personal identity.  
Because values are relatively stable and central to a person‟s cognitive 
structure they are important in focussing attention on salient issues when 
confronted with a new attitude object – such as gene technology or 
nanotechnology. However, values are usually considered relatively distal 
determinants of behaviour, working through more proximal determinants such as 
beliefs, attitudes and norms (Beckmann, et al., 1997; Hitlin, 2003; Schultz & 
Zelezny, 1999; Stern, et al., 1999). Values form a point of intersection between 
the individual and society in that they are both self-centred and socially-centred, 
serving both individualistic and collectivist interests (Beckmann & Kilbourne, 
1997). 
To the extent that evolutionary selection pressures play a causal role in 
human values we would expect universals in the content and structure of values. 
The Schwartz Value Survey has received considerable cross-cultural support over 
more than 70 countries for the universality of its dimensions and structure (Bardi 
& Schwartz, 2003; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Schwartz, 1992, 2006; Stern, Dietz, 
& Guagnano, 1998). Schwartz‟s value theory postulates ten motivational types of 
values: 
 Self-direction (individualistic): value goal is independent thought and 
action – comprised of creativity, freedom, choosing own goals, curiosity, 
and independence. 
 Stimulation (individualistic): value goal is need for variety and stimulation 
to maintain optimal level of activation – comprised of excitement, novelty, 
and challenge. 
 Hedonism (individualistic): value goal is pleasure or sensuous gratification 
for oneself – comprised of pleasure, and enjoying life. 
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 Achievement (individualistic): value goal is personal success through 
demonstrating competence according to social standards and thereby 
obtaining social approval – comprised of ambition, influence, capability, 
success, and self-respect.  
 Power (individualistic): value goal is attainment of social status and 
prestige, control or dominance over people and resources – comprised of 
authority, wealth, social power, preserving one‟s public image, and social 
recognition. 
 Security (individualistic and collectivist): value goal is safety, harmony, 
stability of society, of relationships, and of self – comprised of social order, 
family security, national security, reciprocation of favours, cleanliness, 
sense of belonging, and healthy. 
 Conformity (collectivist): value goal is restraint of actions, inclinations and 
impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or 
norms – comprised of obedience, self-discipline, politeness, honouring 
parents and elders. 
 Tradition (collectivist): value goal is respect, commitment and acceptance 
of the customs and ideas that one‟s culture or religion imposes on the 
individual - comprised of respect for tradition, humility, devoutness, 
accepting one‟s place and role in life, and moderation. 
 Benevolence (collectivist): value goal is preservation and enhancement of 
welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact – 
comprised of helpfulness, loyalty, forgivingness, honesty, responsibility, 
true friendship, and mature love.  
 Universalism (individualistic and collectivist): value goal is understanding, 
appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for 
nature – comprised of broad-mindedness, social justice, equality, world at 
peace, world of beauty, unity with nature, wisdom, and protecting the 
environment. 
It is claimed that Schwartz‟s value types exhibit temporal stability, internal 
reliability, and external validity (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). The Schwartz Value 
Survey is an internationally used and valid instrument for measuring value types 
and personal values. Empirical investigation has confirmed theoretical predictions 
about the relationships between the motivational types of values (Schultz & 
Zelezny, 1998, 1999; Schwartz, 1990, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; Spini, 
2003). Value types that serve individual interests (power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation, and self-direction) emerged as an adjacent set of regions while value 
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types that serve collectivist interests (benevolence, tradition, conformity) emerged 
as a second set of adjacent regions opposed to the first set. The relationships 
between the motivational types of values are visually depicted in Figure 3.2.  
In the figure, adjacent value types are most compatible, whereas increasing 
distance around the circular order indicates decreasing compatibility and 
increasing value conflict. Value types opposite each other are in greatest conflict. 
Schwartz (1992, p. 43) claimed “the total value structure can be viewed as 
composed of four higher order value types that form two basic, bipolar, 
conceptual dimensions.” 
 
Figure 3.2. Relationships between motivational types of values, higher 
order value types and bipolar dimensions. (Source: Schwartz, 1992, p.45) 
The first two bipolar higher order dimensions are openness to change versus 
conservation. At the openness to change end of this dimension are the value types 
of self-direction, stimulation and hedonism, while at the opposite end are the value 
types of security, conformity and tradition. The second bipolar dimension is self-
enhancement versus self-transcendence. The self-enhancement pole includes the 
value types of power and achievement, while the self-transcendence pole includes 
the universalism and benevolence value types. 
Openness to change. The value types of self–direction, stimulation and 
hedonism, which comprise the openness to change higher order dimension, are 
individualistic values concerned with the self, personal motivation, and personal 
gratification. Self direction is concerned with personal freedom, curiosity and 
creativity. Stimulation is concerned with excitement, novelty and challenge. 
Hedonism is defined as “pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself” (Schwartz, 
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1992, p. 8). For the scientist, this set of values is likely to be associated with a 
desire to experiment with new, challenging areas of science for personal curiosity, 
gratification and the excitement of discovery with a dislike of restrictions being 
placed upon one‟s activities.  
It is proposed that scientists strong on these values will place greater 
emphasis on academic freedom and their own interest in conducting scientific 
research than considering the social implication of the research on the wider 
society. This focus will be associated with a lower awareness of the need for 
social responsibility in research and a lower personal judgment of the importance 
of activities designed to enhance social responsibility. However, a reservation 
needs to be made based on previous empirical research. Based on similar 
reasoning to the above, Fritzsche and Oz (2007) also hypothesised a negative 
relationship between openness to change and ethical decision-making in a series 
of vignettes. They found a small negative (r = -.03, N = 100), non-significant 
correlation. Beckmann et al. (1997), while making no directional hypothesis, 
found a small, negative, non-significant (r = -.14, N = 264) correlation between 
openness to change and environmental concern. Both studies lacked adequate 
statistical power (at conventional levels i.e., .80) to detect a conventionally small 
but true population correlation (see Chapter 7, pp. 261-262 for a fuller discussion 
of statistical power). Myyry and Helkama (2002) found a medium size negative 
correlation (r = -.29, p < .05) between openness to change and moral sensitivity. 
Thus, although I have chosen to propose the relationships in H4 and H5 on the 
basis of conceptual reasoning, the few related empirical studies, although having 
an effect in the conceptualised direction, are unclear as to the truth or size of the 
effect. The available evidence suggested the relationship between openness to 
change and scientific social responsibility is small and negative. The following 
hypotheses are proposed regarding the higher order value dimension of openness 
to change:  
H4 There will be a small negative correlation between the higher order value 
dimension, openness to change, and scientists‟ awareness of the need for 
social responsibility in scientific research and development. 
H5 There will be a small negative correlation between the higher order value 
dimension, openness to change, and scientists‟ judgments of the importance 
of specific behaviours to enhance social responsibility in scientific research 
and development. 
The individualistic value types of self-direction, stimulation and hedonism 
comprising openness to change are oriented towards freedom and independence, 
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an interest in novelty and creativity, and personal gratification - values consistent 
with academic freedom. Technological optimism is a belief that focuses on the 
benefits of new technologies and minimises the risk associated with them. 
Perceptions of benefit and low risk may be considered as acceptable conditions 
for embracing academic freedom in research. Thus, although no previous 
empirical research was found relating these constructs, the next hypothesis is:  
H6  There will be a positive correlation between the higher order value 
dimension, openness to change, and the construct of technological 
optimism. 
Conservation. The value types of tradition, conformity and security which 
comprise the higher order dimension of conservation are primarily collectivist 
values (security is both individualistic and collective) concerned with the 
wellbeing of others and the stability and harmony of society. Security is 
concerned with the safety, harmony and stability of society, the preservation of 
social order and the security of family and nation. Conformity is concerned with 
the non-violation of social norms and restraint of actions that might cause harm to 
others. Tradition is concerned with respect for traditions and the customs of one‟s 
culture.  This set of values is likely to be associated with reservations about new 
and disruptive technologies that will have profound effects upon society, 
particularly any which may have harmful social impacts. However, while 
conformity was found to be positively correlated to the New Environmental 
Paradigm and ecocentrism, tradition was negatively correlated with these 
measures of environmental attitudes (Schultz & Zelezny, 1999), suggesting mixed 
forces operating within the higher order value dimension of conservation with 
respect to environmental attitudes (and perhaps attitudes to social responsibility). 
Fritzche and Oz (2007) found a small (r = -.15) non-significant negative 
relationship between conservation and ethical behaviour (although, as discussed 
above this study has low statistical power). Myyry and Helkama (2002) found a 
small non-significant positive correlation (.07) between conservation and moral 
sensitivity (with a sample size of 50, statistical power of this study was also poor).  
The conceptual reasoning and empirical evidence relating conservation to social 
responsibility is mixed. Nonetheless, it is tentatively proposed that scientists 
strong on these values will be sensitive to the social impacts on society of 
emerging Promethean technologies and place greater emphasis on the greater 
good of society than their personal research ambitions. This focus will be 
associated with a higher awareness of the need for social responsibility in research 
and a higher personal judgment of the importance of activities designed to 
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enhance social responsibility. However, because of the mixed theoretical and 
empirical evidence, it is expected that the relationships depicted by H7 and H8, if 
correct, will be small. Therefore, the following hypotheses are tentatively 
proposed regarding the higher order dimension of conservation: 
H7 There will be a small positive correlation between the higher order value 
dimension, conservation, and scientists‟ awareness of the need for social 
responsibility in scientific research and development. 
H8 There will be a small positive correlation between the higher order value 
dimension, conservation, and scientists‟ judgments of the importance of 
specific behaviours to enhance social responsibility in scientific research 
and development. 
The reasoning used above to propose a positive relationship between 
conservation and social responsibility suggests that individuals rated highly on 
conservation, with its focus on security, conformity and tradition, might be 
hesitant about new and novel technologies that create great change and hence 
negatively related to technological optimism. On the other hand, empirical 
research suggests that scientists tend to be highly optimistic about the 
technologies they are developing (National Science Board, 1977; Rollin, 1996; 
Ticky, 2004). Since the enlightenment, technology has been considered a driving 
force behind the grand narrative of progress of western civilisation (Lyotard, 
1984). The traditional, and currently still dominant, social paradigm of both 
western culture and the culture of science is one of optimism about technology 
and belief in the technological fix (Costanza, 1989; Gaskell, et al., 2004; Milbrath, 
1984; Pirages & Ehrlich, 1974; Postman, 1993; Winner, 1986). These 
considerations might suggest that conservation, with its orientation towards 
stability and the preservation of one‟s culture will be positively associated with a 
belief in technological optimism. Due to these conflicting conceptual arguments 
any relationship is likely to be small. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
tentatively proposed: 
 H9 There will be a small positive correlation between the higher order value 
dimension, conservation, and the construct of technological optimism. 
Self-transcendence. Benevolence is a collectivist value type while 
universalism is individualistic and collectivist. These value types comprise the 
higher order dimension of self-transcendence. Benevolence is concerned with the 
“preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in 
frequent personal contact” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 11). Universalism is concerned 
with the “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of 
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all people and for nature” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 12, emphasis in original). Schwartz 
claimed that people high on this value “realise that failure to accept others who 
are different and treat them justly will lead to life-threatening strife, and failure to 
protect the natural environment will lead to the destruction of the resources on 
which life depends” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 12).  
As documented in Chapter 1, the primary risks associated with Promethean 
technologies are social and environmental and hence it is proposed that scientists 
strong on self-transcendence values will be sensitive to the social impacts of 
Promethean technologies on society and nature. They will also be likely to have a 
higher personal judgment of the importance of activities designed to enhance the 
social and moral responsibility of science. Empirical evidence has found positive 
relationships with medium effect sizes between self-transcendence (and 
universalism and benevolence) and environmental concern (Beckmann, et al., 
1997; Schultz & Zelezny, 1998, 1999; Stern, et al., 1995) and self-transcendence 
(and universalism and benevolence) and moral judgment and behaviour (Crilly, et 
al., 2008; Fritzsche & Oz, 2007; Helkama, et al., 2003; Lan, et al., 2008), and self-
transcendence and moral sensitivity (Myyry & Helkama, 2002). As all these 
reported empirical relationships were medium size positive effects, a medium size 
positive relationship between self-transcendence and social responsibility in 
science is predicted. Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed about the 
higher order dimension of self-transcendence: 
H10 There will be a medium-size positive correlation between the higher order 
value dimension, self-transcendence, and scientists‟ awareness of the need 
for social responsibility in scientific research and development. 
H11 There will be a medium-size positive correlation between the higher order 
value dimension, self-transcendence, and scientists‟ judgments of the 
importance of specific behaviours to enhance social responsibility in 
scientific research and development. 
From a conceptual perspective, high concern for the welfare of nature and 
all humans may lead to caution regarding, or even rejection of, the concept of a 
technological fix for all environmental and social problems. This reasoning would 
suggest a negative relationship between self-transcendence and technological 
optimism. Kilbourne et al (2001, p. 212) argued similarly that for individuals who 
believed in technofix, cause for concern regarding environmental problems “is 
minimized, engendering an attitude suggesting that change in individual or social 
behaviour ought to be unnecessary.” They proposed two hypotheses regarding 
individuals‟ increasing belief in the technofix: “(a) their perception of the 
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existence of environmental problems will decrease, and (b) their perception of the 
amount of change necessary to protect the environment will decrease” (p. 213). 
For hypothesis (a) they found a correlation of -.22 for perception of general 
(environmental) problems and -.20 for perception of specific (environmental) 
problems, and -.30 for hypothesis (b). Therefore, a small- to medium-size 
negative relationship is proposed between self-transcendence and technological 
optimism. 
H12 There will be a small-to medium-size negative correlation between the higher 
order value dimension, self-transcendence, and scientists‟ belief in 
technological optimism. 
Self-enhancement. The value types of power and achievement, which 
compose the higher order dimension of self-enhancement, are individualistic 
values concerned with personal power, wealth and ambition. Power is concerned 
with the “attainment of social status and prestige, and control and dominance over 
people and resources” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 8). Promethean technologies offer 
increased personal power and control over both „the other‟ and nature. 
Achievement values “emphasize demonstrating competence in terms of prevailing 
cultural standards, thereby attaining social approval” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 8). 
These values are strongly concerned with self as opposed to other life and nature.  
Concern with personal interests may obscure awareness of social and moral 
impacts of Promethean technologies and lower judgment of the importance of 
activities designed to enhance the social responsibility of science. Empirical 
research supports this reasoning with self-enhancement (in particular, the 
comprising value type of power) found to be negatively correlated (r = -.20, p 
<.01) with perceptions of ecological problems (Beckmann, et al., 1997), 
negatively correlated (r = -.22, p <.05) with ethical behaviour (Fritzsche & Oz, 
2007), and negatively correlated (r = -.38, p < .01) with moral sensitivity (Myyry 
& Helkama, 2002). Therefore, hypotheses 13 and 14 are proposed.  
H13 There will be a small- to medium-size negative correlation between the 
higher order value dimension, self-enhancement, and scientists‟ awareness 
of the need for social responsibility in scientific research and development. 
H14 There will be a small- to medium-size negative correlation between the 
higher order value type, self-enhancement, and scientists‟ judgments of the 
importance of specific behaviours to enhance social responsibility in 
scientific research and development. 
Achievement and power, the value types comprising self-enhancement, are 
oriented towards personal wealth, ambition, success, and control and dominance 
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over people and resources. While Promethean technologies offer increased power 
to control people and resources, technological optimists perceive benefit rather 
than risk associated with such technologies. Some empirical studies have 
suggested a positive relationship between self-enhancement and optimism (e.g., 
Regan, Snyder, & Kassin, 1995) and between self-enhancement and lowered 
perceptions of environmental risk (e.g., Stern & Dietz, 1994; Stern, et al., 1995). 
It is proposed that self-enhancement will be positively related to a belief in 
technological optimism. The empirical evidence is too slight to meaningfully 
predict the size of the relationship.   Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H15 There will be a positive correlation between the higher order value 
dimension, self-enhancement, and the construct of technological optimism. 
Summary  
This chapter outlined the traditional normative ethical and meta-ethical 
theories relevant to understanding the social responsibility of science and 
scientists to society. It then discussed three areas of applied ethics of particular 
relevance to the topic (environmental ethics, bioethics and technoethics), 
highlighting calls from scholars about the need for an extended ethic of scientific 
social responsibility. Emphasis was placed on the responsibility of the science 
community, and individual science practitioners, to society and Gaia, and the 
critical role they play. Philosophers‟ claims about the importance of moral 
perception and sensitivity to ethical judgment and behaviour were then discussed. 
The concept of existential risk and its relationship to the precautionary 
principle was introduced. Costanza‟s Payoff Matrix, which analyses consequent 
effects of approaches to handling existential risks, introduced the notion of 
technological optimism. Evidence for over-optimism amongst scientists regarding 
their own field of technology was presented and a relationship between 
technological optimism and scientists‟ attitude to their social responsibility to 
society was postulated. A specific directional hypothesis was proposed regarding 
technological optimism and each of the two new instruments being developed to 
measure scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility in research. 
Next, three well established psychological theories relevant to moral 
perception and moral judgment were explicated: Kolberg‟s theory of cognitive 
moral development, Rest‟s theory of the stages of moral behaviour, and 
Schwartz‟s theory of personal values. Relationship between four higher order 
value dimensions and scientists‟ attitude to their moral responsibility to society 
was postulated: eight analytically derived directional hypotheses were proposed 
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between the well established Schwartz higher order value dimensions and the two 
new instruments designed to measure scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility. 
Four directional hypotheses were also proposed regarding the relationship 
between the Schwartz higher order value dimensions and attitude to technological 
optimism. These relationships form part of the nomological network of constructs 
designed to help infer construct validity to the new instruments developed in this 
thesis. In addition, a large positive relationship between the two new instruments 
to measure scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility was hypothesised. 
The next chapter reviews scientists‟ concern with social responsibility. 
Several hypotheses are proposed regarding the relationship between scientists‟ 
attitudes to social responsibility and to consequent variables (i.e. 
commercialisation of science and democratisation of science). 
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Chapter 4 - Scientists’ Concern with Social Responsibility 
This chapter reviews scientists‟ concern with social and moral 
responsibility. In the first section the writings of scientists (in particular, 
physicists, physicians and ecologists) are reviewed. In the second section, the 
meagre research literature regarding scientists‟ attitudes to social and moral 
responsibility in science and technological development is reviewed.  
Promethean Technology and Scientists’ Responsibility to Society  
This section reviews literature regarding scientists‟ writings about ethical 
and social responsibility in scientific research and technological development. 
Although socially and morally irresponsible behaviour includes misconduct and 
unethical behaviour, this is not the focus of the current work. For scientists, being 
socially responsible implies more than just not being unethical (Bunge, 1977; 
Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008; Pigman & Carmichael, 1950; Reiser & Bulger, 
1997; Ziman, 1998).  
Pimple (2002) noted that unethical behaviour by scientists and research 
misconduct has received considerable previous attention from scholars, with 
guidelines for in/appropriate practices being well established. In contrast, he 
claimed that social responsibility – the relationship between research and the 
common good - had received very little attention, and guidelines were non-
existent. On a similar note, Prpic (1998), in her study of eminent Croatian 
scientists‟ values, also observed a lack of empirical research regarding scientists‟ 
attitudes to social responsibility. Therefore, one goal of the current work is to help 
fill this void in the empirical literature and to further develop the construct of 
social responsibility in research. Because of the dearth of empirical research into 
scientists‟ attitudes, and because a small group of scientists have been at the 
forefront of advocating an increased role of social responsibility for scientists and 
technologists, a sample of these scientists‟ thoughts regarding the issue are 
reviewed. 
Because of their role as the producers of knowledge and inventors of 
technology, scientists have a higher degree of insight into how such discoveries 
and inventions might affect the world (Reiser & Bulger, 1997). Scientists are the 
human cause behind science and technology and, in general, they have greater 
understanding than the public or politicians about the implications, the 
probabilities and uncertainties, and the risks and benefits associated with their 
science and technology (although, as previously discussed, research indicates that 
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top experts are inclined to be overly optimistic in their evaluation of a new 
technology). Promethean technologies affect “an increasing number of people 
[and they] provide novel opportunities for action about which well thought out 
ethical policies have not yet been developed” (Luppicini, 2008, p. 1).  Therefore, 
scientists have an extra responsibility to society to ensure the products of their 
research are used for the good of society rather than for harm. Reiser and Bulger 
(1997), noting that standards have been set to protect human and animal 
participants in scientific experiments from harm and abuse, claimed that this sets a 
precedent for the scientific community‟s responsibility, not only to individual 
subjects, but also to society.  
After the Second World War and the development of nuclear technology, 
the social and moral role of the scientist came under increased public scrutiny and 
debate. Questions raised concerned the role of science as: the disinterested pursuit 
of knowledge; the pursuit of economic and commercial interests; and a practical 
response to human suffering. The role of social responsibility in setting research 
agendas became a matter of public debate too (Nicholas, 1999b). Scientists 
themselves, especially physicists, physicians and ecologists, were amongst the 
first to raise the issue of their extra responsibility due to the increased power of 
Promethean technologies to affect the social and physical worlds. 
Physicists 
Largely because of the Manhattan Project and the unleashing of nuclear 
energy at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, physicists were in the vanguard of those 
realising the need for an increased ethic of social responsibility in science 
(Nicholas, 1999b). The physicist, J. Robert Oppenheimer, who led the Manhattan 
Project to develop the atomic bomb, in a speech to workers at Los Alamos on 
November 2, 1945 made the following statement: 
It is not possible to be a scientist unless you believe that the knowledge of 
the world, and the power which this gives, is a thing which is of intrinsic 
value to humanity, that you are using it to help in the spread of knowledge, 
and are willing to take the consequences (cited in Masters, 2007, p. 
0399014). 
Philip Abelson, a physicist whose work made a major contribution to the 
Manhattan Project, suggested in a 1970 editorial of Science  that “a few decades 
ago, most scientists held the view that their principal duty was to advance the 
frontiers of knowledge” (Abelson, 1970, p. 241). He claimed that this was 
changing, with public policy aspects of science and technology gaining an 
increasing role in scientists‟ activities. Thus, he suggested that “scientists will 
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have continuing and important roles in determining how science is applied. One 
important function is that of watchdog.” (p.241). He believed that scientific 
communities could play an important role helping to create judicious public 
opinion and that “scientists can make imaginative contributions to planning, and 
they can help ensure that the factual bases for decisions are as sound as possible” 
(Abelson, 1970, p. 241). 
Nobel Peace Laureate and physicist Sir Joseph Rotblat also worked on the 
Manhattan Project, resigning before completion of the bomb when it became clear 
that Germany had abandoned its efforts to construct one. He argued that although 
science has enormously improved the quality of life, it has also “created great 
perils, threatening the very existence of the human species” (Rotblat, 1999, p. 
1475). He believed that scientists must be accountable for their research, and 
professional organisations of scientists “should work out ethical codes of conduct 
for their members, including the monitoring of research projects for possible harm 
to society” (p. 1475).  
The Russian physicist and Nobel Peace Laureate, Andrei Sakharov, while in 
isolated detention in Gorky, wrote an essay on the responsibility of scientists, 
published in Nature (Sakharov, 1981). While holding similar views as those 
expressed above regarding the social responsibility of scientists, probably because 
of his (and of some of his Russian colleagues‟) particular situation, his views have 
a somewhat more political and activist stance. He considered that: “Scientists and 
scholars cannot fail to think about the dangers stemming from uncontrolled 
progress, from unregulated industrial development, and especially from military 
applications of scientific achievement”.  Therefore, he claimed experts are “under 
an obligation to subject these problems to unbiased and searching examination, 
making all socially significant information available to the public in direct, first-
hand form, and not just in filtered versions” (p.184).  
Describing the abuses of human rights that he and other Soviet scientist had 
been subjected to, Sakharov stated: “in order to protect innocent persons it is 
permissible and, in many cases, necessary to adopt extraordinary measures such 
as an interruption of scientific contacts or other types of boycott” (1981, p. 185). 
He argued that it was time for scientists to demonstrate their sense of 
responsibility in a socially significant way and to take a public stand. He 
concluded his essay by saying “the defence of justice, the international defence of 
individual victims of violence, the defence of mankind‟s lasting interests are the 
responsibility of every scientist” (p.185). 
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Albert Einstein, perhaps the most renowned scientist and physicist of the 
20
th
 century, made several memorable statements that demonstrated his attitude to 
the issue of social responsibility in scientific research and application:   
 “Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological 
criminal” (Einstein, n.d. -a).  
 “It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our 
humanity” (Einstein, n.d. -b).  
 “Concern for man and his fate must always form the chief interest of all 
technical endeavours. Never forget this in the midst of your diagrams and 
equations” (Einstein, n.d. -c).  
The first two statements emphasised the danger of powerful modern 
technologies in the hands of a very fallible humanity. Einstein was suggesting that 
humanity‟s spiritual and moral development is insufficient to wisely handle our 
current technological power. The third statement makes it clear that he believed 
that social responsibility should be every scientist‟s primary concern. 
Physicians 
Physicians are responsible for the wellbeing of people. This responsibility 
has led them to be amongst the leaders in recognising the potential harms of 
technology for humanity and in advocating increased social responsibility in 
science (Physicians for Social Responsibility, n.d.). However, Lewis Wolpert 
(1989), (a distinguished professor of medicine) claimed science is not responsible 
for the misapplication of knowledge. Nonetheless, he suggested a major 
obligation for scientists: the necessity to inform the public on science and its 
social implications. As Wolpert saw it, scientists‟ obligations were to examine the 
social implications of their work, to make these known to the public and to make 
it clear how reliable their conclusion were. He did not consider it to be the 
responsibility of scientists‟ to decide how it should be used – rather, he saw this as 
a political decision. He claimed:  
Whatever new technology is introduced, it is not for scientists to make 
moral or ethical decisions about its use, as they have no special rights or 
skills in this regard. There is grave danger in asking scientists to be more 
socially responsible if they would also be given the right and authority to 
make such decisions on their own. (Wolpert, 1999, p. 281) 
This statement by Wolpert may be criticised on several points. First, it is not 
clear that scientists “have no special rights or skills in this regard”, as some of the 
arguments discussed above show (e.g., Bunge, 1977; Cournand, 1977; Jonas, 
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1985; Luppicini, 2008). As the discovers of new knowledge and inventors of new 
technologies they may have marginal extra benefits and rights compared to the 
rest of society; indeed this is traditionally recognised by the granting of patents 
and the bestowing of honours for scientific achievements.  If researchers are to be 
credited as being responsible for positive outcomes from their discoveries and 
inventions should they not, as Reiser and Bulger (1997) and Bunge (1977) argued, 
also being held responsible for harm?   
Second, as scientists and specialists in their particular disciplines they may 
possess knowledge and skills which allow them to better understand and predict 
the potential applications of new technologies than those unversed in the relevant 
science (Luppicini, 2008; Reiser & Bulger, 1997). Certainly, scientists may better 
understand the causal processes involved – an important aspect of foresight and 
teleological ethics as proposed by Moore (1966) and Bunge (1977). Third, asking 
scientists to be more socially responsible does not necessarily mean giving them 
“the right and authority to make such decisions on their own” (Wolpert, 1999, p. 
281). Rather, it involves scientists‟ greater participation in societal decision-
making processes regarding science.  This can occur through transparent science 
processes, technological foresighting and evaluation, advocacy for the objects of 
intrinsic value studied or impacted by their scientific discipline, and information 
dissemination to, and dialogue and deliberation with, the public and other relevant 
stakeholder groups regarding moral issues related to science, technology and their 
uses and application within society.   
Wolpert (1999, p. 282), cautioning against bioethics, claimed pejoratively 
that it is a “growth industry” and that “bioethicists have a vested interest in 
finding difficulties” (p. 282). He argued for a “distinction between knowledge of 
the world and how it is to be used” (p. 282). However, other authors argue that 
while this distinction may have been valid in the past, because techno-science, big 
science, or as termed in the current work, Promethean science and technology, are 
so intertwined in the production of knowledge and its use, this distinction has 
broken down and is no longer valid (Haraway, 1997; Nicholas, 1999a).   
Wolpert (1999) further claimed: “One should not abandon the possibility of 
using a scientific idea to do good because one could use the same idea to do bad. 
There is no knowledge that is not susceptible to manipulation for evil purposes” 
(p. 282). Even agreeing with Wolpert on these two propositions, one could still 
take the position that some technologies are almost purely evil (as did, for 
example, Bunge, [1977]), having no, or almost no, foreseeable good applications, 
and hence ought to be banned. Candidate technologies for pure evil might include 
 89 
 
nuclear weapons, biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as 
highlighted by the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. However, it should be noted that 
the people responsible for developing the Mutual Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) 
rationale for the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons may not share 
this view (Sokolski, 2004). 
In Wolpert‟s (1989, 1999) view, the extra social and moral responsibility of 
scientists lies in transparency of knowledge and information through engagement 
with the public about scientific discoveries, their potential implications for 
society, and the degree of certitude associated with the science. He did, however, 
note that for scientists there may be conflicts between “responsibilities as 
researchers and their responsibility to those for whom they work” (1999, p. 281). 
Although not defining what he meant by “responsibilities as researchers” he went 
on to point out that “Scientists, just like everyone else, have to try not to become 
the unquestioning tools of their employers” (1999, p. 282), implying that in 
certain circumstances scientists have a responsibility to question and even act 
against the instructions of their employers. Considering the question of whether 
there are some areas of knowledge that are too dangerous to research (as was 
argued by Commoner, 1966; Dainton, 1971; Joy, 2000), Wolpert (1999) claimed 
that, provided the above responsibilities were fulfilled, then there were no areas 
which ought not to be subject to research.  
Another physician, Kenneth Shine, in his Presidential address to the 
Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences (USA), also argued for a 
higher degree of accountability of scientists and physicians for science and its 
products (Shine, 1989). He considered that scientists must identify the importance 
of what they do in relation to improvements in health and biotechnology. He also 
saw the need for a larger social ethic – one that addresses the question about the 
right and proper way for society to use its resources and set its priorities. Unlike 
Wolpert, Shine believed that scientists have a responsibility for how knowledge is 
used and to whom it is made available. He claimed that recognising and acting on 
the need for accountability is ethically and socially essential, and that doing so 
will increase society‟s confidence in science. 
Ecologists 
Ecologists, like physicists and physicians, are another group of scientists 
whose research prompts a focus on social responsibility. According to Bradshaw 
and Bekoff (2001), ecologists are caught between two competing models of 
science: “a science apart from society and a science directly engaged with 
society” (p.460), with some ecologists arguing for a new social contract of active 
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engagement while others argue that such engagement amounts to advocacy 
undermining scientific neutrality and credibility. Ecologists work at the 
intersection of humans, nature, science and society. They consider such topics as 
sustainability, ecosystems services, animal ethics and restoration ecology. These 
issues explicitly involve studying the relationship between humans and nature and 
implicitly require examining the boundaries between science and society 
(Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2001).  
Claiming that “most environmental problems stimulating current research 
are products of science and the culture in which they were developed” (p.460), 
Bradshaw and Bekoff (2001) considered that the question of how separate science 
is, or should be, from society should be a concern for all scientists. They stated 
their case for scientific social responsibility:  
There is growing recognition of the social and ecological costs that have 
accompanied science and its supporting worldview. The majority of 
reported marine dead zones, extinctions and land transformations of nearly 
half of the surface of the Earth have been created directly or indirectly by 
Euro-American cultures at the expense of the indigenous peoples. In the 21
st
 
century, science is challenged to be relevant to multiple worldviews, many 
of which are beginning to appear in ecological literature and concepts.” 
(Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2001, p. 462) 
In their opinion, excluding consideration of science-society interactions and its 
intrinsic subjectivity diminishes the power of science, and makes it more 
vulnerable to political manipulation. Therefore, they sought a broader view of 
scientific knowledge – one that included in its practice and theory, scientists and 
science itself (Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2001). The current work also shares this 
perspective. Bradshaw and Bekoff stated:  
Many ecologists argue that the biosphere should be viewed as an integrated 
complex system. The incorporation of the human dimension necessitates 
that ecologists go one step further and view the knowledge, practice and 
practitioners of this dimension as part of the biosphere. (Bradshaw & 
Bekoff, 2001, p. 464) 
The thesis of their paper is that this kind of understanding requires shifting 
from a model of science as separate from society to one of integration. Somewhat 
similarly to Ziman (2001), Bradshaw and Bekoff argued that integrative 
approaches to science and interdisciplinary collaboration need to be part of a 
science education that supports socially responsible science. 
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The Russell-Einstein Manifesto 
On 9 July, 1955 the Russell-Einstein Manifesto was issued in London by an 
eminent group of scientists including Albert Einstein, Bertram Russell, Max Born, 
Linus Pauling and Joseph Rotblat. The Manifesto, noting the “tragic situation 
which confronts humanity…as a result of the development of weapons of mass 
destruction”, called for an end to war and invited scientists and the general public 
to subscribe to the following resolution: 
In view of the fact that in any future world war nuclear weapons will 
certainly be employed, and that such weapons threaten the continued 
existence of mankind, we urge the governments of the world to realise, and 
to acknowledge publicly, that their purpose cannot be furthered by a world 
war, and we urge them, consequently, to find peaceful means for the 
settlement of all matters of dispute between them. (Russell & Einstein, 
1955) 
The Russell-Einstein Manifesto instigated the „Pugwash Meetings‟ which, 
according to Khan (1988, p. 258), became a force of moderation in international 
relations and emphasised “the new role of the scientist as the conscience of 
humanity, and the moral duty of the scientist to be concerned with the ethical 
consequences of his (sic) discoveries.” 
The epistemic code of scientists 
Over time, scientists have developed general rules of procedure to guide the 
conduct of individual scientists towards each other and to help produce certified 
knowledge. Merton (1942b) examined the general norms of scientific activity, 
defining these rules as: 1) universalism: scientific work should be judged on the 
basis of its scientific merits or significance alone, 2) principle of organised 
scepticism: scientific works should be judged provisionally on the relevant 
evidence at hand – however, an open mind should be kept regarding what might 
be found in future, 3) principle of disinterestedness: the advancement of scientific 
knowledge should take primacy over scientists‟ personal motives, 4) the principle 
of communism: scientists should share the knowledge acquired through research 
with the scientific community, which has a right to that knowledge. This last 
principle is often in conflict with the commercialisation of science and the 
patenting of intellectual property that became a prominent feature of late 20
th
 
century science (Krimsky, 2004). 
Twenty-five years after Merton first formulated the scientist‟s code, 
Cournand (a Nobel Laureate for medicine) and Meyer (1976) reformulated the 
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norms for scientists as: honesty, objectivity, tolerance, doubt of certitude, 
unselfish engagement and communal spirit. Honesty and objectivity were defined 
as: avoiding the undisciplined introduction of subjective elements into their 
perceptions, preventing their desires and aversions from penetrating their 
observations of the phenomena that they study and their analyses of these 
observations. Cournand and Meyer argued this could affect selection of problems 
and hypotheses and the presentation of data (Cournand, 1977; Cournand & 
Meyer, 1976).  
Tolerance was defined as “the recognition that respect for the creative 
potentialities of other scientists is closely related to respect for their good faith” 
(Cournand, 1977, p. 700). Doubt of certitude was defined as: “an attitude of 
readiness to question what is accepted as certain by established authorities in 
science is one of the primum movens in the generation of new knowledge” 
(p.700). Recognition of error is relevant because: “the recognition, 
acknowledgment, and admission of error favors progress in understanding” 
(p.700). Unselfish engagement was defined as: “the scientist‟s purpose should be 
to extend our knowledge and understanding of the universe, and not to secure 
personal gain or promote the supremacy of a particular philosophy or ideology” 
(p.700). Communal spirit was defined as:  
It is incumbent on scientists to appreciate and respect their dependence on 
the community of scientists. Scientists must recognise that their own work is 
part of the larger scientific enterprise and that they themselves are linked to 
their colleagues through submission to its traditions and participation in its 
ethos. (Cournand, 1977, p. 700)  
Ziman (2001) called the values underlying the scientists‟ code epistemic 
values because they are principally invoked as a process for acquiring certified 
scientific knowledge, a necessary aspect of scientists‟ social and moral 
responsibility. However, in Ziman‟s view, it is not a sufficient condition, given 
the power of modern technology to ubiquitously affect society. In contrast, he 
referred to the values that relate to how scientific knowledge is put to use in 
society as moral values. In the current work, these moral values have been 
referred to as social and moral responsibilities.  For convenience, henceforth, the 
term “the social responsibilities of science and scientists” will be used. 
The code of scientists as explicated by Merton and reformulated by 
Cournand and colleagues contains epistemic values, but it does not contain 
prescriptions about how scientists should act in regard to the use to which their 
discoveries are put (Cournand, 1977; Ziman, 1998). That is, it does not prescribe 
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an ethic of social responsibility for scientists. Cournand (1977) noted that 
industrialised countries were experiencing the fruits of science in terms of 
unparalleled technological development, but that the benefits of these new 
technologies were distributed in a grossly unbalanced manner, both within 
industrialised countries and among the nations of the world. He claimed that the 
traditional code of scientists is no longer sufficient as a guide for scientists‟ 
responsibilities, that it “does not give adequate guidance in such matters as the 
value of scientific knowledge versus other aspects of life or the application of the 
knowledge gained by scientific research”  (1977, p. 702). 
Ziman (1998) observed an historic distinction between academic scientists 
and industrial scientists, claiming that Merton‟s code of scientists was mainly 
applicable to academic scientists while industrial scientists were committed to a 
different (unstated) code. Whereas academic scientists could claim disinterest, 
objectivity and academic freedom, industrial scientists were required to loyally 
serve their employers, they were not free to choose their own topics or publish at 
will, and they did not own the results of their research. Despite the fact that the 
products of industrial science are intimately interwoven into society and industrial 
scientists are more likely than academic scientists to encounter ethical dilemmas 
of social responsibility, they do not usually have a direct say in how these 
dilemmas are resolved. Rather, the legal responsibility rests with their corporate 
employers, who frequently are not scientists themselves. 
 Ziman (1998) claimed that, like academic scientists, industrial scientists 
have shied away from the ethics of social responsibility, albeit for somewhat 
different reasons. He pointed out that industrial scientists are not completely 
powerless, or exempt from blame, in the face of unethical or socially irresponsible 
behaviour by their employers. They can choose not to take jobs with organisations 
whose policies and practices they find ethically unacceptable or they can resign or 
whistle-blow if required to do unethical or socially irresponsible work. And, like 
other subordinates, they cannot escape personal blame for crimes committed on 
the orders of higher authorities (Ziman, 1998).  
A moral code for scientists 
Cournand argued for the extension of his reformulated scientist‟s code 
beyond the domain of science, that is, scientists should apply their traditional code 
in their transactions with the extra-scientific realm of society. He proposed that 
the code should recognise that scientists are individuals who live in a society 
which has ends other than those of scientists and suggested that the code should 
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be a basis for dialogue and pragmatic reconciliation of conflicting views 
(Cournand, 1977).  
Cournand characterised science and technology as following a path of blind 
emergence, analogous with biological evolution, which has led to the current 
broadening disparities between those who have and those who have not, while 
technology remains unchecked. He believed that we need to find ways of 
controlling the processes of emergence to favour humankind‟s survival – this he 
termed humanised emergence. Like Ziman (2001), Cournand wanted an ethic for 
science that fosters the values of egalitarianism, political pluralism, and 
fraternalism in socio-political development. 
Ziman (2001, p. 165) claimed that “research scientists are trained to produce 
specialised bricks of knowledge, but not to look at the whole building.” Similar to 
Bradshaw and Bekoff‟s (2001) argument, Ziman stated the case for what he called 
„metascience‟, an educational discipline extending “beyond conventional 
philosophy and ethics to include the social and humanistic aspects of the scientific 
enterprise” (p. 165). He wanted to see metascience become an integral part of 
scientific training in order to help equip scientists of the future with the skills 
necessary to tackle ethical dilemmas as they arise. 
Research on Scientists’ Attitude to Social Responsibility  
As documented above, a number of eminent scientists have published their 
views regarding the necessity for increased social responsibility in science and 
technological development and philosophers of science and technology have 
likewise made a considerable contribution to the discussion of this issue. 
However, according to a number of authors (e.g., McCormick, et al., 2009; 
Pimple, 2002; Prpic, 1998; Weil, 2002), published empirical research into 
scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility is almost non-existent. Many studies 
have examined the ethical attitudes of various professional groups, including 
scientists and engineers. However, usually the focus of such studies was on 
participants‟ attitudes regarding misconduct or unethical behaviour in research or 
practice, or the epistemic values of science, rather than attitudes to social 
responsibility regarding the wider community.  
The premise underlying the present thesis is that the Promethean power of 
modern science and technology warrants an extended ethic of social responsibility 
on the part of the scientists and technologists (Bunge, 1977; Cournand, 1977; 
Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 1983; Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 2005; Ziman, 2001). The 
purpose of the empirical research presented here is to examine scientists‟ and 
technologists‟ attitudes to social responsibility in science and technology. While 
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this question has surfaced as a small part of a larger issue in some other studies, 
no other study for which this question is the primary focus has been identified 
during the literature search for this paper. 
One study, which looked at the professional values of eminent scientists in 
Croatia (Prpic, 1998), identified six areas of social relations of scientists 1) 
colleagues, 2) students, 3) respondents and/or patients, 4) work organisations, 5) 
clients or research sponsors, and 6) the wider social community. It is this latter 
component, scientists‟ values regarding their relationship with the wider social 
community, which is relevant to the present discussion. Another study, which 
asked a limited number of questions on social responsibility, amongst a range of 
other issues, is the 2008 survey of New Zealand scientists and technologists by 
Sommer (2010). A couple of studies also examine scientists‟ attitudes to public 
engagement (Market & Opinion Research International, 2000; Small & Mallon, 
2006). Small and Mallon (2006) also examined scientists‟ attitudes to the 
commercialisation of science, another factor which, as previously discussed, the 
public and some scholars believe restricts scientists‟ ability and predilection to act 
socially responsibly.  
A study by Krasner and Houts (1984) examined the differences in value 
structure and epistemological beliefs about science amongst two groups of 
psychologists, behaviourists and non-behaviourists. Over the past 60 years a small 
body of empirical literature has examined the psychology of scientists, sometimes 
including their values. However, generally they address epistemic values rather 
than the issue of scientists‟ social responsibilities to society. As these were the 
only related empirical studies that the author could find they are discussed in 
greater detail in the remainder of this chapter. 
The epistemic values of scientists 
Mahoney (1979) reviewed the empirical literature about the psychology of 
scientists and examined evidence for the generally accepted Mertonian (epistemic) 
social norms in actual scientific behaviour. He cited ample evidence to show that 
these idealised norms are frequently violated by scientists in practice. He cited a 
number of well known examples demonstrating that scientists frequently are not 
objective but are strongly influenced by particular theories, which as Kuhn (1962) 
has shown, they are very reluctant to give up, even in the face of new evidence 
(which also contradicts the Mertonian values of organised scepticism and the 
disinterested pursuit of truth). Some scientists even refused to examine evidence 
(e.g., Skinner refused to examine Chomsky‟s criticisms of behaviourism) which 
claimed to contradict their pet theories (Mahoney, 1979). 
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 Scientists‟ objectivity is also often compromised by intense emotions 
regarding their work. Thus, Mahoney (1979, p. 353) cited Mitroff (1974, pp. 70-
71) regarding the “inner and often extreme emotions that are connected with the 
doing of science” and noted that Mitroff challenged the idea that it is desirable for 
scientists to be unemotional in their work. Rather, he claimed, it is this passion 
that motivates them. Mahoney also documented evidence that the principle of 
communality (open sharing of information and cooperation with scientific 
colleagues) is often neglected in the competitive endeavour to be first to publish, a 
very important career factor for many scientists, which Mahoney described as 
“perhaps the most generously documented phenomenon in the literatures of 
science” (p. 362). For industrial scientists, the imperative of patenting new 
discoveries obstructs and clashes with the principle of communality (Grisham, 
2000; Leonard, 2002; Schacht, 2006; Wadman, 2010). 
Mahoney (1979) also attacked the idea that scientists are particularly 
rational and logical in their work. He claimed scientists suffer from confirmation 
bias. This is a tendency to actively seek out and give more weight to evidence that 
confirms one‟s hypotheses, and ignore or underweight evidence that disconfirms 
those hypotheses. He pointed out that confirmation bias is also common in the 
practice of scientific publication, with editors preferring to publish positive results 
rather than negative results. He claimed that “popular over-emphasis on null 
hypothesis testing exacerbates this irrationality” (p. 355).  
Croatian scientists’ values 
In her study of eminent Croatian scientists, Prpic (1998) used the responses 
of 320 scientists to ratings of the importance of a range of value statements, 
garnered from philosophy, sociology and psychology, regarding the practice of 
science, to analyse their values. Her sample included 64 natural scientists, 61 
technical scientists, 111 life-scientists (bio-medical and bio-technical) and 84 
social scientists. Overall, the scientists rated all the values as important, although 
there were considerable differences in the degree of importance attributed to 
social values and norms. In particular, the traditional epistemic values were rated 
highly important: conceptual accuracy, objectivity, and commitment to searching 
for the truth. Interestingly, responsibility for the effects of one‟s research results, a 
value implying a degree of social responsibility, was considered very important 
(the third most important value) by Prpic‟s sample. 
The next most important group of values was related to supporting 
colleagues and sharing knowledge, knowledge for the benefit of society (a value 
implying social responsibility), openness to data and originality. The lowest 
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ranked values (though still above the scale midpoint) were the rights of 
respondents and patients – anonymity and voluntary participation, the 
accessibility of research and data to scientific public scrutiny, and value-
neutrality: “consistent ethical neutrality or avoidance of evaluating human and 
social un/desirability of scientific results” (p. 278). 
Because of the lack of any previous empirical data regarding scientists‟ 
attitudes towards social responsibility, on a philosophical basis, Prpic 
hypothesised that value-neutrality (the idea that science is the value free discovery 
of true knowledge) would define scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility. That 
is, she hypothesised that those who view science as value-neutral will be less 
inclined to consider the social and moral implications of their research. Value-
neutrality was rated the least important of the rated values. Nonetheless, it still 
received considerable support, 46% rating it as important and 16% as very 
important. Prpic noted that this contradicts the ranking the scientists gave to 
“knowledge for the benefit of man [sic] and society and responsibility for the 
effects of one‟s research results”. Prpic (1998, p. 279) asked: “how can a scientist 
be responsible for the effects of his or her research without evaluating its humane 
and social value?” She concluded that only a small proportion of scientists in her 
study held a consistent attitude towards social responsibility.  
Prpic‟s (1998) analyses showed that there were significant differences 
between scientists from different disciplines in regard to the factor of broader 
social responsibility. Technical and life scientists showed the greatest concern 
with social responsibility, while natural scientists and social scientist showed less 
such concern. However, the technical and life scientists also displayed greater 
value-neutrality than the natural and social scientists, thus demonstrating greater 
inconsistency between value-neutrality and social responsibility. 
New Zealand scientists’ values 
Sommer (2010), in collaboration with the New Zealand Association of 
Scientists (NZAS), conducted a survey of New Zealand scientists (previous 
surveys had been conducted in 1994, 1996 and 2000). The latest survey contained 
several questions relevant to scientists‟ attitude to social responsibility.  Of a 
survey population estimated to be approximately 6,000, a random sample of 930 
scientists was sent an Internet survey. Of this number, 361 (38.6%) usable surveys 
were returned, 28.8% (n=104) of respondents were female and 71.2% (n=257) 
were male. Scientists self-identified as belonging to one of the nine following 
broad fields of science: agriculture and soil science; biological sciences; 
engineering sciences and applied sciences and technologies; earth and 
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environmental sciences, and natural resources; medical and health sciences, 
mathematics and computer sciences; physical sciences; social and behavioural 
sciences; and other.  
Respondents were required to assess their own affinity with a range of 
statements. The first statement relevant to the current work was: “In my 
professional capacity, I feel responsible first to science and the creation of new 
knowledge or products, and then to the concerns of citizens” (Sommer, 2010, p. 
21).  Only 2.8% agreed emphatically, 25.2% agreed in substance, 8.6% neither 
agreed nor disagreed, 48.2% disagreed in substance, while 11.9% disagreed 
emphatically. Women (67.3%) disagreed more than men (57.2%). Differences 
were also found in regard to scientific fields of study. Medical and health 
scientists, and engineers and applied scientists (71.4% and 71.1% respectively) 
disagreed more than other disciplines. Social and behavioural scientists (46.5%) 
were the only group in which less than 50% disagreed with the statement. 
Sommer (2010, p. 21) concluded that scientists‟ sense of social responsibility 
“already strong, strengthened over the past decade.”  
The next statement of interest focussed on scientific governance: “It is the 
proper role for government with regard to funding of science to define broadly 
what should be investigated, thereby providing scientists with a „research 
agenda‟” (Sommer, 2010, p. 22). Disagreement was stronger (55.7%) than 
agreement (33.6%). Women disagreed more than men (65.4% and 51.7% 
respectively) and men agreed more than women (38.5% and 21.2% respectively). 
These results suggest that there is considerable dissatisfaction amongst scientists 
with the role that the New Zealand government currently takes in setting the 
research agenda. As no questions were asked regarding academic freedom or the 
public‟s right to participate in the setting of the science agenda, it is difficult to 
know whether scientists believed that they, or the public (or someone else), should 
have this responsibility (although see the question below regarding scientists 
decision-making role regarding dangerous technologies). 
The next statement of interest addresses the precautionary principle: “The 
New Zealand government‟s Sustainable Development Programme of action 
establishes a set of principles that require government to address risk and 
uncertainty when making choices, taking a precautionary approach to funding 
science and technology. I think that these constraints are more detrimental than 
they are helpful” (Sommer, 2010, p. 23). Only 3.6% agreed emphatically with this 
statement, 36.6% agreed in substance, 37.7% neither agreed nor disagreed, 13.6% 
disagreed in substance, and 1.4% disagreed emphatically. Although a rather large 
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group declined to respond either way, clearly, on balance, New Zealand scientists 
were not very supportive of the precautionary principle. Note the contrast between 
these New Zealand scientists‟ attitudes to the precautionary principle and the 
attitudes of the Spanish public (Lujan & Todt, 2007, reported in Chapter 1), who 
overwhelmingly supported the application of the precautionary principle to 
technological development (75% support, 6% opposed). 
The final proposition of interest concerned the development of dangerous 
technology and the decision role of scientists: “I think that the development of 
potentially dangerous technology should be decided, primarily, within the 
scientific and engineering community” (Sommer, 2010, p. 24). Although 26.1% 
of respondents agreed with this assertion, the majority, 54.5% disagreed. Sommer 
(2010, p. 24) concluded: “these data, once again, represent a strong inclination 
towards societal responsibility and citizen involvement over strict expertise.”  
British scientists’ attitude to public engagement 
Market and Opinion Research International (2000) conducted a study in 
Britain about the role of scientists in public debate. The research was sponsored 
by the Wellcome Trust and the Office of Science and Technology (UK). Noting 
that public understanding of science was well researched they observed “little 
effort has been made to understand how scientists themselves perceive increasing 
calls for them to become more involved in communicating their research to the 
public, and to increase dialogue on the social and ethical implications of research” 
(P. 3). The quantitative survey was conducted with a randomly selected sample of 
1652 British scientists using face-to-face interviews. 
Regarding their image, only 9% of scientists thought that the public 
considered scientists responsible, whereas 44% of scientists perceived scientists 
as being responsible. Only 4% of scientists thought the public considered them 
socially responsible, whereas 29% of scientists perceived scientists as being 
socially responsible (Market & Opinion Research International, 2000). These 
results are interesting not only for the discrepancy in how scientists think the 
public views them and how scientists perceive their own profession, but also the 
relatively low perceptions scientists have of their profession regarding 
responsibility and, in particular, social responsibility.  
Over 70% of scientists considered their field of research had social and 
ethical implications for the public. Biomedical scientists (79%) were more likely 
to agree than non-biomedical scientists (60%), while scientists who work with 
patients (94%) were the most likely to agree with the statement. Overall, 93% of 
scientists agreed (56% strongly agreed) “that the non-specialist public needs to 
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know about the social and ethical implications of scientific research” (Market & 
Opinion Research International, 2000, p. 9).  
The vast majority of British scientists agreed that communication of social 
and ethical implications of research to both the public (84%) and policy makers 
(91%) was their responsibility because their scientific knowledge and skills gave 
them insight into these issues (Market & Opinion Research International, 2000). 
Sixty percent claimed they would like to spend more time communicating their 
results to the public. Although 75% felt adequately equipped to communicate the 
scientific facts of their research, only 20% felt well equipped to do so. This 
confidence declined regarding the communication of social and ethical issues 
associated with their work (62% felt adequately equipped, and only 10% well 
equipped). Lack of public knowledge and education (53%), and lack of public 
interest in science and technology (22%), were perceived as barriers to 
communication with the public, by the scientists surveyed. The media were 
perceived as a barrier to communication with the public by 35% of scientists. 
Ethical and societal concern in biomedical science 
A recent study of biomedical scientists (N = 856) in the U.S. reported 
somewhat lower levels of concern about ethical and social consequences of their 
research (McCormick, et al., 2009). They noted that, while there was “an 
increasing literature on scientists‟ views of scientific misconduct and behaviour, 
very few studies have been published on scientists‟ perceptions of the ethical, 
societal, and policy implications of their research” (p. 2, emphasis in original).  
McCormick et al. (2009) surveyed biomedical scientists to find out what 
percentage perceived ethical and societal implications associated with their 
research, and whether biomedical scientists perceived a need for research ethics 
consultation or would find such a consultation useful. While 41% reported that 
they had not previously experienced ethical and societal issues arising from their 
research, 59% reported they had. Although 53% did not expect their current 
research to generate such issues, 31% thought that it might, while a further 17% 
thought that it definitely would. Half (51%) reported that they would find a 
research ethics consultation service at their institution moderately, very, or 
extremely useful. Thirty-six percent claimed that such a service would be useful 
to them personally. Respondents conducting research with human participants 
were more likely to consider an ethics consultation service useful to them 
personally than those not conducting research with humans. 
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Democratisation and commercialisation of science 
Democratisation of science 
Noting the increasing literature suggesting public mistrust in science and the 
calls for increased engagement between science and society as a remedial 
response, Small and Mallon (2006), in unstructured interviews with 21 New 
Zealand scientists, examined their attitudes to commercialisation and 
democratisation of science
1
. Some authors have suggested that the increasing 
commercialisation of science and its control by big business creates conflict for 
scientists, compromising the public good role of science (Nowotny, et al., 2003), 
compromising scientists‟ ethical and social responsibility (Hurt & Robertson, 
1998; Krimsky, 2004; Olivieri, 2003) and reducing public trust in science 
(Eichelbaum, Allan, Fleming, & Randerson, 2001; Polkinghorne, 2000). That 
commercialisation of science would likely increase public distrust in science is 
also suggested by the results of Small et al. (2005). They found that trust in 
companies was much lower than (the already relatively low) trust in scientists 
regarding genetic engineering. Only 7% of the public agreed or strongly agreed 
that they would trust what companies say about genetic engineering (cf. 24% trust 
scientists), whereas 68% either disagreed or strongly disagreed that companies 
could be trusted (cf. 41% distrusted scientists). A further 24% were either neutral 
or unsure about the trustworthiness of companies (cf. 34% were neutral or unsure 
regarding scientists).  
The democratisation of science, that is, the engagement of the public in 
dialogue about science and technology, its social and moral implications for 
society, and participation in setting the research agenda, is one approach 
suggested for combating the erosion of public trust in science (House of Lords 
Select Committee on Science and Technology, 2000). Advocates suggested that 
increased openness and transparency in science and increased public participation 
in scientific decision-making may help ensure the social responsibility of science 
and hence help restore public trust and confidence in science (Irwin, 2001). 
Small and Mallon (2006), in their qualitative study, found that the scientists 
in their sample generally considered that the public have a right to have a say in 
setting the research agenda and that the science community has a responsibility to 
engage and dialogue with the public in this regard. The main reasons scientists 
                                                 
1
 This study was conducted as part of Study 1 in the current research. However, results are 
reported here for two reasons. First, the data presented have been published in the peer reviewed 
literature, and second, it was not the sole work of the current author. Professor Mary Mallon 
conducted three of the interviews, assisted in the analysis of the data, and co-authored the journal 
article. 
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gave for this attitude were that the public had a right to participate when science 
issues were contentious and had important social and ethical implications for 
society. They argued that, because considerable funding for science came from the 
public purse, the public had a right to say how that money should be spent, that 
science should conform to the mores of society as revealed by engagement with 
the public, and that in order to do public good science, science needed to engage 
with the public to determine what the public considers public good science to be.  
However, more than half of the interviewees spontaneously expressed the 
belief that there should be limitations to the public‟s role in setting the science 
agenda. A range of reasons were given for this position. The most common was 
the belief that science is complex and many of the public are not scientifically 
literate enough to meaningfully participate (in the public understanding of science 
literature this position is known as the deficit theory). Thus, some scientists 
suggested that it needs to be an informed public who participate (Small & Mallon, 
2006). 
Related to the deficit theory concern, some scientists thought that it was not 
for the public to tell scientists about science (some expressed their frustration at 
being given lectures by members of the public who clearly did not understand the 
science they were advising the scientists about). Hence, some suggested the 
public‟s role should be restricted to applications of the technology (rather than 
having a say in basic science), or to the spiritual, ethical and cultural issues that 
surround the science and technological applications.  
Some scientists expressed concern about the logistical processes of 
democratisation, the time consuming nature of dialogue, the logistical difficulty of 
getting fair representation, the diverse range and contradictory nature of public 
opinion, and the impossibility of reaching consensus (Small & Mallon, 2006). 
These process issues related to the democratisation of science led to a concern that 
allowing the public too great a role would result in paralysis of scientific progress. 
Another concern of scientists, regarding democratisation, was that the public 
could be used as pawns in the agendas of vocal pressure groups and be influenced 
by media misrepresentation of science. Finally, the validity of the democratic 
process as a decision-making tool to provide optimal solutions was questioned by 
some scientists.  
Generally, scientists expressed uncertainty about how best to engage with 
the public. They noted a range of different options, and while some thought these 
options were adequate, most did not (Small & Mallon, 2006). Data taken from this 
study and statements made by the participants were used in the construction of the 
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attitude to democratisation scale developed for the quantitative study in this thesis. 
Democratisation of science is one of the component constructs forming the 
nomological network designed to infer construct validity to the new instruments 
being developed in the current work. 
Democratisation and social responsibility. A conceptual argument may be 
made that concern for social responsibility in science will be related to attitudes to 
democratisation of science. Those who favour democratisation are more 
concerned with engaging with the public and finding out what their opinions and 
concerns are. They are also more in favour of sharing the decision-making 
regarding the science agenda. These attitudes are consistent with recognition of 
the social responsibilities of science and a willingness to seek inclusive ways of 
addressing these issues. However, no empirical literature was found that would 
indicate a likely effect size for the relationship. Therefore, the next two 
hypotheses are: 
H16 There will be a positive correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude to 
the democratisation of science and their awareness of the need for social 
responsibility in scientific research and development. 
H17 There will be a positive correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude to 
the democratisation of science and their judgments of the importance of 
specific behaviours to enhance social responsibility in scientific research 
and development. 
Democratisation and technological optimism. As part of the nomological 
network of study constructs, further hypotheses are proposed regarding the 
democratisation of science, the construct of technological optimism, and the four 
higher order Schwartz value dimensions. Scientists who have a strong belief in 
technological optimism may perceive lower levels of risk attached to new 
technologies and believe in a technology fix for any emerging problems. Their 
perception of the need to dialogue with the public about the social consequences 
of technology, about its acceptability, and about the science agenda, will be 
diminished. If scientists who are technological optimists also believe that the 
democratisation of science is likely to impede scientific progress (as a majority of 
scientists in Small and Mallon‟s (2006) qualitative study believed) then they will 
be less likely to support the democratisation of science (i.e., it is both unnecessary 
and impedes scientific progress). However, no empirical literature was found that 
would indicate a likely effect size for the relationship. Therefore, the next 
hypothesis is: 
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H18 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude 
to the democratisation of science and their belief in technological optimism. 
Democratisation and openness to change. The individualistic value types, 
„hedonism‟, „self-direction‟ and „stimulation‟, constituting „openness to change‟, 
are oriented towards personal satisfaction and fulfilment, freedom, independence, 
and self direction. Such values are consistent with the traditional scientific value 
of academic freedom, whereas the democratisation of science is likely to place 
limits on scientists‟ degree of freedom to choose and conduct research following 
their own interest and intellectual stimulation. This suggests a negative 
association between democratisation and openness to change. On the other hand, 
the openness to novelty and challenge aspects of this dimension might suggest 
greater tolerance of change towards more democratic processes in science, 
perhaps suggesting a positive relationship. No empirical evidence was found that 
suggested the size of any relationship between the two variables. On balance, it is 
predicted the relationship will be negative but, because of the two contradictory 
forces, it is likely to be weak. Therefore, the next hypothesis is:  
H19 There will be a small negative correlation between scientists‟ favourable 
attitude to the democratisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension openness to change.  
Democratisation and conservation. The higher order value dimension 
„conservation‟ is predominantly collectivist oriented; the comprising value types 
of „tradition‟, „conformity‟ and „security‟ are about the maintenance and security 
of the collective‟s culture and status quo. Traditionally, the public have had little 
say in the direction and agenda of science and academic freedom has been highly 
valued by the science community. It is proposed that scientists strong on the 
higher order value dimension of conservation will tend to want to maintain current 
practices and will value the concept of academic freedom. It is also likely that 
they will be accepting of scientists‟ traditional perspective of the deficit theory of 
public understanding of science and hence be opposed to the democratisation of 
science. However, on the other hand, the scientists in the sample work and live in 
western culture which has a strong tradition of democracy and may believe that 
democratic principles should also apply to the world of science. Some support is 
found for this idea in Small and Mallon (2006) in their qualitative study where 
most of the scientists they interviewed were supportive, in principle, of the 
democratisation of science even if they questioned the capability of the public and 
were concerned about the practical implications in terms of the detrimental effects 
on scientific progress. No previous empirical data was found about the 
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relationship between these two constructs. On balance it is predicted that the 
relationship will be negative but, because of the two contradictory forces argued 
above, it is likely to be weak. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H20 There will be a small negative correlation between scientists‟ favourable 
attitude to the democratisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension of conservation. 
Democratisation and self-transcendence. The higher order value dimension, 
„self-transcendence‟, is comprised of the value types „universalism‟ and 
„benevolence‟. These values are associated with justice and equity, concern for 
friends, concern for all people and concern for nature. It is proposed that scientists 
strong on self-transcendence will consider it the public‟s right to participate in 
setting the research agenda, particularly in an age of Promethean technologies 
with significant social and moral implications for society. No empirical literature 
was found relating democratisation of science to self-transcendence. Hence, while 
a positive relationship is proposed for conceptual reasons, no prediction is made 
regarding the size of the relationship. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H21 There will be a positive correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude to 
democratisation of science and the higher order value dimension self-
transcendence. 
Democratisation and self-enhancement. The higher order value dimension, 
„self-enhancement‟ is comprised of the value types „hedonism‟, „power‟ and 
„achievement‟. These are individualistic values concerned with personal 
gratification, success, ambition, and control over people and resources. It is 
proposed that the logistics of democratisation will slow decision-making and 
hence scientific progress as well as diminishing scientists‟ control over the 
science agenda. No empirical literature was found relating democratisation of 
science to self-enhancement. Hence, while a negative relationship is proposed for 
conceptual reasons, no prediction is made regarding the size of the relationship. 
Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H22 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude 
to democratisation of science and the higher order value dimension of self-
enhancement. 
Commercialisation of science 
In the Small and Mallon (2006) study most interviewees had a negative 
attitude to the commercialisation of science, but were resigned to it being 
politically and economically ordained. Generally, they considered it an 
ideological imperative of governments to turn science and technology into 
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economic growth and wealth creation. However, most viewed it as an unsuitable 
model for science – of more detriment than value. A range of serious concerns 
was expressed by scientists regarding the negative effects of commercialisation on 
science.  
First, commercialisation was viewed as inhibiting scientific progress by 
most of the interview participants (e.g., by restricting scientific result sharing in 
order to protect commercial advantage). Second, science quality was considered 
to be negatively affected, commercialisation was perceived as focussing on 
applied rather than basic research, with commercial imperatives setting research 
agendas rather than good science. Third, public good science was considered to be 
negatively affected; concern was expressed about profit seeking at the expense of 
public good.  Fourth, science transparency and scientific communality were 
considered to be compromised by commercialisation with secrecy about science 
results until after patents were obtained in order to gain commercial advantage 
(Small & Mallon, 2006).  
Fifth, public trust in science and scientists was thought to be damaged 
(because of the association of science with big business – perceived negatively by 
both the public and scientists). Sixth, concerns were expressed regarding the 
impact of commercialisation on scientists‟ ethical conduct. Scientists were 
concerned about personal wealth-seeking taking precedence over public good, and 
about the competitive funding process, which a number of scientists claimed 
encouraged exaggeration of the potential benefits of research in order to secure 
funding. Seventh, scientists‟ viewed it as damaging to their careers and working 
conditions. They saw commercialisation as contributing to a loss of their 
independent status, coercing scientists to be pawns of big business and politicians, 
with the consequent effect of a drop in status, authority, and trust in the eyes of 
the public (Small & Mallon, 2006).  
 Eighth, scientists thought that commercialisation eroded their traditional 
academic freedom (concerns included loss of autonomy, increasing 
managerialism and bureaucratic compliance). Finally, scientists considered their 
ability to participate in public dialogue to be restricted by the commercialisation 
of science (commercial sensitivity restricting companies‟ willingness to allow 
science employees to discuss science issues in public). This resulted in a reduction 
of science transparency and increased secrecy in the eyes of the public. As one 
scientist lamented “the focus and the science is to make money – it‟s not for the 
public good anymore” (Small & Mallon, 2006, p. 112). Several scientists 
considered that, because of the power of the technologies currently being 
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developed, a precautionary approach was necessary in the interest of the public 
good and for social responsibility. These scientists were concerned that the 
imperative of profit would compromise precaution.   
Amongst Small and Mallon‟s (2006) interviewees, commercialisation was 
frequently seen as conflicting with the aims of democratisation (i.e., openness and 
transparency, increased engagement and dialogue with the public and increased 
public participation in the scientific research agenda). A few scientists expressed 
mixed feelings about commercialisation, although finding it undesirable for the 
reasons cited previously, they nonetheless thought that it was necessary in some 
cases, particularly where the development of new products was a lengthy and 
expensive process (e.g., the pharmaceutical industry). Against the general grain of 
opinion, two scientists held positive views of commercialisation. One claimed that 
money was the root of all progress and hence commercialisation would enhance 
scientific innovation (Small & Mallon, 2006). Data and statements taken from 
Small and Mallon‟s participants were used to construct a scale of attitudes to the 
commercialisation of science for use in Study 2 of the current work.  
Commercialisation and social responsibility. Commercialisation of science 
is one of the construct components forming the nomological network designed to 
infer construct validity to the new instruments related to scientists‟ attitudes to 
social responsibility being developed in the current research. The 
commercialisation of science has been identified as a possible threat to ethical 
behaviour in science and to scientific social responsibility by the public (O'Neill, 
2002; The Office of Science and Technology and The Wellcome Trust, 2000; The 
Royal Society, 2002), by theorists and science commentators (Hurt & Robertson, 
1998; Krimsky, 2004; Nowotny, et al., 2003; Olivieri, 2003; Polkinghorne, 2000), 
and in empirical research (Small & Mallon, 2006). However, no empirical 
evidence was found which suggested the likely strength of the relationship. 
Therefore, the next two hypotheses are: 
H23 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude 
to the commercialisation of science and their awareness of the need for 
social responsibility in scientific research and development.  
H24 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude 
to the commercialisation of science and their judgments of the importance 
of specific behaviours to enhance social responsibility in scientific research 
and development. 
Commercialisation and democratisation. Small and Mallon (2006) found, in 
their qualitative study, that scientists felt conflict between the goals of 
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democratisation of science and the increasing commercialisation of science.  They 
perceived a rational conflict between the aims of democratisation (e.g., trust, 
transparency, participation) and the perceived consequences of commercialisation.  
However, no empirical evidence was found which suggested the likely strength of 
the relationship. Therefore, the next hypothesis is:  
H25 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude 
to the commercialisation of science and a favourable attitude to the 
democratisation of science.  
Commercialisation and technological optimism. As part of the nomological 
network of study constructs further hypotheses were proposed regarding the 
constructs of commercialisation of science and technological optimism, and the 
four Schwartz higher order value dimensions. Scientists who have a strong belief 
in technological optimism will be less concerned about potential negative social 
and moral consequences of Promethean technologies. They believe in a 
technology fix for any emerging problems. Their perception of the need for strong 
governance of science and technology will be diminished. They will be less likely 
to believe that market driven Promethean science will lead to negative social 
consequences for society and thus more likely to support the commercialisation of 
science. Kilbourne, Beckman, Lewis and Van Dam (Kilbourne, et al., 2001) found 
a medium size positive correlation (r = .33, p <.01) between economic liberalism 
(a laissez-faire approach to economics) and belief in the technofix. Therefore, the 
next hypothesis is: 
H26 There will be a medium size positive correlation between scientists‟ 
favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and their belief in 
technological optimism. 
Commercialisation and openness to change. The individualistic value types, 
„hedonism‟, „self direction‟ and „stimulation‟, which comprise the higher order 
value dimension, „openness to change‟, are oriented towards freedom, 
independence, self-direction, novelty and creativity consistent with academic 
freedom, free market theory and with opening science up to commercialisation. 
This suggests a positive correlation between commercialisation and openness to 
change. On the other hand, as some scientists considered that commercialisation 
of science will restrict academic freedom and independence this suggested a 
negative relationship between commercialisation and openness to change. No 
empirical evidence was found regarding this relationship. On balance, it is 
predicted that openness to change will be positively related to a favourable 
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attitude commercialisation but, because of these contradictory forces, the 
relationship is likely to be weak. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H27 There will be a small positive correlation between scientists‟ favourable 
attitude to the commercialisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension of openness to change. 
Commercialisation and conservation. The higher order value dimension 
conservation is predominantly collectivist oriented; the comprising value types of 
tradition, conformity and security are about the maintenance and security of the 
collective‟s culture and status quo. The increasing commercialisation of science is 
a relatively recent phenomenon in the history of science. The science culture of 
the twentieth century was mainly oriented towards public good science funded by 
the state through university and government controlled science bodies with a 
significant amount of academic freedom for individual scientists, particularly in 
the university system (Nowotny, et al., 2003; Ziman, 1994). This could suggest a 
negative relationship between commercialisation and conservation. However, the 
cultural tradition of Western society, the source of the scientist participants in the 
current work, is strongly orientated towards laissez-faire governance structures, 
capitalism and private ownership. Because this is a highly dominant tradition of 
Western culture it is proposed that an orientation towards tradition, preservation 
of culture, conformity and security will be positively related to the construct of 
commercialisation of science. However, because of these contradictory conceptual 
forces, the relationship is expected to be weak. No previous empirical research 
was found regarding this relationship. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H28 There will be a small positive correlation between scientists‟ favourable 
attitude to the commercialisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension of conservation.  
Commercialisation and self-transcendence. The higher order value 
dimension, „self-transcendence‟, is comprised of the value types „benevolence‟ 
and „universalism‟. Its value focus is towards the collective and concern for all 
people, justice, equity, nature, and with preservation of the environment. Self-
transcendence is concerned with the public good rather than private good. It is 
proposed that self-transcendence will be negatively associated with a favourable 
attitude to the commercialisation of science. In an age of Promethean 
technologies, where the potential social and environmental impacts are immense, 
self-transcendence is consistent with a preference for public benefit over the 
privatised benefits of commercialised science. No previous empirical research, 
 110 
 
which might indicate the likely effect size, was found regarding this relationship. 
Therefore the next hypothesis is: 
H29 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude 
to the commercialisation of science and the higher order value dimension 
self-transcendence. 
Commercialisation and self-enhancement. The higher order value 
dimension „self-enhancement‟ is comprised of the individualistic value types 
„achievement‟ and „power‟. These values are orientated towards ambition, 
success, wealth, authority, and control over people and resources. These values 
are consistent with free market concepts, privatised goods and hence the 
commercialisation of science. Additionally, Promethean science offers enormous 
potential for power and control over society and nature. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is predicted between self-enhancement and the commercialisation of 
science. However, no previous empirical research, which might indicate the likely 
effect size, was found regarding this relationship. Therefore, the next hypothesis 
is: 
H30 There will be a positive correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude to 
the commercialisation of science and the higher order value dimension self-
enhancement. 
Questioning scientific objectivity 
Krasner and Houts (1984) claimed that the traditional value-free 
conceptualisation of science is based on the “epistemology and ethics developed 
in the logical positivist philosophy of science” and that “the history of science was 
construed as a story of progress towards unbiased, objective knowledge” (p. 804) 
derived from the analysis of objective raw data. They noted that this conception 
has been challenged both by scientists and philosophers. They cited Heisenberg 
pointing out the implausibility of objective observation, Toulmin showing that 
theory and assumptions precede observation, Hanson‟s argument that there can be 
no neutral observation language, MacIntyre‟s claim that the “epistemological 
status of scientific claims may be no less relativistic than the comparable status of 
value claims in philosophical ethics” (p. 841) and Kuhn‟s challenge to the notion 
of gradual progress towards objective truth.  Rejecting objectivism they asserted 
the value-laden nature of science claiming that scientists must be understood in 
the social context of the common assumptions of their discipline, including its 
norms and values. They claimed that scientists begin with assumptions that cannot 
be justified by appeals to facts or logic and that some of these assumptions vary 
with disciplinary perspective. 
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Krasner and Houts (1984) studied the value systems of two groups of 
psychologists, the first group self-identified as behaviour modification 
psychologists while the second group did not self-identify with behaviour 
modification. Significant differences were found between the two groups of 
psychologists theoretical orientations. Behavioural psychologists were more 
oriented toward the factual (rather than the theoretical), to impersonal causality 
(rather than personal will), to behavioural content (rather than experimental), 
towards environmental determinism, toward physicalism, and were more 
quantitative in orientation than the non-behavioural psychologists. The non-
behavioural psychologists were more oriented towards biological determinism 
than behaviourists. Behaviourists also showed greater objectivism (rather than 
subjectivism) than the non-behaviourists.  
 Behaviourists showed significantly less metaphorism, rationalism and anti-
empiricism and more reductionism than the non-behaviourist. Multiple regression 
analysis showed that participants who viewed science as value-neutral favoured 
physiological reductionism and quantitative methods in psychology, whereas 
those who viewed science as value-laden “favored an intuitionist-subjectivist 
epistemology” (p. 848). Krasner and Houts (1984) concluded: “It will be 
especially important to relate [discipline-specific assumptions] to broader 
sociocultural and personal values in order to understand how the latter impact on 
the goals of research as well as on the influence of science on social planning and 
social policy” (p. 848). 
Summary 
To summarise this chapter, the social and moral consequences of technology 
are becoming increasingly important as science and technology become more 
powerful in their social ramifications (e.g., Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008; Small & 
Jollands, 2006). Considerable theorising and discussion about this issue has 
occurred both by scientists themselves (Abelson, 1970; Commoner, 1966; 
Cournand, 1977; Dainton, 1971; Lovelock, 2006; Polkinghorne, 2000; Rotblat, 
1999; Russell & Einstein, 1955; Sakharov, 1981; Union of Concerned Scientists, 
1992; Wackernagel & Rees, 1996; Walter & Richards, 1998; Wilson, 2002; 
Wolpert, 1999; Ziman, 1998) and by bioethicists and philosophers of technology 
(Bulger, Heitman, & Reiser, 2002; Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 1983; Lujan 
& Todt, 2007; Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 2005; Nicholas, 1999b; Petrinovich, 1999; 
Van  Potter & Whitehouse, 1998).  
However, few empirical studies have been conducted regarding scientists‟ 
attitudes to this issue (Market & Opinion Research International, 2000; 
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McCormick, et al., 2009; Pimple, 2002; Prpic, 1998; Weil, 2002). The mostly 
qualitative anthropological work that has been conducted with scientists has 
usually focussed on what Ziman (2001) calls the epistemic values of scientists, 
rather than what he calls the moral values, that are the primary focus of this work.  
In this chapter, 15 directional hypotheses have been proposed regarding the 
relationships between the various research constructs and their relationships to the 
higher order Schwartz value dimensions. These hypothesised relationships form 
part of the nomological network being developed to help assert the validity of the 
research instruments designed to measure the constructs under study. In Chapter 
5, nine further hypotheses regarding relationships between the previously 
discussed research constructs and a concurrent criterion (general attitude to 
genetic engineering) are proposed along with a discussion of the rationale for 
development of a nomological network and its relationship to the construct 
validity of the research instruments under development.  
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Chapter 5 - Nomological Networks and Mixed Methods Research  
This chapter consists of two sections. The first section is about the 
quantitative research (Study 2). So far 30 hypotheses have been proposed as part 
of the nomological network of relationships between the research constructs. In 
addition, a further nine hypotheses are proposed in this chapter, which describe 
relationships between the study constructs and a concurrent criterion: general 
attitude to genetic engineering. Next, six conceptual diagrams, one for each of the 
five construct for which a new measurement instrument was developed, and a 
further one to include the existing instruments, are presented to illustrate the 
relationships between the research constructs. The second section primarily relates 
to the qualitative research (Study 1). Some philosophical issues associated with 
mixed method approaches to research with a particular focus on qualitative 
methodologies are discussed.  
Nomological Network and Quantitative Research Hypotheses  
Nomological networks 
The literature reviewed in previous chapters suggested the need for an 
extended ethic of scientific social responsibility in an age of Promethean 
technologies. Very little empirical research has been conducted into scientists‟ 
attitudes to social responsibility (and related constructs), and the domain of the 
construct remains to be properly described and defined (McCormick, et al., 2009; 
Pimple, 2002; Prpic, 1998; Weil, 2002). The author knows of no existing 
instruments to measure scientists‟ attitude to social responsibility. Therefore, two 
aims of the current work are to explicate the construct domain through in-depth 
interviews with scientists (Study 1) and to use the qualitative exploration of the 
content domain to start exploratory development of instruments to measure 
scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility in research (Study 2). 
 According to the philosophers Blum (1991) and Sherwin (2001), and the 
psychologist, Rest (1986), before an agent can make moral judgments about the 
right action in a particular situation the agent needs to perceive or be aware of a 
moral issue. Therefore, it is proposed to develop two instruments to measure 
scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility: one instrument to measure scientists‟ 
awareness of the issue of the social responsibility of science to society and one 
instrument to measure scientists‟ judgments of the importance they place on a 
range of personal actions believed to enhance their social responsibility in 
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research. Also consistent with the decision to develop two instruments which 
measure slightly different aspects of scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility is 
the observation by Pimple (2002) that “no scientist is responsible for setting the 
science agenda…. No one scientist can bear the burden [of social responsibility] 
alone, it is still true that each scientist has an obligation to carry some part of the 
burden” (p. 198). The first instrument addresses scientists‟ awareness of the social 
burden of science to society (the burden that no single individual carries). The 
second instrument addresses the social burdens (judgments about specific 
practices to enhance social responsibility) that each scientist bears. 
The literature reviewed has suggested a range of constructs related to the 
concept of social responsibility in research. These constructs include personal 
values, technological optimism, democratisation of science, and 
commercialisation of science. Previous research, theory and analytical arguments 
are used to propose 30 directional hypotheses about relationships amongst these 
constructs. In the next few pages another nine directional hypotheses will be 
proposed about the relationship between the research constructs and a concurrent 
criterion (i.e., global attitudes to genetic engineering). These 39 hypotheses 
describe relationships amongst the study constructs which constitute a 
nomological network.  
A construct is defined as “some postulated attribute of people, assumed to 
be reflected in test performance” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 283).According to 
Cronbach and Meehl (pp. 299-300), “A construct is defined implicitly by a 
network of associations or propositions in which it occurs. Constructs employed at 
different stages of research vary in definiteness.” By the last sentence Cronbach 
and Meehl meant that, in the early stages of development a construct is usually ill 
defined, but as more propositions that capture relations between the new construct 
and other constructs in the network are developed, both theoretically and 
empirically, the construct becomes more definite. They stated “At least in the 
early history of a construct the network will be limited, and the construct will as 
yet have few connections” (p. 290). Since the current work is aimed at 
establishing the domain of a new construct (and developing potential measures for 
it), the construct is in the early stage, and is not yet clearly defined, as are some of 
the other constructs that are proposed as being related (i.e., democratisation of 
science, commercialisation of science, and technological optimism, with new 
measures being developed for these constructs in the current work). 
The construct validity of a measure is the degree to which the measure 
reflects the construct under consideration. Thus, a construct validity coefficient 
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would represent “the proportion of the test score variance that is attributable to the 
construct variable” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 298). Unfortunately, no such 
generally accepted statistic is available (Although, recently Westen and Rosenthal 
[2003] proposed two measures of construct validity based on nomological 
network analysis. These measures will be discussed briefly in Chapter 7).  
Therefore, other means of inferring construct valid must be pursued. As argued by 
Cronbach and Meehl: 
Construct validation takes place when an investigator believes his 
instrument reflects a particular construct, to which are attached certain 
meanings. The proposed interpretation generates specific testable 
hypotheses, which are a means of confirming or disconfirming the claim. 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955, p. 290) 
Cronbach and Meehl proposed that nomological networks may be used to 
help infer the construct validity of a measure. If instruments do not measure the 
constructs of interest, then proposed theoretical relationships between the 
constructs will not be found between the instruments used to measure them. 
Cronbach and Meehl defined nomological networks as “Scientifically speaking, to 
„make clear what something is‟ means to set forth the laws in which it occurs. We 
shall refer to the interlocking system of laws which constitute a theory as a 
nomological network” (p. 290). They further defined the concept “The laws in a 
nomological network may relate (a) observable properties or quantities to each 
other; or (b) theoretical constructs to observables; or (c) different theoretical 
constructs to one another. These “laws” may be statistical or deterministic” (p. 
290). In order to help infer construct validity, the goal is to embed the construct 
into a network of other constructs and test the hypothesised relationships in terms 
of their direction (positive or negative) and the strength or effect size of the 
relationship (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Meehl, 1978, 1990; Smith, 2005a).  
In the literature review (Chapters 3 and 4), interpretations of the proposed 
constructs were presented which led to the proposal of 30 directional hypotheses 
which described relationships between the theoretical constructs. In addition, a 
further nine hypotheses (giving a total of 39 hypotheses in the nomological 
network) are proposed below between the study constructs and a concurrent 
criterion measure of „general attitude to genetic engineering‟ (Small, Parminter 
and Fisher, 2005). As well as specifying the direction of the relationship, where 
there was sufficient prior empirical evidence or good theoretical reasons an 
attempt was made to estimate the strength of the correlation in terms of Cohen‟s 
(1988) effect size conventions (i.e., small, medium, large). This follows Meehl‟s 
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(1978, 1990) advice that hypotheses that predict the size of the relationship are 
much more informative than hypotheses that only predict the direction of the 
relationship. As Smith noted “If the outcome is close to prediction, one has 
demonstrated much stronger support for one‟s theory than if one had merely 
confirmed a positive relationship between two variables” (Smith, 2005a, p. 399). 
These relationships will be tested in the quantitative component of this work, 
Study 2 in Chapter 7. These constructs and relationships complete the 
nomological network designed to infer construct validity to the new research 
instruments. 
Further hypotheses 
Study 2 will quantitatively assess NZ scientists‟ general attitudes to genetic 
engineering (this construct will be further explicated in Study 2) using an 
instrument developed by Small, et al., (2005). This data was collected 
concurrently in the scientists‟ survey and also forms part of the nomological 
network of theoretical constructs. Thus, further hypotheses are proposed about the 
relationship between this construct and other constructs in the nomological 
network. These further hypotheses regarding the concurrent criterion will be 
tested in Study 2.   
Because genetic engineering is a Promethean technology with enormous 
potential social and moral implications for society (as described in Chapter 2), but 
about which considerable scientific uncertainty still remains, it is proposed that 
scientists with a stronger awareness of the need for social responsibility in 
scientific research and development will have a more precautionary and 
consultative approach to the technology resulting in a less positive general moral 
attitude to GE. No previous empirical research was found which might indicate 
the strength of the effect size. Therefore, the following two hypotheses are 
proposed. 
H31 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ awareness of the 
need for social responsibility in scientific research and development and 
their favourable general moral attitude to genetic engineering. 
H32 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ judgments of the 
importance of specific personal behaviours to enhance social responsibility 
in scientific research and development and their favourable general moral 
attitude to genetic engineering.  
It is also proposed that belief in technological optimism is consistent with a 
positive general attitude to genetic engineering. No previous empirical research 
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was found which might indicate the strength of the effect size. Therefore, the next 
hypothesis is: 
H33 There will be a positive correlation between scientists‟ belief in 
technological optimism and their favourable general moral attitude to 
genetic engineering. 
It is proposed that because of the enormous commercial potential of genetic 
engineering that a favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science will be 
associated with positive general attitude to genetic engineering. No previous 
empirical research was found which might indicate the strength of the effect size. 
Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H34 There will be a positive correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude to 
the commercialisation of science and favourable general moral attitude to 
genetic engineering. 
It is proposed that scientists who are in favour of the democratisation of 
science, who favour power sharing and public inclusion in the development and 
application of contentious new Promethean technologies, will be more aware of 
and concerned about the potential social impacts of Promethean sciences such as 
genetic engineering. Their concern about the power of the technology and 
uncertainty of applications and impacts will lead to a more precautionary 
approach towards genetic engineering. Thus, favourable attitudes to the 
democratisation of science will be negatively related to a positive general attitude 
to genetic engineering. No previous empirical research was found which might 
indicate the strength of the effect size. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H35 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ favourable attitude 
to the democratisation of science and favourable general moral attitude to 
genetic engineering. 
It is also proposed that personal values will be related to general moral 
attitude to genetic engineering. The higher order value dimension of „openness to 
change‟ is comprised of the value types „hedonism‟, „stimulation‟ and „self-
direction‟, having an individualistic orientation towards personal pleasure seeking, 
personal freedom (and for scientists, academic freedom), creativity and novelty. 
Thus, it is proposed that openness to change will be associated with a positive 
general attitude to genetic engineering, a novel technology with enormous 
potential, but as yet unclearly defined applications, that remain to be creatively 
explored. No previous empirical research was found which might indicate the 
strength of the effect size. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
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H36 There will be a positive correlation between scientists‟ scores on the higher 
order value dimension of openness to change and favourable general moral 
attitude to genetic engineering. 
The opposing higher order value dimension of „conservation‟ is comprised 
of the value types „tradition‟, „conformity‟ and „security‟, and has a collectivist 
orientation towards the current culture, security, and restraint from actions that 
might harm others. It is proposed that a favourable general attitude to genetic 
engineering will be negatively associated with conservation, a technology which 
has the potential for great benefit, but more importantly, in connection to the 
value dimension of conservation, also has potential for great harm and is currently 
associated with considerable uncertainty regarding applications and impacts. No 
previous empirical research was found which might indicate the strength of the 
effect size. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H37 There will be a negative correlation between scientists‟ scores on the higher 
order value dimension of conservation and a favourable general moral 
attitude to genetic engineering. 
The higher order value dimension of „self-enhancement‟ is comprised of the 
individualistic value types, „power‟ and „achievement‟, with an orientation 
towards ambition, success, wealth and control and dominance of people and 
resources. It is proposed that self-enhancement will be positively associated with a 
favourable general attitude to genetic engineering, a technology which offers 
powerful control over life (a primary planetary resource), the potential for career 
and reputation making scientific discoveries, and the potential for enormous 
wealth creation. A study by Dreezens et al. (2005) found a small to medium size 
(r = .29, p = .01) positive relationship between the value type power and a 
favourable attitude to genetically modified food. Therefore, the next hypothesis is: 
H38 There will be a small to medium size positive correlation between scientists‟ 
scores on the higher order value dimension of self-enhancement and a 
favourable general moral attitude to genetic engineering. 
The opposite higher order value dimension of „self-transcendence‟ is 
comprised of the value types „benevolence‟ and „universalism‟, and has a more 
collectivist orientation towards the welfare of friends, all people and nature, and 
protection of the environment. It is proposed that self-transcendence will be 
positively associated with a precautionary approach to Promethean technologies. 
Genetic engineering is a technology with enormous potential social and moral 
implications for society and the environment – including the potential to cause 
great harm. Therefore, favourable global attitudes to genetic engineering will be 
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negatively associated with self-transcendence. Dreezens et al. (2005) found a 
small (r = -.15) negative, though non-significant (however, as previously noted 
their study has poor statistical power), relationship between the value type 
universalism and a favourable attitude to genetically modified food. Therefore, the 
final hypothesis regarding relationships amongst the constructs in the nomological 
network is: 
H39 There will be a small negative correlation between scientists‟ scores on the 
higher order value dimension of self-transcendence and a favourable global 
moral attitude to genetic engineering. 
Testable hypotheses have now been proposed between all the new research 
constructs, the four higher order Schwartz value dimensions, and the concurrent 
criterion measure: general attitude to genetic engineering. This completes the 
description of the proposed conceptual relationships between the constructs of the 
nomological network. 
Diagrams of nomological network hypotheses 
Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 visually display the nomological 
relationships and hypotheses associated with the five new instruments and the 
constructs they are designed to measure. Each relationship is represented by one 
hypothesis. Altogether, 39 relationships have been hypothesised between the 
research constructs and existing instruments. For each of the new instruments 
(i.e., the two social responsibility instruments, the technological optimism 
instrument, the attitude to commercialisation of science instrument, and the 
attitude to democratisation of science instrument), directional correlational 
relationships are proposed (either positive or negative) and may therefore be 
tested using one-tailed tests.  
 Although subject to ongoing controversy (Aron & Aron, 1999), the 
conventional definition of small (.10), medium (.30) and large (>.50) correlations 
were proposed by Cohen (1988).   According to Aron and Aron (1999, p. 89), “in 
psychology it is rare to obtain correlations that are greater than .40.” 
Consequently, most of the correlations proposed in the hypotheses above are 
expected to have small to medium correlations. Fortunately, with a sample size of 
over 730 respondents, using 1-tailed significance tests, the statistical power to find 
relationships significant at the .05 level is reasonably good, even for small effect 
sizes, such as correlations of .10, statistical power is .84. As statistical power of 
between .8 and .9 is generally recommended (Aron & Aron, 1999), the current 
sample size just reaches adequacy in this respect (statistical power, precision, and 
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experimentwise type I error due to multiple hypotheses testing will be discussed 
further in Chapter 7). One potential exception, to the expected small effect sizes, 
is the relationship between the two new social responsibility instruments (H3). 
These two instruments measure slightly different aspects of scientific social 
responsibility. One is designed to measure perception or the awareness of the need 
for social responsibility in science and technological development (i.e., the 
responsibility of science to society). The other is designed to measure moral 
judgment regarding personal behaviour to enhance social responsibility in 
research.  
These two instruments correspond respectively to the first two stages of 
Rest‟s (1986) theory of moral behaviour. Rest claimed that each of the four stages 
of his model was conceptually independent and that success at one stage did not 
necessarily mean success at the next. Thus, although stage one (awareness or 
perception of a moral issue) is believed to be an important condition for stage two 
(judgment regarding the appropriate moral action), achievement at stage one is not 
necessarily sufficient for achievement at stage two. Thus, the two instruments are 
expected to have a large correlation (because they both measure an aspect of the 
same construct: social responsibility in scientific research). However, the 
relationship is not expected to be as high as that required for alternate form 
reliability (the correlation between two instruments designed to measure exactly 
the same construct), which, according to Anastasi (1976) should be greater than 
.80. For the two new instruments a correlation of between .50 to .60  would be a 
good supporting result (a stronger correlation than usually exists between 
psychological constructs that are not measuring the same variable, and less than 
that required for alternate form reliability of measures of exactly the same 
variable). 
The next few pages present the diagrammatic representations of the 39 
hypotheses.
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Figure 5.1.  Nomological relationships for attitudes to social responsibility (Awareness). Hypotheses numbered with a „-‟ 
symbol (e.g., -H1) signify negative relationships, hypotheses numbered with a „+‟ symbol (e.g., +H3) signify positive 
relationships. 
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Figure 5.2. Nomological relationships for attitudes to social responsibility (Judgment). Hypotheses numbered with a „–‟ symbol 
(e.g., -H1) signify negative relationships, hypotheses numbered with a „+‟ symbol (e.g., +H3) signify positive relationships. 
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Figure 5.3. Nomological relationships for belief in technological optimism. Hypotheses numbered with a „–‟ symbol (e.g., -H1) 
signify negative relationships, hypotheses numbered with a „+‟ symbol (e.g., +H3) signify positive relationships.  
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Figure 5.4. Nomological relationships for attitudes towards democratisation of science. Hypotheses numbered with a „–‟ symbol (e.g., -
H1) signify negative relationships, hypotheses numbered with a „+‟ symbol (e.g., +H3) signify positive relationships. 
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Figure 5.5. Nomological relationships for attitudes to commercialisation of science. Hypotheses numbered with a „–‟ symbol 
(e.g., -H1) signify negative relationships, hypotheses numbered with a „+‟ symbol (e.g., +H3) signify positive relationships. 
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Figure 5.6. Nomological relationships for general attitudes to GE. Hypotheses numbered with a „–‟ symbol (e.g., -H1) signify 
negative relationships, hypotheses numbered with a „+‟ symbol (e.g., +H3) signify positive relationships.
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Mixed Methods Research 
This is a mixed methods research thesis. The rationale for using mixed 
methods is the exploratory nature of the research. While the need for social 
responsibility in scientific research has been identified by scientists and 
philosophers of technology, the construct domain has not previously been clearly 
defined, nor have instruments to measure the construct been developed. 
Qualitative methods are ideally suited to elucidating the construct domain, to 
determining the range of attitudes scientists have towards the issue, and for 
developing potential items to measure the construct.  
However, because of the small sample size used in the qualitative study (N 
= 22) and because of the logical limitations of the unstructured interview process, 
the qualitative research is unsuitable for external generalisation (e.g., indicating 
the prevalence of particular attitudes held by the larger population from which the 
sample is drawn) or for finishing the development of the quantitative measures or 
testing their psychometric properties. Study 2, the quantitative survey, is an 
appropriate methodological approach for external generalisation. The quantitative 
survey also provides an appropriate data structure for analysing the psychometric 
properties of the new items and for selecting the most appropriate items for the 
construction of reliable and valid instruments to measure the research constructs.   
Before reporting on the qualitative component of the current research (in 
Chapter 6) it is important to consider the historical circumstances that have given 
rise to the increasing legitimacy of qualitative research over the past three decades 
and the relationship between qualitative and quantitative research. In particular, 
this section focuses on the philosophical assumptions that underlie these two 
methodologies and the scholarly debate that has surrounded their use as 
techniques for the scientific analysis of the social realm. 
Much of the discussion, debate, and perhaps confusion, surrounding 
qualitative and quantitative research over the past four decades hinged around the 
question of whether or not the methods used by the natural sciences were 
appropriate for the scientific examination of the social realm (Bryman, 2001). In 
general, purist quantitative researchers believed that they were, while purist 
qualitative researchers did not. Mixed method researchers considered either some 
aspects or even all aspects of the social realm were amenable to the methods of 
the natural sciences (Bryman, 2001). However, there was one aspect of the social 
realm that clearly differed from the natural realm and which provided one 
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rationale for the use of subjective, qualitative methods. That is, the objects of 
study in the natural realm (e.g., molecules and atoms) do not imbue meanings into 
the natural world; here science was viewed as a search for explanation in terms of 
cause and effect. In contrast, the objects of study in the social realm (i.e., people) 
imbue meaning and relevance to its constituent objects (e.g., other people, social 
situations, institutions etc), and believe that such meaning is relevant to an 
understanding of people‟s actions (Schutz, 1962). From this perspective, science 
is viewed as a search for explanation through understanding (whether or not a 
causal explanation of behaviour is sought). Qualitative researchers claimed that 
human researchers were able to arrive at interpretive understandings of social 
action because of their own humanness and previous experience of social meaning 
(Neuman, 2000). 
Methodological paradigms and philosophical assumptions 
Morgan (2007) claimed that probably the biggest shift in social sciences 
from the period 1980 to 2000 was the renewed attention to qualitative research. 
He contended that the increased legitimacy of qualitative research was “justified 
through an emphasis on the contrast between epistemological stances such as 
realism and constructivism” (p. 53). However, the philosophical and 
methodological nature of qualitative research is still relatively contentious both 
within and without the qualitative research community (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2003). The nature and understanding of qualitative research is still evolving and 
developing amongst qualitative practitioners (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007; 
Elliot, Fischer, & Rennie, 1999; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). A consequence of 
this is that terminology is often imprecise and inconsistent. It is claimed that this 
is to be expected as the approach evolves and until it is consolidated (Tashakkori 
& Teddlie, 2003).  
Epistemology, ontology and paradigms 
During the 1980s and 1990s, in what was sometimes referred to as the 
„paradigm wars‟, there was considerable methodological disagreement between 
some members of the quantitative and qualitative research communities (Bryman, 
2001). At its most extreme, qualitative researchers denied the scientific validity of 
quantitative research and, conversely, quantitative researchers denied the 
scientific validity of qualitative research (Morgan, 2007). Some scholars have 
claimed that the basis for this rejection of one methodology by the practitioners of 
the other methodology lay in different epistemological and ontological beliefs 
(Bryman, 2001; Neuman, 2000).  
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Quantitative research was traditionally associated with an objectivist/realist 
ontology and a positivist epistemology. Other related philosophical positions 
sometimes ascribed to quantitative research included empiricism, reductionism, 
determinism, realism, and modernism. The aim of quantitative researchers was to 
establish objective knowledge represented as regularities or laws (Bryman, 2001; 
Polkinghorne, 1983). Thus, from these assumptions, the principal purposes of 
quantitative research were: to test hypothesised relationships or causal 
explanations and theories, to find mathematical order amongst constituent 
elements of reality, to analyse factors of constructs, to develop psychometric 
measures, to generalise across populations, and to predict (Bryman, 2001). These 
are the purposes of Study 2 in the current work. 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, was associated with a constructivist 
ontology (usually associated with the social constructionist movement), and an 
interpretivist epistemology. The aim was to understand the particulars, especially 
the meaning and context, of human experience and social life (Bryman, 2001; 
Elliot, et al., 1999). Other related philosophical positions sometimes ascribed to 
qualitative research included: hermeneutics, phenomenology, existentialism, 
indeterminism, humanism, nominalism and post-modernism.  Thus, from these 
assumptions, the principal purposes of qualitative research were to: understand 
participants‟ perspectives, provide meaning and context, conduct exploratory 
research and, inductively develop constructs, hypotheses, and theories (Bryman, 
2001). These are the purposes of Study 1 in the current work.  
Each methodology also has a set of research methods, concepts and 
linguistic conventions that its practitioners tend to use and are, therefore, often 
associated with it (Bryman, 2001). For some scholars, particular methods, 
concepts and linguistic conventions were ineluctably embedded in particular 
epistemological and ontological ideologies (Hughes, 1990; Lincoln & Guba, 
1985; Morgan & Smircich, 1980; Smith, 1983; Smith & Heshusius, 1986).  
However, empirical analysis of social research articles and their methods (Platt, 
1986, 1996; Snizek, 1976) indicated that, in practice, researchers paid little 
attention to any supposed relationship between epistemological and ontological 
theories and research methods. It appeared that although links between 
philosophical assumptions and research methods were discernable, they were not 
absolute or determined (Bryman, 2001; Morgan, 2007; Neuman, 2000). While 
ontological and epistemological beliefs may influence research design and 
methods, it is not necessarily so. 
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Some researchers have taken a more pragmatic approach (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2006; Morgan, 2007; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005) and have not 
confined themselves to a particular set of ontological or epistemological beliefs. 
These authors also claimed that “true” knowledge can be obtained using both 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies and that the dichotomy 
between the two methodologies was false. That is, quantitative methodologies 
were not necessarily positivist and qualitative methodologies were not necessarily 
interpretivist. They believed that it was acceptable, or even desirable, to mix and 
even integrate these methodologies in a single research program. They considered 
that both methodologies have weaknesses and strengths and the strengths of each 
should be utilised to enhance understanding of social phenomena. The choice of 
particular research methods, from a pragmatic standpoint, was at least as much 
determined by the research questions being asked, and the intended purpose or use 
to which the research results were to be put, as it was to the particular set of 
ontological and epistemological beliefs that the researcher held.  
Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005) identified three approaches along a 
continuum to the integration of quantitative and qualitative methodologies: 
purists, situationalists, and pragmatists. Purists were firmly embedded in one 
camp or the other and adhere to the Incompatibility Thesis (methods are logically 
incompatible and must not be mixed), pragmatists were at the other end of the 
continuum, they dismissed the Incompatibility Thesis, and mixed and integrated 
methodologies, while situationalists fell somewhere between the other two. 
Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005, p. 380) claimed that “rather than representing bi-
polar opposites, quantitative and qualitative research represents an interactive 
continuum” and that “neither tradition is independent of the other, nor can either 
school encompass the whole research process. Thus, both quantitative and 
qualitative research techniques are needed to gain a more complete understanding 
of phenomena”.  The perspective of King, Keohane and Verba was adopted in the 
current work: 
The two traditions appear quite different: indeed they sometimes seem to be 
at war. Our view is that these differences are mainly ones of style and 
specific techniques… Most research does not fit clearly into one category – 
qualitative or quantitative – or the other. The best often combine features of 
each. In the same research project, some data may be collected that is 
amenable to statistical analysis, while other equally significant information 
is not…Neither quantitative nor qualitative research is superior to the other.  
(King, Keohane & Verba, 1994, pp. 5-7) 
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Mixed Methods and Multimethod Research Strategies 
Mixed methods research, as a particular research methodology, is relatively 
new and “still developing and will do so for years to come” (Tashakkori & 
Creswell, 2007, p. 3). In the first issue of the academic Journal of Mixed Methods 
Research the editors stated: 
Given that mixed methods research is still evolving, we believe that it is 
essential to keep the discussion open about the definition of mixed methods. 
This might seem a trivial or commonsense issue because many scholars are 
often certain about what constitutes a mixed methods study. Often writers 
will say that a mixed methods project is one that includes a qualitative and a 
quantitative substudy. Inconsistencies and disagreements start when one 
considers how the two substudies (or strands) are related to each other. 
(Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007, p. 3) 
They listed seven different types of studies which researchers explicitly 
label mixed methods. In an effort to be inclusive they defined mixed methods as: 
“research in which the investigator collects and analyzes data, integrates the 
findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative approaches 
or methods in a single study or program of inquiry” (p. 4). This definition is 
adopted in the current work. Considerable space was devoted to discussion of the 
above philosophical issues in the first edition of the Journal of Mixed Methods 
Research (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007).  
In the current work, the qualitative and quantitative studies were designed to 
answer different questions about the same construct. This reason for combining 
methods is referred to as complementarity (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989). 
Data from the results of one method (i.e., qualitative) were also used to inform the 
other (i.e., quantitative). This is referred to as a development purpose for 
combining methods (Greene, et al., 1989). Convergence of results from qualitative 
and quantitative methods is referred to as triangulation and helps increase 
confidence in the results (Greene, et al., 1989) of each study.  
The current qualitative study was designed to explore the under-researched 
question of scientists‟ understanding of the concept of social responsibility in 
order to help define the construct. The quantitative research was designed to 
examine scientists‟ attitudes to the construct by developing and using two 
measures of scientists‟ attitudes to the construct. This was intended to serve the 
dual purposes of making generalisations about scientists‟ attitudes to social 
responsibility and testing the hypothesised relationships of the nomological 
network. Items for the quantitative research instruments to measure scientists‟ 
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attitudes to social responsibility were mainly derived from statements made by 
participants in the qualitative study (i.e., the developmental purpose). 
Some authors make a distinction between mixed methods and multimethod 
research strategies. For example, Morse (2004) considered that, in mixed methods 
research, one of the methods is a dominant overarching design and the other 
method is supplemental to it (however, other authors accept that some mixed 
method studies may place equal weight on the two methods e.g., Cresswell and 
Plano-Clark, 2007). Morse defined multimethod designs as those in which the use 
of each method represents a completely rigorous study in its own right. 
Multimethod approaches do not necessarily mix methods across the quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. In such a case, two different questions about the same 
research area are posed and different methods are independently used to answer 
each question. 
The current work displays characteristics of both mixed methods and 
multimethod design as defined by Morse (2004), in that it is predominantly 
quantitative, but the qualitative study is designed to stand on its own. As noted 
above, the qualitative and quantitative studies in the current work answer different 
questions about the same construct and the results serve different purposes. 
However, it will be claimed that the two studies reinforce and support each other 
(i.e., triangulation of results). 
The current work had both an exploratory component and explanatory 
component. The qualitative study was exploratory and sought to clarify what 
scientists understand by the construct of social responsibility regarding science 
and technology. The quantitative study also had a strong exploratory component 
in that the major purpose was to explore items for the development of new 
instruments to measure the research constructs. It also had an explanatory 
component in that it sought to explain scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility 
in research through the antecedent constructs of personal values and technological 
optimism. It also sought to explain the consequent constructs of attitudes to 
commercialisation of science, attitudes to democratisation of science, and general 
attitude to genetic engineering, through the construct of attitude to social 
responsibility in research.  
In mixed method terminology, the current work had a developmental 
purpose and was sequentially organised with the qualitative component conducted 
prior to and feeding into the quantitative component.  Apart from this, the degree 
of integration between the qualitative and quantitative components was relatively 
limited. The qualitative research was used to define the domain of the social 
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responsibility construct and participants‟ statements about the constructs were 
used to develop items for the instruments to measure the constructs. Integration 
also occurred in the triangulation and interpretation of the results.  
Quantitative and qualitative presentation styles 
Traditionally, quantitative research has been associated with scientific 
realism and the search for objective truth, whereas qualitative research has been 
associated with social constructivism and subjective interpretation of meaning. 
This has led to differences in the presentation styles of research reporting of 
qualitative and quantitative researchers (Bryman, 2001; Neuman, 2000).  
In the past quantitative researchers have generally used the third person and 
other language and tense constructions, which removed themselves from the 
scientific data and writing (the invisible data collector and analyst), in the belief 
that the research data „speaks for itself,‟ reflecting „the truth that is out there‟ 
independent of the researcher. This traditional requirement of quantitative 
research reporting has been relaxed recently with use of the first person pronoun 
now being accepted by the American Psychological Association (American 
Psychological Association, 2009). To convey a sense of inevitability about the 
findings, whether or not the research proceeded in such a manner, the research 
process was usually presented as linear (Bryman, 2001; Gusfield, 1976). This 
style was intended to give the reader the impression that the research was 
objective and reflected the epistemological assumptions of scientific realism 
(Bryman, 2001).  
Qualitative researchers, particularly those who assumed a social 
constructivist epistemology, have considered that such an approach conveyed a 
false impression of objectivity, and have preferred to use language constructions 
that, by including the researcher, acknowledged his/her role in the co-production 
of knowledge with the research participants (Bryman, 2001; Fontana & Frey, 
2003). This writing style was intended to convey the subjectivity of the research 
process and reveal the researchers assumptions (and biases), or as it is sometimes 
called, the researcher‟s positionality. It was claimed that only by having access to 
this information can the reader make a rational evaluation of the data presented. 
Therefore, it is common in qualitative research reporting to use the first person 
pronoun to make the researcher visible in the research process, to state 
philosophical and other assumptions and potential biases, and to reflect on 
himself/herself as a research tool (Bannister, Burman, Parker, Taylor, & Tindall, 
1994).  
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Neuman (2000, p. 473) claimed that qualitative research reporting has 
“fewer rules and less structure” than quantitative reporting and that “qualitative 
reports tend to be longer.” While the bulk of the current work takes the more 
common and widely accepted objectivist approach to science writing and 
reporting, the qualitative research (Study 1) uses a writing and presentation style, 
including the use of the first person pronoun, more in-line with the approach 
advocated by qualitative researchers. 
Summary 
A number of authors have claimed that empirical research regarding 
scientists‟ attitudes to their wider social responsibilities to society was very 
meagre. Likewise, the conceptual nature of this responsibility was considered ill-
defined and lacking in consensus, with few guidelines existing for scientists and a 
paucity of training, in this regard, in scientists‟ educational programmes. The need 
for an increased understanding of these issues is made more urgent by the 
Promethean power of recent science and technology and the consequent increased 
social and moral implications for humans and all life on Gaia. The current work is 
intended to help address some of these knowledge deficits by examining the 
attitudes and beliefs of practicing scientists regarding their wider social 
responsibilities in an age of Promethean technologies. 
This aim is addressed in several ways. First, the social and moral 
implications of human use of past technologies and potential uses of developing 
Promethean technologies (with particular reference to gene technologies) have 
been reviewed and explicated (Chapters 1 and 2). Second, reviews of theory and 
empirical research have helped identify a number of antecedent and consequent 
constructs related in a nomological network to the construct of social 
responsibility regarding science and technology (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Third, a 
qualitative study (Study 1, Chapter 6) used in-depth, unstructured interviews to 
obtain scientists‟ opinions and outline the domain of the wider social 
responsibilities of science and scientists. The results of Study 1 are a thematic 
model of the elements of scientists‟ social responsibilities (i.e., a framework for 
scientific social responsibility). Such a framework may help provide moral 
guidelines for scientists and be useful as a training tool for students and scientists. 
Study 1 also produced a set of proposed question items for possible inclusion in 
instruments to measure constructs in the nomological network emerging from the 
literature review. Fourth, a quantitative questionnaire was designed and 
administered to a sample of New Zealand scientists (Study 2, Chapter 7). This 
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survey contained the proposed items for the psychometric instruments intended to 
measure the previously identified constructs.  
Items for the instruments were derived primarily from attitude statements, 
regarding the constructs, made by scientists in Study 1, and the reviews of the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Finally, scientists‟ general attitudes to a 
particular Promethean technology, genetic engineering, were canvassed in the 
survey, and results, including a comparison with public attitudes, are presented in 
Study 2 (Chapter 7). Scientists‟ attitudes to genetic engineering were also used as 
a concurrent criterion to help infer construct validity to the new measures of social 
responsibility in research. 
To the knowledge of the author no existing psychometric instruments have 
been designed to measure scientists‟ attitude to social responsibility in scientific 
research. Such instruments are desirable and may be useful in a number of ways. 
First, they could be used as a „before and after‟ test to measure the effects of 
ethical training programmes for scientists and science students. Second, because 
science and technology are continuing to become increasingly powerful in their 
social and moral implications, the issue of scientists‟ social responsibility will 
continue to grow and become more prominent (Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 1983; 
Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 2005; Small & Jollands, 2006). The instruments proposed 
may be used in time series studies to track changes over time in scientists‟ 
acceptance of their widened responsibilities to society. Third, if the instruments 
meet appropriate psychometric requirements, they could be used as tools to 
conduct further research into the topic of science and social responsibility. Fourth, 
for science organisations cognizant of their extended social responsibilities, they 
might be used as part of a selection battery for scientists, or for existing 
employees to determine which employees could most benefit from ethical training 
programmes. 
Two instruments were designed to measure scientists‟ attitudes to social 
responsibility based on Pimple‟s (2002) characterisation of social responsibility in 
science as consisting of the responsibilities of the science community and the 
responsibilities of the individual scientist.  The first instrument focuses on 
scientists‟ awareness of the social and moral role of science in society (stage 1 in 
Rest‟s psychological model of ethical behaviour). The second instrument focuses 
on the individual scientists‟ social and moral judgments regarding personal 
actions and practices in their research roles (stage 2 in Rest‟s model). Directional 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between the research constructs were used 
to define a nomological network to help provide evidence for the construct 
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validity of the instruments. The development of the research instruments will be 
described in further detail in Chapters 6 (Study 1) and 7 (Study 2). 
This chapter also provided an overview of the philosophical issues involved 
in mixed methods research, still a hot topic amongst mixed methods researchers 
as evidenced by recent articles in the Journal of Mixed Methods Research. The 
current work may be described as predominantly quantitative, with an embedded 
qualitative component. It is sequential and developmental with the qualitative 
component conducted first and results fed into the quantitative component to 
develop the construct measures. The purpose of the qualitative component is 
primarily exploratory while the purpose of the quantitative component is both 
exploratory and explanatory. In terms of the integration of methods the current 
work is closer to the concept of multimethod research than a fully integrated 
mixed method design as the different research methodologies‟ questions are 
complementary, though integration occurs for the purpose of development and the 
results triangulate in the interpretation phase. 
The next chapter reports Study 1, the qualitative research component of the 
current work. 
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Chapter 6 - Study 1 
This chapter reports a qualitative investigation of scientists‟ moral attitudes 
regarding the research question: 
1) What are scientists‟ attitudes and beliefs regarding social responsibility in 
scientific research and technological development in an age of Promethean 
technologies?  
Two further sub-areas related to the main question were also investigated: 
a)  What are scientists‟ attitudes to the commercialisation of science?  
b)  What are scientists‟ attitudes to the democratisation of science?  
The two sub-questions [a) and b)] were originally investigated as part of the 
current work. However, the focus of this chapter will be on question 1. This is 
because the research regarding the two sub-questions has already been published 
in the peer reviewed literature (Small & Mallon, 2006) and at academic 
conferences (Small, 2005b; Small & Mallon, 2004), and because it was not the 
sole work of the current author (Professor Mary Mallon was co-author). The 
results from these sub-questions were reported in the literature review in Chapter 
4 of the current work. However, measures for these constructs (i.e., the 
democratisation of science and the commercialisation of science) are developed in 
Chapter 7 and used as component constructs in the nomological network 
developed to test the construct validity of the new research instruments. The 
primary purpose of Study 1 was to help clarify the domain of scientists‟ wider 
social responsibility in an age of Promethean technology. 
The second purpose of Study 1 was to provide information from which I 
could develop items for new psychometric instruments to measure scientists‟ 
attitudes to their wider social responsibilities to society. Throughout the Results 
and Discussion section of this chapter, items for the new instruments are proposed 
in no particular theoretical order, but rather, proximal to the data from which they 
were derived.  
As with most technologies, Promethean technologies have the potential to 
be used for both good and for evil (Miller & Selgelid, 2007), either accidentally, 
as in the case of unknown or unforeseen consequences, or deliberately; either with 
malevolent intent or as known incidental negative side effects of a desirable 
application of the technology (Small & Jollands, 2006). However, because of the 
power and pervasiveness of the potential applications of Promethean technologies, 
the degree of potential good and evil is much greater than for past technologies 
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(Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 1983; Luppicini, 2008; Petrinovich, 1999; Small & Jollands, 
2006).  
My personal contention (and a central concept argued throughout this 
thesis), is that as science and technology become increasingly powerful they 
require an increasingly precautionary approach based on scientific foresighting to 
both their development and application, and that this necessitates extra 
responsibility on the part of scientists and technologists beyond their traditional 
scientific ethical norms. A number of previous writers, philosophers, scientists 
and technologists, have also argued along similar lines (e.g., Bulger, et al., 2002; 
Bunge, 1977; Cournand, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 1983; Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 
2005; Petrinovich, 1999; Van Potter & Whitehouse, 1998; Ziman, 1998).  
Thus, the focus of this research was not on epistemic values, such as the 
traditional Mertonian scientific values of universalism, collegiality, 
disinterestedness, and organised scepticism (Merton, 1942a, 1973), except where 
these internal scientific norms impact on the question of the broader social 
responsibility of science to society. Rather, my focus was on scientists‟ wider 
external moral responsibilities regarding the application and use of their scientific 
discoveries, including the consequent technologies, by society. The epistemic 
ethics of scientists have received considerable previous research, with guidelines 
and moral codes being well developed (Cournand, 1977; Mahoney, 1979; Pimple, 
2002; Prpic, 1998; Weil, 2002; Ziman, 2001). However, as evidenced in previous 
chapters, this is not the case for scientists‟ wider moral responsibilities to society 
(McCormick, et al., 2009; Pimple, 2002; Prpic, 1998; Weil, 2002, Ziman, 1998, 
2001).  In Study 1, I consider this question in a very general sense, mostly without 
reference to any particular technology. However, as most of my participants 
worked either in gene technology research or in related fields of research, when 
specific technologies are used as examples to illustrate concepts or points 
participants discussed, the examples are generally from the gene technology field. 
The central foci of Study 1 were:  
 What is the range of attitudes, beliefs and values that scientists hold 
regarding their social and moral responsibilities to society? This 
information was expected to help clarify the domain of the construct of 
scientific social responsibility. 
 What are the methods of ethical reasoning that underlie scientists‟ attitudes 
and beliefs regarding socially responsible research? 
I was interested in what factors (variables, issues, constructs) scientists 
considered to be of moral significance, and why they considered them to be so. I 
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was also interested in understanding the nature of scientists‟ ethical arguments: 
did they use traditional normative philosophical arguments (e.g., teleological 
ethical theories, deontological ethical theories, and virtue ethics) in their reasoning 
to describe and rationalise their attitudes and beliefs? What meta-ethical theories 
were assumed by their arguments (e.g., moral absolutism, ethical relativism, 
moral conventionalism)? Were their moral judgments consistent? Did they 
recognise inconsistencies? How did they rationalise inconsistencies? Did emotion 
play a role in their moral attitudes and beliefs? 
Method 
This was an exploratory qualitative study in which the data were collected 
by means of unstructured interviews. The purpose was to sample the range of 
beliefs and attitudes held by scientists regarding the principal research question 
and to analyse the nature of their ethical reasoning.  “The aim of qualitative 
research is to understand and represent the experiences and actions of people as 
they encounter, engage, and live through situations” (Elliot, Fischer & Rennie, 
1999, p. 216). The researcher strives to understand, as much as is possible, the 
phenomena being studied from the perspective of the study participants.  
Nonetheless, most qualitative researchers accept that it is impossible to 
completely set aside one‟s own perspective and come to a totally objective 
analysis and understanding of the other‟s perspective; all researchers bring their 
own set of epistemological preferences, ontological and axiological beliefs to the 
research process (Blaikie, 1993). Within the qualitative research community there 
are a range of philosophical positions with which researchers sometimes align 
themselves. Thus, qualitative researchers may position themselves along a 
continuum from realism, post-positivism, critical realism, pragmatism, 
constructivism, critical theory and post-structuralism (Denzin & Linclon, 2003). 
The research context  
In order to provide the reader with appropriate knowledge to judge the 
credibility of qualitative research, many qualitative scholars recommend that 
researchers make clear their personal perspectives or positionality (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006; Holloway & Todres, 2003; W. J. Potter, 1996). In this tradition, I 
declare my own positionality to be aligned with the pragmatist camp (e.g., 
Morgan, 2007; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005; Patton, 1988, 2002).  I agree with 
the philosopher of science, Feyerabend (1975), that all methodologies have their 
limitations and that methodological choice is largely a creative and playful, 
subjective act on the part of the researcher. 
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I assume the pragmatists‟ position that in conducting research it is 
epistemologically acceptable to use whatever scientific methods prove useful to 
elucidate the particular research questions being asked, irrespective of whether the 
methods are usually considered as most suitable for particular ontological and 
epistemological positions (Morgan, 2007; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). While 
agreeing that total objectivity is an impossibility for a researcher, I believe that 
some methods help provide greater degrees of objectivity than other methods. 
However, I also believe that even highly subjective knowledge may provide valid 
scientific insight. Such insight will require confirmation from other sources, such 
as triangulation with other research (including quantitative research), or repetition 
by other researchers, or at the least, critical conceptual analysis by other 
researchers competent in the particular field. The process of subjecting one‟s 
research to the scrutiny of scientific peers provides a mechanism for assessing the 
intersubjectivity of research results (Bryman, 2001). In some knowledge areas, 
intersubjectivity may be as much verification that knowledge is “objective” as 
science can attain (Krasner & Houts, 1984).  
I also assume the related belief that, in social science, observation by, and 
interaction with, a researcher may change the attitudes, beliefs or behaviours of 
the participants. This can be caused by the mere fact that the observed subjects are 
aware of the observation (Wilkinson, 2000), or in the case of unstructured 
interviews (as with the current research), the interaction between the researcher 
and the participant may influence how the participant thinks during the interview 
(and hence the research data captured), and even the participant‟s subsequent 
perspectives on the issue being studied, either temporarily or permanently. This 
effect is variously called the observer effect, reactivity, the experimenter effect 
(Wilkinson, 2000), or the Hawthorne Effect (McCarney, et al., 2007).  
The degree to which this effect occurs may depend upon the particular 
research methods used. Interviewing, with intense interaction between the 
researcher and the participant, is a method of data capture that is particularly 
prone to this effect. It was my expectation (borne out during the interviews) that 
some of the participants in this study would not have given a great deal of thought 
to the research issue of scientists‟ social responsibility to society. Getting them to 
discuss and think deeply about this issue may well affect their future attitudes and 
beliefs. It is my belief that, in an age of Promethean science and technology, it is 
becoming increasingly important for scientists to consider such issues. Indeed, I 
have an agenda to help bring the issue to scientists‟ awareness and to help them 
consider their wider social responsibility to society. 
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The selection, coding and the interpretation of data contains a degree of 
subjectivity stemming from the knowledge, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions of 
the analyst. This particular deficiency in objectivity is known as observer bias (or 
observer-expectancy effect) and affects the researcher‟s interpretation of the 
observations (Wilkinson, 2000). This is a particular problem in social science, 
where actions may be interpreted in multiple ways by different observers. 
Observer bias may be present in research design and data collection methods 
(such as interviews), as well as the analysis and interpretation phase of research. 
In a research project using the unstructured interview as the method of data 
collection, researcher subjectivity occurs at both the data collection and the 
analysis stages. Because of this, I consider that in this research, I am a co-creator, 
along with my interviewees, of the knowledge generated (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
This position is gaining increasing acceptance in qualitative interview research. 
“Interviewers are increasingly seen as active participants in interactions with 
respondents, and interviews are seen as negotiated accomplishments of both 
interviewers and respondents” (Fontana & Frey, 2003).  Therefore, in order to 
obtain a degree of intersubjectivity, it is particularly important that my 
philosophical positionality (assumptions) and relationship to the research 
participants is made clear, that the analysis is as rigorous as possible, that it is 
described accurately and in detail, and the research results and interpretation are 
considered coherent and meaningful to the knowledge audience (Denzin & 
Linclon, 2003). 
The researcher as analyst: Assumptions and context 
My philosophical position and research assumptions have been stated in the 
section above. It remains for my role and relationship to the research participants 
to be made clear to the reader. Throughout the period of this research, I have been 
employed full-time as scientist, and later senior scientist, in the roles of 
psychologist and bioethicist, at AgResearch, New Zealand‟s largest Crown 
Research Institute (CRI). I have worked on a number of projects examining the 
ethics of various gene technologies and both the public and scientists‟ attitudes 
towards them. I have built up considerable knowledge about gene technologies 
and am able to converse easily about the subject with scientists from the field. 
This is important as it helps build what Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and 
Corbin (1990) refer to as the theoretical sensitivity of the researcher. “Theoretical 
sensitivity refers to a personal quality of the researcher. It indicates an awareness 
of the subtleties of meaning of data....[It] refers to the attribute of having insight, 
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the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity to understand, and capability to 
separate the pertinent from that which isn't” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 42).  
To a certain extent, as a researcher and organisational insider I may be 
considered a participant observer having contextualised myself within the 
working environment of my study participants over a period of several years. In 
this role, as participant observer, I have operated sometimes in a covert manner 
(as in informal conversations with workmates about attitudes and ethics), and at 
other times overtly (as in the unstructured interviews comprising this research and 
organisational wide surveys of scientists‟ attitudes to such issues). 
The role of participant observer, although not forming part of the data 
collected for analysis in this project, nonetheless, confers several advantages over 
simply interviewing participants (Bryman, 2001). As noted above, I have 
contextualised myself in the working environment of the scientists. This has made 
me familiar with the organisational context from within which scientists work. It 
has also enabled much closer contact with scientists and the kinds of activities that 
scientists do. Thus, the „culture‟ of the scientist is familiar to me, as is the „native‟ 
language of the science culture and, specifically, the theoretical language used in 
gene research and related technologies. It is also sometimes claimed that the 
participant observer becomes more sensitised to the context of research 
participants than the researcher who merely interviews them. However, the 
possible downside of immersion in the science culture is that features of one‟s 
own culture are often invisible to oneself (Bryman, 2001). 
AgResearch, besides agricultural, farm systems and environmental research, 
is noted for its research into molecular biology and gene technology. Scientists at 
AgResearch experiment with genetic engineering and cloning of both animals and 
plants. Thirteen of the scientists interviewed were also employed by AgResearch. 
Seven were known to me before interviewing (and I to them), the other remainder 
were not; AgResearch employees are situated at a number of locations throughout 
New Zealand. While my relationship to the interviewees that I knew was 
relatively weak and at the level of acquaintanceship, rather than friendship, I 
believe that knowledge of my employment by AgResearch, and of my role as a 
scientist within the organisation, helped secure some of the interviews and also 
created an enhanced level of trust in me as an interviewer with a sympathetic 
understanding of their science (Fontana & Frey, 2003). The appearance (genuine) 
of empathy with, and interest in, their discipline was further enhanced by my 
knowledge of gene technology, which, because of the particular selection strategy 
followed, participants frequently used as examples in our discussion. 
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Mary Mallon, a professor of Human Resources with a strong background in 
qualitative research and practice, conducted three of the 22 interviews on my 
behalf (Interviewees 18, 19, & 20) and checked and verified the data coding and 
analysis of the sub-theme questions of commercialisation and democratisation of 
science. This sub-section of the research was jointly published in a special issue 
(Organising Science) of the journal International Studies of Management and 
Organization (Small & Mallon, 2006). 
Sample selection strategy 
As an exploratory, qualitative study, my purpose was to sample the range of 
attitudes and beliefs that scientists held about their ethical and social 
responsibility to society regarding their scientific research and technological 
developments in general. However, as most of the scientists interviewed worked 
on some aspect of science related to gene technologies, it was expected that 
discussion and examples would reference this particular Promethean technology. 
Therefore, the sample selection was purposive rather than random.  
Several different sampling strategies were applied (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). First, a homogeneous strategy defined the sample frame, that is, New 
Zealand scientists with a focus on molecular biology (gene technologies), either as 
molecular biologists, or as other specialist scientists studying the impacts of 
molecular biology.  Next, strategies of maximal variation (attempting to obtain 
participants with widely different attitudes and beliefs) as well as typical case 
were applied within the sample frame. Finally, snowball or chain sampling was 
also used to acquire participants. The sample is not considered to be 
representative (in a proportional sense) of the population of scientists in New 
Zealand CRIs or universities. The data, therefore, are not generalisable, in a 
statistical sense, to the population of scientists from which my participants were 
drawn. However, due to the particular sampling strategies, the open-ended, 
unstructured nature of the interviews, the number of participants, and the fact that 
the interview process was stopped once no new data were being obtained (i.e., 
data redundancy was reached), it is probable that a considerable range of the 
attitudes and values of the scientific community involved in gene research were 
canvassed. 
In order to operationalise the maximal variation strategy, I sought to sample 
both male and female scientists, scientists across a full spectrum of ages (and 
experience as scientists), scientists across a range of organisational levels e.g., 
junior scientists to very senior scientists, scientists known either for their strong 
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support or opposition to genetic engineering, scientists who were molecular 
biologists, and scientists from other disciplines (though, as explained above, with 
an interest in the biological or social impacts of molecular biology).  Variation in 
ethnicity was not possible due to the restricted ethnic nature of the sample frame. 
In order to operationalise the typical case strategy, scientists known for not 
adopting strong stances to gene technology (i.e., “middle of the roaders”) were 
also sought – it was also expected that the maximal variation strategy would also 
likely include typical cases. Snowballing was expected to maintain the base 
sampling strategy. 
Participants 
Twenty-two scientists from three New Zealand Crown Research Institutes 
(CRIs) and one New Zealand University were interviewed (see Table 6.1). The 
three CRIs were: AgResearch (13 participants), Crop and Food (3 participants), 
HortResearch (2 participants), and the other institution was Massey University (4 
participants –arranged and/or conducted by Mary Mallon). CRIs are owned by the 
New Zealand Government and charged with conducting research for the benefit of 
New Zealand while having fully commercialised goals and management practices.  
Twelve potential participants known to myself (7) or Professor Mallon (5) 
as meeting one or more of the sample strategies of homogeneity, maximum 
variation and typical case were approached by myself (or by Professor Mallon), 
given detailed information of the purpose and methods of the research project and 
invited to participate.  The 10 remaining participants were found using the 
snowball sampling technique. That is, at the conclusion of each interview 
participants were asked to suggest one scientist whom they knew who might be 
interested in participating and whom they believed might be able to contribute 
knowledgably to the research project. All invited scientists agreed to participate.  
Interviewees ranged from a recently graduated scientist to senior industrial 
scientists leading large research projects, and university lecturers and professors. 
Several interviewees were internationally renowned in their field.  Scientific 
disciplines of interviewees are presented in Table 6.1. Ten participants were 
female and 12 were male. The age of interviewees ranged from twenty-six to 
sixty, with a mean of 44 years and a standard deviation of 8.8 years (excluding 
one participant for whom age datum was not collected). On average participants 
had been working in their field of study for 15.3 yrs (SD = 8.6yrs) (excluding 3 
participants for whom these data were not collected) and employed by their 
current employer for 10.3 yrs (SD = 9.1 yrs) (excluding 4 participants for whom 
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these data were not collected). Twenty-one participants had PhDs and one had an 
MSc. All participants were of European ethnicity. 
Table 6.1. 
 Interview Participants: Demographic Data 
ID 
No 
Sex Age Qual Occupation Company 
Years in 
field 
Years in 
company 
1 M 43 PhD Soil scientist AgR 15 15 
2 F 42 PhD Plant molecular biologist AgR 15 2 
3 M 36 PhD Plant molecular biologist AgR 12 2 
4 M 52 PhD Entomologist AgR 27 27 
5 F 38 PhD Plant ecologist AgR 8 12 
6 M 60 PhD Animal mol. biologist AgR 35 * 
7 M 40 PhD Animal mol. biologist AgR 13 3 
8 M 35 PhD Ecological economist AgR 6 1 
9 F 44 PhD Animal mol. biologist AgR 20 20 
10 F 30 PhD Molecular biologist AgR 2 2 
11 F 43 PhD Animal mol. biologist AgR 15 13 
12 F 26 MSc Animal geneticist AgR 1 1 
13 M 40 PhD Plant molecular biologist AgR 13 2 
14 M 53 PhD Evolut./mol. biology Uni 30 30 
15 F 42 PhD Plant molecular biologist C&F 14 6 
16 M 46 PhD Plant molecular biologist C&F 18 18 
17 M 41 PhD Plant molecular biologist C&F 14 7 
18 M 58 PhD Evolutionary biologist Uni * * 
19 F 58 PhD Plant molecular biologist Uni * * 
20 F * PhD Plant molecular biologist Uni * * 
21 F 42 PhD Plant molecular biologist HortR 15 15 
22 M 46 PhD Plant molecular biologist HortR 18 10 
* Missing data 
Procedure 
The research project had received prior approval from Waikato University‟s 
Psychology Department Research and Ethics Committee. Permission was 
requested from the CEO‟s of AgResearch, HortResearch and Massey University 
to interview selected science staff (see Appendix 6.1. Letter requesting permission 
to interview scientists). All scientist participants were provided with written 
information about the project and a copy of the interview questions when first 
approached to participate (see Appendix 6.2: Narrative Interview Guide) and 
again at the beginning of their interview. All participants were informed of their 
rights to confidentiality and anonymity, their right to refuse to answer any specific 
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questions, and to withdrawal from participation at any stage. Participants signed 
two copies of a standard University of Waikato human research participant 
consent form – one copy retained by them and the other retained by me (see 
Appendix 6.3. Participant Consent Form). Participants were given the opportunity 
to review the transcript of their interview and to change or remove any material 
they were not happy with. Thirteen participants took the opportunity to check the 
transcript. No participants chose to change their interview transcripts. 
Interviews 
Face-to-face qualitative interviews were conducted in the participants‟ place 
of work, in a private location, in 2002. Empirical and theoretical weaknesses, 
regarding objectivity in the nature of this type of unstructured interview, have 
previously been discussed in the section above (i.e., The researcher as analyst: 
Assumptions and context). Interviews lasted between one and two hours. 
Permission was sought to digitally record all interviews. Two participants 
declined to be recorded so extensive handwritten notes were taken during these 
two interviews. In addition to digitally recording the majority of interviews, brief 
handwritten notes, observations and demographic details were made for all 
participants. Recorder/operator malfunctions in two interviews meant that these 
two interviews were only partially recorded. However, in these two cases, 
handwritten notes taken during the interview were expanded upon within an hour 
of the interview finishing.  
Although having considerable previous experience in conducting a range of 
different types of interviews, before beginning the interviews, I re-familiarised 
myself with academic literature regarding the conduct of qualitative interviews, 
including the kinds of questions often asked, and the skills and criteria required by 
the interviewer. The interview procedure was based on Kvale‟s (1996) principles 
regarding interview questions and interviewer criteria. The interview process used 
could be described as a purposive conversation being at the unstructured end of 
the interview continuum (Burgess, 1984; Malbon, 1999). That is, there was one 
main interview question (i.e., the research question described above) with a 
couple of potential probe questions. However, participants were free to raise and 
discuss any issue at all within the bounds of, or related to, the research question 
and probes. Consistent with the position of the interview as a negotiated text 
(Fontana & Frey, 2003) and the researcher as co-creator of the knowledge (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006), I was also free to pick up on any issue that participants raised 
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and pursue it in further depth, as well as bring up other issues and new questions, 
sparked by the conversation.  
Thus, both participants and I had considerable degrees of flexibility in 
directing the interview content which, along with the phrasing and sequencing of 
the interview conversation, varied from interview to interview. These features are 
common in qualitative interviews of the unstructured type (Bryman, 2001; Willig, 
2001), where the researcher‟s intention is to acquire „thick descriptions‟ or rich, 
detailed answers that reveal the participant‟s understanding and imbued meaning 
of the issue being researched. 
This type of interview has the advantage of flexibility in the pursuit of 
interesting or novel lines of inquiry and is highly suited to exploratory research 
(Willig, 2001). However, it is important to note that this type of interview process, 
besides increasing the subjectivity (and reducing objectivity) of the data collected 
(as previously discussed), also confers analytical limitations on the data corpus. 
Although the same base question and probes (when necessary) were used with all 
participants, after this point, there was no standardisation of questions or 
discussion content across the participants.  
Therefore, the structure (or lack of structure) of the interview format means 
that quantitative analysis of the data is nonsensical, in this case, being 
incompatible with the unstructured interview method used. It makes little sense to 
say that only 2 out of 22 participants mentioned „factor X‟ when in the majority of 
interviews „factor X‟ was not part of the interview conversation. Therefore, 
following other qualitative researchers (e.g., Lang, et al., 2003; Meehan, Vermeer, 
& Windsor, 2000), I refrain from precisely quantifying the number of scientists 
who held a particular belief, or point of view, preferring instead to give a sense of 
trends (this issue of prevalence of themes receives a more in-depth discussion in 
the next section). It should be appreciated that the error or level of uncertainty 
associated with such trends is unknown.  Quantitative analyses will be reserved 
for Studies 2, which used data collection methods appropriate for quantification 
and statistical analysis.  
Analysis 
The interview transcripts were analysed manually (as opposed to computer 
based software) using the method of thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & 
Clarke, 2006; Tuckett, 2005). “Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 
79). Thematic analysis is an interpretive process in which the analyst identifies 
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and selects text fragments (sometimes called data extracts) relevant to the research 
questions and develops codes to identify and describe patterns occurring in the 
text fragments. Codes are collated to form higher level themes. If desired, the 
thematic analysis may then be used for theory development, as is the purpose in 
grounded theory (Glaser, 1992; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Braun and Clarke (2006) claimed that, within psychology (and other 
disciplines), thematic analysis is a frequently used, largely unacknowledged and 
poorly demarcated qualitative analytic method. They noted that because it is 
generically used across a wide range of qualitative analysis methods, it is 
generally considered as a tool rather than a specific analysis method. For example, 
Boyatzis (1998) considered that, rather than being a method, it was a process that 
could be applied across a range of qualitative (and quantitative) research methods, 
irrespective of the ontological and epistemological position of the analyst. In 
contrast, Braun and Clarke argued that “thematic analysis should be considered a 
method in its own right” (p.78). They outlined the theory, application and 
evaluation of thematic analyses. They also claimed that thematic analysis is 
independent of, and can be applied across, a range of theoretical, ontological and 
epistemological approaches. As a method of analysis, it is consistent with the 
pragmatic philosophical assumptions underlying the current work. Braun and 
Clarke (2006) identified six phases of thematic analysis as presented in Table 6.2 
below. This is the process that I used to analyse the interview data. 
Table 6.2.  
Phases of Thematic Analysis  
Phase Description of the process 
1. Familiarise yourself 
with your data: 
Transcribe data, reading and re-reading the data, noting down 
initial ideas. 
2. Generating initial 
codes: 
Coding interesting features of the data in a systematic fashion 
across the entire data set, collating data relevant to each code. 
3. Searching for themes: Collating codes into potential themes, gathering all data relevant 
to each potential theme. 
4. Reviewing themes: Checking if the themes work in relation to the coded extracts 
(Level 1) and the entire data set (Level 2), generating a thematic 
„map‟ of the analysis. 
5. Defining and naming 
the themes: 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the 
overall story the analysis tells, generating clear definitions and 
names for each theme. 
6. The final opportunity 
for analysis:  
Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of 
extracts, relating back of the analysis to the research question and 
literature, producing a scholarly report of the analysis 
Note. Table reproduced from Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 87). 
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Defining exactly what counts as a theme is also somewhat problematic. 
Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 82) claimed that “rigid rules really do not work” and 
that flexibility about what constitutes a theme must be maintained. According to 
Braun and Clarke the main feature of a theme is that it “captures something 
important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some 
level of patterned response or meaning within the data set” (p. 82, emphasis in 
original). Boyatzis defines a theme as: 
…a pattern found in the information that at the minimum describes and 
organises possible observations or at the maximum interprets aspects of a 
phenomenon. A theme may be identified at the manifest level (directly 
observable in the information) or at the latent level (underlying the 
phenomenon).  The themes may initially be generated inductively from the 
raw information or generated deductively from theory and previous 
research. (Boyatzis, 1998, p. vii) 
There are two points important to the explication of the current research in 
the above quote from Boyatzis (1998). First, he noted that themes may be 
identified at the manifest or latent level. At a manifest level (referred to by some 
authors as „semantic‟) it is the surface content of the text that the analyst is 
interested in. That is, the words the participant speaks are taken to directly reveal 
what he or she means or believes. At the latent level, the analyst is interested in 
the reasoning and underlying assumptions and constructions of the participant that 
give rise to the manifest utterances. For my research question I am primarily 
(though not only) interested in themes at the manifest level. That is, because the 
question seeks to discover what scientists consider their social responsibilities to 
society regarding their research are, without recourse to any specific technology, 
this information should be present in the data at the manifest level. However, in 
some instances, participants analysed their own responses, showing insight at the 
latent level (such as the ethical processes and theories that they were using in their 
moral judgments). I occasionally record and discuss such analysis by 
interviewees. As much as possible, I wish to tell the story in the words of my 
participants. Hence, the extensive use of participant quotes in the Results and 
Discussion section. 
The second point to note from the above quote from Boyatzis (1998) is that 
two methods of developing themes from text have been identified. The first is 
inductive (sometimes call data-driven e.g., Braun & Clarke, 2006). Data-driven 
thematic analysis induces the themes directly from the data (e.g., grounded theory 
analysis), whereas with theory-driven thematic analysis the researcher approaches 
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the data with specific theoretical concepts in mind and codes text extracts in 
relationship to the theoretical concepts. In the current work, the research question 
is primarily analysed inductively for manifest concepts (of course, it should be 
noted that due to my knowledge of theory and empirical research in the area, my 
inductive analysis cannot be considered free of pre-existing theory). However, 
there is also a degree of theoretical latent thematic analysis regarding types of 
moral reasoning (e.g., teleological, deontological, relativistic, absolutist, etc.) that 
underlie the participants‟ manifest attitudes.  
The analysis and reporting of prevalence of themes in qualitative data is 
also a somewhat thorny issue, especially when the data comes from unstructured 
interviews. Prevalence may be measured in a number of arbitrary ways (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006), such as counting the number of data items (interviews in this case) 
in which they occurred, or the number of times it occurred across the entire data 
set (number of occurrences in all interviews). As discussed above, unstructured 
interviews conducted in the manner of the current research project are not suitable 
for such quantitative analysis, which, if given, tend to lead the reader to believe 
that an exact number has a greater or more meaningful relevance than is actually 
the case.  
Indeed, because of this problem, the current conventions for representing 
prevalence in thematic analysis do not provide a tightly quantified measure. Thus, 
as examples of this practice, Braun and Clarke (2006) cited authors such as 
Meehan et al. (2000, p.372) “the majority of participants”, Taylor and Ussher 
(2001, p.298) “many participants” and Braun et al., (2003, p.249) “a number of 
participants”. Braun and Clarke claimed that these descriptors are employed to 
“suggest that a theme really existed in the data” (p.83, emphasis in original). They 
questioned how much this information actually tells us and suggested that this is 
an area of qualitative reporting that needs further debate about how and why the 
prevalence of themes is reported, and whether or not prevalence is important at all 
in some types of qualitative analysis.  
In the case of Study 1 in the current work, prevalence is not important (and 
was not the purpose, because as argued above the unstructured nature of my 
interview process is inconsistent with counting the occurrence of particular 
themes). Rather, the purpose of the interview process was to define the domain 
range of the construct. While recognising the issues regarding the current 
conventions (and its inappropriateness for my data collection technique and 
purpose), in my analysis the terms „a few‟, „some‟ and „most‟ will occasionally be 
used for convenience. 
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Somewhat similarly, the relationship between prevalence and the 
importance of a theme is not straight forward. Of greater significance than 
prevalence, is whether or not the theme “captures something important in relation 
to the overall research question” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 82). From this 
perspective, even a theme that occurred only once across a whole data set (and 
hence has low prevalence) might be considered important if it addresses the core 
of the research question.  
Phase 1: Transcription  
Braun and Clarke (2006) recommended for the first phase of the analysis, 
familiarisation with the data, that the analyst should thoroughly immerse 
himself/herself in the data by reading and re-reading the data to gain familiarity 
with the “depth and breadth of the content” (p.87). Reading for analysis should be 
an active process in which meanings and patterns are sought. Some theorists (e.g., 
Bird, 2005; Lapadat & Lindsay, 1999) have claimed that transcribing verbal 
interview data is an excellent way to familiarity and should be viewed as an 
important data analytic phase with an interpretive aspect where meanings are 
being created.   
Ten of the 20 digitally recorded interviews were transcribed by me, while 
the remaining interviews were transcribed by a professional transcriber. The 
transcription process was conducted within two weeks of each interview. I used 
the following process for transcription. Before beginning the transcription each 
interview recording was listened to in its entirety to gain a feel for its content and 
to aid my memory of the participant and the interview. Transcription required 
repeated listening to short sections of the recorded interviews with a verbatim 
account of all verbal utterances being typed into a MS Word document. After each 
interview had been transcribed (by either me or the professional transcriber) I 
checked the transcription against the recording, correcting errors found. While the 
transcripts have a reasonably high degree of accuracy, complete accuracy was not 
possible in all instances, as for example, when words or sentences were too quiet 
to hear or were obscured by other sounds on the recording. The 22 interviews 
(including the handwritten recorded notes) amounted to 225 single spaced, typed 
A4 pages of transcripts. 
Phase 2: Coding  
After transcription of a recorded interview, coding, the second phase of 
analysis, was undertaken. Strauss and Corbin (1990) referred to this task as open 
coding. Each transcript was read again. This time, text segments that I deemed 
meaningful and of relevance to the research question were highlighted on the 
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transcript hardcopy and given a data-driven initial code. Next, the highlighted text 
segments were extracted from the interview transcript and placed in a MS Word 
document table along with the initial code and also with a reference locating the 
text extract within the transcript, so that if required the text segment could easily 
be located in its original context. This process was repeated for all interview 
transcripts. 
A large amount of data was generated in this process; the initial table 
consisted of a document with more than 100 A4 single-spaced pages. In order to 
manage the data and the analysis, three broad meta-themes associated with the 
main research question and the two sub-topics were analysed separately. These 3 
broad themes were: 1) the ethical and social responsibilities of science and 
scientists, 2) the democratisation of science, 3) the 
commercialisation/privatisation of science. Three tables, one each for the meta-
themes, were then constructed with relevant text extracts and transcript location 
references.  
Phase 3: The search for themes  
Separate analyses were then conducted for each of these three meta-themes. 
The same data-driven, manifest thematic analysis process was used for all three 
meta-themes. The procedure was as follows. The codes from each of the meta-
themes were listed and sorted into a number of different groups, on the basis of 
conceptual similarity, with reference to the original transcript documents being 
retained. The groups of collated codes are potential themes. In this way codes 
were combined to form the main themes of the analysis. Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) referred to this phase as axial coding. Note that in the current chapter, only 
the first meta-theme is analysed - the ethical and social responsibilities of science 
and scientists. As previously explained, the democratisation and 
commercialisation meta-themes have been reported elsewhere. 
Next, in order to try and understand the data and the various meanings and 
relationships inherent between the induced themes, I spent a considerable amount 
of time trying to create thematic maps of the data (as recommended by Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). This is considered by qualitative researchers as a largely creative 
endeavour on the part of the analyst (Fontana & Frey, 2003). A variety of 
different thematic maps were created in an iterative process similar to the 
examples shown by Braun and Clarke. Initially large and complex thematic maps 
were eventually synthesized into smaller less complex maps either by various 
themes being discarded, due to their tangential relationship to the research 
questions, or by the amalgamation of relevant sub-themes into overarching 
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themes. The result of this process was a collection of candidate themes and sub-
themes to which text extracts were coded.  
Phase 4: Reviewing themes  
Phase 4 of the thematic analysis involved the refinement of themes and 
thematic maps. Themes and supporting text fragments were critically read and 
examined for robustness of the coherent patterns. During this process some 
themes were amalgamated when they seemed to be relatively homogeneous and in 
one instance a theme that contained heterogeneous text data (i.e., personal values) 
was deconstructed into two homogeneous themes (i.e., personal values and 
business norms). This process is consistent with Patton‟s (1990) two criteria for 
judging categories or themes: internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity. 
According to Patton, elements or concepts should be homogeneous within a theme 
and heterogeneous with elements and concepts in other themes.  
Nonetheless, complete internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity 
were not achieved – some of the themes clearly have degrees of overlap or have 
elements in common with, or that relate to, elements within other themes. Within 
the current work, such connections may be seen where a single quotation is used 
to illustrate more than one theme (thus the reader will note the deliberate use of 
the same quote to illustrate different themes or sub-themes). When satisfied that 
the themes appeared coherent and relevant to my research question a final 
thematic map reflecting the finalised themes was created.  
Next, following Braun and Clarke‟s (2006) guidelines, the validity of 
individual themes in relation to the entire data set and the accuracy of the thematic 
map as a reflection of the meanings and relevance evident in the data set were 
considered. This process involved a critical rereading of all the transcripts. During 
this process, any relevant text that had not previously been coded was allocated to 
the themes and sub-themes previously identified. Once the themes, sub-themes 
and the thematic map appeared to satisfactorily reflect the transcript data set, and 
no substantial revision seemed necessary, phase 4 was deemed complete. 
Phase 5: Defining and naming themes 
In this phase the text extracts of the various themes and sub-themes 
represented in the thematic map were organised into internally consistent, 
coherent accounts, accompanied by an analytical narrative. Definitions describing 
the content and scope of the themes and sub-themes were developed and then 
final names were assigned to each. Following Braun and Clarke‟s (2006) advice, 
the descriptions are brief (no more than a few sentences is recommended) and the 
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names chosen are concise and immediately convey to the reader a sense of what 
the theme is about. 
Phase 6: Producing the report 
This is the last of the phases in thematic analysis as elucidated by Braun and 
Clarke (2006), and consists of writing up the story revealed by the thematic 
analysis. According to Braun and Clarke, the write-up should be a concise and 
coherent account of the story with sufficient text extracts to demonstrate evidence 
of the themes. Such extracts should be vivid examples of the issues being 
discussed and be embedded within an analytic, interpretive narrative. The output 
of this phase is produced below in the Results and Discussion section. It is 
common in qualitative research to combine results with discussion and to compare 
findings with previous empirical research (Bryman, 2001; Neuman, 2000).  
However, as this work is a PhD thesis, rather than a journal article, my focus 
was on coherence, analysis and interpretation, with lots of illustrative text 
extracts, perhaps at the expense of conciseness. Because the participants in my 
research were all highly educated, articulate and frequently analysed and 
interpreted their own, and the science community‟s, positions and statements (as 
scientists their daily work involves analysis and interpretation), when apparent in 
the data, I have sometimes chosen to use participants‟ text extracts to provide both 
analysis and interpretation of the concepts under discussion. I believe that this 
technique helped to give increased voice to the participants. 
Results and Discussion 
Main themes and sub-themes: Descriptions and thematic maps 
The analysis and model offered here is a thematic one, as opposed to being a 
causal model. Three main themes were developed from the data analysis of the 
meta-theme: the wider social and moral responsibilities of science and scientists 
(i.e., scientific social responsibility). These themes are: 1) public good, 2) 
engagement, and 3) compliance.  Figure 6.1 is a high level thematic map depicting 
the 3 meta-themes and the main themes of scientists‟ and science‟s social 
responsibilities to society. The two meta-themes that are not the focus of this 
chapter (democratisation of science and commercialisation of science) are also 
shown in dashed boxes. These two meta-themes are also related to the themes of 
public good, engagement, and compliance. Each main theme of scientific social 
responsibility is briefly outlined first, after which the themes and sub-themes are 
discussed in greater detail.  
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Figure 6.1. Thematic map of scientists‟ social responsibilities to society 
These three main themes are described as follows. 
1) Public good (theme and sub-themes are depicted in Fig. 6.2): describes 
the range of participant‟s beliefs about the responsibility of science and scientists 
to „do good‟ or „to do public good‟. This range covers a continuum of beliefs from 
„do no harm‟ through „there is no imperative for science and scientists to do good‟ 
to „science should be done for the public good‟. Sub-themes of „public good‟ are: 
benefit/harm – balancing societal benefits and harms, knowledge –  its production 
and value, technologies – development, distribution and value, and foresight – 
contemplating and researching how potential technological applications impact on 
society, the environment and other objects of value.  
 
Figure 6.2. Sub-themes of the „public good‟ theme. 
2) Engagement (theme and sub-themes depicted in Fig. 6.3): describes 
scientists and the science community‟s responsibility to engage and communicate 
with society. Engagement has three sub-themes, informing society about the 
meaning and relevance of scientific knowledge and benefits and risks associated 
with new or developing technologies. The second sub-theme is becoming 
informed regarding public expectations of science and the science agenda. This 
involves the acceptability of research projects and technology developments as 
well as listening to the issues that concern the public. The third sub-theme is 
Public good 
Knowledge Technology 
Benefit/harm Foresight 
Social responsibility 
(Meta-theme) 
Public good Engagement Compliance 
Democratisation 
(Meta-theme) 
Commercialisation 
(Meta-theme) 
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integrity regarding engagement with the public. This applies to both informing 
society about research and the potential benefits and risks, including the reliability 
and validity of research results and the uncertainties associated with the potential 
risks and benefits, and becoming informed about what the public think, receiving 
this information with respect, and giving it appropriate significance in terms of 
scientific response.  
 
Figure 6.3. Sub-themes of the „engagement‟ theme. 
3) Compliance (theme and sub-themes depicted in Fig. 6.4): describes 
scientists‟ responsibility to comply with various norms and regulations.  
 
Figure 6.4. Sub-themes of „compliance‟ theme. 
Five sub-themes are identified under this theme. The first is compliance 
with scientific norms - the practices and processes that help produce sound 
scientific knowledge and which enhance the scientific community‟s ability to 
develop sound knowledge. These scientific norms are what Ziman (2001) refers to 
as the epistemic code of values of scientists. These are similar to the science 
values first popularised by Merton (Merton, 1942a). The second sub-theme is 
compliance with business norms - scientists employed in the commercial sector 
have extra norms related to employment by private or public companies. The third 
compliance sub-theme, applicable to all scientists, is laws and regulations. Fourth 
Compliance 
Societal mores 
Scientific norms 
Laws and regulations 
Personal values 
Business norms 
Engagement 
Becoming informed 
Integrity Informing society 
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is societal mores – the values, norms and expectations of society, and lastly, 
personal values.  
Public good 
I now discuss and illustrate the theme of doing „public good‟, along with its 
four sub-themes (benefit/harm, knowledge, technology, and foresighting). 
Although I treat each of these sub-themes as discrete, they are to a considerable 
extent intertwined. Thus, for example, foresight refers to the practice of imagining 
(and/or researching) the potential uses of knowledge and technology and 
considering whether, and how, they will be beneficial or harmful to society and 
engaging with the public to inform and discuss issues such as their concerns and 
what regulations should be applied in the context of the science, potential 
technologies and understanding of human behaviour. Thus, although foresight is 
categorised as belonging to the theme of doing public good, as just illustrated, it 
can clearly be related to elements of the themes of engagement and compliance. 
All of the participants discussed the notion that science and scientists had a 
responsibility to „do public good‟. The majority believed that science had a 
responsibility to “do good” (e.g., respondent 2, hereafter respondents will be 
identified as: R1, or R2 etc.) or to “do public good” (e.g., R13). Participants made 
statements such as, “science should be done for the good of the greater world 
population” (R5), “scientists have a responsibility to do public good” (R15) and “I 
have a desire to do some sort of good for the community” (R8). For some 
participants it seemed almost unbelievable that a scientist would not want to do 
public good: “Why would you not want to do public good, I mean you don‟t go 
through, or I would know very few people who go through the system not wanting 
to do some good with their science. I have never met a scientist yet who said: I 
want to be evil with my research” (R17). Another participant stated: “Scientists, in 
general, tend to be very ethical people, they tend to be people who are there 
because they are interested in humanity and in solving things and problems to 
make things better” (R6). 
While some participants stated that their desire to do good, through their 
research, was an altruistic desire, one participant questioned this saying, “I 
wouldn‟t say it was altruism either. I mean altruism would be showing 
selflessness, whereas, I think if you can do society good then you‟d get something 
in return. I mean ultimately if I produce something that was beneficial to society 
you would hope you‟d get rewarded for that” (R17). Contrary to the majority, a 
few participants argued that “there is no ethical imperative to do good” (R9) and 
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“so I don‟t have as like a preset that science should be necessarily for the good of 
humanity or for the good of the world – it‟s more of a purist type pursuit – 
knowledge for knowledge‟s sake…. it‟s not the scientists‟ primary activity to 
convert knowledge into public good, it is still to seek knowledge” (R21).  
Nonetheless, even those participants who took this latter position argued 
that there is an ethical imperative, “not to do harm” (R9). One scientist taking this 
position questioned the idea that scientists (as a profession) had any more 
responsibility to do good than any other career. She opined, “Most scientists are 
trying to do good – to help people… however, scientists do not have any more of 
a responsibility than any other sector, bankers, shopkeepers, to do good. Society 
can‟t demand more responsibility of scientists than they do of anybody else” 
(R11). However, this participant then immediately reflexively reconsidered her 
statement and raised a contrary argument: “Although, ministers and police are 
supposed to be particularly ethical. Expectations of scientists are more like 
ministers and police than perhaps car salesmen” (R11). Indeed, most participants 
seemed to consider science to be a „vocation‟ that carried with it an obligation to 
be especially morally responsible. Considering the above information, the 
following item is proposed for the awareness of social responsibility instrument:  
There is no ethical imperative for science to do good [10] 
Note that the number in the square bracket, after the proposed items, is the 
item reference number in the two social responsibility instruments i.e., the number 
represents the order in which the items occur in the scientists‟ survey in the 
quantitative research in Chapter 7 (see Appendix 7.1. Scientists‟ Survey 
Instrument). Items referenced 1-10 are proposed for the „awareness of social 
responsibility‟ instrument, while items referenced 11-20 are proposed for the 
„judgment of social responsibility‟ instrument. Note also, that not all sub-themes 
discussed lead to the proposal of an item for one of these instruments, but rather, 
sub-themes are discussed in their own right, in order to elucidate scientists‟ 
attitudes and beliefs regarding social responsibility of science and scientists. 
Benefit/harm 
Several of the participants couched their belief that science should be done 
for the public good, with reference to a beneficial purpose for the research: 
“Research should have a purpose that benefits society” (R7) and “there has to be a 
reasonably good need for it – a purpose even for blue sky research” (R3). Some 
arguing for this perspective thought that the purpose should be a benefit for 
society: “rather than knowledge for knowledge‟s sake. [We] need to know how 
this knowledge is going to fit in, what can be done with it” (R6).  
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Others considered that such a criterion was too restrictive in that it was often 
impossible to predict the eventual benefits (or harms) of basic or blue skies 
research at the time at which it was being conducted, but that such research often 
proved to be very valuable and have public benefits at a later date. One participant 
gave an example of some basic research she had conducted that was now being 
used in an unforeseen way in medical research. She commented: “so it is not 
necessarily foreseeable [that] the area of research that I work, plant viruses, would 
ever have anything to do with medical research, but it is… it‟s been used for some 
unforeseen thing that nobody would have expected and so that‟s the beauty of 
discovery” (R21). Some participants considered that knowledge was intrinsically 
valuable and hence producing it was good or beneficial for society, independent 
of any utility it might currently or eventually have. 
Not doing harm was almost universally considered to be an important social 
responsibility by sample participants, irrespective of whether they believed 
scientists had an obligation to „do good‟. One participant stated this principle as 
“first do no harm, not to do damage, not to make monsters” (R4). Several 
participants talked about the relevance of a Hippocratic Oath for scientists. 
However, in an apparent contrast to their position of „no harm‟ a majority of 
participants also talked about „balancing benefits and harms‟ – which clearly 
implies acceptance of some degree of harm. Several participants referred to 
utilitarianism (a teleological ethical theory) as their guiding ethical principle: “I 
tend to take a utilitarian approach to scientific ethics – what will the value of it be 
– how do the possible benefits of the research weigh up against the possible 
harms” (R6). Although „not doing harm‟ was a moral ideal to be strived for, there 
was recognition that this was perhaps an impossible goal for at least three reasons.  
First, there was the understanding that most scientific knowledge and 
resulting technologies could be used for both benefit and harm (e.g., dual-use 
technology Miller & Selgelid, 2007): “Almost any technology or field of science 
– medicine, physics, chemistry – can have potential lethal applications if used as 
weapons” (R13). Second, there was awareness that sometimes technological 
applications that provided benefits for some sectors of society contributed to harm 
in other sectors or for other stakeholder groups: “Scientists have a responsibility 
to think about whether their research is ethically justifiable – do we really need to 
know this thing? Is this knowledge worth the harm that it may cause, for example, 
animal suffering?‟‟ (R12). Third, there was the observation that some 
technologies that produced benefits for society in one area produced negative 
consequences for society in another. The example of the motor car was used – the 
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car gives the benefit of quick, reliable, autonomous transport at the expense of 
pollution, fossil fuel depletion, and road injuries and death caused by car accidents 
(Brandon, 2002). Like some of the bioethicists and technoethicists (e.g., Bulger, et 
al., 2002; Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008), most participants 
considered foresighting a social and moral responsibility of scientists. As one 
participant stated: “scientists have an obligation to help evaluate and understand 
both the potential benefits and potential risks associated with their fundamental 
research and with technological development” (R7).  Based on the above 
illustrations of this theme, the following item is proposed for the judgment social 
responsibility instrument: 
To evaluate possible benefits against possible harms when deciding on research 
projects [11] 
Going back to the concept previously mentioned regarding the purpose of 
research, it seems that while some considered it too strong a criterion that all 
research must have a beneficial purpose, the vast majority of participating 
scientists were against research that had harm as its central purpose. Participants 
made comments such as “research into biological weapons is problematic if not 
really unethical” (R2) and “I think those kinds of areas, for example, nuclear 
weapons, biological warfare, is an area that should not be studied. Yes, very 
much” (R14). This latter participant is raising the idea of dangerous knowledge 
and forbidden areas of study (which I will return to shortly).  
In regard to the prevention of harm, there were a number of potential areas 
of harm that were identified by participants. Similar to the results of Small et al. 
(2005) regarding public concerns about genetic engineering, the main potential 
areas of harm identified were the environment, people and animals. Participants 
made comments such as “need to be careful not to damage the environment or 
biodiversity” (R2), “do not cause problems for the environment” (R15), “should 
take care not to have any kind of negative impact on people” (R4), and “it is 
important to limit animal suffering for the sake of research” (R12). One scientist 
discussed how her attitude to the use of animals in research had changed over the 
years: “See one of the things I should have clarified, work that I wouldn‟t want to 
do. I used to do a lot of work with animals. And I didn‟t really have any problems 
with killing rats. I think that for three or four years of my life, I basically, three or 
four rats a week, that I had to kill to do the experiment. I wouldn‟t do that now” 
(R19). Since the publication of Animal Liberation by Peter Singer (1975) there 
has been growing awareness of the ethical aspects of the treatment of animals by 
society and researchers.  
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The safe practice of science and the safety of the technological products of 
science were other aspects of „no harm‟ raised by participants: “Safety of the 
products of science is an important ethical issue” (R3) and “I think it is an ethical 
responsibility, is to, obviously in the kind of gene research that we do, to do things 
appropriately and safely…. So we have ethical and social responsibilities, I guess, 
to be safe” (R14). Based on the above discussion the following item is proposed 
for the awareness of social responsibility instrument: 
The science community has a moral obligation to ensure that the products of 
science knowledge do not cause harm (e.g., to humans, animals, environment) 
[2]. 
Some participants also acknowledged accountability for harms that resulted 
from science and technology: “Corporations should be liable for any damage that 
is done as a result of their research or product development – why should the 
public pay the price for their mistakes?” (R4) and “Scientists have a responsibility 
for the use to which their technological discoveries are put…. I just think that if 
everybody blindly goes along not thinking about what they are actually doing and 
what it [research and technology] can be used for, then we have got a problem. 
Researchers should definitely be thinking about the future” (R13). This participant 
then went on to temper his claim with: “Although, if as a researcher you are an 
optimist and always trying to do public good then you don‟t tend to think what 
could be the negative things that can happen – whether it be natural disaster 
because it got mucked up and out of hand or whether somebody actually took it 
and modified it and used it for a different purpose. It is very difficult to think of 
all those different things – nobody‟s got a God‟s eye view where they can think of 
every different one” (R13). 
The unpredictability of the eventual uses of science and technology was also 
raised by another participant who used it as an argument to claim that scientists‟ 
responsibility for the application and use of their technological discoveries is very 
limited: “It is often unclear how new knowledge can be applied and what 
technologies might be developed from it. Often the new knowledge will be 
combined with other bits of knowledge or technologies to produce things that 
scientists developing the fundamental knowledge could not have foreseen. 
Scientists cannot be held responsible for unforeseen uses of the knowledge they 
develop” (R7).  This participant went on to attribute accountability to society: “It 
is up to society to decide which uses are ethical and which ones are unethical and 
to regulate the technologies in accordance with society‟s norms” (R7). For this 
participant, a scientist‟s responsibilities were limited to helping the public 
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understand and evaluate both the potential benefits and risks of fundamental 
research and technological developments. This echoes the position espoused by 
Wolpert (1989, 1999) and described in Chapter 4. From the above reflections, the 
following item is proposed for the awareness of social responsibility instrument: 
The scientific community cannot be held ethically responsible for the use to 
which scientific discoveries are put [3]. 
Several participants expressed the opinion that because science was largely 
funded by the taxpayer that scientists were accountable for their research to the 
public. Noting taxpayer funding, one participant claimed, “The taxpayer ought to 
know what we are doing because we are accountable. And if we are doing 
something that the taxpayer disagrees with, then we shouldn‟t be doing it – but 
that‟s my opinion” (R19). However, she then goes on to use the deficit theory of 
public understanding of science (Irwin & Wynne, 1996) to moderate this stance: 
“The taxpayer is quite likely to be [an] uninformed person who can‟t make a 
judgement that‟s based on sound knowledge, and that‟s a problem, so I don‟t 
know, I don‟t know where you go” (R19). 
The final topic regarding the sub-theme benefit/harm is the distribution of 
benefits and harms throughout society. This was viewed by a number of 
participants as a problem of equity. One participant, echoing ideas discussed in 
the literature review (see Chapter 1) from the Nobel Laureates (2001) statement 
and by Seragaldin (2002) observed, “increasing technological power is tending to 
increase the gap between the rich and the poor, between the Western world and 
the third world – this will create future problems unlikely to be resolved by 
peaceful social upheaval” (R2). Similarly, another scientist claimed that wealth 
distribution and lack of equity was perhaps the biggest social problem facing 
humanity (for an academic argument supporting this premise, see Wilkinson & 
Pickett, 2010). “Wealth distribution and equity, this is a huge area of future social 
problems in the 21
st
 century. Lack of adequate distribution of wealth is going to 
cause major problems – perhaps one of the biggest problems facing humankind” 
(R4). One scientist claimed that “the practical benefits of research and technology 
need to be distributed to society – not just locked away in a scientific publication” 
(R7). Another felt “a responsibility to get the knowledge that I have discovered 
out there, into the community” (R8). He also observed that “I am funded, pretty 
much, by public money, so there is a responsibility that the information that I gain 
is, that I produce, is made available and is used, maybe in a utilitarian kind of 
sense, is used for the benefit of the NZ taxpayer, for the public good…. that‟s 
particularly the case in areas that I work in, like environmental impacts, where 
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you are not getting a private provider picking up a lot of the stuff that we work 
on…. it often falls outside the standard market model…. the things we are looking 
at – systems implications of activity on the environment” (R8). From the above 
discussion the following item is proposed for the awareness of social 
responsibility instrument: 
The benefits of science and technology should be distributed throughout society 
in a fair and equitable way [9]. 
Knowledge 
I have previously alluded to the fact that some participants considered 
knowledge to be of intrinsic value – that is, the belief that, knowledge, in itself, 
irrespective of any potential utility, is a good thing and a public good: “I think that 
a healthy society is a society that values knowledge for its own sake. I think that 
the pendulum is much more the other way now, there‟s this feeling that the only 
good knowledge is knowledge that helps us make a buck” (R14). Another 
claimed, “I think we should be able to do science for science‟s sake, as long as 
people aren‟t being exploited and animals aren‟t being exploited” (R19). A third 
opined, “Knowledge for knowledge‟s sake – now there is a caveat to that, in that 
it‟s important that the science that is being done is well balanced because it‟s very 
important for science to be useful and caring of the environment and stuff. But I 
don‟t believe that it necessarily, absolutely has to be, it can be knowledge for 
knowledge‟s sake, some of which is applied” (R21). For participants‟ holding this 
belief, science was viewed as being, “about discovery – it‟s about making 
mankind more knowledgeable” (R1).  
Like Wolpert (1989, 1999), some viewed scientific knowledge as „value-
free‟. That is, they considered that knowledge in itself was neither good nor bad 
but rather it was the application to which people put the knowledge that could be 
classified as good or bad: “scientific knowledge is value-free – application of the 
knowledge has value” (R1) and “I don‟t think that knowledge itself can harm, but 
only what we do with the knowledge” (R2). A subtly different view was 
expressed as, “gathering scientific knowledge is neutral, value-free. It is the 
application of the technology that has ethical value” (R13).  The difference resides 
in the word „gathering‟. Gathering knowledge is the activity of research rather 
than the subject of knowledge. However, even those who consider knowledge 
itself to be value-free may consider gathering knowledge to be a value-laden 
activity. Indeed, this is a major tenet of Science, Technology and Society Studies 
(STS); the choice of what knowledge to gather, who to gather it about, who may 
have access to it, and for what purpose, are highly value-laden issues, as is the 
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issue of who will be the beneficiary of the knowledge and who might fall victim 
to its accidental, incidental, or malevolent harmful use (Hackett, et al., 2008). 
From the above discussion the following item is proposed for the awareness of 
social responsibility instrument: 
Science is the value-free pursuit of true knowledge [7] 
The notion referred to above by one participant, “that the only good 
knowledge is knowledge that helps us make a buck,” (R14) refers to a value 
decision about the purpose of science, which we might call the economisation of 
science. This particular value, which several scientists claimed was the over-
riding criterion for selection for science funding by the Foundation for Research 
Science and Technology (FRST)
2
, for better or worse, is setting the current New 
Zealand science research agenda. It is a reflection of the ideological position of 
most Western governments that economic growth is necessarily beneficial and 
that the purpose of science should be to create economic growth.  
Interestingly, the scientist who considered that “a healthy society is a 
society that values knowledge for its own sake” (R14) questioned the notion that 
all knowledge is good (and also the notion that knowledge itself is value-free) “it 
does come down to this really fundamental question. Is all knowledge good? I 
mean you could say, well the knowledge that allowed people to make the atomic 
weapons was not good…. I guess you have to come to the logical conclusion that 
not all knowledge is good. There is some knowledge that is actually evil, or as 
close to evil as you‟re ever going to get” (R14). It is, perhaps, true that some 
knowledge is more amenable to harmful use, and indeed, that the purpose behind 
the research that discovered a particular knowledge set may have been to commit 
harm, or that harm was caused to some group during the research process. Under 
such circumstances the research activity may be considered evil. However, it is 
not absolutely clear, that the knowledge so obtained, is itself evil. 
Allied to the position that knowledge itself was value-free (even if gathering 
it is not) was the belief that all subjects or topics should be open to scientific 
research: “Any kind of knowledge should be tried to be gained because I don‟t 
think that knowledge, in itself, can harm” (R2). This participant raised the 
question of dangerous or forbidden knowledge (Commoner, 1966; Dainton, 1971; 
Joy, 2000).  Despite her initial statement, she expressed subtle and complex 
attitudes to dangerous knowledge. She considered that some research should not 
be done due to a lack of knowledge about what the potential harms associated 
                                                 
2
 FRST was the New Zealand Government body for purchasing and funding scientific 
research. 
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with the research might be. “Some studies should not be done until we have a 
sufficient level of understanding of the possible dangers. Genetically engineered 
(GE) plants should not be released into the environment to study ecological 
effects – current knowledge is not good enough. Experimentation in containment 
is alright” (R2). In this passage, the participant was advocating an approach 
consistent with the precautionary principle (Kriebal, et al., 2001).  
She considered that there was scientific hubris and arrogance in the face of 
lack of knowledge in the field of GE: “the current contention that 90% of our 
DNA is „junk DNA‟. It is just that we cannot understand DNA. It is like when we 
read a book in a language that we do not understand or have not learned. But to 
say that all these letters are „junk‟ is very scary” (R2). Her suspicions about this 
issue have since been confirmed with important roles being found for so-called 
„junk DNA‟ (Ide, et al., 2010; Nowacki, et al., 2009), as noted in Chapter 2. This 
participant was also of the opinion that “It may not be OK to put some knowledge 
in the public arena, for example, biological and chemical warfare. However, those 
who want to find out probably can” (R2). Thus, although she considered some 
knowledge too dangerous for public release, she doubts that knowledge, once 
discovered, can be kept secret.  
After the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US, editors of scientific journals met to 
consider the withholding from publication of biological information that could be 
used to develop weapons of mass destruction (Journal Editors and Authors Group, 
2003). Other interview participants also noted research activities or technologies 
they thought should be forbidden: “Human cloning is something that‟s just not 
done. Biological warfare, those kinds [of things] they are just not done…I guess 
certain things are off limit and why would you want to do it anyway?” (R16).  
Following the above discussion, the following item is proposed for the awareness 
of social responsibility instrument: 
There are some fields of knowledge that are so potentially dangerous that they 
should not be researched [6]. 
However, it is a matter of record that some scientists not only want to do 
this kind of work but are actively engaged in such research. Although none of my 
participants said that they would like to do such research, some of them suggested 
reasons why other scientists might want to: “You do work with scientists that 
science is their absolute passion and they will keep going because they can 
scientifically do it, and I think that is a bit of a concern. The drive is to keep doing 
it because it‟s a challenge to do something scientifically, like cloning humans, or 
whatever it might be. It‟s part of the science ethos – the challenge of doing the 
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undoable. It‟s a bit of a concern, but I don‟t know how you quite control that. 
Some people are so passionate about science they can‟t divorce the science from 
the ethical side of it” (R10). Another participant expressed it like this: “One of the 
basic things of being with scientists is seeking the truth. And in terms of one of 
the glories and pleasures of being a scientist is just that that‟s so much of a 
passion to find out how and why” (R21).  
Besides the scientific passion for knowledge, a second reason suggested for 
scientists‟ desire to work in forbidden areas was the desire for scientific status; to 
be the first to achieve an „impossible‟ goal: “Why the hell do you need to clone a 
human? It‟s really just so that someone can say „I cloned the first human being,‟ 
here they are sort of hoping to be a bit of a hero” (R3). An achievement such as 
creating the first human clone would ensure scientific fame (or perhaps, infamy) 
and immortality throughout future human history – like being the first person to 
step on the moon. A third reason was also put forward. This related to the effects 
of commercialisation of science, “If the science is commercialised then the issue 
of money will over run anything else and you will, I think you will, not always get 
dishonest science, not at all, but very, very frequently, I think scientists will do 
ethically irresponsible things for the sake of money” (R12). 
Several participants noted a problem that they and the scientific community 
in general faced in regard to the pace of discovery of scientific knowledge: 
“Things are moving so fast. It‟s absolutely phenomenal, the amount of 
information. We cannot keep up with it. You can keep up with your own little 
area most of the time, but even then there‟s still things that you miss. And to try 
and keep up with everything, that‟s going on, you know, we‟re just not 
superhuman, we can‟t do it. The pace of science is a worry” (R19). Regarding the 
exponential growth of knowledge, see Kurzweil (2001, 2005) and Toffler (1971, 
1980). 
Technology 
As discussed above, scientists have different opinions regarding the moral 
value of knowledge and technology. Even if they believe that knowledge is value-
free and that no areas of knowledge should be restricted from research, they may 
still believe that some technologies should not be developed due to their potential 
for creating harm: “I certainly wouldn‟t feel comfortable working on aspects like 
the atomic bomb or chemical warfare stuff or biological weapons… certainly not” 
(R7). When the purpose of research was to create technologies for which the 
foreseeable use was clearly to do harm, such work was considered unethical by 
most of the participants. This focus on the purpose of the technology is a 
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teleological ethical consideration. For some participants a technology may be 
considered unethical because the purpose behind the development of the 
technology is expressly to do future harm. One participant did suggest that 
scientists who were employed by the military had different social responsibilities 
from other scientists: “A scientist‟s social responsibility varies with the 
organisation that they work for…. scientists employed by a CRI have a greater 
social responsibility than scientists employed by the military” (R4).  
This scientist also believed that some technologies were inherently “better, 
more moral than other technologies, even military technologies, for example, 
military sensor technologies, sniffer technologies to hunt out biological agents” 
(R4). The military technologies referred to by the participant are clearly different 
from weapons in that their purpose is not to cause harm but rather to hunt out 
sources of potential harm – ostensibly for harm prevention. He cited other 
potentially good technologies “bio-diesel, growing renewable, biodegradable fuel, 
and bio-plastics” (R4). These technologies were good because he considered them 
beneficial for the environment. Perhaps, as this participant claimed, there are 
some technologies that can be considered unethical. Candidates for this category 
are those technologies that are developed for the purpose of causing harm and 
which do not have any applications that do not result in harm (landmines, nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons seem to fulfil these criteria).  
However, it seems clear that most technologies cannot be considered either 
ethical or unethical and, as is the case with knowledge, it is the application to 
which humans put the technology that is good or bad or that ranges along a 
good/bad continuum. Indeed, even many technologies developed by the military 
are classified as „dual-use technologies‟. A dual-use technology is generally 
considered to be a technology that has the potential to be used for hostile and/or 
peaceful purposes (Miller & Selgelid, 2007). Originally these were technologies 
developed for military purposes that had the potential for beneficial peacetime 
activities (e.g., nuclear technology has the potential for being used for atomic 
weapons or for generating electricity). However, the current crop of new 
Promethean technologies being developed by civil society (e.g., nanotechnology, 
genetic engineering, medical and cognitive technologies etc.) may also have 
massive potential for harmful and/or military application and are also considered 
dual-use technologies (Miller & Selgelid, 2007). 
Weapons were not the only technologies considered inherently bad (by 
some participants) or that had primarily bad uses. In the next few paragraphs I 
will examine participants‟ attitudes to a particular controversial gene technology 
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that elicits a wide range of different responses: cloning technology. My purpose in 
doing so is to show the range of responses and the types of moral reasoning that 
underlie the participants‟ attitudes to Promethean technologies. Several 
participants claimed that “cloning animals is unnecessary and unethical” (R9). 
However, perhaps the majority of participants were not opposed to cloning 
animals, as long as there were no animal welfare issues involved: “Identical twins 
are clones…it [animal cloning] doesn‟t bother me at all…. I mean, aside from the 
issues of animal welfare” (R11). In some cases, participants believed that it was 
acceptable to clone some animals but not others: “Cloning dogs, people‟s pets is 
unacceptable…. that is the next step to cloning children…. against cloning race 
horses or pets” but, from the same individual “cloning food animals, I don‟t really 
have a huge issue with that” (R10).  
Reflectively analysing her attitudes to animal cloning, this scientist went on 
to state “maybe I‟m finding it acceptable if it is for a commercial reality 
reason….I‟m wondering if that is because, you know, married to a farmer and I 
have got that production side of me. Maybe if I was married to a company who 
was to make a truck load of money out of cloning pet animals and I could see the 
financial side of it, then probably I could feel quite differently” (R10). Here the 
participant is aware of an apparent contradiction in her moral reasoning and she 
attempts to resolve the conflict by observing that it is the contextual circumstances 
in which one is embedded that shapes one‟s feelings about what is ethically 
acceptable and what is not. After reflection on the contradiction in her manifest 
statements she analyses and resolves her contradiction by revealing her latent 
assumptions of ethical relativism and moral conventionalism. Her position seems 
to verify the earlier cited statement by participant 12 “I think scientists will do 
ethically irresponsible things for the sake of money.” Participant 10 seemed to be 
indicating that, perhaps for her, financial profit could make a practice, which she 
would normally consider unethical (i.e., the cloning of companion animals), 
acceptable.  
Whether or not they found animal reproductive cloning acceptable, almost 
all participants objected to human reproductive cloning: “Cloning humans is 
unethical” (R9).  Participants made statements such as “I just don‟t think it needs 
to be done” (R6), “I would not do it…. it does not fit with the norms of our 
society” (R7), “as a scientist, if you have a conscience you would try to steer 
away from cloning humans or cloning people‟s dog…. I just can‟t see the point in 
it…. it just doesn‟t seem right” (R12) and “Human cloning, no, no way. No, I find 
that totally abhorrent” (R8). This latter participant showed considerable emotion 
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when considering reproductive cloning (as did several others who objected to this 
application of cloning technology). The participants quoted here were expressing 
a deontological objection to human reproductive cloning. To them, the act of 
human reproductive cloning is considered wrong, unethical, irrespective of any 
possible justifying circumstances. They considered it to conflict with the ethical 
norms or moral principles of society. Currently, there is a UN ban on reproductive 
cloning (Arsanjani, 2006). While the cloning of pets was considered by some 
participants to be morally wrong there are commercial organisations (e.g., BioArts 
International and RNL Bio) who have built a business model based on this 
concept (Carlson, 2009; Mott, 2004). Perhaps if participant 10 above was 
employed by one of these organisations she might not consider cloning 
companion animals unethical. 
Some participants also had teleological ethical arguments against human 
reproductive cloning “I can just see that there will be a lot of problems from 
cloning humans…. the poor thing that is cloned, growing up, I‟m just worried that 
this individual would be considered to be more of a lab animal” (R12). Her 
teleological concerns were centred about the psychological impact of being a 
cloned person. Interestingly, this teleological argument also had a deontological 
aspect, in that she was concerned about the clone‟s likely treatment, particularly 
the potential lack of respect for the human dignity of the clone. In a Kantian 
(1998) tone she stated “every human being is a human being and should have the 
full respect of a human being” (R12). 
No participants expressed an unreservedly positive attitude to human 
reproductive cloning (for an alternative perspective cf. the ethicist Strong, 2005). 
However, a couple of participants, while expressing their general deontological 
distaste for human reproductive cloning, also demonstrated teleological ethical 
reasoning and moral relativism, with respect to this technology, by stating that 
you need to make such decisions on a case-by-case basis, and implying that in 
some situations the resulting benefit may outweigh any other moral problems 
associated with the technology. For these scientists, whether human reproductive 
cloning is acceptable: “…depends on the application…. case-by-case scenarios 
and even on individual case-by-case human…. you could have an extreme 
situation whereby I think you could say you can understand why you‟re doing 
it…. it‟s very, very, naïve to say there is no situation in which it is justifiable…. I 
would be very, very, very much struggling to find a case where I would be happy 
for it to go. But there is no way I would say no, because I‟m sure there would be a 
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case that I haven‟t thought of that, that application in my mind is justifiable” 
(R13). 
Although most participants had strong deontological objections to human 
reproductive cloning, therapeutic cloning was a concern to only some participants. 
Briefly, therapeutic cloning involves cloning a human from a somatic cell and 
harvesting the resulting embryo for stem cells for therapeutic intervention in the 
individual who donated the somatic cell. The clone or embryo is destroyed in the 
process (Human Genome Project Information, 2009). This technology is 
considered to hold huge medical potential in curing a wide variety of diseases, 
including potentially growing replacement organs. The technology also provides 
the benefits of compatibility with the tissue type of the cell donor – therefore, 
immunosuppressant drugs are not required in, for example, an organ transplant 
(Mooney & Mikos, 1999). Currently, embryonic stem cells are the most suitable 
for such medical wonders because of their pluripotency – that is, their plasticity to 
be transformed into any other type of cell in the human body. However, in the 
future, it is hoped that adult stem cells, which currently cannot be so readily 
transformed into the full range of cell types, may be used as a replacement for 
embryonic stem cells. This involves the direct creation of cells or organs from the 
adult stem cells without the intermediary step of the clone/embryo/potential 
human being. 
Those participants morally objecting to human therapeutic cloning generally 
did so because it involves the creation and then destruction of an embryo which 
has the potential of becoming a human. Opponents of therapeutic cloning may 
argue, along deontological lines, that it is wrong to either create an embryo in 
such a manner and/or destroy a potential human or to treat a potential human as a 
„use‟ or means to an end for some other person. Some compared it to abortion: “I 
come from like a Catholic upbringing so abortion is like real evil and all that” 
(R3), “Personally I really don‟t like that kind of work where you produce embryos 
to then donk them and do various things with them.  And I have never really sat 
down and worked hard on myself and deciding, when is an embryo life?….I like 
contraception methods that don‟t abort the foetus… I never want to be involved in 
doing [embryonic] stem cell stuff” (R6), and “destroying the embryo, doesn‟t, to 
me, sound ethically appropriate, acceptable” (R8). These three participants were 
opposed even to „waste‟ embryos from in vitro fertilisation (IVF) programs being 
used for stem cell therapy. However, all three of these participants (i.e., R3, R6, 
R8), while being totally opposed to stem cell therapies derived from therapeutic 
cloning for deontologically reasons, were completely in favour of stem cell 
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therapies derived from adult stem cells, where embryos were neither required nor 
destroyed. 
From this discussion of cloning technology we can see a wide range of 
different attitudes coming through regarding different potential uses of what is 
essentially a single technology. Thus, a few participants believed the technology, 
in all applications (animal reproductive, human reproductive, human therapeutic), 
to be unethical. From these individuals‟ perspectives, the technology itself may be 
considered unethical. These people primarily held deontological objections, but 
some also held teleological objections.  
For the majority, however, it was a particular application (or applications) of 
the technology that was (were) unethical, sometimes for deontological reasons 
associated with particular circumstances, sometimes for teleological reasons, and 
sometimes for both, rather than anything inherent in the technology itself. Such 
reasoning and flexibility regarding particular circumstances reveals a latent ethical 
relativism underlying the moral judgments of these scientists. 
In some cases deontological opposition is reinforced by teleological 
arguments, and in other cases, potential teleological benefits argue against (and 
may outweigh) deontological objections. For some, animal reproductive cloning 
was acceptable but human therapeutic and reproductive cloning was not, while for 
others, human therapeutic cloning was acceptable but human reproductive cloning 
was unacceptable under any conditions, no matter how great the benefit. For a 
small minority, even human reproductive cloning could be considered ethical 
under some (considered to be extreme) circumstances. Thus, there is a clear 
continuum of moral attitudes to cloning technology and its potential uses. In this 
continuum of attitudes we see a range of philosophical ethical and meta-ethical 
arguments being used or assumed, including: moral absolutism, moral relativism, 
conventionalism, deontological and teleological ethical reasoning. 
Deontological ethics was a major consideration when the technologies under 
discussion were very controversial (such as cloning and GE), or radically different 
from current technologies. However, in general, the study participants were 
particularly concerned about teleological impacts of new technologies – how the 
technologies might be used in society and what the potential benefits and harms of 
those uses might be. In this regard attempting to ensure the safety of the products 
of science and technology was considered a major social responsibility of science 
and scientists. Several participants noted that as science gives us greater 
understanding of nature, as our knowledge becomes more comprehensive, then 
the potential power of possible new technologies to influence and affect the 
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physical and social realms, for good or for bad, also increases. Put another way, 
the more profound the science, the more potentially powerful the technological 
uses and abuses become. Such arguments were common in the ethics of 
technology field (e.g., Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 2005). 
From the above discussion the following item is proposed for the awareness of 
social responsibility instrument: 
The more powerful a technology is, the more important the evaluation of its 
ethical and social implications become [4] 
An interesting perspective on the increasing power of technology was 
presented by one participant who stated: “I don‟t have concerns over the power 
that science gives humans. I think, if we blow ourselves out of existence, big deal. 
What does it matter? It is just a little green-blue planet. Cosmically, it doesn‟t 
matter…. I think there are going to be some huge disasters caused by 
inappropriate use…. Maybe in a hundred years time, I think people will realise the 
global effects and they will stop having this attitude of “I‟m OK…. But it is going 
to take a couple of big disasters. Mankind doesn‟t learn very well from history. It 
is not going to be pretty but I‟m still confident that our species will survive and 
that we won‟t go back to a pre-industrial age” (R13). While this participant had a 
near-to-medium term pessimistic view of human use of technology, he managed 
to maintain an overall optimistic attitude to technology and the long term future of 
society and humanity.  Most participants, however, did not take quite such a 
cavalier attitude to short or medium term harm. Instead, they were concerned with 
trying to prevent such disasters.  
To this end, similar to some of the theorists reviewed in earlier chapters 
(e.g., Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 2005), participants 
frequently suggested that an important social responsibility of scientists is 
foresighting the applications and consequences, both good and bad, of new 
knowledge and technologies. Hence, the final sub-theme of „Doing public good‟ 
is: foresight. The purpose of foresighting is to help ensure the products of science 
and technology are safe, to help society become aware of potential harms, thus 
enabling societal action to minimise or mitigate through regulation and 
legislation, and to elucidate the potential benefits. Foresighting is necessary for a 
precautionary approach to technological development (Kriebal, et al., 2001). From 
the above discussion the following item is proposed for the awareness of social 
responsibility instrument: 
The more powerful a technology is, the more important and relevant the 
precautionary principle becomes [5] 
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Foresighting 
As discussed earlier, many of the participants believed that they had at least 
some responsibility for how their scientific discoveries and technological 
inventions were used by society: “Should we have responsibility? And I guess the 
answer is yes, although I was starting to say no, but I have come round…. Do 
scientists take responsibility? Probably not” (R8). This scientist then referred to a 
famous quote from Albert Einstein regarding scientists‟ responsibilities: “Concern 
for man and his fate must always form the chief interest of all technical 
endeavours. Never forget this in the midst of your diagrams and equations” (R8). 
Reflecting on his own attitude to scientific responsibility, he then stated: “It is a 
sad indictment on my own scientific endeavour, but I have never given much 
thought to these issues, about how they relate. So that is probably why I have 
gone round in circles to try and answer it” (R8). However, some scientists pointed 
out that it was impossible to predict all the possible uses to which new knowledge 
and technology could be put, and therefore, there were limits to the responsibility 
of science and scientists for societal use of technologies.  
Nonetheless, many participants suggested that scientists have a 
responsibility to try to foresight the possible uses and abuses of science and 
technology: “…an obligation in evaluating developing technology, understanding 
the technology, looking at the risks….We don‟t do it. It‟s bad” (R7), and 
“Scientists doing basic or fundamental research have to have some sort of social 
responsibility, they have to be aware of the possible applications once it‟s gone 
past them. Because someone out there will pick up on what they are doing. 
Scientists have a responsibility to consider what the possible negative applications 
of their research could be, and they have to be willing to walk away from a project 
if they realise that its negative applications are too great” (R10). Two important 
concepts are introduced in this last quote. First, is the idea that, at some point, 
science and technology pass from the hands of the scientist and into the hands of 
society and people (other than scientists) who could possibly misuse it. Therefore, 
it is important for scientists to consider the possible negative applications. Second, 
is the idea of personal moral responsibility (which I shall return to in a later 
section), that is, the responsibility of scientists to exercise personal moral choice 
and abandon research whose potential for misuse and harm they consider too 
great.  
Another scientist, while acknowledging that scientists had a responsibility to 
foresight both positive and negative uses of their technologies, observed that it 
was not always easy for scientists to consider the negative applications, “I just 
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think that if everybody blindly goes along not thinking about what they are 
actually doing and what it [research and development] can be used for, and what it 
will be used for, then we have got a problem. Researchers should definitely be 
thinking about the future” (R13). Later in the interview he tempered this position 
with, “although, if as a researcher you are an optimist and always trying to do 
public good, then you don‟t tend to think what could be the negative things that 
can happen – whether it be natural disaster because it got mucked up and out of 
hand or whether somebody actually took it and modified it and used it for a 
different purpose. It‟s very difficult to think of all those different things. Nobody‟s 
got a God‟s eye view where they can think of every different one” (R13). 
Part of the responsibility of foresighting is also in communicating the 
possible uses and misuses of technology to the public, thus, providing an 
opportunity for society to discuss the issues, raise any concerns they have, and 
participate in the decision-making process: “scientists have a responsibility to 
point out how their technologies could be used, for good and bad and to provide a 
forum to help society think about the issues and come to decisions about what is 
acceptable and what is not” (R11) and “to try and watch what is on the horizon, to 
make sure that the government of the day, as it were, is pre-warned that there will 
be these issues” (R20). Once society decides what is (or is not) acceptable then 
the science and the technology may be regulated by legislation. From the above 
discussion the following item is proposed for the judgment of social responsibility 
instrument: 
To consider and dialogue with the public about the possible misuses to which 
knowledge gained from your research could be put [18]. 
Foresighting was considered necessary because, “Ethics is not just 
[compliance with] legislation because there can be holes in legislation. And the 
scientists can either choose to bring that to the legislators notice, then plug it, or 
chose to work around that… the technologies are moving so fast that our 
legislative system just simply will never keep pace. And this is where ethics 
comes in, that it‟s up to people working in these areas to say, look this is on the 
horizon…. so that ethics is much more, I think, ethical behaviour amongst 
scientists, than just adhering to the current legislation” (R20). 
One mechanism scientists could use for foresighting was to: “look at things 
which are already known” (R2). That is, to evaluate similar kinds of existing 
technologies and look at what their impacts have been. Scientific research was 
seen as a tool for foresighting. Some scientists considered it important, after 
engaging in dialogue with the public, to research the issues of public concern – 
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though some wished to qualify this to concerns they considered genuine as 
opposed to false concerns or unanswerable questions: “I don‟t think you need to 
do research to address concerns that are just not genuine… but we are concerned 
with animal health and wellbeing from the work we did [GE animals and 
clones]…. things like „playing God‟ well, you are not going to do research to 
prove or disprove that” (R6).  
While much of the purpose in foresighting was precautionary, through intent 
to prevent the harmful (mis)use of technology, some participants noted that a 
precautionary approach might also be interpreted as foresighting the elimination 
of existing harms through the adoption of a new technology. Thus, in such a 
situation, the precautionary approach would not be to slow the release of the 
technology but rather to hasten or encourage its development and argue against 
resistance to adoption. Arguing that our future planetary population would require 
vastly increased food production and that GE was the best means to achieve this, a 
couple of participants claimed that it was unethical not to research GE food 
applications. Such a position is frequently taken by advocates of GE (e.g., 
Fedoroff, et al., 2010). 
Finally, for the sub-theme of foresighting, several participants pointed out 
the need to consider and evaluate the benefits and harms of technologies on a 
case-by-case basis: “…need to look at research on a case-by-case basis regarding 
public acceptability” (R9). This result is consistent with a study by Small (2001) 
in which a small sample size qualitative study of New Zealand environmental 
scientists (N = 12) found that they considered it necessary to evaluate GE products 
on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, Small (2005a) found that a majority of the NZ 
public also considered it necessary to evaluate GE products case-by-case (72% 
agreement in a 2003 survey and 83% agreement in a 2005 survey).  For some 
technologies, it was argued that each case of use might need to be treated as a 
different case and evaluated on its own merits. An example of this has previously 
been discussed regarded cloning technology where many participants felt that 
some applications of cloning were acceptable but that others were not. However, 
as previously noted, even amongst this relatively homogeneous group of scientists 
there was considerable variability regarding what cases (uses) were acceptable 
and what were not. From the above discussion the following item is proposed for 
the judgment of social responsibility instrument: 
To ensure that the process and development of research complies with the 
precautionary principle [16] 
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Engagement 
I now discuss and illustrate the second of the three main themes; 
„engagement‟ (with the public) along with its three sub-themes: becoming 
informed, informing others, and integrity. Again, although each sub-theme was 
treated as a discrete category, they are, in fact, pragmatically intertwined. It 
should be noted that elements of some of the sub-themes in the main theme of 
engagement were also found in, or were related to, elements in the main theme 
and sub-themes of doing public good and the main theme and sub-themes of 
compliance. Before discussing the sub-themes of informing, becoming informed 
and integrity, I first discuss issues participants raised regarding engagement in 
general. These issues are: the necessity of engagement; scientists as members of 
the public; methods of, and barriers to engagement and; public understanding of 
science. 
Most participants considered that engagement of the science community 
with the public was a necessary part of what it means for a scientist to be socially 
responsible: “Being socially responsible in research means communicating with 
the public” (R4), “scientists need to listen to the public and engage in discussion 
with them over their work – including those who have very different viewpoints – 
this is not done enough” (R2), “scientists have a responsibility to participate in 
public debates over science…. if scientists aren‟t involved then a valuable part of 
the picture is missing” (R8), “Scientists have a social obligation to make their 
work known to the public…. I‟ve made quite an effort to do that” (R11), “it is 
important to take the time to have this communication. It‟s very valuable to know 
that you are going in the right direction…. I think this communication between 
science and society is very important” (R21), “I think science, as a whole, has a 
lot to learn from the GM [genetic modification] debate, about keeping the public 
informed about what we are doing, because our kids nowadays are taught to 
challenge and ask questions” (R16), and “the science community has a 
responsibility to communicate with the public about science. But not all scientist 
are good at it” (R10). The earlier quotes in this paragraph speak to the 
responsibility of individual scientists to engage, whereas the latter quotes, 
recognising that not all scientists are good communicators, emphasise the role of 
the science community in engaging with society. Some considered that 
engagement with the public was necessary in order to: “create a balance to the 
disinformation spread by groups such as the Greens, MADGE, and GE Free NZ” 
(R15). From the above discussion the following item is proposed for the judgment 
of social responsibility instrument: 
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To participate in public debate and dialogue over contentious scientific issues 
[19]. 
A number of participants pointed out that although they were scientists they 
were also members of the public or various communities and that they could not 
entirely separate the two roles: “Although I am a scientist I don‟t think I can ever 
split myself from also being a community member. So I don‟t feel that my ethical 
responsibilities as a scientist are any different from my ethical responsibilities of 
being a mother, or being a member of the general community” (R10). This 
participant also believed that “I don‟t think that if you look at scientists as a 
community versus the rest of the community that the range [of ethical viewpoints 
and behaviour] would be any different” (R10) and, as a consequence, “I don‟t 
think that because you are a scientist that you definitely believe in all the things 
that science is doing” (R10).  
Most frequently engagement was mentioned in terms of discussion, debate, 
dialogue, communication, education, informing the public or decision-makers, 
becoming informed about public attitudes, beliefs, concerns and moral boundaries 
and expectations. Participants considered engagement and communication could 
be formal, informal, structured, unstructured, and/or culturally appropriate, such 
as Hui. Ethical commissions, Royal Commissions, professional groups, interest 
and advocacy groups were all seen as having a role to play in the process of public 
engagement. Nonetheless, how to engage was considered difficult, “I think it is 
very important to have a method, and this is something that is not well 
developed….I don‟t think that we have a good way for interacting between 
science and society” (R21). 
Public debates on science issues were seen by some participants as 
beneficial and, although initially focussed on extreme views, eventually reached a 
more nuanced middle ground. One participant used the example of the very public 
GE debate in New Zealand “where the debate has been taken to the public. There 
was a lot of rubbish said on both sides, but in the end people came back, on the 
whole, to a more middle ground. So scientists you once heard saying there are no 
problems are now saying, “Yeah, well, there are issues. On both sides a lot of 
people aren‟t saying the extreme stuff any more…. they are arguing about real 
issues” (R11). 
However, another scientist took a quite a different view of the GE debates, 
claiming that debates were often a setup that polarised opinions: “Public debate, 
that‟s a „them and us thing‟. That is, the debates have been disastrous in terms of 
polarising, because you‟re asked to come along to a debate, and this happened to 
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be, this is how I got into the whole public talk stuff. And it was quite definitely set 
up as „them and us‟. And even though I was asked to explain the technology in a 
very basic way, I was on the practitioner‟s side, therefore, I was pro without any 
question. And the other people were all anti, without any question, basically” 
(R20). Several scientists who had actively participated in GE debates felt that they 
had been trapped or set up by the organisers. Their reaction to this was that they 
felt reluctant to participate in such debates in future unless they were fairly 
organised and managed: “It is right that scientific research should be open to 
public scrutiny, but it has to be a fair process” (R6). Some participants had 
attended „dialogue events‟ where there had been a concerted effort and process 
structure designed to minimise confrontational engagement and greater time 
allowed for participants to engage and come to understand the viewpoints of the 
other. These events were considered much better than shorter public debates or 
meetings, but on the downside, they involved greater commitment and economic 
and time requirements. 
The media were also viewed as a possible mechanism for engagement with 
the public. It was recognised that “Public interest in science issues is created by 
the media” (R15) and that “People are learning how to use the press more to tell 
the public about what they are doing. And that seems to be a fairly efficient way 
of getting out to a lot of people quickly” (R22). Some considered that the media 
could be a better ally of science: “I think they could be more of our friends than 
they are” (R19), but that it would require, “having more positive stories in the 
media about the good things that are occurring in science as opposed to just 
focussing on controversial science. The media don‟t tend to pick up on the good 
stories – just the negative ones” (R10). This participant thought that there should 
be, “more stories in the media about non-traditional stereotype scientists e.g., 
woman scientists, instead of middle class, middle aged, white males. I don‟t think 
woman are seen as corporate, or as the slightly crazy person in a white coat” 
(R10).  
However, in general, participants held a poor view of science journalism in 
New Zealand and believed that the media, “…are a barrier. They present things 
out of context and distorted. They sensationalise the issues rather than presenting 
fair and balanced points of view” (R15), and “I think the media has got a lot of 
responsibility for a lot of bad press that scientists get” (R19). One scientist 
claimed that because of the poor quality of science journalism in New Zealand our 
public are, “poorly informed, except at the level of slogans” (R18). Other 
scientists were wary of the press in terms of misinterpretation and misreporting. 
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That is, they claimed journalists did not understand their science and did not 
report interviews with them accurately. Due to previous bad experiences with the 
media, some of the scientists interviewed would no longer let stories go to print 
unless they had the opportunity to review them first. This also made scientists 
wary of media reports of the work of other scientists: “I‟ve got to the stage now 
that I won‟t let anything go into the newspaper that I haven‟t read…. When I do 
read articles I think, well I just don‟t know whether I should believe this because I 
know I have been misreported and it‟s quite likely that other people are as well” 
(R19). 
Other barriers to engagement were also raised. The difficulties associated 
with the communication of complex scientific concepts was raised by several 
participants: “It‟s a difficult process because the science that‟s being done is very 
technical and society is very large and multifaceted” (R21), and “its just the 
difficulty of explaining what you do because the work we do is so specialised that 
most people don‟t really want to listen about it, because they‟re shut off, because 
it‟s like gobbledegook to them” (R3). The complexity of science argument is 
related to the deficit theory of public understanding of science which will be 
discussed further below.  
The commercialisation of science was viewed by some as placing 
institutional barriers on scientists‟ ability to engage with the public. In order to 
protect commercial advantage companies often required that scientists seek 
permission to talk to the public or the media about their work: “there‟s 
institutional barriers ….so like in AgResearch, often like, you can‟t actually go 
and talk to the press unless you get official approval, and I agree with that because 
most people haven‟t got the skill of dealing with the media anyway….[but], some 
people might feel quite differently to me about it…. they might feel that they 
should be allowed to talk more openly” (R3). Companies may also insist on 
censoring press releases and restricting publication of some results until patents 
have been applied for and received. This restriction on release of information may 
also apply to discussions with other scientists.  
A further barrier that could limit engagement was peer pressure from the 
science community. In respect to GE one participant had this to say: “our science 
general manager stood up and said we are going to be doing a lot of media 
releases on genetic engineering so please make sure that you stand up for what we 
are saying.  And that you tell everyone that genetic engineering is good…. I think 
it would be very hard for a scientist to come out and say I‟m unsure in public.  To 
do that you would feel like you were going against the science community” (R10).  
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One senior, internationally renowned scientist, talked about the difficulty of 
speaking out about social issues or problems in science due to the conservative 
nature of science and scientists: “It‟s a very hard thing to do. You‟ve got to be 
exceedingly brave. And particularly because scientists are so conservative they 
don‟t like contrary opinion and they don‟t like people disagreeing with them. And 
it is very hard from that point of view and so I notice that people tend to get more 
outspoken, particularly about social issues as they relate to science, as they get 
older. Because they, you could say, in one sense, because they have the mana then 
to be able to do that” (R14). He then went on to suggest an additional reason why 
older scientists are more willing to speak out and, by implication, gives the reason 
of career protection and progression for young scientists remaining silent: “But 
also because they [older scientists] are less afraid of what might happen to their 
careers…. since, presumably, they have well established ones and they are beyond 
those kind of effects” (R14). 
Other scientists talked about the desire for career progression as a restraint 
on public engagement and the dissemination of their research: “Career 
progression.  My career progression is based on the number of papers I produce, 
the number of conferences I attend, number of networks that I make…. It‟s about 
getting out there and pumping out new information…. If I spend all of the rest of 
my career making sure that people heard about my [previous research] findings 
and didn‟t pursue new knowledge, then I wouldn‟t get anywhere” (R8). This is an 
explanation for lack of public engagement due to the lack of recognition of public 
engagement activities as a valued part of progressing one‟s scientific career: “I 
think a barrier that we [scientists] have in being socially responsible, is not giving 
value to time and the process of this [science and society] interaction… you‟re not 
producing results…. in fact, you are impinging on the time that you could be 
doing experimentation…it‟s the lack of valuing that time and allocating it to the 
process” (R21). Thus, given the current emphases of scientific culture on the 
production of new knowledge, the rational means to develop one‟s science career 
is to allocate as much time as possible to conducting new science rather than 
disseminating old science to the public.  
Lack of recognition of public engagement activities was also highlighted by 
the distain with which some scientists hold popularisers of science. Referring to 
the evolutionary biologist and populariser of science, Stephen Jay Gould, one 
participant (an internationally recognised evolutionary biologist) stated, “There 
was a lot of stuff in the obituaries about how his only contribution was really to 
write for the public. And the tone is very clear. The tone of those comments is 
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negative, whereas in fact, I would have thought, and by the way, that was 
manifestly untrue. Stephen Jay Gould made absolutely fundamental and enormous 
contributions, almost more than any other evolutionary biologist, over the time 
that he was active and writing” (R14).  
This participant went on to question why this might be: “Why do scientists 
kind of criticise people for writing for the public? It‟s the demeaning thing, it 
demeans science almost” and then suggests an additional reason “The worry here 
is that there is a thing inherent in science that we know and we‟re not going to tell 
you, because if we tell you, then you know too, and we‟ve lost all our power. So, 
in fact, knowledge is power” (R14). Thus, according to this scientist, not engaging 
with society can be a source of power for scientists. He also considered that the 
writing style scientists were trained in is a barrier to engagement: “Only scientists 
would read, or scientist would be bothered with, quite frankly” (R14). Similarly, 
some participants considered, “Scientific jargon can be a barrier to social 
responsibility…. it can be a screen for scientists to hide behind…. a barrier to 
honest communication” (R11). 
Several participants pointed out that not all scientists are suited to the role of 
engaging with the public: “I think you almost need specific positions for that 
because it‟s very hard, or quite often people go into science because they‟re a bit 
out of the ordinary. You could go to a conference in which you will find there will 
be ten people stand up and talk that are dreadful at standing up and talking and 
one person who is a natural…. if you‟re going to talk to the public, you need a 
natural…. it comes down to personality, some people are good at it, some people 
are crap at it” (R17). Another participant took the position that “Individual 
scientists do not have a responsibility to communicate with the public, because 
some are not good communicators and might do more harm than good.” However, 
he was still of the view that “It is preferable that scientists do communicate with 
the public, if they are able” (R13). These scientists considered the most important 
thing was that it needed to be the right person for the job: “Some people just don‟t 
have the right mannerisms to come across in an appropriate manner.… so, you‟ve 
got to find the right person…. that‟s not to say that people shouldn‟t be allowed to 
do public talks…. but, I think the person is really important…. they‟ve got to be 
seen as being honourable, I suppose, and believable” (R16). Several participants 
saw a role for, “training scientists in the art of communicating with the public” 
(R2). 
Participants noted that often it is people with extreme views, both members 
of the public and scientists, who tended to engage in public debate regarding 
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science issues: “What happens in science is that you get the extremes talking. But 
there is a hell of a lot of people that sit in the middle and don‟t talk. Because they 
don‟t feel strongly one way or the other” (R10). Another scientist noted that this 
led to difficulty in gauging the true level of public concern: “Meetings and 
gatherings, so forth, while they will give you better feedback, they probably don‟t 
reach enough people to actually be that useful. More than likely you just meet 
certain types of people, generally very pro or anti. So you are never quite sure 
[whether] you actually are talking to an incredible minority, or are you really 
talking to the common voice that‟s coming from the community. Sometimes it‟s 
difficult to gauge what is happening” (R22). Although this scientist was aware of 
the anecdotal nature of his personal experience of public engagement, some 
scientists, generally those who had been heavily involved in public debates did 
not seem to have this awareness. Rather, they considered the New Zealand public 
to be much more strongly opposed to GE than the empirical evidence would 
suggest (Small, et al., 2005; Small, 2005, 2007). 
The public understanding of science was considered an issue for many of 
the participants. Indeed, educating the public was considered a major reason for 
the necessity of public engagement: “We need to make sure the public are more 
educated about science so that they understand the debate… the GM debate has 
got really out hand…. the public just don‟t understand enough science to 
appreciate the issues” (R16), “The public are not well informed on a lot of science 
issues. They need to be better informed to have any meaningful or relevant input 
into the science agenda…. Some people (e.g., GE Free NZ and MADGE) have 
outlandish views on what we molecular biologists do; uniformed and irrational” 
(R15), and “The taxpayer is quite likely to be an uninformed person who can‟t 
make a judgment that‟s based on sound knowledge…I think the biggest problem 
that we‟ve got is to try and educate the public to a level that they can be confident 
with what we are doing” (R19).  
In the public understanding of science literature, this latter position is 
known as the deficit theory, that is, if only the public understood more about 
science then they would support what science is doing. Empirical research 
generally does not support the deficit theory (Evans & Durant, 1995; Georges 
Gaskell, Bauer, Durant, & Allum, 1999; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Marris, 2001; 
Pardo & Calvo, 2002). Interestingly, participant 19‟s next statement somewhat 
deflates her argument: “…and in saying that, I‟m not even confident that my 
colleagues are doing the right thing. I actually don‟t blame the public for being 
sceptical, I really don‟t” (R19). Thus, we have an individual, well versed in 
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science, who, nonetheless, does not always feel confident with either her fellow 
scientists or the science agenda. 
The deficit theory is related to the earlier discussed issue of the complexity 
of science. Several of the participants voiced concern about the complexity of 
science, regarding engaging with the public, and expressed strong support for the 
deficit theory. However, support for the deficit theory was not unanimous 
amongst participants; even sometimes amongst individuals who noted the 
complexity of science as a problem. Indeed, several participants viewed the deficit 
theory as little more than scientific arrogance: “Some scientists have this thing I 
find incredibly patronising and rude, where they stand up and say the public just 
needs to be better educated. And every time I hear that, I just cringe, because it is 
so arrogant” (R10), and “It is arrogant scientists who claim that the public are 
ignorant, that they are incapable of understanding science. My mum had this 
quote on her windowsill from Ernest Rutherford saying, „if a scientist can‟t 
explain what he is doing to the cleaning lady then he doesn‟t really know‟. Some 
scientists do get quite arrogant; the education system that they have been through 
can lead them to think they are intellectually superior” (R11). 
A number of scientists believed that the public also had a responsibility to 
engage with science. That is, engagement is not just a one way process which is 
entirely the scientists‟, or the science community‟s, responsibility. The public also 
have a responsibility to become informed about science: “…but that is not their 
[scientists] sole responsibility and public should seek to educate themselves too” 
(R18), and “I don‟t believe it solely rests on the shoulders of scientists and that 
people who point the finger at scientists doing evil things need to get involved and 
be part of the decision-making process and get off your arse…. scientists are part 
of society and we are moving forward together. And, there‟s a time for society 
people to be complacent, but there‟s also a time to be active and that if this is 
something that gets you going, then get involved” (R21). One scientist claimed 
that “some pressure groups, like the Greens, have their power through lack of 
engagement, in their refusal to look at issues and find common ground (R18).  
The process of engagement may be viewed as having three main 
components; informing or educating the public, listening to the public and 
becoming informed about their values, beliefs, expectations and concerns, and 
conducting engagement with honesty and integrity. 
Informing the public 
One important aspect of public engagement is informing the public about 
science. As discussed above, a number of participants considered that the public 
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were lacking in the necessary scientific knowledge to participate meaningfully in 
discussion about science and the science agenda. These people placed importance 
on scientists helping to raise levels of public knowledge regarding science and, 
therefore, regarded public education as an important role in which scientists could 
participate: “We need to make sure the public is more educated about science” 
(R16). For others, the public had a right to know what science was doing and 
scientists had a responsibility to provide that information: “…responsibility to 
disseminate information about the research that we are doing. It is important that 
scientists do this” (R15), “Scientists have got to get out there and talk about the 
things that they are doing” (R10) and “[we] need to keep the public informed” 
(R3).  
For some there was an element of scientists being accountable to their fund 
providers: “the taxpayer ought to know what we are doing because we are 
accountable” (R19) and, therefore, scientists have a responsibility to keep the 
public informed as to: “...the goals of research, products that might result, 
potential benefits and harms” (R4). The need to help society become aware of the 
potential implications of new science and technology was also an important 
responsibility for some participants: “It‟s up to people working in these areas to 
say: look, this is on the horizon” (R20). One participant, while bemoaning 
scientists‟ lack of willingness to participate in helping to keep the public 
informed, offered a reason for this lack of engagement: “Scientists don‟t 
disseminate knowledge and its implications for future environments or future 
wellbeing comprehensively enough…. Scientists are often scared of telling the 
public about their work because they fear it will be misinterpreted” (R1). 
Participants‟ discussions centred about the need to keep the public informed 
and reasons for this, as well as the types of things or issues that scientists should 
be informing the public about. Several participants considered it important that 
scientists point out how new technologies could be used for good or bad: “A 
scientist should be being honest and saying we‟ve had this finding, now it could 
be used for this, it could be used for that, this is unethical” (R11). This participant 
viewed this precautionary foresighting role as important in that it could help to 
facilitate societal decision-making “I think society also has to decide, there‟s a lot 
of, sort of ethical issues that society has to decide, but scientists should not be 
making it difficult for society to make those choices” (R11). Keeping the public 
informed about potential technology applications and ethical issues is strongly 
interconnected with the sub-theme of foresighting. Here, however, the emphasis is 
on communicating the insights from foresighting activities to the public or 
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specific sectors of the public: “…future watch, to try and watch what was on the 
horizon and to make sure the government of the day was pre-warned that there 
will be these issues” (R20). From the discussion above the following item is 
proposed for the judgment of social responsibility instrument: 
To give the public clear guidance on the reliability and validity of scientific 
conclusions regarding potential benefits and risks [13] 
For some participants, scientists had a responsibility to participate in 
informing and educating the public because they saw it as necessary in order to 
balance what they construed as misinformation coming from other sectors such as 
the media, pressure groups and Internet. “Scientists need to create a balance to the 
misinformation spread by groups such as the Greens, MADGE (Mothers Against 
Genetic Engineering), and GE Free NZ” (R15), and “the issue with the public at 
the moment with the Internet and everything like that…. you can get as much 
misinformation as you like, like white noise to drown out the real message” 
(R17). This participant saw a specialist role for science communicators: “You 
almost need specific positions for that because it‟s very hard” (R17). One 
participant considered that there needed to be special processes or methods to 
communicate technical information to the public: “It‟s very important to have a 
method and this is something that‟s not very well developed…it‟s a difficult 
process because the science that‟s being done is very technical” (R21). Another 
considered it essential that information was communicated to the public in jargon 
free language but that scientists, generally, are not trained for this. 
Becoming informed 
Another component of engaging with the public was becoming informed as 
to public attitudes and moral values regarding science and technological 
development. This sub-theme might also be called listening to the public. Several 
participants made statements to the effect that science should be conducted within 
the moral boundaries of society: “The wider issues of ethics, I see, is working 
within the norms of society values…it‟s working within the boundaries that you 
feel….ethical society are comfortable with” (R16), “[a scientist has] responsibility 
to match or at least be cognisant of the community‟s ethical opinions and to give 
back to research within those boundaries” (R21), and “becoming informed about 
what society finds acceptable” (R9). In order to comply with public morality, 
scientists need to listen to the public to become cognisant of their issues and 
concerns: “ [one of] the factors that enhance our [scientists‟] responsibility is 
getting to know more about what the public are interested in and what their fears 
are and concerns about” (R6), “…just getting out and talking to people and seeing 
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what they think and what they understand and don‟t understand” (R5), and “it is 
very important to listen to the public” (R2). From the above discussion the 
following item is proposed for the judgment of social responsibility instrument: 
To become informed about what society finds acceptable or unacceptable in 
scientific research [17]. 
Several participants emphasised the need to engage with members of the 
public who share very different points of view from themselves: “What scientists 
should do is engage in discussions with the public as far as possible about their 
research, but also especially with people who might have a different angle on the 
problems, so with environmentalists, with people from groups which are not 
necessarily very positive towards whatever a scientist is doing, so that we can get 
a broader perspective on whatever we are working on” (R2). Others noted the 
importance of becoming informed about different cultural perspectives and, in 
New Zealand, about the responsibility of becoming informed regarding Maori 
perspectives: “…to some extent like, I take into account Maori views on things” 
(R3). When scientists listen to the public they can gain insight into socially 
appropriate research and technology development: “…mixing with non-
scientists…. and getting feedback from them…. doing work based on what they 
are asking…. not just going off and doing something and saying this is what you 
need to do. I take the stance where I listen…. going off and doing something and 
then forcing it on the general public isn‟t very responsible” (R5).  
One scientist, who had been heavily involved in public engagement 
activities in the area of GE, believed that there were lessons to be learnt from the 
GE debate: “…but it‟s appreciation of what society thinks about what we are 
doing. I believe we haven‟t done that really well in the past in many cases. GM 
[genetic modification] is a good example of that. In all honesty we have come into 
that with something of arrogance 20 years ago, believing society would accept 
what we‟re doing…. I think science as a whole has got a lot to learn from the GM 
debate…. about keeping the public informed about what we are doing… about 
engaging the public well enough, early enough” (#16). In general, most 
participants believed that the public did have a right to have some say in the 
setting of the science agenda. However, there was considerable variation with 
respect to the amount of influence the public should be able to have. This aspect 
of engagement (sometimes referred to as the democratisation of science) was 
briefly discussed in the literature review of the current work (see Chapter 4). For a 
more detailed discussion of scientists‟ attitudes to the democratisation of science 
see Small and Mallon (2006). 
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Integrity 
Honesty and integrity in engaging with the public were mentioned by 
several participants as essential: “Being honest and open with either the public or 
with the funders or whatever about the outcomes of the work” (R3), “that they 
[scientists] are honest about what they are doing and that they are up front about 
what they are doing and they are doing it well” (R11), “To report scientific 
findings with honesty and integrity” (R4), and “To ensure that the science that you 
do, that the results, findings are actually reported as they are recorded. And 
reported in a way that enables people to interpret them…. so that you provide 
sufficient data for people to draw their own conclusions” (R1). Several aspects of 
honesty and integrity are embedded in these quotes. First, scientists should be 
honest and open about what it is that they are doing, second, they should be 
honest about reporting the outcomes or results of the research, which also 
involves providing enough information about the research to enable the reader to 
make judgments about the reliability, validity and quality of the findings, and 
third, that the research be competently performed.  
Another participant considered transparency to be the crucial ingredient of 
integrity in engagement: “Transparency is the main ethical responsibility [of 
scientists]. It is extremely important to be open rather than secretive. 
Transparency gives the public the opportunity to see what scientists are doing, it 
puts research up for public scrutiny. In this way a scientist‟s ethical 
responsibilities will be moderated by the community. The public will judge 
whether you can go ahead and do it…. if the researchers transparently declare 
what they are doing and get funding from a public body then clearly the public 
body is saying this work is for the public good. Total transparency necessarily 
implies total honesty and integrity in research” (R13).  
One aspect of integrity in engagement with the public was demonstrating 
scientific integrity. In this respect some participants considered it essential that 
work should be peer reviewed before being communicated to the public “if you‟ve 
had a result that you think is really important but it hasn‟t been published in a peer 
reviewed journal, that is the one way for other scientists to know that it‟s been sort 
of looked at and its right. I mean, I think there is a big responsibility not to ring 
the Herald and say I have found the cure for this or that and give false hope to 
people” (R11). The issue of peer review is discussed further in the section on 
scientific norms below. The purposes for which scientists used the media was an 
issue for some participants who considered that when engaging with the media it 
should not be purely for the ends of the scientist: “…having responsibility, not to 
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get up and grab the media for their own purposes. I feel quite strongly about 
that….we should be communicating with the public, but we shouldn‟t be 
communicating for our own ends, just because funding is about to happen and we 
want to make a big splash” (R11). Thus, scientists have a responsibility to subject 
their work to the scrutiny of their peers, to use the media with integrity, and to 
report their findings accurately and not to make dubious claims which could 
unrealistically raise people‟s hopes about what science can achieve: “Scientists 
have a responsibility to ensure that benefits and risks are not exaggerated” (R5). 
From the above discussion the following item is proposed for the judgment of 
social responsibility instrument: 
To refrain from exaggerating the potential benefits or minimising the potential 
risks [12]. 
Nonetheless it was recognised by some participants that “Scientists don‟t 
get the real message right every time, you know, they make mistakes, just like 
everybody else. But that‟s the difficult thing, that is, getting what is at the time 
known to be state of the art, and getting that message across to the public” (R17). 
Here there is acknowledgment that science is a process that works towards getting 
at „the truth‟ and that what is considered correct knowledge today may need to be 
revised in the light of new research and findings. Related to this concept is the 
responsibility of scientists to advise the public about the certainty (or lack) of their 
findings and to help interpret the meaning and implications: “There is a 
responsibility to ensure that scientific uncertainty and/or confidence in data is 
made transparent” (R4).  
Several participants, noting that scientists are like other members of the 
public, observed that there will be honest scientists and dishonest scientists in the 
same way that there are honest and dishonest members of the public: “If you look 
at a spectrum of scientists you will have honest scientists, dishonest scientists and 
the same range as you would maybe within any other profession” (R17). One 
participant reflecting on why scientists might be dishonest suggested: “…money 
is one thing, fame is another. You know that scientists aren‟t honest, because if 
they were you wouldn‟t get the retractions of journal articles that you get. And I 
think that‟s a real shame because I think, you know, we don‟t do ourselves any 
service by not being upfront and admitting that you are wrong. We need to admit 
that we don‟t know everything, I mean that‟s the reason why we are scientists, 
because we don‟t know and we want to find out” (R19).  
However, in contrast, several participants took a more positive view of 
scientists‟ moral character being of the opinion that, in general, scientists tended 
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to be ethical people: “Scientists that I know are very ethical people, they really 
are. Scientists basically tend to be people who as a rule…. tend to be not 
mercenary….they tend to be people who are there because they are interested in 
humanity and interested in solving things and problems and issues to make for 
better” (R6), and “there‟s been very, very, few scientists who do behave in 
unethical ways…. some scientists are arrogant but not unethical” (R11). 
Several participant noted that scientists who engage with the public have, 
“…got to be seen to be honourable, I suppose, and believable” (R16). Thus, not 
only was it important for scientists engaging with the public to have integrity, it 
was also important that they be credible in the eyes of the public. While scientists 
were, by virtue of their career and knowledge set, likely to have a certain amount 
of credibility in regard to communicating science issues, credibility was also 
partly a matter of having appropriate communication skills: “Maybe there‟s a high 
level of credibility that comes from scientists, but sometimes they are not the best 
at communicating” (R22). As earlier discussed, this led some participants to 
suggest that specialist science communication positions were required.  
Participants considered integrity an important aspect of public engagement. 
Integrity on the part of scientists was considered an essential component to help to 
create and maintain public trust in science and scientists; an issue that some of the 
interviewees were concerned about and which has recently become a major 
concern for governments and science organisations such as the British Royal 
Society. Note that integrity regarding conducting research and reporting the 
process and the research outcomes is also a scientific norm, particularly in respect 
to reporting to the scientific community.  
Compliance 
The last main theme of scientists‟ social responsibility was compliance. 
Compliance refers to scientists‟ responsibility to comply with various norms, 
values and regulations. Five sub-themes were identified under this theme. They 
were compliance with scientific norms, business norms, laws and regulations, 
societal mores, and personal values. 
Scientific norms refer to the practices and processes that help produce sound 
scientific knowledge and which enhance the scientific community‟s ability to 
develop sound knowledge. Compliance with scientific norms might be considered 
as scientific integrity and there is considerable overlap between this concept and 
integrity in engagement with the public. Similarly, there is clearly a considerable 
degree of crossover between the sub-themes of compliance. Many personal values 
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are derived from or consistent with societal mores, while societal mores are also 
often reflected in laws and regulations: “Collective ethics and social responsibility 
is reflected in government policies and regulations” (R9). Scientific norms also 
usually reflect societal mores and laws and regulations while being consistent 
with many widely held personal values of science practitioners.  
However, there may also be areas of difference or conflict between the sub-
themes: “Ethics is not just legislation because there can be holes in 
legislation….technologies are moving so fast that our legislative system just 
simply will never keep pace” (R20). The implication is that laws and regulations 
tend to lag behind societal mores. Personal values (and laws and regulations) also 
sometimes conflict with societal mores; a number of participants expressed ethical 
disgust regarding working on military projects or for tobacco companies and yet 
such projects are not against the law and significant segments of both society and 
the science community clearly support them. Therefore, the five sub-themes may 
be considered to be related, but different, compliance mechanisms through which 
scientists and society evaluate and enact scientific social responsibility.  
All participants expressed the need for scientists to be socially responsible 
with most suggesting compliance with at least one or more of the five identified 
mechanisms for evaluating scientific social responsibility. One scientist, 
somewhat typically, stated: “It is up to society to decide which uses [of science 
and technology] are ethical and which ones are unethical and to regulate the 
technological use in accordance with society‟s norms” (#7). This scientist 
expressed the idea that it was important to regulate science based upon societal 
mores. Another made the comment, “Although I am a scientist, I don‟t think I can 
ever split myself off from also being a community member…. So I don‟t feel that 
my ethical responsibilities as a scientist are any different to my ethical 
responsibilities as being a mother or being a member of the general 
community….I could never work on tobacco ….I guess we all have our things 
which we feel we could work on and things that we don‟t…. I want to be proud of 
what I do” (R10).  This participant was suggesting that because scientists are also 
members of society their scientific ethical responsibilities are similar and should 
be consistent with society‟s values. Non-compliance with her personal values was 
inconsistent with personal identity and self-esteem. Recall that some scholars 
consider personal values central to the concept of self-identity (e.g., Feather, 
1988; Hitlin, 2003). Although her personal values were important to her when 
considering social responsibility as a scientists, she, nonetheless, recognised that 
personal values may vary from individual to individual and within a community. 
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She went on to say, “You can get scientists with a very big range of ethical 
views…. I don‟t think that if you look at scientists as a community versus the rest 
of the community that the range would be any different” (R10). 
While laws and regulations are legally or professionally compulsory, 
encoded in writing, and hence clearly definable, the other four mechanisms carry 
no such legal weight and the perception of what is a scientific norm or societal 
more may vary from individual to individual, place to place, and time to time, just 
as do personal values. 
Scientific norms 
Scientific norms are all about ensuring the integrity of scientific knowledge, 
the integrity of the mechanisms and processes through which that knowledge is 
generated and disseminated, and about the behaviour of scientists in regard to the 
rest of the science community (Cournand & Meyer, 1976; Pimple, 2002; Ziman, 
1998). Many of the research participants viewed science as a process that “…is 
seeking the truth” (R21) and it is, therefore, important that “The research process 
is honest and has integrity” (R1). This is similar to Merton‟s (1942a) principle of 
universalism (quality of a scientific work should be judged on the basis of its 
scientific merits or significance alone) or as Cournand and Meyer (1976) 
reformulated it, honesty. However, it was recognised that in many situations, 
scientific certainty (the „truth‟ about reality) is difficult if not impossible to 
achieve: “As a scientist you can never stand up and say that you are 100% sure 
that this won‟t affect your child or whatever. In science you can never be 100% 
sure about anything” (R10). This concept, which is similar to Merton‟s (1942a) 
scientific norm the principle of organised scepticism and Cournand and Meyer‟s 
doubt of certitude, was viewed as posing a difficulty regarding communication 
with the public: “…so you stand up and say I‟m 99% sure that eating this tomato 
won‟t adversely affect your child. The media will immediately hang on that 1% 
that you are not sure” (R10). 
One of the main ideas that scientists embraced to try to approach the truth is 
the concept of objectivity in research: “So seeking the truth means that you‟re 
trying to be objective as possible” (R21), “I have a responsibility to pursue new 
knowledge in a way that‟s honest and accurate…. in a way that has integrity” 
(R8), and “it‟s just to be honest as best you can, to do things in the best manner 
possible” (R17).  This is similar to the scientific norm that Merton (1942a) called 
the principle of disinterestedness (the setting aside of personal motives for a focus 
on the advancement of science) and which Cournand and Meyer (Cournand & 
Meyer, 1976) reformulated as objectivity. However, even participants arguing for 
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objectivity recognised that total objectivity in scientific research is not possible: 
“I‟m just aware that none of us are objective and we can attempt to be but there 
are all sorts of reasons for not being objective” (R21, cf. with her first statement 
above in this paragraph). Another participant stated, “I think it‟s a big illusion 
when scientists think that whatever they do that they are kind of objective. They 
are not and no one is really objective…what we think depends on where we live.  
And it‟s never free of the society we live in or the environment we live in” (R2).  
One aspect of objectivity that was considered important by several 
participants was being open-minded and open to considering other alternatives: 
“Scientists have a responsibility to be open-minded about the interpretation of 
their research results – not to start with too much of a preconceived idea of what 
they will find. They need to be able to revise their hypotheses in the light of their 
research results. Accepted scientific theory must be open to challenge in the light 
of new evidence” (R11). Cournand and Meyer‟s (1976) scientific norm of 
tolerance is similar to the concept of keeping an open mind. Another participant 
stated “Keeping an open mind is an important scientific ideal. But it is actually 
probably completely untrue. I think most people [scientists] are very closed-
minded and once they get an idea and a particular style or technique of research 
they often stick to it, to their detriment” (R13). Nonetheless, aiming for „the truth‟ 
and „objectivity‟ was, even if technically impossible, considered by most 
participants to be a laudable scientific goal. As far as I was able to discern, all the 
scientists interviewed could be classified as scientific realists. 
Several participants talked about the need to be honest regarding the 
reporting of findings to both the public and the scientific community: “…that the 
research results are presented honestly – the scientific integrity of data” (R1), 
“…being honest and open with either the public or with the funders or whatever 
about the outcomes of the work.  So you are not sort of like hidden away doing 
some work that you are not accountable for” (R3), and “[Scientists] have a 
responsibility to tell the truth and not manipulate data for the sake of getting 
publications” (R12). One responsibility scientists had towards other scientists in 
regard to reporting research was: “…that you recognise other people‟s inputs, 
acknowledge other people‟s work, and that when you claim a thing as being 
yours, that it really is” (R16). Cournand and Meyer (1977) claimed that this 
obligation of scientists to acknowledge their sources springs from the scientific 
norms of objectivity and honesty. 
An important aspect of reporting results accurately and honestly was to 
include sufficient information: “…that‟s really central, if you are going to conduct 
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a piece of research, that it is reported as it occurs. You provide the reader with 
sufficient information about the background, about the methodology, about the 
sensitivity of any techniques you use. So they can also make an interpretation of 
your results, your findings and your conclusions” (R1). Sufficient information 
also helped truth seeking in terms of enabling further criteria for scientific 
integrity; that the research be repeatable, testable and falsifiable “What 
constitutes, or the values of, what is good science come back to issues around 
repeatability, testability and falsifiability” (R22).  
Sufficient information enables other researchers to repeat a piece of 
research, test the same hypothesis again and check that the results are the same 
(within conventional parameters), or if not, question or falsify the results and 
hypothesis. Falsification of a hypothesis or theory is an important method of 
gaining information about what the world is like, through determining what it is 
not like, eliminating both potential possibilities and falsely held beliefs. Once a 
hypothesis or theory has been firmly falsified through sufficient disconfirmation 
instances further researching it wastes valuable research resources.  
Some participants made suggestions about how scientific objectivity and 
integrity could be enhanced. One claimed that there was an increasing separation 
between scientific knowledge and other knowledge sets (e.g., indigenous 
knowledge) and that “The scientific way of looking at the world isn‟t the only 
way of looking at the world” (R14). This participant stated that scientists needed 
to: “…be increasingly critical of their own perspective on the world…need to 
immerse yourself in those other knowledge systems” (R14). Another scientist 
echoed this perspective but introduced the concept of peer critiquing as an aid to 
cultural constraints to objectivity: “And then you get even less and less objective 
…your ideas will filter through your own cultural setting and your sub-cultural 
setting. So that‟s why it‟s really important to have this peer critiquing, where at 
least you can try to see from different cultures or different perspectives. And to try 
and get around that constraint of your objectivity” (R21).  
Peer critiquing or peer review was considered an essential tool of scientific 
integrity: “Another of those basic sort of principles around seeking the truth, is the 
way that we go about that in terms of peer critiquing” (R21), “…work within the 
context of peer reviewed science, you work within the norms of appropriate 
controls and everything is there, just a standard sign of good practice that you do 
follow the accepted norms” (R16), and “I guess collectively by peer reviewing 
accurately and having checks and balances in place then that‟s where, maybe is, 
that collective social responsibility comes in” (R17). Scientists also had a 
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responsibility, “…to critique fellow scientists‟ work objectively and 
constructively” (R13). Most considered peer reviewing fellow scientists‟ work a 
socially responsible and important part of belonging to the science community.  
It was also considered important to have had your work peer reviewed 
before presenting it to the public “to ensure that you have subjected your results to 
peer review before presenting to the public – to ensure that your peers believe 
your work is adequate” (R11).  Interestingly, despite scientists‟ apparent faith in 
the peer review process, empirical research has consistently suggested that peer 
review is quite unreliable (and hence not valid); agreement between reviewers 
often being little better than chance (Ceci, Peters, & Plotkin, 1985; Cole, Cole, & 
Simon, 1981; Horrobin, 2001; Peters & Ceci, 1981; Rothwell & Martyn, 2000; 
Scott, 1974). Paradoxically, the very process that scientists claimed as a guarantee 
of the validity of their work, when subjected to scientific analysis, turns out to be 
of questionable validity.  
An area that several participants believed was inadequately addressed by the 
science community, and that was hindered by the process of scientific validation 
through peer reviewed journal publications, was the reporting of hypothesis 
falsification or negative results: “…and that‟s where - one of the things we 
haven‟t been doing well - is that we would get a negative result, or no result, we 
often don‟t report it. And that is just as valid, often, as the result that supports the 
hypothesis” (R1). Journals also had a responsibility in this regard, “[Scientists] 
have the responsibility to also publish negative data, in case they should find 
something negative, and as for the publishers they have the responsibility to also 
take papers that have negative data, instead of well, it just seems like a trend to 
me, that all I am seeing there, is all this positive nice results, while I‟m sure there 
is a lot of negative results up there as well that never really gets published” (R12). 
This echoes the concern previously expressed by Mahoney (1979, see Chapter 4) 
of a confirmation bias in scientific publication, which he attributes to an over-
emphasis on null hypothesis testing. 
In general, publishers are not interested in publishing negative results 
(Mahoney, 1979) unless they are particularly robust and provide a disconfirmation 
instance of a hypothesis or theory that is only moderately well integrated into the 
wider theoretical context. Positive data or confirmation instances of hypotheses or 
theories seem psychologically more deserving of publication than negative results 
because they appear to increase the verisimilitude of scientific knowledge with 
reality in a more precise manner than negative data. That is, psychologically, 
positive data suggest that one hypothesis out of many potential hypotheses is 
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likely to be right, thus potentially eliminating the rest. Whereas negative data 
indicates one hypothesis is likely to be wrong, eliminating that hypothesis but 
remaining silent about the many other potential hypotheses. However, this is 
actually a logical illusion. Assumption of the truth of a hypothesis from a 
confirmation instance is a logical fallacy known as affirming the consequent. This 
fallacy takes the form: if X then Y, Y therefore X. The fallacy is easily perceived 
when the argument form is given empirical content e.g., Take hypothesis x that 
„all swans are black‟, if y is a black swan, it would clearly be wrong to affirm that 
an instance of y proves „all swans are black.‟ 
As a few participants suggested, and as is argued above, negative results do 
provide information and unless they are published and moved into the codified 
body of scientific knowledge then researchers may needlessly repeat research in 
blind avenues. The availability of negative results is also important for use in 
meta-analytical studies which seek to mathematically synthesise independent 
research results regarding a particular hypothesis, thereby giving much greater 
certainty and effect size accuracy than individual statistical studies (Hunter & 
Schmidt, 1990). 
Scientists also had a responsibility, “…to be competent in their area of 
research” (R6). A major component of competence was, “…keep[ing] up with all 
the changes and developments that are going on” (R17) in their area of research. 
Nonetheless, in an age of exponentially expanding scientific information 
(Kurzweil, 2001, 2005; Toffler, 1971, 1980), it was realised that even being 
familiar with all the research in one‟s own area could be a monumental task.  
It was considered by some to be irresponsible to make public comments 
about an area of science outside one‟s area of expertise. One GE scientist (a strong 
public advocate), demonstrated considerable anger about opposition to GE from 
other scientists whom he considered were spreading misinformation: “I think it‟s 
got political leanings for certain people, as an avenue of making a political 
name….and there was a lot of misinformation that was just taken as being, it 
comes back to the first point, irresponsible scientists speaking out….I mean not 
validating their own information, speaking outside their area of expertise to make 
a political point, and others got on the bandwagon. I mean there are certain 
individuals in the science community out there who are irresponsibly opposed to 
GE” (R16). 
Although academic freedom was traditionally considered a scientific value 
or norm this was now considered to be largely a thing of the past for many 
scientists: “Academic freedom, this is a mindset that a lot of academic people 
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have….and yet that‟s gone out with the ark. Years ago there was academic 
freedom, you got an academic position at a university, you could do whatever you 
like in terms of research, but you can‟t anymore” (R19). In general though, 
scientists in commercial research institutes were considered to have less academic 
freedom than scientists at universities. However, most participants viewed 
academic freedom as also declining in universities, especially as they became 
more commercialised. Nonetheless, some participants argued that some academic 
freedom was beneficial for science: “Scientists need a certain amount of academic 
freedom – otherwise knowledge development will be restricted” (R3), and “at 
least in a certain proportion of science, I think, you should have total academic 
freedom, within ethical standards” (R21). Another participant believed in 
academic freedom at the level of basic or fundamental research, but not 
necessarily for applied research: “Some applied research should be restricted” 
(R9). 
The question of how much science should be applied research and how 
much should be basic research was related to social responsibility for some 
participants: “I don‟t think it‟s socially responsible for all scientists to do totally 
basic research. It would be insane. Nor do I think it‟s socially responsible for all 
scientists to do absolutely applied research. It is short term thinking, not future 
planning. So it is socially responsible for scientists to be doing the whole portfolio 
of research” (R21). The commercialisation and economisation of science, with its 
focus on quick financial returns, was seen as shifting the balance away from basic 
science and towards applied research.  While applied research was viewed as 
having more immediate public benefits, basic research was considered very 
important for the long term development of science. The implications of basic 
research were often not clear at the time, but several participants noted that most 
applied research currently being conducted was the result of previous basic 
research. Thus, basic research was viewed as a scientific norm necessary for 
continued scientific progress. 
Business norms 
Academics were viewed as being in a better position to do basic research 
than commercial scientists because of their greater academic freedom. 
Commercial scientists, on the other hand, were viewed as having a greater 
responsibility towards their employing organisation and generally a greater need 
to produce applied science that would lead to more immediate economic returns. 
Scientists working for commercial organisations were also limited in their ability 
to follow the scientific norm of sharing their discoveries with the rest of the 
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science community because of commercial sensitivity: “If you work in a company 
where everything is protected then you can‟t publish” (R10). Commercial 
research organisations had a need to develop and patent intellectual property in 
order to ensure a return from their research investments, this usually involved 
withholding publication until patents were granted. This was seen as having a 
negative impact on science: “…it does affect science, because the way that we try 
and do science is by building on what other people discovered. We don‟t know 
what other people have discovered. We are re-inventing the wheel all the time” 
(R10). Scientists‟ attitudes to the commercialisation of science were briefly 
discussed in Chapter 4 and a fuller discussion of this issue, as seen from the 
perspective of the current sample of scientists, may be found in Small and Mallon 
(2006). Business norms and/or corporate and institutional pressure were also 
sometimes considered to conflict with the application of personal values to 
scientific research and technological development. This issue will be further 
discussed with examples from participants in the section below on compliance 
with personal values.  
Laws and regulations 
Most participants considered that a major social responsibility of scientists 
was compliance with laws and ethical regulations, “…first of all its legislation” 
(R20), “We have to abide by ethical regulation. I am involved with animal 
research and human research and I have enough social responsibility myself that I 
wouldn‟t even think about it without going through the appropriate channels” 
(R19), “[there are] actually quite strong ethical guidelines already in legislation, 
especially in New Zealand….so it is regulated by the government and so we have 
to work within those guidelines (R3), and “I‟m really proud to be living in New 
Zealand where we address that [ethical boundaries on GE] through our ERMA 
[Environmental Risk Management Authority] applications” (R21). From these 
considerations the following item is proposed for the judgment of social 
responsibility instrument: 
To ensure that approval for research is gained from the appropriate ethical 
authorities [15]. 
Despite her pride in the ERMA regulatory process this scientist went on to 
state that while she thought ERMA was necessary, she had reservations about the 
degree of restriction that ERMA placed on her area of science, genetic 
engineering. She criticised the current ERMA requirements as being very 
frustrating. In her opinion, it was far more restrictive than necessary (for social 
rather than scientific reasons), and hence acted as an impediment to scientific 
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research. She expressed concern that if the regulations were too strict (i.e., without 
good scientific reasons) then scientists would either be tempted to ignore them or 
give up and choose to work overseas in a less constrained environment “there is a 
possibility…that it becomes socially irresponsible to have it [ERMA regulations] 
that tight…scientist will actually just choose not to work in New Zealand because 
it‟s too damn hard to work within the regulations and that‟s not socially 
responsible” (R21).  
Compliance with animal welfare standards in research was cited as 
important by most participants. There are a number of pieces of legislation in New 
Zealand relevant to animal welfare including the Animal Welfare Act, the 
Agricultural Compounds and Veterinary Medicines (ACVM) Act and the Animal 
Products Act. All experimentation involving animals requires approval from an 
Animal Ethics Committee. However, some scientists noted that although they had 
to have ethical approval for research interventions with animals, farmers, in some 
cases, could do much the same kinds of interventions with farm animals without 
any such bureaucratic procedures being required. Thus, for some scientists, there 
appeared to be an inconsistency between regulations governing research practices 
with animals and allowable animal treatment practices of the rest of the (in 
particular farming) community: “…white tape…its incredibly frustrating…I‟m 
running trials and the work I‟m doing on the animals is not different to what a 
farmer‟s doing. So I‟m just injecting the things that a farmer injects them with, but 
I have to fill out five bits of paper to do it” (R10). 
A couple of participants noted that, particularly in the past, there was a 
discrepancy between the legal requirements for animal research and human 
research: “We‟ve always had animal ethics but not human, it‟s an interesting one, 
we haven‟t always had human ethics….It wasn‟t anything like it is now” (R19). 
This scientist worked for a university and noted that university researchers are 
now required to have permission from ethics committees for any human research. 
Most viewed this as a good thing. One participant tempered this point of view 
with the perspective that it was part of the changing nature of universities 
reflecting a continuing loss of academic freedom. Outside the university 
environment, however, there is still no requirement to have research with humans 
approved by an ethics committee. Researchers outside university are only 
restricted by the standard laws of the land that all residents are subject to, and to 
various ethical codes of professional bodies to which they may belong. 
Various professional bodies have codes of ethics with which, while not 
being legally binding, their members are supposed to comply. In fields that 
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involve research with humans, such as psychology, there are specific ethical 
requirements for such work. Transgression of professional codes of ethics may 
result in censure or even expulsion from the professional body. Different attitudes 
to compliance with ethical codes and regulations were noted amongst different 
research communities. One participant claimed that “there is still are a subset of 
people who work in medical schools and hospitals who don‟t think that they have 
to abide by the same ethical regulations that we [university scientists] do because 
they are medical people” (R19). This participant also noted what she considered a 
ludicrous discrepancy between human research ethics regarding the conduct and 
the consequences of research: “…see that [developing the atom bomb] is 
something you don‟t have to have ethical approval for. Is it because it doesn‟t 
involve working with people? The consequences of using that technology on the 
people, that was the damage” (R19). 
Several participants noted intellectual property rights and patents as 
legislative tools with which scientists were required to comply. Most of these 
participants were of the opinion that these were important tools for scientific 
development, especially in a commercialised science environment: “Patenting is 
an acceptable way to protect the knowledge that has been generated and reap a 
return on research investment” (R7). However, several also noted a drawback to 
scientific social responsibility caused by these legal tools: “Intellectual property 
and patenting prevents scientists from going public with their plans; 
confidentiality is a barrier to discussion with the public about what scientists are 
doing” (R2).  
A few participants noted that, due to the Treaty of Waitangi, there was a 
requirement to consult with Maori regarding research that may impact upon them. 
Another piece of legislation that affects scientists in New Zealand is the 
Hazardous Substances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act (administered by 
ERMA). The main concern of this act is the safety of herbicides, insecticides, 
fungicides, molluscicides, plant growth regulators (PGRs), fumigants, agricultural 
detergents and sanitisers, and veterinary medicines. Non-compliance with this act 
can earn fines of up $500,000 and three month prison terms. As documented 
earlier, many participants noted that ensuring the products of science and 
technology were safe for humans, animals and the environment was an important 
social and ethical responsibility of scientists. Finally, regarding compliance with 
legislation, one participant noted that “ethical behaviour amongst scientists is 
much more than just adhering to current legislation….because there can be holes 
in legislation” (R20). 
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Societal mores 
Many societal mores are enshrined in legislation. However, many are not 
and instead are unregulated values and norms widely held by particular 
communities. Many societal mores are compatible with scientific norms and 
personal values, but again, they are not identical sets. Thus, although there is 
considerable overlap with many elements in common amongst these sub-themes 
of compliance, they are not the same. Elements in common to societal mores, 
scientific norms and personal values, relevant to research practices, probably 
include not to do harm (or at least balancing benefits and harms), animal welfare 
and the safety of products. These issues have already received considerable 
discussion above, particularly in the theme of doing public good and its sub-theme 
benefit/harm. Suffice it to say, the concern here is compliance with those values, 
standards and regulations.  
Nonetheless, even within these common elements, there are variations in 
belief within society. Indeed, it is important to note that there is considerable 
variation in the values held, within and across different communities within 
society at large, and even between individuals within a relatively homogeneous 
community (as, for example, is demonstrated in this research with a relatively 
homogeneous group of scientists). Similarly, individual and societal values and 
ethical beliefs may change over time and with variations in personal or societal 
circumstances (Small, 2004a, 2004b). As one participant noted “what is ethics, 
what is morality, what is socially acceptable behaviour…. could vary 
enormously…. [given different circumstances] what I considered was acceptable 
would change dramatically” (R17). He then went on to point how inconsistent our 
moral behaviour can be “one injured New Zealander is worth 123 dead famine 
victims….morals and ethics change [dependent] on the circumstances. How much 
of your lifestyle and your freedom that you have, here in New Zealand, would you 
give up to make other people equal to that?” (R17). These two quotes suggest the 
participant‟s belief in cultural relativism and moral conventionalism. 
For many participants a prerequisite to being socially responsible was to be 
ethical in one‟s research. Ethics and social responsibility were generally seen as 
entwined constructs: “[The] main issue of social responsibility, one of the social 
responsibilities, is being ethical, so that is, sort of, all linked together” (R6). For 
some, transparency in research was an essential component of being socially 
responsible, in that, if the public was fully aware of what was occurring in science 
then they would be in a position to have scientists comply with societal mores. 
“Transparency is the main ethical responsibility…. Transparency gives the public 
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the opportunity to see what scientists are doing, it puts research up for public 
ethical scrutiny. In this way a scientist‟s ethical responsibilities will be moderated 
by the community. The public will judge whether you can go ahead and do it” 
(#13). Transparency is strongly linked to the theme of engagement, particularly 
the sub-theme of informing the public. 
Most participants believed that scientific research should comply with the 
ethical values and norms of society: “The wider issue of ethics, I see, is working 
within the norms of society values” (R16), “[Scientists have] responsibilities to 
match or at least be cognisant of communities‟ ethical opinions and try to give 
back to research within those boundaries” (R22), “Research should comply with 
the ethical and social norms of society” (R7), and “I have a responsibility to make 
sure that my science and investigation is done in a way that is acceptable to the 
community” (R8). As previously discussed, foresighting the potential ethical and 
unethical uses of science and technology was considered by some as an essential 
element of socially responsible research. One reason given for this was that it is 
“up to society to ban applications which are unethical… in line with the social 
norms in culture” (R7).  
One participant proffered the view that the collective ethics of society were 
reflected in government policies and legislation (R9). Another claimed, “as long 
as you work in an organisation that is responsible or answers to the government 
then you work very much within the bounds of social sensibility” (R17). In a 
similar vein, another participant considered that ethics committees acted as a 
proxy for societal mores (R18). Seeking approval of ethical committees for 
research was considered a mechanism for compliance with societal mores: 
“...have to have ethical approval…. go through the appropriate channels… 
[Society] has put those boundaries, I guess, on us, so we have to work within 
them” (R19). 
However, while accepting that science should generally comply with the 
moral boundaries of society, a few scientists expressed the opinion that societal 
moral values were not static but changed over time “it‟s like what is socially 
acceptable at the time, and perhaps, in 100 years, a different method would be 
more acceptable” (R5). This opinion led some participants to believe that science 
had a right to challenge society‟s moral boundaries: “Science needs to push the 
ethical envelope sometimes – do research that is on the boundary of what the 
public see as being ethical. Historically, a lot of beneficial progress has been made 
by science doing this” (R3), and “there is probably also a case to be made for 
scientists to try and push boundaries, because often the boundaries end up going 
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outside social norms and societal values and things that are accepted socially 
now” (R8). Thus, these participants questioned whether strict compliance with 
societal mores was always appropriate to the truth seeking endeavour of science. 
From these considerations the following item is proposed for the awareness of 
social responsibility instrument: 
Science must sometimes push the boundaries of social and ethical acceptability 
in order to advance knowledge [1]. 
Participant 8 used the example of Galileo, whose scientific advocacy of 
Copernicus‟ heliocentric model of the solar system clashed with the dogma and 
social and moral conventions of the Catholic Church of the time. Hindsight has 
proven Galileo and Copernicus right and the historical, social and moral 
conventions of the Catholic Church wrong (Gribbin, 2002; Silver, 1998). 
Darwin‟s theory of evolution was also cited as an example of an historically 
justified challenge to the scientific, social and moral conventions of his time. 
These participants argued that such examples show that sometimes challenging 
what is socially and morally acceptable can lead to scientific progress and even 
bring about change in social and moral beliefs.  
These two revolutionary theories changed the moral status of humankind. 
No longer was „man‟ or humankind the centre of the universe and qualitatively 
different from animals as Descartes had claimed. Humankind‟s importance, moral 
status, and difference from other animals were irrevocably diminished by these 
two theories (Gribbin, 2002; Silver, 1998). This new scientific understanding 
opened the way for a new moral relationship between humans and the rest of the 
natural world (Small, 2004a, 2004b).  
A few participants challenged the current dogma underlying political 
investment and control of science, previously referred to in this thesis as the 
economisation of science; the believe that economic growth is an unconditional 
good and that the main purpose for government support of science is to create 
economic growth (see Small & Mallon, 2006, for a more detail discussion of the 
sample scientists‟ attitudes to this issue). 
A number of participants noted factors that helped facilitate compliance 
with societal mores including, “…Royal Commissions, ethical committees, 
science cafes, public debates – involving scientists and people from the 
community” (R2). Others suggested that “socially responsible behaviour can be 
enhanced through awareness of issues, moral consciousness raising” (R4) and “a 
greater focus on ethics in the science community” (R12). Several advocated for: 
“…ethical education in science training” (e.g., R2, R6, R7, R12, and R18). The 
  
203 
 
democratisation of science was also advocated by some, “Doing science based on 
what the public want rather than based on what scientists want” (R5). Another 
opined that “Social pressure is one of the strongest pressures to be socially 
responsible” (R8). These considerations lead to the proposal of the following item 
for the awareness of social responsibility instrument: 
Ethical training should be an integral part of scientific training [8] 
Personal values 
Many participants argued that scientists had a responsibility to only work on 
projects that complied with their personal values: “I think scientists have a 
responsibility in terms of thinking about whether their research is ethical, whether 
they can justify it ethically….I think that everyone should search in their own 
conscience and see whether they can justify it” (R12), and “I think every 
individual has to balance those standards, if you like, those parameters with what 
they are doing, and who they are doing it for, and why they are doing it. I‟d like to 
think I‟m very principled in society, do things that I think are worthwhile doing” 
(R17). Another participant related compliance with personal values to self-esteem 
and self-identity: “We all have our things that we could work on and things that 
we don‟t….I want to be proud of what I do. So I don‟t want to feel like I have to 
hush, hush because I‟m concerned that I‟m causing harm to someone or 
something” (R10).  The arguments given in this paragraph and the following ones 
are similar to the normative theory of virtue ethics where one attempts to be a 
good person and do the right thing by consulting one‟s conscience. 
Some participants made claims that they would not work on research they 
considered unethical, “If you find it morally and ethically unacceptable to be 
doing a particular line of work then, thinking of all the pain you‟d go through at 
night as you are lying in bed and things, yes, I wouldn‟t do it and I would think 
anybody who did was silly” (R6), “It means there are some research projects I just 
wouldn‟t do (R19), and “But I certainly wouldn‟t do work I didn‟t feel 
comfortable with. I would certainly look for an alternative job” (R11). Some felt 
that choosing the projects that you worked on, or the employer that you worked 
for, was one way in which scientists could exercise their personal values in 
research. “Scientists can choose their place of employment. This choice should be 
made with regard to the ethics of the employer and the type of research that the 
employer conducts and its compatibility with the scientist‟s ethical and social 
values” (R4), “You can chose the area of your research and employment to be 
consistent with your ethical beliefs” (R10), and “Before I was a scientist, there 
were certain jobs I probably wouldn‟t have done. And the same with being a 
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scientist, there are certain jobs and certain things I wouldn‟t do. And I have left 
jobs on principle” (R17). From these considerations the following item is 
proposed for the judgment of social responsibility instrument: 
To refrain from conducting work in areas that you find morally questionable 
[14]. 
One scientist, whose real passion was for basic research rather than applied 
research, observed that this caused her a personal moral dilemma because applied 
research held the possibility of more immediately alleviating existing pain and 
suffering in the world. “This is my personal social dilemma. Do I do something 
that is immediately useful for people who have a need, or do I do something that 
is, I have more personal passion, desire to do because it zings my brain and is of 
no certain immediate use to anyone?” (R21). However, along with a number of 
other participants, she believed that it would be short sighted for science to just 
focus on applied research and that basic research was essential for science and 
society over the long term.  “Nor do I think it‟s socially responsible for all 
scientists to do absolutely applied research, its short term thinking not future 
planning…. Are you doing outputs for this year or outputs for 50 years?  So I 
think that knowledge can be used for public good and it can be used directly or 
immediately or in the longer term” (R21).   
It was noted by several participants that different people, and different 
scientists, had different personal values. “To me, social responsibility means to do 
things that are morally acceptable, and there is always a fine line there, some 
people have different morals than others” (R5), “Different scientists have different 
thresholds as to what their social responsibility is” (R10), “…really it‟s an 
individual thing….morals and ethics change [dependent] on the circumstances” 
(R17), and “Ethics is a personal thing. So while you might say, I won‟t work on 
that project, I wouldn‟t feel ethically comfortable, you can‟t say he or she should 
not be doing it. Not in a democracy like ours” (R11).  These statements indicated 
latent underlying beliefs in ethical relativity and moral subjectivism.  
However, in contrast, to this last participant‟s point of view, other 
participants noted areas of research that they thought should be forbidden to all 
researchers: “I think those kinds of areas, for example, nuclear weapons, 
biological warfare, is an area that I think should not be studied. Yes very much” 
(R14). And, “Human cloning, something that‟s just not done. Biological warfare, 
those kinds of things, are just not done” (R16). These latter statements conveyed a 
tone of latent moral absolutism and ethical objectivism underlying the 
participants‟ reasoning. 
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 The next quote makes explicit the notion that not all scientists support all 
science activities or all aspects of the science agenda: “I don‟t think that because 
you are a scientist that you definitely believe in all the things that science is 
doing” (R10). This was demonstrated by several of the research participants 
regarding specific aspects of GE research (see also the earlier discussion of 
attitudes to different applications of cloning technology). Amongst the 
participants was an animal reproductive scientist (R9) who was quite concerned 
about the release of GE plants because she believed that it was impossible to 
contain GE plants (because of pollen dispersal) and that they, therefore, 
represented a substantial threat to the environment. She considered that there was 
not enough scientific knowledge to accurately predict the long term environmental 
effects – a precautionary teleological argument. On the other hand, she was 
relatively comfortable about transgenic animals, especially if developed for 
medical purposes (i.e. as bioreactors for medicines) and as long as there were no 
bad animal welfare impacts, believing GE animals to be easy to contain. Her 
concerns were entirely teleological, she was not deontologically opposed to the 
manipulation of either plant or animal genomes. Her position was that the 
teleological risks associated with GE plants were greater than that posed by GE 
animals. 
A plant GE scientist when asked her opinion on plant and animal gene 
technologies said “I must confess I don‟t have very deep ethical concerns, at least 
not in the plant area… so in general I do not have ethical concerns in changing the 
genome of the plant. But I have environmental concerns” (R2).  Like the animal 
scientist, she was not deontological opposed to GE plants but, unlike some other 
GE plant scientists she also had teleological concerns about potential 
environmental impacts. She was strongly opposed to the release of GE plants in 
the environment because she also considered that we lacked the scientific 
knowledge to understand the environmental implications, and hence precaution 
was the greater virtue. However, she differed from the animal reproductive 
scientist when it came to the manipulation of animal genomes. She stated, 
“Animals, it is more difficult, especially when it goes into the region of apes and 
primates” (R2). She explained that she had some kind of a „sliding proximity to 
human scale‟ where it was perhaps alright to do things to some animals but not 
others. “Kind of a sliding scale, yes…. it‟s not really based on…. rational 
decisions, it‟s more… I feel closer to animals where I can see that they are almost 
human. Like apes or chimpanzees or something like that” (R2). Here she was 
expressing a deontological objection to manipulation of the genome of higher 
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animals, based primarily on emotional feelings of species proximity. She did not 
hold such deontological concern for, “lower order creatures, for example, a spider, 
which I usually kill when I see” (R2). Another  plant GE scientist was also 
reticent about animal experimentation, again, from an emotive perspective “I 
guess the reason I am sort of moving more into plant research is I didn‟t feel like 
experimenting on animals very much” (R3). 
Several participants made personal moral statements about research they 
would not do. Many, such as, not working on military applications of technology 
(e.g., nuclear or biological weapons), cloning humans or animals, experiments 
which involved animal suffering, and working on projects which have (from the 
perspective of the individual involved) a high potential to cause harm (e.g., field 
trials of GE plants), have previously been quoted. Participants also made personal 
moral statements about their perceived moral responsibilities in research, the 
things they should try to ensure or achieve during the process of research. Most of 
these have also previously been quoted. Examples included being competent and 
up to date in your area of research, ensuring the safety of the products of science 
and technology, ensuring approval from appropriate ethical bodies, complying 
with animal welfare standards, limiting animal suffering, choosing areas of 
research compliant with personal moral values, working within society‟s ethical 
boundaries, foresighting the possible impacts of research, alerting the public to 
social and moral implications of research, disseminating the products of research 
to both the science community and the public, and reporting research to the public 
in jargon free language. 
Participants noted a number of factors which could compromise a scientist‟s 
compliance with his/her own personal moral values or with acting socially 
responsible in research and technological development. Interestingly, while 
passion for science, the drive to understand how things work, is considered by 
many scientists to be one of their main motivations for taking up a career in 
science (Fisher, et al., 2005; Keysar & Kosmin, 2008), several participants 
suggested that it could also inhibit socially responsible behaviour in research. 
Generally, this criticism was couched as a reflection of the behaviour of „other 
scientists‟ rather than being attributed to the informant. “You do work with 
scientists, that science is their absolute passion and they will keep going because 
they scientifically can do it… it‟s a challenge to do something scientifically like 
cloning humans… its part of the science ethos, the challenge of doing the 
undoable. It‟s a bit of a concern” (R10), “Scientists can get so engrossed and so 
sure that what they are doing is the right thing that they lose the big picture and in 
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losing the big picture, and losing what is going on in the real world with real 
people, that they become a bit biased and socially irresponsible” (R5), and 
“scientific elitism may make scientists not want to open their work to public 
scrutiny or comply with regulations that restrict or take something from their 
science” (R2). 
Also compromising the scientist‟s ability to comply with their own personal 
values was a network of issues around science funding. These included the 
political drive for science to deliver economic goals, the increasing privatisation 
of science, corporate or institutional demands on scientists, and fashion in science. 
Because science is becoming increasingly privatised and publicly funded science 
is being increasing controlled by political processes aimed primarily at economic 
growth, scientists considered they are being increasingly pressured to conduct 
research that compromises social responsibility and public good. “The huge push 
at the moment [is] for science to result in money or making money. I don‟t think 
that, that makes for responsible science, because the goals there is to make money 
its not to be responsible…. it‟s not for public good anymore even though it might 
be in the guise of public good, I think that sometimes scientists can be led astray” 
(R5). One senior science leader claimed: “Profit maximising is only one route to 
nirvana and not necessarily the shortest…. Scientists have a moral obligation to 
put the good of society ahead of commercial profit” (R4). These considerations 
lead to the proposal of the following item for the judgment of social responsibility 
instrument: 
To put the good of society ahead of commercial profits [20]. 
Another scientist considered that “If the science is commercialised then the 
issue of money will overrun anything else and you will, I think you will not 
always get dishonest science, not at all, but very, very frequently, I think scientists 
will do ethically irresponsible things for the sake of money” (R12). A scientist‟s 
personal financial situation was also posited as having the potential to sway them 
to act for companies in ways that they would prefer not to “If you are working for 
a company and you‟re financially strapped or you‟re in debt and things like that 
then you would be more inclined to give the company what they wanted.  I mean 
it‟s just survival sort of aspect I guess” (R17).  
The allocation of science funding was seen as having the potential to restrict 
scientists‟ ability to work in the areas that they considered would deliver the 
greatest public good.  “We are really getting pushed [by] the science funding…. 
It‟s the way of keeping your job going or to continue having funding…. 
[scientists] might work on something they didn‟t agree with…. there were no 
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other projects to work on and that‟s where the funding was” (R10). She went on to 
give an example: “The way things have gone in terms of the traditional, say 
quantitative genetics and plant and animal breeding approaches, funding has just 
been ripped out of the system.  And so you‟ve almost been forced to go into the 
more biotech type approaches to get funding. And you can see that with 
traditional breeders they don‟t necessarily believe in that technology, that it‟s 
going to improve our plants or animals as much as people say it is” (R10). For the 
latter participant and the next one, there was an element of fashion dictating 
research: “so if you‟ve got an occupation that‟s maybe not flavour of the month 
anymore, and people don‟t see the relevance to it anymore, because of some other 
development, you‟d be under a lot of pressure to maintain that piece of work.  
And vice versa, you may have things that are not flavour of the month but you can 
still see the benefits and possibilities of it.  And so, therefore, you have to then go 
against what is perceived out there to carry on that work” (R17). 
Corporations and institutions that employed scientists were also viewed as 
compromising their ability to be true to their own personal values. “What is 
starting to bother me is the focus of our CRIs in New Zealand and the balance 
between science excellence and science and commercial gain…. it‟s just being 
able to speak out your concerns and you got the corporate view of how you should 
speak out…. it‟s a difficult balance and I see it becoming more of a barrier as 
other avenues or other aspects of science come before having a public debate, is 
this corporate view of what you can say and what you can‟t say” (R16). Another 
senior scientist also considered that CRI‟s and their employees were placed in 
conflicted situations by Government or commercial requirements: “And that the 
problem is, in my institute, is that the drivers for profit maximisation are not 
necessary internal, there‟s some very severe pressures on our institute externally.  
And I really have a lot of sympathy for those that are trying to balance their 
personal values and views with the pressures that are being imparted by the 
government on the institute.  I think it‟s a really tough environment, actually very 
conflicted” (R4).  Another CRI scientist leading a research team working in the 
area of genetic engineering and cloning stated “If your employer, or through 
commercial pressure and whatever, I‟m not just saying commercial pressure, but 
if your employer decides that this is a priority area and you don‟t agree with that 
then you can be put into a situation, I imagine, where you are working against 
your ethical and your social responsibilities. And certainly I know within my own 
area of work there were some people who were not that comfortable with what 
was being done” (R6). 
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Conclusions 
Study 1 had three central aims. 1) To determine scientists‟ beliefs about the 
elements that compose scientists‟ wider social and moral responsibilities in the 
process of scientific research and technological development (i.e., define the 
construct domain), 2) to determine the ethical processes and theories that 
scientists used when thinking about their social and moral responsibilities to 
society, and 3) to use the data gathered from scientists‟ interviews to develop 
items for instruments to measure scientists‟ attitudes to social and moral 
responsibility in scientific research and technological development. The first aim 
was accomplished with the development and elucidation of thematic maps 
showing the elements of scientists‟ conceptualisation of their social and moral 
responsibilities to society. Interspersed throughout the Results and Discussion, I 
have analysed scientists‟ ethical reasoning processes relating them to ethical 
theories and metaethical theories to accomplish the second aim. The third aim, 
which is the basis for the integration of the qualitative and quantitative studies, is 
addressed in the following section. 
A thematic model of the elements of scientists‟ social and moral 
responsibilities in scientific research and technological innovation has been 
developed on the basis of interviews with scientists. To the author‟s knowledge, 
no such model previously existed. However, in recent years, several scholars have 
commented on the need for such a model (e.g., Pimple, 2002; Prpic, 1998; Weil, 
2002). Three main themes emerged from the interview data regarding the social 
and moral responsibilities of science to society: Doing public good, engagement 
with the public and compliance with relevant norms. Each of these themes had a 
number of sub-themes. These have been described, analysed and illustrated with 
the use of quotes from participants. In many cases, study participants (who were 
all highly educated scientists) reflexively analysed their own statements, 
recognised inconsistencies and contradictions in their beliefs, attitudes, and 
values, either just noting the inconsistency or, in some cases, trying to resolve it 
sometimes through philosophical manoeuvres, such as ethical relativism or moral 
conventionalism.  
While most participants generally agreed on the elements (i.e., themes and 
sub-themes) that constituted scientific social responsibility, there was usually a 
range of different attitudes and personal positions regarding these elements. 
Scientists‟ viewpoints were often complex, multifaceted and sometimes 
contradictory, perhaps reflecting the complex contradictory environment in which 
they worked. Although traditionally scientists often considered their work to be a 
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public good, usually associated with the concept of knowledge as good in itself, 
given the significant negative impacts of science and technology on society, life 
and the environment (and the potential challenging existential risks of Promethean 
technologies), as argued in the first three chapters, such an ethic can no longer be 
maintained.  
A new or increased ethic of social and moral responsibility on the part of 
scientists to society is required. Many scientists recognise this, at least to some 
degree. However, an increased responsibility poses difficulty for many scientists. 
It is in conflict with some of the traditional ethics of science, thus causing conflict 
and inconsistency in scientists‟ attitudes. Science was traditionally considered the 
value free, objective pursuit of true knowledge, conducted for the public good, 
with scientists being allowed academic freedom. Although in recent years, the 
concepts of value-free science, scientific objectivity and academic freedom have 
all been subjected to strong theoretical (and commercial) attack, they are still 
concepts that resonate strongly with many scientists.  
Taking an increased social and moral responsibility for the science produced 
means giving up the concept that science is a value-free pursuit, and that scientists 
must remain objective and disinterested, as opposed to being advocates. It also 
means giving up the idea that scientists are entitled to research whatever they like 
and accepting the concept that society has a right to oversee and even govern 
(albeit in conjunction with scientists and politicians) particular aspects of research 
and technological development. The purpose and value of the new ethic was 
apparent to a large proportion of the study participants. However, what was not 
apparent to many was how to resolve and balance these new responsibilities in the 
face of their previous scientific ethic and norms. 
While some participants had given considerable thought to the issues 
canvassed, most had not, and a number of them stated this to me during the 
interviews. Most participants appeared to find the interview quite challenging, but 
also interesting and self-revealing. They frequently noticed that the positions they 
first responded with had weaknesses that they then felt obliged to examine, 
explain or modify. Once stimulated to think about the issue, nearly all of them 
recognised it as being an important concern, with several telling me that they 
would need to consider it further and our conversation made them think a little 
differently about some of the work they were doing, or could potentially be doing. 
Scientists‟ social and moral responsibility to society is a growing issue which is 
currently moving into the consciousness of scientists as well as the public. Yet 
scientists are still struggling to understand the complexities of the issue, the 
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developing nature of their individual roles, the role of the science community, the 
role of the public, the role of government, the role of commercial science 
organisations and the potential social and moral impacts of Promethean 
technologies. 
All three of the major normative ethical theories (deontology, teleology and 
virtue ethics) could be seen in participants‟ reasoning. However, while some 
participants focussed on deontological concerns regarding some issues or 
technologies, the majority of participants tended to focus on teleological concerns. 
However, nearly all participants showed evidence of both deontological and 
teleological moral reasoning. When individuals took a deontological stand against 
a particular technology (e.g., cloning), there was often a strong expression of 
emotion associated with their objection. An element of virtue ethics was evident 
in some participants‟ exhortations to follow one‟s conscience in regard to 
compliance with their personal values. Evidence of the use of various meta-ethical 
theories (e.g., ethical relativism, ethical objectivism, moral realism, moral 
absolutism, moral conventionalism, and moral subjectivism) to support, explain, 
or as underlying constructs necessary for, particular moral positions, was found 
and noted in the analysis. 
Question items for social responsibility instruments 
As signalled previously, two new instruments are being developed to 
measure scientists‟ attitudes to social and moral responsibility in research and 
technological development. The rationale for developing two instruments with 
different foci, as previously explained (Chapter 5), comes from Pimple‟s (2002) 
observation that while the science community has moral obligations to society, 
individual scientists also have some moral obligations to society “…no scientist is 
responsible for setting the research agenda for the nation or the world” and 
“…granted that no one scientist can bear the burden alone, it is still true that each 
scientists has an obligation to carry some part of the burden…. but clearly science 
as an institution and scientists as a group do have such a moral obligation” (p. 
198).  
Thus, the focus of the first instrument is about awareness and sensitivity to 
the social and moral responsibilities of science to society, while the focus of the 
second instrument is on moral judgments about behavioural principles and 
personal actions scientists can follow to help ensure their research is socially 
responsible. The development of two instruments to measure different theoretical 
components of scientific social responsibility was also designed to be congruent 
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with Rest‟s (1979, 1986) 4-stage psychological theory of ethical behaviour 
(presented in chapter 3). 
The focus on scientists‟ perceptions (awareness) regarding the social and 
moral responsibilities of science to society relates to the first stage of Rest‟s 
(1979, 1986) theory of the logical processes involved in ethical behaviour; 
awareness of a moral issue. Philosophers have also claimed that moral awareness 
and sensitivity is a necessary prerequisite to moral reasoning (Blum, 1991; 
Sherwin, 2001). All the items in the moral awareness instrument address the issue 
of the recognition of the moral responsibilities of science to society (see p.213 for 
proposed items for moral awareness instrument) and, therefore, are congruent 
with the first stage of Rest‟s theory moral of behaviour. The focus on behavioural 
principles, to guide personal actions of scientists, relates to the second stage of 
Rest‟s model; moral judgment. The moral judgment instrument measures 
scientists‟ attitudes to performing certain actions during the context of the 
research process i.e., the importance they place on behavioural principles/actions 
guiding socially responsible research conduct. These actions were identified by 
participants in Study 1 as being important components of scientists‟ social 
responsibilities to society. Responses to questions in this instrument entail having 
made a moral judgment regarding these specified actions in a research context 
(see page 214 for proposed items for moral judgment instrument) and, therefore, 
are congruent with the second stage of Rest‟s theory of moral behaviour. 
Most of the items for the two instruments are derived directly from Study 1, 
and for some items, parts of their wording are verbatim quotes from Study 1 
participants. However, in developing the items, I was cognizant of the theoretical 
and empirical research previously reported in the current work, and this has 
influenced some items composing the instrument. It was my aim to construct an 
instrument that would have a relatively small number of items (10 for each 
instrument) and which would access a general factor of the multidimensional 
concept of scientific social responsibility. The awareness instrument consists of 
items 1-10, having a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = 
neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree). As is apparent from a perusal of the items 
of this instrument, in order to form a directionally consistent instrument, some of 
the items in the instrument need to be reverse scored. The second instrument 
consists of items 10-20, in which the respondents are requested “to rate the 
importance of the following principles to you as a scientist living and working 
within society”. The response scale consists of 5 options (1 = not important, 2 = of 
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little importance, 3 = moderately important, 4 = important, and 5 = very 
important). Below are the 20 items. 
Science-society interface: Moral awareness instrument  
1. Science must sometimes push the boundaries of social and ethical 
acceptability in order to advance knowledge. 
2. The science community has a moral obligation to ensure that the products of 
scientific knowledge do not cause harm (e.g., to humans, animals, 
environment). 
3. The science community cannot be held ethically responsible for the use to 
which scientific discoveries are put. 
4. The more powerful a technology is the more important the evaluation of its 
ethical and social implications become. 
5. The more powerful a technology is the more important and relevant the 
precautionary principle becomes. 
6. There are some fields of knowledge that are so potentially dangerous that 
they should not be researched. 
7. Science is the value free pursuit of true knowledge. 
8. Ethical training should be an integral part of scientific training. 
9. The benefits of science and technology should be distributed throughout 
society in a fair and equitable way. 
10. There is no ethical imperative for science to “do good.” 
Scientists’ responsibilities: Moral judgement instrument 
1. To evaluate possible benefits against possible harms when deciding on 
research projects. 
2. To refrain from exaggerating the potential benefits or minimising the 
potential risks associated with research. 
3. To give the public clear guidance on the reliability and validity of scientific 
conclusions regarding potential benefits and risks. 
4. To refrain from conducting work in areas that you find morally questionable. 
5. To ensure that approval for research is gained from the appropriate ethical 
authorities. 
6. To ensure that the process and development of research complies with the 
precautionary principle. 
7. To become informed about what society finds acceptable or unacceptable in 
scientific research. 
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8. To consider, and dialogue with the public about, the possible misuses to 
which knowledge gained from your research could be put. 
9. To participate in public debate and dialogue over contentious scientific 
issues. 
10. To put the good of society ahead of commercial profits. 
 
I also tried to ensure adequate coverage of as many of the themes, as 
possible, that were identified in Study 1 as being relevant to the concept of 
scientists‟ social responsibilities to society. To this end, I constructed a table with 
a row for each of the main themes and sub-themes, discussed above, and a column 
to record all the items that conceptually related to each sub-theme and a column to 
record the counts of items related to each sub-theme. The criterion for item 
allocation to a sub-theme was that, in order to understand or operationalise the 
item, use or knowledge of the sub-theme construct is necessary. Table 6.3 below 
presents this data.  
With the exception of business norms (one item) all sub-themes were 
conceptually related to at least 3 items. All 20 items were conceptually related to 
the compliance sub-theme of personal values. This is understandable and perhaps 
desirable as the instruments are designed to measure personal attitudes of 
scientists regarding their personal and the science community‟s social and moral 
responsibilities to society. Fifteen of the 20 items were conceptually related to the 
compliance sub-theme of societal mores. Again, this is consistent with the 
purpose of the instrument. 
Other sub-themes that were conceptually related to a large number of the 
items were benefit/harm (11 items), knowledge (11 items), technology (10 items) 
and foresighting (10 items). All 20 items were conceptually related to the sub-
themes of doing public good and compliance, while five items were conceptually 
related to the sub-themes of engagement. Therefore, from a conceptual 
perspective, I consider that the content domain of scientists‟ social and moral 
responsibilities to society, as revealed in the qualitative interviews, is adequately 
covered by the quantitative instrument items.  
The methodological processes used in this study were highly subjective. 
Although the work on the democratisation and commercialisation of science was 
subject to reliability procedures with my co-author, Prof. Mary Mallon, the work 
reported in this chapter is a co-construction of the study participants and myself 
and was not subject to reliability analysis with another researcher. The interview 
conversations were very unstructured and free flowing. 
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Table 6.3.  
Instrument Items Related to Each Theme and Sub-theme of the Social and Moral 
Responsibility Construct
1 
Themes/Sub-themes Items related to sub-
themes
2 
No. of items relating to each theme 
and sub-theme 
Public Good  All 20 items relate to public good 
and sub-themes 
Benefit/harm 2, 3, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 
13, 18, 19, 20 
11 
Knowledge 1, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 
16, 17, 18, 19 
11 
Technology 2, 3, 4, 5, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 19 
10 
Foresighting 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 16, 18, 
19, 20 
10 
Engagement  5 items relate to engagement and 
sub-themes  
Informing 12, 13, 18, 19 4 
Becoming informed 17, 18, 19 3 
Integrity 12, 13, 18, 19 4 
Compliance  All 20 items relate to sub-themes 
of compliance 
Laws and regulations 2, 4, 5, 15, 17 5 
Scientific norms 2, 8, 10, 15, 17 5 
Business norms 20 1 
Societal mores 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 
15 
Personal values 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 19, 20 
20 
Note: 
1
These are personal judgments made by the author, the reliability of these 
judgments has not been evaluated. 
2
Numbers in this column are the reference numbers of the items composing the two social 
and moral responsibility instruments. 
The same topics and sub-topics were not necessarily discussed with all 
participants. I selected the relevant text extracts and decided on the coding 
structures. I determined the themes and sub-themes. And, although significant 
portions of the analyses were quotes from the high functioning individuals 
participating in my study, it was I who selected those analytical quotes for 
inclusion in this document.  Likewise, I analysed the ethical processes that 
participants used while discussing the issues and I selected the items for inclusion 
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in the proposed instruments to measure scientists‟ attitudes to social 
responsibility.  
This degree of subjectivity raises flags regarding the credibility of the 
research. Would another analyst conducting similar research have selected the 
same text fragments as being relevant, found the same themes and sub-themes, 
and seen the same latent ethical beliefs underlying scientists‟ attitudes? 
Ultimately, scientific credibility must be “…agreed by an audience – a scientific 
community” (Salmon, 2003, p. 26). I agree with Salmon that it is “…a social 
act…what the audience accepts is what it agrees to accept” (2003, emphasis in 
original). These are questions that the reader must decide for themselves. Is it a 
coherent account? Does it make sense? Does it convey a believable story? Is it 
consistent with what the reader knows about science and scientists? Is it consistent 
with related literature? Is it relevant or meaningful to other researchers, scientists 
or the general public? Such questions are relevant to both qualitative and 
quantitative research. 
In this chapter (and throughout this thesis) I have tried to convey a more 
comprehensive understanding of science, scientists, and social responsibility. Of 
course, as noted by a number of the study participants, in science, one study 
(generally) proves little; replication and reproducibility are the keys to good 
science, despite their infrequent use (J. Potter, 1996). A qualitative study with 
only 22 participating scientists can make few claims about the prevalence or 
distribution of attitudes amongst the wider population of scientists. However, 
what it can do is show the range of attitudes and beliefs, and the complexity and 
richness of participants‟ reasoning, in a manner that would be difficult to achieve 
with quantitative research. 
I hope that through triangulation and consistency of findings, a degree of 
credibility will be conferred to the qualitative results by using the statements made 
by participants as items in the research instruments in the quantitative component.  
In Chapter 7, Study 2, the instruments will be subject to psychometric analysis for 
reliability, factorial structure, dimensionality, and construct validity. If reliable 
and valid measures can be obtained from these items, and consistency between 
responses to them and the analyses presented in this chapter are found, then the 
two studies will go some way towards providing support for each other, thus 
conferring some degree of confidence and understanding to the results of both 
studies.  
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Chapter 7- Study 2  
Introduction 
For the past half century, because of the Promethean power of modern 
technologies, a number of scientists, science commentators, sociologists of 
science, philosophers of technology, and ethicists, have argued the need for an 
increased ethic of social responsibility in scientific research and technological 
development (e.g., Abelson, 1970; Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2001; Bulger, et al., 
2002; Bunge, 1977; Dainton, 1971; Jonas, 1985; Joy, 2000; Lenk, 1983; 
Lubchenco, 1998; Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 2005; Pimple, 2002; Van  R. Potter, 
1971; Russell & Einstein, 1955; Shine, 1989; Ziman, 1998). However, little is 
known about scientists‟ attitudes concerning ethics and social responsibility 
(McCormick, et al., 2009; Pimple, 2002; Prpic, 1998; Weil, 2002). Yet this 
information is crucial since scientists must first perceive ethics and social 
responsibility as important before their behaviours are likely to reflect the greater 
social responsibility required by increasing technological power (Bebeau, et al., 
1995; Blum, 1991; Rest, 1979, 1986; Sherwin, 2001). 
From the literature reviewed and the results of Study 1, a survey was 
designed for administration to scientists. The survey contained proposed items for 
five new instruments to measure constructs forming a nomological network 
focussed around and including the concept of social responsibility in scientific 
research. The survey also contained items from the Schwartz Value Survey (1992) 
to measure the „higher order value dimensions‟ and an instrument developed by 
Small et al. (2005) to measure „general attitudes to genetic engineering‟. These 
two existing instruments also formed part of the nomological network of 
constructs designed to test and infer the construct validity of the new instruments.  
The primary objectives of Study 2 were: 1) to test the psychometric 
properties (i.e., unidimensionality and reliability) of two instruments designed to 
measure scientists‟ attitudes to social responsibility in research (potential items 
were developed in Chapter 6, Study 1), 2) to assess the instruments‟ concurrent 
and construct validities by testing hypotheses describing conceptual relationships 
between the constructs in a nomological network, 3) to investigate and describe 
scientists‟ general attitudes to social responsibility in scientific research, 4) to 
examine scientists‟ attitude to a particular Promethean technology, genetic 
engineering (GE), and 5) to compare scientists‟ attitudes to GE with those of the 
public.  As noted above, research had not previously been conducted into 
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scientists‟ attitudes to their broader social and moral responsibilities, nor are there 
any existing instruments to measure this important aspect of the science-society 
interface. 
Due to the lack of existing instruments to measure some of the other 
constructs in the nomological network, three further instruments were developed 
in the current study. Items for two of these instruments (attitude to the 
democratisation of science and attitude to the commercialisation of science) were 
derived from Small (2005b), and Small and Mallon (2004, 2006) (see literature 
review - Chapter 4). Items for the third instrument (technological optimism) were 
derived from several sources (Costanza, 1989; Daly, 1996; Daly & Cobb, 1994; 
George Gaskell, et al., 2004; Huesemann, 2001; Kriebal, et al., 2001; Krier & 
Gillette, 1985; National Science Board, 1977; Rollin, 1996; Ticky, 2004, see 
literature review - Chapter 3).  In the present chapter the psychometric properties 
of these instruments will also be described and their construct validity tested by 
examination of the conceptual relationships proposed in the nomological network 
in which they are conceptually embedded. 
Overview of chapter layout 
In the Method section of this chapter the survey sample and research 
procedures are described followed by a discussion of the analysis procedures to 
test the psychometric properties of new instruments.  Next, the questionnaire is 
described and the psychometric properties of the two existing instruments (i.e., the 
Schwartz Value Survey and the general attitude to GE instrument) are tested using 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and reliability analysis. Because these were 
existing instruments developed on samples independent of the current sample, 
CFA was conducted on the whole sample (i.e., N = 733) for these two 
instruments. 
The results and discussion are combined in one section. In the Results and 
Discussion section the psychometric properties of the five proposed new 
instruments are examined and the instruments refined. The data sample was 
divided into two equal halves, the first half for conducting exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA, n = 366) to develop the preliminary scales and the second half for 
conducting confirmatory factor analysis (CFA - holdout sample, n = 366) for 
purifying the dimensionality of the scales. Preliminary scales were developed 
using principal axis factoring (PAF) on the EFA data set to select the best items, 
with poor performing items dropped prior to CFA. Then CFA was used to refine 
the measures and determine the goodness-of-fit of the proposed factor models on 
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the holdout cross-validation sample. Next, reliability analyses, using Cronbach‟s 
coefficient alpha, were conducted on the refined instruments for the whole sample 
(N = 733).  
Descriptive statistics for instrument scores are reported to elucidate and 
describe the sample scientists‟ attitudes to democratisation of science, 
commercialisation of science, technological optimism, social responsibility in 
research and general attitude to genetic engineering. Next, a comparison of 
scientists‟ and the New Zealand public‟s attitude to GE is presented. Finally, the 
research hypotheses (see Chapter 5) comprising the nomological network are 
tested. These hypotheses describe the relationship between the research 
instruments, including the new instruments and the existing instruments. For both 
the descriptive statistics and testing the research hypotheses the whole data set 
was used, except for the correlations with the attitude to GE scale, the reason for 
which is explained in the appropriate section below. 
Method 
Sample and Procedures  
Sample  
Science organisations. Six Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) were invited to 
participate: AgResearch (AgR), HortResearch (HortR), Crop and Food (C&F), 
Landcare, Environmental Science Research (ESR), and Industrial Research 
Limited (IRL). There are nine Crown Research Institutes in New Zealand. They 
are scientific research organisations owned by the government and run on a 
commercial basis, but charged with producing public good science. As 
organisational size is approximately double the sample frame of scientists a rough 
idea of the size of these organisations can easily be calculated from data in Table 
7.1. All scientists and science technicians working for these six organisations who 
met the criterion of having a tertiary qualification were invited to participate. In 
total, 2125 scientists and science technicians were invited to participate. The web-
based survey application was entered by 1014 potential respondents, 47.7% of 
invitees. Of those who entered the survey website, 733 (72.3%) submitted a valid 
survey back to the researcher, giving an overall survey response rate of 34.5%. In 
comparison, Sommer (2010), who conducted a survey of New Zealand scientists 
in 2008, had a response rate of 38.6%. Table 7.1 shows sample frames, respondent 
numbers and response rates for each participating organisation.   
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Table 7.1.  
Sample: Organisation, Sample Frame, Respondent Count and Response Rate 
Organisation 
Sample 
frame 
Respondent 
count 
Response 
rate 
AgResearch 690 303 44% 
HortResearch 335 136 41% 
Crop and Food 270 80 30% 
Landcare 330 68 21% 
ESR 250 78 31% 
IRL 250 78 31% 
Total 2125 729 + 4 no id 34.5% 
Note. CRI = Crown Research Institute 
Age and ethnicity. The oldest respondent was 81years and the youngest 21, 
the mean age was 41.2 years and the SD of respondents‟ age was 11.3 years (15 
respondents did not give their age). Three hundred respondents (40.9%) were 
female and 427 (58.3%) were male (6 respondents did not report gender).  
Ethnicity was reported by 716 respondents (17 non-responses); 534 (72.9%) 
reported being New Zealand European, 10 (1.4%) were Maori, 3 (0.4%) were 
Pacific Islanders, 41 (5.6%) were Asian, and 128 (17.5%) reported their ethnicity 
as other (over half of these reported being a European of one kind or another, 
boosting European ethnicity to about 82% of the sample).  
Science seniority. In response to seniority, 209 (28.5%) reported being 
senior scientists, 250 (34.1%) were scientists, 219 (29.9%) were science 
technicians and 49 (6.7%) reported as other. The other category consisted 
primarily of research associates, engineers, post-doctoral researchers, and 
information specialists (there were 6 non-responses to this question).   
Education and religion. Fifty-six respondents (7.6%) had a diploma or 
certificate as their highest academic qualification, 157 (21.4%) had Bachelors 
degrees, 13 (1.8%) had Honours degrees, 155 (21.1%) had Masters degrees, 333 
(45.5%) had PhDs, and 14 (1.9%) reported other qualifications. Respondents were 
asked their religion, to which 374 (51%) replied no religion, 285 (38.9%) replied 
Christian, there were six Buddhists  (0.8%), five Muslims  (0.7%), five Hindus  
(0.7%), three Jews (0.4%), 41 others (5.6%), and 14 (1.9%) non-responses.  
Scientific disciplines. The major scientific disciplines in which respondents 
worked were animal science, ecology, microbiology and plant science. Table 7.2 
presents the respondents‟ current main areas of research. 
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Table 7.2 
Respondents’ Current Main Areas of Scientific Research 
Research area Frequency Percent 
Animal science 103 14.1 
Chemistry 48 6.5 
Computer science 8 1.1 
Ecology/ environmental science 89 12.1 
Economics 3 0.4 
Engineering 31 4.2 
Entomology 39 5.3 
Food science 37 5.0 
Health science 26 3.5 
Mathematics/statistics 17 2.3 
Microbiology/molecular biology 103 14.1 
Physics 32 4.4 
Plant science 130 17.7 
Social science 16 2.2 
Other 45 6.1 
Missing  6 .8 
Total 733 100 
 
Sample representativeness. Comparisons with the composition of Sommer‟s 
(2010) sample are relevant to the issue of sample representativeness. Sommer‟s 
sample included university scientists as well as scientists employed by CRIs, 
whereas the current sample was composed exclusively of CRI scientists. Only 
23.2% of Sommer‟s CRI scientists were female, whereas 40.9% of the current 
sample was female. This is a striking difference. Sommer claimed that female 
scientists made up 32.4% of the population of scientists in NZ. Sommer‟s sample 
is under-representative of New Zealand female scientists, while the sample from 
the current study is over-representative. Ethnicity is relatively similar between the 
two samples. Sommer‟s sample contained a greater percentage of engineers (10.5 
% vs. 4.2%), mathematicians (7.2% vs. 3.4%), health scientists (10.6% vs. 3.5%), 
and social and behavioural scientists (16.1% vs. 2.2%). The current sample 
contained more environmental scientists than Sommer‟s sample (12.1% vs. 7.8%). 
Differences between Sommer‟s (2010) sample and the current sample were likely 
due to non-inclusion of university scientists in the current sample. Given these 
differences, the current sample cannot claim to be representative of all New 
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Zealand scientists. Therefore, generalisations from the current sample to the New 
Zealand science population or the larger world population of scientist should not 
be drawn on the basis of this study alone. 
Item non-response. Half of the item non-responses in the survey were 
associated with just 5 individual cases. Excluding these cases (n=728) there was a 
total of 108,472 possible item responses of which 108,058 (99.62%) were 
completed, resulting in a 0.38% item non-response rate. Note that although the 
five cases of high non-response were not removed from the sample, for all 
analyses conducted (unless otherwise specified), all cases with relevant missing 
data were excluded through listwise deletion (thus sample size may vary slightly 
across different analyses). Item non-response was very low, and with the large 
sample size, missing values have negligible impact on results. 
Procedures 
The research project received prior approval from Waikato University‟s 
Psychology Department Research and Ethics Committee as a PhD study. The 
survey was first drafted in a Microsoft Word document (see Appendix 7.1. 
Scientists‟ Survey Instrument) and then transferred to a web-based form using the 
SurveyPro software. A web-based survey was considered appropriate for the 
sample frame of Crown Research Institute (CRI) scientists, as all scientists 
working for the six participating CRIs had email addresses. A web-based survey 
also has the advantage of not requiring data transcription into a statistical analysis 
programme, which can be a source of error through wrongly transcribed data. The 
researcher initially trialled the survey himself several times and corrected obvious 
defects.  
Next, 20 scientists from AgResearch from several different scientific 
disciplines were asked to pilot the survey. For the first ten of these pilot trials the 
researcher sat in the room and observed the trial respondents, who were asked to 
vocalise their thoughts while completing the survey.  The researcher noted 
comments, questions and criticisms. Revisions were made to the survey to take 
account of relevant comments and observations. The other ten pilot respondents 
completed the survey unobserved at their own convenience. After completion of 
the survey they then gave oral feedback and some also gave written notes to the 
researcher. A few further minor revisions deemed necessary by the participants or 
the researcher were made. The trial data were removed from the survey software 
database before the invitation to participate in the survey was emailed to the 
sample.  
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Numerous additional questions were included in the survey that do not 
directly relate to the current work (to prevent confusion these additional questions 
are not included in Appendix 7.1). The reason for this is that the researcher was 
employed full-time by AgResearch while collecting the current data and was also 
employed on other related FORST (Foundation for Research Science and 
Technology – the New Zealand Government science funding agency) funded 
projects. Therefore, for reasons of convenience, cost saving and expediency, data 
collection for these projects was conducted concurrently in the survey.  
Via email contact with the CEOs of six NZ Crown Research Institutes 
(CRIs), access was sought and gained for participation of their science staff in a 
survey of scientists (see Appendix 7.2. Letter requesting permission to conduct 
survey). Permission was also obtained to identify the participating organisations 
(though not the individual participants) in the current work. Once the CEOs had 
consented to participation, the researcher was put in contact with the Human 
Resource Managers of each of the CRIs in order to obtain the email addresses of 
scientists and science technicians in their employ. A database of email addresses 
was constructed and an email was then sent to all scientists and science 
technicians with a tertiary science qualification, for whom emails addressed were 
obtained (N = 2125). As far as is known, this sample frame is equal to the scientist 
and science technician population in these six CRIs.   
The email invited them to participate in a web-based survey and provided 
them with a hotlink to the survey web-site. The survey software allocated a unique 
ID number to each participant based upon order of entry to the survey website. 
Thus, ID numbers were generated and recorded for all persons who responded to 
the email request and visited the survey website, even if they did not complete the 
survey, or chose not to submit their data. 
Once a week for four weeks the email invitation was sent to the sample, 
asking them to ignore if they had previously responded, and again inviting them to 
participate if they had not (see Appendix 7.3. Canvassing email to potential 
survey participants). The canvassing email informed potential participants that a 
good response rate helps to increase the external validity of survey data and 
results. However, as is necessary to meet the ethical requirement of informed 
consent, they were also informed that participation was voluntary, that they could 
pass over any question they did not want to answer, and that they could withdraw 
from the survey by using the back arrow of their web browser at any time until 
they submitted their data. They were informed that all responses would be 
anonymous, that only aggregate group data would be published, and that because 
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of the data collection process, even the researcher would be unaware of their 
identity (unless they chose to make their identity known). Therefore, their 
confidentiality was assured.  
The sample was informed that electronically submitting the completed 
survey questionnaire to the researcher (i.e., clicking the submit button) would be 
considered as giving informed consent for their participation in the research 
project. After four weeks the survey was closed off, the website disabled and the 
data downloaded into an Access database. The data were exported from the 
Access database into SPSS 14 for analysis.  
Analysis 
Data screening 
Missing data. As previously noted missing data were minimal: for all items 
in all scales (with the exception of the general attitude to GE scale) the maximum 
number of cases with a missing response was 10 (out of 733). The general attitude 
to GE scale was a little different as will be explained in the section reporting and 
analysing this instrument. Where data relevant to a particular analysis were 
missing the cases were either listwise deleted or the method of handling them is 
described in the relevant sections.  
Normality and outliers. All variables were screened for normality: 
histograms, normal Q-Q plots, and box plots were examined, and skewness 
statistics, standard error of skewness, kurtosis statistics and standard error of 
kurtosis calculated. While the graphs all indicated that the distributions of all 
items were relatively normal, statistics suggested most items were either skewed 
or had some kurtosis, and all items were non-normally distributed as defined by 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality. However, this test is notoriously over 
sensitive to sample size (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Skewness and kurtosis 
statistics for variables may be found in Appendix 7.4.  Kurtosis is considered 
unimportant as sample size well exceeds 200, the number at which, according to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) the effects of kurtosis on variance disappears. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996, p. 73) advised that “In a large sample, a variable 
with statistically significant skewness often does not deviate enough from 
normality to make a substantive difference in the analysis.” They also noted that 
“if all the variables are skewed to about the same moderate extent, improvements 
of analysis with transformation are often marginal” (p. 82).  
The following process was used to handle both non-normality and also 
univariate and multivariate outliers. All main analyses were done twice (i.e., 
  
225 
 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, and the nomological network 
correlation matrix): first, with no transformation or outlier deletion and second, 
with non-normal variables transformed and univariate and multivariate outliers 
deleted. The results were then compared to determine if there were any 
substantive differences and whether transformation and outlier deletion were 
necessary. In the data cleaning process, all variables with a skewness statistic 
more than twice the standard error of skewness were, if negatively skewed, 
reflected, as advised by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), and then all skewed 
variables were transformed using the square root function (skewness was slight to 
moderate in all cases). After re-running normality checks (skewness, kurtosis, box 
plots and normal Q-Q plots) to ensure the effectiveness of the transformations, 
univariate outliers (identified from box plots) and multivariate outliers for each 
scale (detected using Mahalanobis distances: χ2 α set at .001, as advised by 
Tabachnick and Fidell) were deleted. 
 Then the confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) and the nomological network 
correlation matrix of the two conditions (i.e., cleaned and non-cleaned) were 
compared for substantive differences. For three scales (awareness, technological 
optimism, and democratisation) the cleaned data produced slightly improved CFA 
model fits on some indices, for the judgment scale the CFA fit indices remained 
the same and for the commercialisation and general attitude to GE scale the CFA 
fit was slightly poorer on some indices. However, none of these differences were 
substantive and both methods resulted in development of the same models. For 
the nomological network correlation matrix small differences were found, most 
usually at the third decimal place (indicating irrelevance of the data cleaning 
process to this analysis), but occasionally at the second decimal place. Of the six 
correlations (out of 39) that changed at the second decimal digit one increased by 
.03, two increased by .02, and three increased by .01. Due to the negligible 
differences resulting from transformation and outlier deletion (and the difficulty 
involved in interpreting transformed data); all analyses reported are conducted on 
untransformed data in which the outliers have been retained. 
Validity 
Content validity (the extent to which the content of an instrument is relevant 
to the construct or characteristic being measured) was assumed by the use of 
statements made by interviewees on the subject in Study 1 and by allocation of the 
items to the emergent themes and sub-themes of social responsibility (see Chapter 
6, Study 1, Table 6.3, p. 215). One of the main foci of this study (Study 2) was on 
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inferring construct validity in the new instruments. The construct validity of an 
instrument is the extent to which an instrument measures the theoretical construct 
that it was intended to measure (Anastasi, 1976; Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & 
Heerden, 2003).  Construct validity is an elusive ideal and, as noted in Chapter 5, 
there is no well accepted statistic that accurately measures or describes construct 
validity (Smith, 2005a, 2005b). Numerous authors have noted that construct 
validation is an ongoing process never finished (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Maher 
& Gottesman, 2005; Smith, 2005a; Westen & Rosenthal, 2005).   
For a psychological instrument to have construct validity, two main 
requirements must be met: reliability and homogeneity. Most authors have 
claimed the construct must be unidimensional or homogeneous (e.g., Costello & 
Osborne, 2005; Drewes, 2009; Gerbing & Anderson, 1988; Hattie, 1985; 
McDonald, 1981; Smith, McCarthy, & Zapolski, 2009). A two-step process 
consisting of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis is recommended for 
developing unidimensional scales (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). After a 
unidimensional scale has been developed it is subjected to reliability analysis. I 
shall return to a fuller discussion of unidimensionality after briefly discussing the 
second requirement that the instrument must be reliable (Anastasi, 1976; 
Nunnally, 1978).  
Reliability 
According to Anastasi, “reliability refers to the consistency of scores 
obtained by the same person when examined with the same test on different 
occasions, or with different sets of equivalent items” (p. 103). When using a 
single administration of an instrument (as is the case in the current work) by far 
the most common reliability index reported is Cronbach‟s coefficient alpha 
(Cronbach, 1951), which is a lower bound measure of reliability (Sijtsma, 2009a). 
That is, it underestimates the true reliability of an instrument (Sijtsma, 2009b).  
Instrument reliability is a necessary but not sufficient condition for validity. 
According to classic reliability theory the upper limit of validity is the square root 
of the reliability of the criterion variable. The true relationship between a criterion 
and its predictor will be attenuated by unreliability in either instrument (Schmidt 
& Hunter, 1996; Schmitt, 1996). Some authors have suggested correcting for 
unreliability in predictor and criterion by dividing the observed correlation by the 
product of the square root of their reliabilities (Lord & Novick, 1968; Schmidt & 
Hunter, 1996; Schmitt, 1996).  
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Although some authors prefer a coefficient alpha approaching .90 (Aron & 
Aron, 1999), Nunnally (1978) recommended striving for an alpha higher than .70 
for psychometric instruments. However, Nunnally suggested that, in the early 
stages of research and instrument development, an alpha of .60, or even as low as 
.50, may be adequate. Other authors have suggested alphas of .60 or higher are 
acceptable dependent on test use, item face validity and interpretability (Armor, 
1974; Schmitt, 1996). Using the example of the commonly used .70 cut-off value, 
Schmitt (1996) warned against the dogmatic use of a particular cut-off value of 
alpha and made the crucial point that  
Even relatively low (e.g., .50) levels of criterion reliability do not seriously 
attenuate validity coefficients….Even with reliability as low as .49, the 
upper limit of validity is .70. When a measure has other desirable properties, 
such as meaningful content coverage of some domain and reasonable 
unidimensionality, this low reliability may not be a major impediment to its 
use. (Schmitt, 1996, pp. 350-352)  
This point is important for the current research because the nomological 
network is essentially a series of „validity coefficients‟ with correlations between 
construct measures and other constructs to which they are related and which they 
predict or are predicted by (also one of the new instruments has a low coefficient 
alpha of .57). Gerbing and Anderson (1988) recommended reliability analysis 
after CFA to ensure that factor subscale scores are not determined primarily by 
error measurement. Cronbach‟s coefficient alpha was used to measure reliability 
and the analysis conducted using SPSS 14.  
Scale unidimensionality: Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis 
Scale unidimensionality. According to Drewes (2009, p. 259), 
“Unidimensionality is generally defined as the condition wherein a set of items 
measures the same latent attribute, trait, or psychological functioning.” Hattie 
(1985, p. 49) claimed: “That a set of items forming an instrument all measure just 
one thing in common is a most critical and basic assumption of measurement 
theory.”  
The rationale for requiring unidimensionality is that a single composite 
score (e.g., summated, or mean of, items) composed of multiple dimensions is 
difficult to interpret and consequently that “construct validation/theory test has 
theoretical uncertainty built into it” (Smith, et al., 2009, p. 273). That is, the 
different dimensions in a multidimensional score may relate differently to the 
other constructs in a nomological network (Reise, Waller, & Comrey, 2000). In 
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such a case it is impossible to tell what the contribution of each dimension of the 
composite score is to the other constructs, thus the use of a single composite 
multidimensional score may obscure predictive and/or causal relationships. As 
Smith et al. (2009, p. 277) explained: “Only measures of unidimensional 
constructs can lay claim to explaining psychological processes and hence to 
explaining possible causal activity.”  
Although coefficient alpha has commonly been used as an indicator of 
unidimensionality, as noted in the previous section on reliability, they are not the 
same thing (Cortina, 1993; S. B. Green, Lissitz, & Mulaik, 1977; Hattie, 1985; 
Schmitt, 1996). Currently, the most widely used methods of inferring scale 
unidimensionality are various types of exploratory and/or confirmatory factor 
analysis. In the early stages of scale development, exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) is commonly used to assess dimensionality and refine the measure by item 
deletion to provide preliminary scales (e.g., Aupperle, 1984; Cohen, Pant, & 
Sharp, 1993; Singhapakdi, Vitell, Rallapalli, & Kraft, 1996).  
Exploratory factor analysis. For EFA, Costello and Osborne (2005) 
recommended factor analysis rather than the more commonly used principal 
components analysis (PCA). They claimed that factor analysis better reflects the 
nature of the population, that is, factor analysis is considered to have greater 
external validity than PCA and be more generalisable to other samples and 
groups, as it does not inflate the variance estimates (Costello & Osborne, 2005). 
Of the six methods of factor analysis available in most statistical packages (such 
as SPSS and SAS), if the data are relatively normally distributed, Costello and 
Osborne claimed the most appropriate factor extraction method is maximum 
likelihood (ML) as it allows computation of goodness-of-fit indices. However, if 
the data are significantly non-normal, then the method of principal axis factoring 
(PAF) is more appropriate (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Fabrigar, Wegener, 
MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999). This method is also more commonly used. 
Responses to items in all of the five new scales are significantly non-
normal, in terms of significant results on the Kolomogorov-Smirnov test with the 
Lilliefors Significance Correction (although this statistic tends to reject normality 
with large sample sizes). Also, for almost all of the items, either the skewness 
statistic was more than twice the standard error of skewness, or the kurtosis 
statistic was more than twice the standard error of kurtosis, or both (see Appendix 
7.4, Table A7.4.1). Therefore, PAF was used in the current study for the EFA to 
develop the preliminary scales. 
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The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (KMO) was used 
to test whether the proposed set of scale items was factorable. Bartlett‟s (1950) 
test of sphericity, which uses the chi-square statistic to test the null hypothesis that 
the items in the population correlation matrix are uncorrelated (i.e., the correlation 
matrix is an identity matrix), was also considered, but rejected due to its extreme 
sensitivity to sample size (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). The KMO statistic is an 
index for comparing the magnitude of the observed correlation coefficients with 
the magnitudes of the partial correlation coefficients. It is based on the principle 
that the more common variance that is shared between the set of items the less the 
partial correlation between any two items (i.e., unique variance which the two 
items share). The KMO statistic has a range from 0.0 to 1.0. Kaiser (1974) 
recommended a minimum KMO value of .5 for a factorable set of items. 
To determine the number of factors to retain for rotation in EFA, Cattell‟s 
(1966) scree test is considered effective (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Reise, et al., 
2000) and was used in conjunction with eigenvalues and observation of the item-
total correlation matrix. As any factor with an eigenvalue of less than 1.0 accounts 
for less variance than any individual item in the scale, factors with an eigenvalue 
of less than 1.0 were not considered. An oblique rotation (such as oblimin) is 
recommended rather than an orthoganol rotation as this allows correlation 
between the factors, a situation that is often the case in psychology (Costello & 
Osborne, 2005; Reise, et al., 2000). It also produces the same results as an 
orthoganol rotation, if the factors are truly uncorrelated. Therefore, in the current 
work, to develop preliminary scales, PAF factor analysis was used with oblimin 
rotation when more than 1 factor was extracted. 
Some authors have recommended that to be retained in a scale the minimum 
loading of an item on to a factor should be at least .30 (e.g., Costello & Osborne, 
2005), Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) suggested .32 (which means the item shares 
approximately 10% overlapping variance with other items in the factor), while 
other authors recommended a minimum loading of .40 (e.g., Churchill, 1979). 
However, Tabachnick and Fidell claimed, “Choice of the cut-off size of loadings 
to be interpreted is a matter of researcher preference” (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996, 
p. 677). In the current work a midrange value of .35 was used as the minimum 
loading. This value was also used by Bottari, Dassa, Rainville, and Dutil (2009) in 
a recent factorial validity study. SPSS 14 was used to conduct the EFA. 
Confirmatory factor analysis. However, Gerbing and Anderson (1988) 
claimed that the unidimensionality of the scale developed using EFA should then 
be assessed and refined using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). They stated 
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“confirmatory factor analysis affords a stricter interpretation of unidimensionality 
than can be provided by more traditional methods such as coefficient alpha, item-
total correlations, and exploratory factor analysis” (p. 186), and “exploratory 
factor analysis can be a useful preliminary technique for scale construction but… 
a subsequent confirmatory analysis would be needed to evaluate, and likely refine, 
the resulting scales” (emphasis in original p. 189).  
Amos 6 was used to conduct maximum likelihood CFA. Although questions 
have been raised regarding maximum likelihood CFA under the violation of 
multivariate normality, recent studies suggest that “ML [maximum likelihood 
CFA] seems to be quite robust against the violation of the normality assumption” 
(Schermelleh-Engel, Moosbrugger, & Muller, 2003, p. 26). Therefore, the items 
comprising the five new scales were tested for unidimensionality using maximum 
likelihood CFA to determine the goodness-of-fit of the items to a single latent 
variable (here referred to as a „Model‟). 
The most well known goodness-of-fit index is the chi-square statistic (a 
non-significant chi-square statistic indicates that the model fits the data). 
However, care must be taken when using the chi-square statistic to reject 
goodness-of-fit. It is well known that the significance of this statistic is very 
sensitive to large sample size and a number of authors caution against sole 
reliance on it for rejection of goodness-of-fit under such circumstances (Anderson 
& Gerbing, 1992; Bearden, Sharma, & Teel, 1982; Bentler & Bonett, 1980). 
Fortunately, there is a range of other indices available which provide descriptive 
criteria for goodness-of-fit evaluation (Schermelleh-Engel, et al., 2003). However, 
as debate exists around most of these indices regarding the effects of sample size 
or model complexity, and there is only rough consensus as to what value of the 
various indices constitutes a „good fit‟, it is generally recommended that a range 
of fit indices be considered simultaneously (e.g., Schermelleh-Engel, et al., 2003; 
Wheaton, 1987).  
Therefore, in addition to the chi-square statistic (χ2), the following indices 
will all be considered: χ2/df ratios, the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the Tucker-
Lewis coefficient (TLI, also known as the Bentler-Bonett non-normed fit index - 
NNFI), the comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean square residual index 
(RMR) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). The ratio of 
χ2/df should be as small as possible for good model fit. Schermellah-Engel et al. 
(2003, p. 33) claimed that although “there exist no absolute standards, a ratio 
between 2 and 3 is indicative of a "good" or "acceptable" data-model fit, 
respectively”.  For the GFI, TLI and CFI indices a value of 1.0 represents a 
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perfect fit. A GFI of .95 is considered a good fit and values greater than .90 are 
considered acceptable (Schermelleh-Engel, et al., 2003).  As a rule of thumb, 
Bentler and Bonett (1980) suggested CFI and TLI indices above .90 indicate 
acceptable fit.  
The root mean square residual index (RMR) and the root mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA) are indices for which 0 represents a perfect fit. The 
rule of thumb for these indices is the smaller the better – values less than or equal 
to .05 indicate a good fit on the RMSEA, values between .05 and .08 an adequate 
fit and values greater than .10 are not acceptable, while the acceptable upper limit 
of the RMR is difficult to determine and “depends on the sizes of the variances 
and covariances of the observed variables” (Schermelleh-Engel, et al., 2003, p. 
38). Currently, the goodness-of-fit index conventions are poorly established. 
Academic debate is ongoing as to exactly which are the best indices and what cut-
off values constitutes good fit under CFA (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Schermelleh-
Engel, et al., 2003), and hence the unidimensionality of a scale. And, as we shall 
also see, the indices are not always congruent with one another; suggesting lack of 
reliability and raising questions about their validity. Arbitrary cut-off values add 
to the dubious nature of these indices. Recall both Hattie (1985) and Segars 
(1997) claimed there were no effective indices of the unidimensionality of a set of 
items.  
Sample and holdout sample. Technically, CFA should be performed on a 
second independent cross-validation sample (Schermelleh-Engel, et al., 2003). In 
the current study, because of the reasonably large sample size (in relation to factor 
analysis) it was possible to divide the sample into two random halves, conduct 
EFA on the first half and then CFA on the second half (the hold-out cross-
validation sample). With 366 cases in each sample, the samples easily meet the 
rule of thumb requirements of a subject to item ratio of 1:10 for factor analysis 
(Costello & Osborne, 2005) or “at least 300 cases for factor analysis” 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996, p. 640). This two step EFA-CFA process was 
followed in the development of the current instruments. Table 7.3 presents a 
comparison of descriptive statistics for the EFA sample and the CFA sample. The 
original data set was divided in two by taking every second case in the data file 
(i.e., every second respondent) for the CFA data set.  
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Table 7.3.  
Comparison of Descriptive Statistics: EFA Sample and CFA Sample 
Demographic EFA Sample CFA Sample 
n 366 366 
Mean Age 40.6 years 41.7 years 
Gender 42.6% female 39.9% female 
Ethnicity   
NZ Euro 73% 72.7% 
Maori 2.2% .5% 
Pacific Islander .3% .5% 
Asian 5.7% 5.5% 
Other 17.2% 17.8 
Religion   
No religion 53.3% 48.9% 
Christian 36.6% 41.0% 
Buddhist .8% .8% 
Muslim .8% .5% 
Jewish .8% - 
Hindu - 1.4% 
Other 5.7% 5.5% 
Employer   
AgResearch 40.2% 42.6% 
HortResearch 21.3% 15.8% 
Crop and Food 11.5% 10.4% 
Landcare 8.7% 9.8% 
Environmental Science Research 9.0% 8.5% 
Industrial Research Limited 8.7% 12.3% 
Highest qualification   
Diploma/certificate 7.7% 7.7% 
Bachelors degree 23% 19.7% 
Masters degree 19.7% 22.7% 
Doctorate 45.9% 45.1% 
Other 3.3% 4.1% 
 
Overall the two sets look as comparable as can be expected from a random 
division and they function as two independent samples from a single population. 
  
233 
 
Questionnaire and Existing Measures 
Questionnaire 
The 149 item web-based survey consisted of 106 items that are part of the 
current research: 11 items collected demographic material, six items were 
designed to collect information about attitudes to democratisation of science, nine 
items were designed to collect information about attitudes to the 
commercialisation of science, 10 items were designed to collect information about 
scientists‟ awareness of the social responsibility of science to society, 10 items 
were designed to collect information about scientists‟ judgments about personal 
actions to enhance their social responsibility in research, five items were designed 
to collect information about attitudes to technological optimism, 16 items 
collected information on attitudes to GE, and 37 items were from the Schwartz 
Value Survey. The specific measures are discussed in detail below. 
In the questionnaire, all instruments which used Likert scales were scored: 1 
= strongly disagree, 3= neutral, to 5 = strongly agree. However, in four of the 
new research instruments using Likert scales (i.e., democratisation of science, 
commercialisation of science, moral awareness and technological optimism) some 
question items were reverse worded with respect to the scale direction. For the 
analyses of these instruments (i.e., reliability, factorial dimensionality, and 
validity), reverse worded items in instruments were reverse coded in order to give 
them the same directionality as the other items in the instrument.  
Schwartz value survey 
General values were measured with items from the Schwartz value survey 
as shown in Table 7.4. Not all of the 56 items of the instrument were used due to 
space constraints in the questionnaire. Following Schultz and Zelezny (1998, 
1999), 37 items were selected. They provided the following justification for 
selection of these items: 
Items were selected based on the empirical locations of each value in 
regions generated from a series of smallest space analyses reported by 
Schwartz (1994). We selected the four items with the greatest frequency of 
occurrence in each of the ten primary regions; the selected items were those 
that emerged most often in the appropriate value-type region in 97 
independent samples from 44 countries. (1999, p. 259) 
However, for one value type (universalism) two of the four items used in the 
current study differ from the items used by Schultz and Zelezny (1998, 1999). 
Schultz and Zelezny used four of the original nine items from the universalism 
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scale: protecting the environment, a world of beauty, unity with nature, and broad-
minded. In the current study, a world of beauty and broad-minded were replaced 
with two of the other nine original Schwartz items: social justice, and a world at 
peace. The reason for swapping these items was that they are more congruent with 
the two areas of primary concern regarding the impacts of Promethean science 
and technology on Gaia elucidated in Chapter 1. These concerns were the natural 
environment and social justice. Note that the two items used by Schultz and 
Zelezny, although not used, were also collected in the current work. The two four-
item scales (i.e., the four items used by Schultz and Zelezny and the four items 
used in the current work) had a correlation of .98. 
Table 7.4.  
Higher Order Value Dimensions, Value Types, Value Items and Alpha 
4 Higher order 
value dimensions 
Alpha
a 
10 Value types 37 Value items 
Self-
transcendence 
(Trans) 
.82 
Universalism Protecting the environment, Unity 
with nature, Social justice, A world 
of peace. 
Benevolence Helpful, Honest, Forgiving, Loyal. 
Self-enhancement 
(Enhan) 
.80 
Power Social power, Authority, Wealth, 
Preserving my public image. 
Achievement Successful, Capable, Ambitious, 
Influential. 
Openness to 
change 
(Opn) 
.84 
Self-direction Creativity, Curious, Freedom, 
Choosing own goals. 
Stimulation Daring, A varied life, An exciting 
life. 
Hedonism Pleasure, Enjoying life. 
Conservation 
(Con) 
.84 
Tradition Devout, Respect for tradition, 
Humble, Moderate. 
Conformity Politeness, Honouring parents and 
elders, Obedient, Self-discipline. 
Security Clean, National security, Social 
order, Family security. 
Notes. 
aCronbach‟s coefficient alpha for the higher order value dimensions. 
Following the instructions of Schwartz (1992), respondents were asked to 
rate each of the value-items „as a guiding principle in my life‟ from -1 = opposed 
to my values, 0 = not important, 2 = important, 4 = very important to 5 = of 
supreme importance. Note that Schwartz used a 9-point scale (-1 to 7) rather than 
the 7-point scale used here. Scores for value types were calculated by taking the 
mean of responses. As recommended by Schwartz, scores for the four higher 
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order value dimensions were calculated by taking the mean of all items in the 
value types comprising the higher order dimension. The value types comprising 
each of the four higher order value dimensions and the value items comprising the 
value types can be found in Table 7.4. 
As the hypotheses forming the nomological network use only the higher 
order value dimensions, only data regarding these dimensions are reported here. 
Although the Schwartz value types and higher order value dimensions are claimed 
to be cross-culturally and universally valid, because a subset of values was used in 
the current study (however, note, as explained above, these subsets have been 
used in previous studies), confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to examine 
the factor structure of the higher order dimensions. As this was not a new 
instrument, and was developed on samples independent of the current one, EFA 
was not required and the CFA analysis could be conducted on the whole sample 
(N = 733) rather than just the holdout sample. 
The value type scores (means of the value type) were used as the variables 
for the higher order Schwartz value dimensions. Table 7.5 presents the fit 
statistics for the higher order Schwartz value dimension model. The chi-square 
statistic is significant at the .001 level indicating rejection of fit. As previously 
noted this statistic is very sensitive to sample size and should not be entirely relied 
on in such situations. The GFI, RMR and CFI indices indicate a reasonable fit 
while the χ2/df, TLI, and RMSEA indices suggest a poor fit. The incongruity of 
the results from these indices (which are all supposed to measure 
unidimensionality) not only raises question about the scale, but also raises doubts 
as to the validity and practicality of the indices and cut-off points themselves. 
Table 7.5.  
CFA Results for Schwartz Value Survey Higher-Order Dimensions (N = 733) 
Model χ2
 
df χ2/df GFI TLI CFI RMR 
RMSEA 
[90% CI] 
4 Higher 
order 
factors 
298.52 
(p < .001) 
28 10.7 .93 .86 .91 .04 
.11 
[.103, .127] 
 
The path diagram is presented in Figure 7.1. Note that the diagram includes a path 
between the achievement value type and the higher order dimension openness to 
change; this modification considerably improved the fit. However it leads to a 
concern about the self-enhancement dimension.  
In Figure 7.1 the values on the path arrows from the factor (i.e., the 
unobserved variable) to the observed variables (i.e., value types) represent the 
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correlations between the items and the factor (i.e., factor loading). The values 
beside the observed variable boxes represent the squared factor loadings on the 
items (i.e., the percentage of variance of each item explained by the factor). As 
can be seen from Figure 7.1, the intercorrelations amongst the four higher order 
dimensions were reasonably high between adjacent dimensions (range: .37 to .57) 
and lower between opposing dimensions (i.e., .03 and .26), as would be expected 
from Schwartz‟s theory (see Figure 3.2, Chapter 3, p. 76). 
 
Figure 7.1. CFA path diagram for Schwartz higher-order value dimensions. 
Coefficient alpha reliabilities for the higher order value dimensions 
(calculated using all the items from the relevant value types) can be found in 
Table 7.4. The reliabilities of all the four higher order value dimensions were 
good. Despite the reservations regarding the higher order value dimension of self-
enhancement (which needs to be considered in interpreting the results), as an 
integral part of the research design, and, in particular, given the voluminous 
research supporting this instrument, less than perfect results from a single study 
should be considered with caution. Therefore, the Schwartz higher order value 
dimensions were used as part of the nomological network to help establish 
construct validity in the new instruments and the theoretical relationships between 
the constructs. 
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General attitude to genetic engineering 
The second existing research instrument is a scale developed by Small, 
Parminter and Fisher (2005) on a sample of the New Zealand public (N = 842). 
This 11 item instrument measures general attitude to genetic engineering (GE). In 
the current work, the instrument was adapted a little: only nine of the items were 
used for reasons that will be explained below. All items were measured using a 5 
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree), however, for these 
items, respondents also had the opportunity to answer „don‟t know‟ (the reason 
for this is to make the data in the scientists‟ survey comparable to the public 
survey data). „Don‟t know‟ responses in the attitude to GE instrument are treated 
as missing cases and are listwise deleted in all analyses. Of the 733 respondents, 
549 responded to all nine GE items. Thus, in the nomological network analysis, 
all correlations of instruments with the attitude to GE instrument have a sample 
size of approximately 549. 
The original Small et al. (2005) instrument consisted of four subscales: 
deontological moral values regarding GE (here referred to as intrinsic values 
regarding GE, or for brevity, intrinsic values); teleological beliefs about the 
(moral) consequences of GE (here referred to as beliefs about the extrinsic moral 
consequences of GE, or for brevity, extrinsic beliefs), trust in authorities 
responsible for GE (trust), and perception of social consensus regarding GE 
(social consensus). Although the subscales comprising general attitude to GE 
represent conceptually distinct constructs, Small et al. (2005) reported that they 
were all highly intercorrelated (rs ranging from .60 to .76, p <.001 for all 
correlations). Coefficient alphas for the four subscales were reported as ranging 
from .72 to .93, while alpha for all 11 items was reported as .93. They reported 
that factor analysis of the 11 item instrument yielded a single factor with an 
eigenvalue greater than 1, thus indicating a single general factor underlying all 
items.  Small et al. reported that the general attitude to GE scale accounted for 
61% of the variance of a concurrent criterion: intention to purchase a specific GE 
milk product. The general attitude to GE instrument was further tested on an 
independent sample of the New Zealand public with similar results to those 
reported above (Ah Yuk-Winters, 2009).  
However, one subscale, „perception of social consensus regarding GE‟ is 
not strictly an attitude. The general attitude to GE instrument was originally 
designed to predict behavioural intentions about GE (i.e., intention to purchase a 
GE product) and is based on the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) theory of planned 
behaviour/reasoned action. In this theory, attitude towards the value object, and 
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perception of the social norms of relevant others regarding the value object, are 
considered to influence the behavioural intention of the agent. Because it is not an 
attitude of the agent, in the current work, the perception of social consensus 
subscale was deleted from the general attitude to GE instrument. Therefore, the 
general attitude to GE instrument comprised three subscales (intrinsic values, 
extrinsic beliefs and trust in responsible authorities) with three items each, giving 
a total of nine items in the instrument. The instrument items (including descriptive 
statistics) and subscales, along with coefficient alpha for each subscale for the 
scientists‟ sample are presented in Table 7.6.  
Table 7.6.  
General Attitude to GE, subscales and items (n = 549) 
Subscale Alphaa
 
Item M (SD) 95% CI 
Intrinsic 
values 
.90 
GE fits with my cultural and 
spiritual beliefs. 
3.52 (1.06) [3.43, 3.61] 
GE fits with my moral principles. 3.60 (1.03) [3.51, 3.69] 
It is acceptable to GE animals for 
human benefit. 
3.53 (1.11) [3.44, 3.62] 
Extrinsic 
beliefs 
.82 
GE will help cure the world‟s 
major diseases. 
3.48 (1.00) [3.40, 3.57] 
GE will help solve the world‟s 
food problems. 
3.11 (1.14) [3.02, 3.21] 
GE products are environmentally 
friendly. 
2.94 (.97) [2.86, 3.02] 
Trust in 
responsible 
authorities 
.79 
I trust the regulatory authorities 
about GE.  
3.07 (.98) [2.99, 3.15] 
I trust scientists about GE. 3.42 (.92) [3.34, 3.50] 
I trust companies about GE. 2.26 (.91) [2.19, 2.34] 
Notes. Response scale: 1= strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = strongly agree, 6 = don’t 
know. All cases where participant responded „don‟t know‟ to any of the 9 items were 
listwise deleted from analysis reducing sample size from 733 to 549. 
a
Coefficient alpha for subscales.  
The mean of the intrinsic value subscale was 3.55 (SD = .97), 95% CI [3.47, 
3.63]; the mean of the extrinsic belief scale was 3.18 (SD = .88), 95% CI [3.10, 
3.25], and for the trust in responsible authorities scale the mean was 2.92 (SD = 
.79), 95% CI [2.85, 2.98]. The mean score for the overall general attitude to GE 
scale for the scientists‟ sample was 3.22 (SD = .76), 95% CI [3.15, 3.28], 
indicating that, overall, they had a moderately favourable attitude to GE.  
Because this was an established instrument developed on a sample 
independent of the current study, the CFA analysis was conducted on the whole 
sample, with cases which had „missing items‟ (i.e., true missing and „don‟t know‟ 
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responses) listwise deleted from analyses (leaving an n of 549). Although Small et 
al. (2005) treated the scale as a single factor model (Model 1: a single latent factor 
underlying all the observed variables), two slightly different but equally valid 
approaches are: 1) to treat each subscale as a factor: three latent factors underlying 
the nine observed variables (Model 2) or, 2) to use the means of the sub-scales as 
variables (thus increasing variable reliability):  one latent factor with three 
observed variables, each variable comprising three items (Model 3). These three 
different models were tested using CFA to determine which model had the best 
goodness-of-fit characteristics. Goodness-of-fit indices for the three models are 
presented in Table 7.7. 
As can be seen from Table 7.7, despite the 9 item instrument having a 
coefficient alpha of .91, Model 1 is a poor fit on all indices. Model 2 still performs 
poorly on the chi-square, the χ2/df and the RMSEA indices, but performs 
adequately on the other fit indices. Model 3 also performs poorly on the chi-
square, the χ2/df and the RMSEA indices but performs very well on the GFI, TLI 
and RMR. Overall, Model 3 performs best on the fit indices. 
Table 7.7. 
 CFA Results for General Attitude to GE Instrument (n=549) 
Model χ2
 
df χ2/df GFI TLI CFI RMR 
RMSEA 
[90% CI] 
Model1 
(1 factor  
9 variables) 
715.3 
(p < .001) 
27 26.5 .74 .70 .78 .09 
.216 
[.203, .230] 
Model 2 
(3 factors 
 9 variables) 
190.9 
(p = .001) 
24 7.96 .93 .92 .95 .06 
.113 
[.029, .119] 
Model 3 
(1 factor, 
3 variables) 
13.04 
(p < .001) 
1 13.0 .99 .94 .98 .05 
.149 
[.084, .225] 
 
However, again note the inconsistent results of the goodness-of-fit indices, 
supposedly all measuring unidimensionality. Model 3, having only a single factor 
(i.e., being unidimensional) also makes for a simpler nomological network 
analysis. The path diagram for Model 3 is presented in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2. CFA path diagram for attitude to GE instrument. 
Coefficient alphas for the three subscales were: intrinsic value subscale = 
.90, extrinsic belief subscale = .82, and trust subscale = .79. Small et al. (2005) 
report similar coefficient alphas for these scales. Using the three subscale means 
as variables in a higher order factor scale (general attitude to GE) returned a 
coefficient alpha of .83 for the general attitude to GE instrument. Due to its 
superior performance on the fit indices, and good reliability, Model 3 (i.e., the 
means of each of the three subscales treated as variables of the general attitude to 
GE scale) will be used as the concurrent criterion for inferring construct validity 
in the five new instruments in the nomological network. Because some of the fit 
indices are not particularly good (i.e., the χ2 the χ2/df and the RMSEA) caution 
must be expressed regarding the results of analyses using the GE instrument.  
Results and Discussion 
First, the psychometric properties of the five new instruments are examined 
using the two-step EFA-CFA process described in the Method section of this 
chapter. Descriptive statistics for instrument items are presented for the interested 
reader. However, they receive minimal discussion as the primary focus is on the 
instruments‟ psychometric properties and the samples‟ responses to the 
instruments. Next is a brief comparison between the attitudes of the New Zealand 
public and the current science sample to a particular Promethean technology, 
genetic engineering. Finally, the nomological network with its 39 hypothesised 
relationships designed to infer construct validity to the new instruments is 
examined. 
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Democratisation of science scale 
Six items measured scientists‟ attitudes to democratisation of science (see 
Table 7.8). These items were derived from the qualitative study, reported 
previously, by Small and Mallon (2006). The process used to extract suitable 
items from the interview data was the same as that described in Chapter 6 (Study 
1) used to derive items for the moral awareness and moral judgment instruments. 
The attitude to democratisation of science instrument used a 5-point Likert 
response scale (see Appendix 7.1). All democratisation items received responses 
across the full range (1-5). 
After reverse coding items D4, D5, D6, in order to give all items the same 
directionality, an exploratory PAF analysis with oblimin rotation and missing 
values listwise deleted was conducted on the six proposed items using the EFA 
data set. The KMO MSA statistic was .78, within an appropriate range for 
assumption of factorability (Coakes, Steed, & Dzidic, 2006). The KMO values of 
the individual items in the scale (data from the anti-image correlation matrix) for 
the democratisation items were all above .5, ranging from .74 to .85 indicating 
that all items are acceptable for inclusion in the instrument (Coakes, et al., 2006). 
Examination of eigenvalues and the scree plot (see Fig. 7.3) indicated a one factor 
solution with an eigenvalue of 2.57, accounting for 42.78% of the variance.  
 
Figure 7.3. Democratisation scree plot. 
Descriptive statistics and factor loadings (the correlation of the item with the 
factor) for the democratisation items are given in Table 7.8. Item D3 was the only 
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item that did not meet the factor loading requirement of .35.  Therefore, item D3 
was deleted from the scale. The EFA suggested a one factor model of 
democratisation comprising five items D1, D2, D4, D5 and D6.  
Table 7.8  
Democratisation Items: Factor Loadings and Descriptive Statistics 
a 
No Item 
Factor 
Loading 
M (SD) 95% CI
 
D1 The science community has a duty to 
consult and dialogue with the public 
regarding the directions of science. 
.50 4.02 (.83) [3.96, 4.08] 
D2 The public has a right to influence the 
amount of funding that is directed to 
different areas of research. 
.53 3.30 (.95) [3.23, 3.37] 
D3 Science should respect and act within the 
mores of society 
.31 3.98 (.84) [3.92, 4.04] 
D4
b
 The public lack the necessary scientific 
literacy to properly participate in setting 
the scientific research agenda. 
.71 3.54 (.97) [3.47, 3.61] 
D5
b
 Public participation in setting the research 
agenda should be limited to issues 
regarding culture, spirituality and ethics. 
.55 2.84 (1.04) [2.77, 2.92] 
D6
b
 Giving the public a significant public role 
in setting the science agenda will impede 
scientific progress. 
.73 3.43 (1.03) [3.35, 3.50] 
Note. EFA data set, n = 366. Extraction method: Principal axis factoring. 1 factor 
extracted, missing cases listwise deleted. Factor loadings > .34 are in boldface. CI = 
confidence interval. 
a
Descriptive statistics (M, SD, and 95% CI) are for whole sample (N = 722, listwise 
deletion of missing cases). 
b
For the factor analyses these items were reverse coded to 
maintain scale directionality. However, for item descriptive statistics (i.e., M, SD, CI), in 
the above table, these items have not been reverse coded so that the statistics remains 
consistent with the direction of the response scale: 1= strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = 
strongly agree. 
Confirmatory factor analysis was then conducted on this model.  The 
proposed one factor model performed very well on all the goodness-of-fit indices 
(see Table 7.9) including the chi-square statistic which had a p value larger than 
.05 (a non-significant chi-square statistic indicates that the model fits the data). 
The χ2/df ratio was close to 2 and the GFI, TLI, and CFI indices are all very close 
to 1 (within the recommended good fit values), and the RMR and RMSEA indices 
are both acceptable.  
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Table 7.9  
CFA Results for Democratisation Instrument (n=366) 
Model 
χ2
 
df χ2/df GFI TLI CFI RMR 
RMSEA 
[90% CI] 
One factor, 
5 items 
11.04 
(p = .051) 
5 2.21 .99 .97 .98 .03 
.06 
[.000, .104] 
 
Figure 7.4 presents the path model for the five-item democratisation 
instrument. Coefficient alpha for the five item democratisation scale was a 
reasonable .74 (for the entire data set, N=733). The five-item democratisation 
scale was used in the nomological network analysis. 
 
Figure 7.4. CFA path diagram for democratisation instrument. 
Commercialisation of science scale 
Nine items measured scientists‟ attitudes to commercialisation of science 
(see Table 7.10). These items were derived from the qualitative study reported by 
Small and Mallon (2006). The process used to extract suitable items from the 
interview data was the same as described in Chapter 6 (Study 1) to derive items 
for the awareness and judgment instruments. The attitude to commercialisation of 
science instrument used a 5-point Likert response scale. All items received 
responses across the full range. 
Using the EFA data set an exploratory PAF analysis, with oblimin rotation 
and missing values listwise deleted, was conducted on the nine proposed items. 
The KMO MSA statistic was .85, within an appropriate range for assumption of 
factorability. Measures of sampling adequacy (MSA – from the anti-image 
correlation matrix) for the commercialisation items were all above .5 ranging from 
.80 to .90 indicating that all items are acceptable for inclusion in the instrument.  
The analysis yielded two factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1. Factor 1 had 
an eigenvalue of 3.84 and accounted for 42.63% of the variance, while factor 2 
had an eigenvalue of 1.11 accounting for 12.28% of the variance.  
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Table 7.10.  
Commercialisation Items: Factor Loadings and Descriptive Statistics
a 
No. Item 
Factor 
loading
 M (SD) 95% CI 
C1 Commercialisation has had a 
positive effect on scientific 
progress. 
.75 
 
2.78 (1.06) 
 
[2.70, 2.85] 
C2
b
 Commercialisation inhibits the 
production of public good 
science 
.67 
 
3.58 (1.02) 
 
[3.50, 3.65] 
C3 Commercialisation increases 
transparency and public 
participation in science. 
.59 
 
2.46 (1.02) 
 
[2.39, 2.54] 
C4
b
 Commercialisation reduces 
public trust in science and 
scientists. 
.60 
 
3.52 (1.02) 
 
[3.44, 3.59] 
C5
b
 Commercialisation promotes the 
profit imperative at the expense 
of the precautionary principle. 
.48 
 
3.72 (.91) 
 
[3.65, 3.79] 
C6
b
 Commercialisation increases the 
probability of ethical misconduct 
by scientists. 
52 
 
3.23 (1.08) 
 
[3.15, 3.31] 
C7 Commercialisation enhances the 
free flow of scientific knowledge. 
.52 2.10 (1.12) [2.02, 2.19] 
C8
b
 Commercialisation has been 
detrimental to scientists‟ working 
conditions. 
.61 3.36 (1.05) [3.29, 3.44] 
C9 Commercialisation increases 
scientific innovation 
.60 2.85 (1.05) [2.77, 2.93] 
Notes. EFA data set (n = 366). Extraction method: Principal axis factoring, 1 factor 
extraction, missing cases listwise deleted, factor loadings > .34 are in boldface. CI = 
confidence interval. 
a
Descriptive statistics (M, SD and 95% CI) are for whole sample (N = 712, listwise 
deletion of missing values). 
b
For the factor analyses these items were reverse coded to 
maintain scale directionality. However, for item descriptive statistics (i.e., M, SD, CI), in 
the above table, these items have not been reverse coded so that the statistics remains 
consistent with the direction of the response scale: 1= strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = 
strongly agree.  
However, the scree plot suggested a single factor solution (see Figure 7.5). 
Therefore, a one factor forced extraction was also performed. The one factor 
extraction produced a factor matrix in which all items met the .35 loading 
criterion (see Table 7.10 above). 
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Figure 7.5. Commercialisation scree plot. 
Therefore, all 9 items were taken forward for testing and refinement using 
maximum likelihood CFA. The nine item scale performed adequately on four of 
the seven fit indices, but poorly on the other three. However, by deleting items 4, 
5 and 6, an improved six-item, single factor model was found. The values for all 
fit indices for this model represent an excellent fit, suggesting a unidimensional 
scale. The goodness-of-fit indices for this model are presented in Table 7.11.  
Table 7.11. 
CFA Results for Commercialisation Instrument (n = 366) 
Model χ2
 
df χ2/df GFI TLI CFI RMR 
RMSEA 
[90% CI] 
1 factor, 
6 items 
15.25 
(p = .08) 
9 1.7 .99 .98 .99 .03 
.04 
[.000, .080] 
 
Figure 7.6 presents the path model. Coefficient alpha for the whole sample 
was a healthy .80 for the six item single factor instrument. This instrument was 
used to represent the construct of attitude to commercialisation of science in the 
nomological network analysis. 
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Figure 7.6. CFA path diagram for commercialisation. 
Technological optimism scale 
Five items were proposed to measure scientists‟ degree of technological 
optimism. These items were proposed on the basis of the theoretical construct as 
discussed in the literature and reported in Chapter 3 of the current work. The 
attitude to technological optimism instrument used a 5-point Likert response scale 
(see Appendix 7.1). All technological optimism items received responses across 
the full range (1-5). 
Using the EFA data set an exploratory PAF analysis, with oblimin rotation 
and missing values listwise deleted, was conducted on the five proposed items.  
The KMO MSA was .64, just adequate for assumption of factorability. Measures 
of sampling adequacy (MSA – from the anti-image correlation matrix) for the 
technological optimism items were all above .5, ranging from .52 to .64, 
indicating that all items are acceptable for inclusion in the instrument. The 
analysis yielded two factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1. Factor 1 had an 
eigenvalue of 1.87 and accounted for 37.40% of the variance while factor 2 had an 
eigenvalue of 1.04 accounting for 20.76% of the variance.   
After oblimin rotation, the pattern matrix showed that item T5 (M = 1.56, 
95% CI [1.49, 1.62]) loaded very poorly on Factor 1 (-.01) and Factor 2 (.10), so 
this item was dropped from further analysis and the EFA rerun with items T1 to 
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T4. The KMO MSA statistic (.64) again indicated the correlation matrix was just 
adequate for assumption of factorability. This time a single factor was found with 
an eigenvalue of 1.86 accounting for 46.45% of the variance. The scree plot for 
the four items is presented in Figure 7.7. 
 
Figure 7.7. Technological optimism factor scree plot. 
Items T2 (factor loading = .41, M = 3.82, 95% CI [3.74, 3.89]), T3 (factor 
loading = .72, M = 3.04, [2.96, 3.13]) and item T4 (factor loading = .69, M = 3.04, 
95% CI [2.97, 3.12) reached the cut-off criterion, however, item T1 (factor 
loading .32, M = 2.13, 95% [2.05, 2.20]) did not reach the .35 criterion and was 
deleted from the scale. Thus, a three item model emerged from the EFA data set. 
Next, the 3 item technological optimism model was analysed using 
maximum likelihood CFA on the holdout sample. Goodness-of-fit indices for the 
technological optimism instrument are presented in Table 7.12. Clearly, the 
instrument does not perform well on most of these fit indices.  
Table 7.12. 
CFA Results for Technological Optimism Instrument (n = 366) 
Model χ2
 
df χ2/df GFI TLI CFI RMR 
RMSEA 
[90% CI] 
Model 1, 
1 factor 
15.2 
(p < .001) 
1 15.2 .97 .43 .81 .09 
.19 
[.118, .290] 
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The only index on which it performed well was the goodness-of-fit index 
(GFI). Figure 7.8 presents the path diagram for the technological optimism 
instrument. 
 
Figure 7.8. CFA path diagram for technological optimism instrument. 
As can be observed from the path diagram, all items reached the .35 
criterion. Further improvements in the scale were not possible. Coefficient alpha 
for the three item scale (.57) was calculated for the whole sample (N = 733). 
Clearly, this instrument has relatively poor psychometric properties. While many 
authors would consider reliabilities between .5 and .6 as unacceptably low, some 
authors (e.g., Armor, 1974; Nunnally, 1978; Schmitt, 1996) have claimed that 
reliabilities at this level are adequate for an early stage research instrument. 
Therefore, taking into account the above data it was decided to use the three item 
instrument for testing the nomological network. However, it must be noted that, 
due to its poor psychometric qualities, any hypotheses or relationships 
investigated must be considered provisional and treated with caution. 
Scientists’ attitudes to social responsibility scales 
Two measures of attitudes to scientific social responsibility were developed. 
The first, moral awareness, was designed to measure scientists‟ awareness of the 
social and moral responsibilities of science to society. The second, moral 
judgment, was designed to measure scientists‟ judgments regarding personal 
actions believed to enhance social and moral responsibility in research. Items for 
these instruments were developed in Study 1 (reported in Chapter 6). 
Awareness of science-society moral issues 
Ten items were proposed to measure this construct (see Table 7.13). 
Additionally, because item D3, „science should respect and act within the mores 
of society‟ (which was deleted from the democratisation scale), has a conceptual 
similarity to the awareness construct, it was included in this analysis, making a 
total of 11 items. The awareness of responsibility of science to society instrument 
Tech Op
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TechOp2
.32
TechOp3
.22
TechOp4
.48
.47
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t3
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.56
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used a 5-point Likert response scale. All awareness items received responses 
across the full range (1-5).  
First, using the EFA data set, an exploratory PAF analysis with missing 
values listwise deleted and oblimin rotation was conducted on the 11 items. The 
KMO statistic was .74, within an appropriate range for assumption of 
factorability. Measures of sampling adequacy (MSA – from the anti-image 
correlation matrix) for the awareness items were all above .5 ranging from .63 to 
.86 indicating that all items are acceptable for inclusion in the analysis.  
The analysis yielded three factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1. Factor 
1 had an eigenvalue of 2.90, accounting for 26.36% of the variance and Factor 2 
had an eigenvalue of 1.31, accounting for 11.94% of the variance, while Factor 3 
had an eigenvalue of 1.14 accounting for 10.37% of the variance.  However, 
examination of the scree plot (see Figure 7.9) suggested a one factor solution.  
 
Figure 7.9. Awareness scree plot. 
When the factor structure is ambiguous, as in this case, some authors (e.g., 
Costello & Osborne, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996) recommend running the 
EFA with a range of factors extracted and opting for the extraction giving the 
most interpretable results. Therefore, both a one factor and a two factor extraction 
were also performed. As the second factor only loaded moderately on two items, 
the one factor extraction was adopted. The factor matrix showed that items A1 
and A7 did not meet the loading criterion of .35 and these items were deleted from 
further analysis and the single factor EFA extraction rerun (see Table 7.13).  
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Table 7.13.  
Awareness Instrument: Factor Loadings and Descriptive Statistics
 a 
No Item 
Factor 
loading
 M (SD) 95% CI
 
D3 Science should respect and act within 
the mores of society. 
.43 3.97 (.84) [3.91, 4.03] 
A1
b
 Science must sometimes push the 
boundaries of social and ethical 
acceptability in order to advance 
knowledge 
- 3.78 (.88) [3.71, 3.84] 
A2 The science community has a moral 
obligation to ensure that the products 
of scientific knowledge do not cause 
harm (e.g., to humans, animals, 
environment). 
.52 4.18 (.88) [4.11, 4.24] 
A3
b
 The science community cannot be 
held ethically responsible for the uses 
to which scientific discoveries are put. 
.48 3.19 (1.12) [3.11, 3.28] 
A4 The more powerful a technology is the 
more important the evaluation of its 
ethical and social implications 
becomes. 
.59 4.04 (.81) [3.98, 4.10] 
A5 The more powerful a technology is the 
more relevant the precautionary 
principle becomes. 
.59 3.93 (.86) [3.87, 4.00] 
A6 There are some fields of knowledge so 
potentially dangerous that they should 
not be researched 
.36 2.72 (1.12) [2.64, 2.80] 
A7
b 
Science is the value-free pursuit of 
true knowledge 
- 3.08 (1.14) [3.00, 3.17] 
A8 Ethical training should be an integral 
part of scientific training 
.52 3.92 (.81) [3.86, 3.97] 
A9  The benefits of science and 
technology should be distributed 
throughout society in a fair and 
equitable way 
.39 3.93 (.82) [3.87, 4.00] 
A10
b
 There is no ethical imperative for 
science to „do good‟. 
.44 2.60 (1.03) [2.53, 2.68] 
Notes. Items A1 and A7 deleted from EFA. EFA data set n = 366, extraction method: 
principal axis factoring, missing cases listwise deleted. Factor loadings > .34 are in 
boldface. CI = confidence interval. 
a
Descriptive statistics (M, SD and 95% CI) are for whole sample (N = 706, listwise 
deletion of missing cases). 
b
For the factor analyses these items were reverse coded to 
maintain scale directionality. However, for item descriptive statistics (i.e., M, SD, CI), in 
the above table, these items have not been reverse coded so that the statistics remains 
consistent with the direction of the response scale: 1= strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = 
strongly agree. 
This time factor loadings ranged from .36 to .59, suggesting a nine item 
single factor model. This model was tested using CFA on the holdout sample. The 
model was a poor fit with several items not meeting the .35 cut-off criterion. 
However, rerunning the analysis with item A5 deleted produced an eight item 
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single factor model with excellent goodness-of-fit indices with all items meeting 
the .35 criterion. Table 7.14 presents goodness-of-fit indices for this model. 
Table 7.14  
CFA Results for Awareness Instrument (n = 366) 
Model χ2
 
df χ2/df GFI TLI CFI RMR 
RMSEA 
[90% CI] 
8 items, 
1 factor 
25.54 
(p = .18) 
20 1.27 .98 .97 .97 .03 
.03 
[.000, .056] 
 
Figure 7.10 shows the path diagram for the eight item single factor model. 
As is apparent from the squared correlations in the path diagram (Figure 7.10), the 
factor only explains a small percentage of the variance of each of the items (range 
= .14 to .28, mean = .20), thus, by far the majority of the variance in each item 
remains unexplained. 
 
Figure 7.10. CFA path diagram for awareness instrument. 
This suggests that the scale taps into a broad construct regarding the 
awareness of need for social responsibility in research (perhaps helping to explain 
the relatively low coefficient alpha). Coefficient alpha for the 8 item instrument 
(.67) was calculated for the whole sample (N = 733). Although coefficient alpha 
for the awareness scale is not high, it is in the acceptable range for an early stage 
research instrument.  
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Judgment regarding personal responsibilities  
Ten items were proposed to measure this construct (see Table 7.15). The 
instrument consisted of a question: How important are the following principles to 
you as a scientist living and working within society? The ten statements had a 5-
point response scale (1 = Not important, 3 = Moderately important, 5 = Very 
important). All judgment items received responses across the full range (1-5). 
Exploratory PAF analysis was conducted on the EFA data set with missing 
values listwise deleted and oblimin rotation. The KMO statistic was .87, within an 
appropriate range for assumption of factorability. Measures of sampling adequacy 
ranged from .82 to .88, indicating all items were acceptable for inclusion. 
Although two factors had an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 (Factor 1 eigenvalue 
3.76, Factor 2 eigenvalue 1.15, accounting for 37.63% and 11.56% of the variance 
respectively), the scree plot (see Fig. 7.11) suggested a one factor solution.  
 
Figure 7.11. Judgement scree plot. 
Therefore, EFA PAF one and two factor extractions were conducted. 
However, as the one factor solution proved best in the CFA (and was more 
congruent with the scree plot interpretation) only this solution is discussed further. 
As Table 7.15 shows, all items loaded on to the factor above the .35 criterion 
(range: .45 to .71). These data suggested a viable one factor model. 
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Table 7.15.  
Judgement Instrument: Factor Loadings and Descriptive Statistics
a 
No Item 
Factor 
loadings
 M (SD) 95% CI
 
J1 To evaluate possible benefits against 
harms when deciding on research 
projects. 
.52 3.89 (.80) [3.83, 3.95] 
J2 To refrain from exaggerating the 
potential benefits or minimising the 
potential risks associated with research. 
.50 4.13 (.80) [4.07, 4.19] 
J3 To give the public clear guidance on the 
reliability and validity of scientific 
conclusions regarding potential benefits 
and risks. 
.56 4.27 (.70) [4.22, 4.32] 
J4 To refrain from conducting work in areas 
that you find morally questionable. .44 4.02 (.92) [3.95, 4.09] 
J5 To ensure that approval for research is 
gained from the appropriate ethical 
authorities. 
.48 4.11 (.92) [4.04, 4.18] 
J6 To ensure that the process and 
development of research complies with 
the precautionary principle. 
.49 3.69 (.89) [3.63, 3.76] 
J7 To become informed about what society 
finds acceptable or unacceptable in 
scientific research. 
.70 3.46 (.90) [3.40, 3.53] 
J8 To consider and dialogue with the public 
about the possible misuses to which 
knowledge gained from your research 
could be put. 
.70 3.44 (.94) [3.37, 3.51] 
J9 To participate in public debate and 
dialogue over contentious scientific 
issues. 
.60 3.61 (.97) [3.54, 3.68] 
J10 To put the good of society ahead of 
commercial profit. 
.52 4.10 (.87) [4.04, 4.17] 
Notes. EFA data set n = 366, extraction method: Principal axis factoring, missing cases 
listwise deleted. 1 factor was extracted. Factor loadings > .34 are in boldface. 
a
Descriptive statistics (M, SD and 95% CI) are for whole sample (N = 713, listwise 
deletion of missing cases). Response scale: 1 = not important, 3 = moderately important, 
5 = very important. 
Next, the ten item one factor model was tested and refined on the holdout 
CFA data set using maximum likelihood CFA. Initially, the model was a poor fit. 
Deletion of items J3, J8, and J9 produced a revised one factor model with 
reasonably good fit (see Table 7.16).  
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Table 7.16.  
CFA Results for Judgment Instrument (n=366) 
Model χ2
 
df χ2/df GFI TLI CFI RMR 
RMSEA 
[90% CI] 
7 items,  
1-factor  
31.82 
(p = .004) 
14 2.27 .98 .95 .97 .03 
.06 
[.032, .086] 
 
While the model has a significant chi-square statistics (p < .01), as 
previously noted this statistic is very sensitive to sample size. Hoelter‟s critical 
number for p < .01 is 335, less than the sample size of 366, suggesting that the 
descriptive goodness-of-fit indices are a better indication of fit than chi-square. 
All of the remaining fit indices indicate adequate to very good fit. The seven item 
instrument appears unidimensional.  
The path diagram for this model is displayed in Figure 7.12. 
 
Figure 7.12. CFA path diagram for judgment instrument. 
Next, coefficient alpha was calculated for the moral judgment instrument on 
the whole sample, returning a reasonable reliability value of .76. This model was 
used for analysis of the nomological network. It conforms to the intention of the 
research to develop relatively short scales that capture the broad construct of 
scientific social responsibility.  
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Summary of Research Instruments’ Properties 
Items for five new instruments have been proposed and then developed 
using EFA, and refined with CFA on a holdout sample. Reliability was assessed 
using coefficient alpha, a lower bound, reliability statistic. The first instrument, 
attitudes to the democratisation of science, is a five-item, single factor scale with 
excellent goodness-of-fit characteristics and a reasonable coefficient alpha of .74. 
The second instrument, attitudes to the commercialisation of science, is a seven-
item, single factor scale with excellent goodness-of-fit characteristics and a good 
coefficient alpha of .80.  
The third instrument, technological optimism, was a poor instrument 
comprised of three items. It performed poorly on most of the goodness-of-fit 
indices, although it met acceptable levels on the GFI index. However, its 
reliability was low (.57), even for an early stage research instrument. Caution is 
required regarding the use of this instrument. The fourth instrument was designed 
to measure scientists‟ awareness for the need for social responsibility in research. 
Eleven items were proposed and tested for this instrument. An eight item single 
factor solution was settled on with excellent goodness-of-fit characteristics 
Coefficient alpha was acceptable though relatively poor at .67. The fifth new 
instrument developed for the current work was designed to measure judgment 
regarding personal actions believed to enhance social responsibility of scientists 
conducting research (hereafter referred to as scientists’ moral judgement or 
judgment for brevity). Ten items were proposed to measure this construct. After 
EFA and CFA a seven item one factor solution with good to excellent goodness-
of-fit characteristics was settled on. Coefficient alpha for the instrument was 
reasonable at .76. 
Two existing instruments were also proposed as part of the nomological 
network: the Schwartz higher order value dimensions and a general attitude to GE 
instrument. These instruments were also subject to CFA analyses (over the entire 
sample as the scientists‟ sample was independent of the sample from which these 
instruments were developed). The factor structure and reliability of the four higher 
order Schwartz value dimensions (Schwartz, 1992) were examined for the sample. 
Three of the four higher order dimensions demonstrated good internal 
(convergent) and external (divergent) discriminant validity and had good 
reliability (coefficient alphas above .8). The higher order dimension self-
enhancement was problematic. One of its constituent subscales (achievement 
value type) loaded weakly on the relevant extracted factor and cross-loaded 
moderately on to the extracted factor representing openness to change. While 
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performing poorly on some goodness-of-fit indices, the four factor higher order 
model performed acceptably on the GFI, CFI and RMR indices. Nomological 
network results using the self-enhancement scale will need to be considered 
carefully in light of this result.  
Finally, an instrument developed by Small, Parminter and Fisher (2005), 
„general attitude to GE‟, which was used in this thesis as a concurrent criterion in 
the nomological network for the five new instruments, was tested for goodness-of-
fit and reliability. CFA analysis indicated that the scale performed best on a range 
of goodness-of-fit indices when the three subscales were treated as variables in a 
higher order general factor (Model 3). Model 3 performed excellently on four out 
of seven goodness-of-fit indices and had a good alpha coefficient of .83. Table 
7.17 presents descriptive statistics for the above instruments.  
Table 7.17 
Descriptive Statistics for Research Instruments 
Instrument 
No. 
Items 
N
a 
M SD 95% CI Alphab
 
Skew
c 
Democratisation
d 
5 726 3.10 .67 [3.05, 3.15] .74 .15 
Commercialisation
d 
7 726 2.54 .74 [2.49, 2.60] .80 .22* 
Technological optimism
d 
3 726 3.31 .78 [3.25, 3.36] .57 -.31* 
Awareness
d 
8 726 3.63 .51 [3.59, 3.66] .67 -.24* 
Judgement
e 
7 726 3.92 .56 [3.88, 3.96] .76 -.47* 
Self-transcendence
f 8 726 3.44 .67 [3.39, 3.49] .82 -.11 
Self-enhancement
f 
8 726 2.04 .66 [1.99, 2.09] .80 .21* 
Openness to change
f 
9 726 3.11 .70 [3.06, 3.16] .84 .00 
Conservation
f 
12 726 2.49 .73 [2.43, 2.54] .84 -.06 
General attitude to GE
g 
9 549 3.22 .77 [3.15, 3.28] .83 -.50* 
Notes. CI = confidence interval.  
a
Listwise deletion of missing values. 
bCronbach‟s coefficient alpha for each of the 
research instruments. 
c 
Std error of skewness = .09 for all except general attitude to GE 
scale which = .11, *skewness statistic more than twice std. error of skewness. 
d
Response 
scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = strongly agree. 
e
Response scale: 1 = not 
important, 3 = moderately important, 5 = very important. 
f
Response scale: -1 = opposed 
to my values, 0 = not important, 2 = moderately important, 4 = very important, 5 = of 
supreme importance (note that the mid-point of the scale is 2). 
g
Response scale: 1= 
strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = strongly agree, 6 = don’t know. Listwise deletion of 
missing values (including all cases where participants responded „don‟t know‟ to any of 
the 9 items) left a sample of n = 549 from the original sample N = 733. 
As can be seen from Table 7.17, the sample scientists had a mildly positive 
attitude to the democratisation of science, a strongly negative attitude to the 
commercialisation of science, and a moderately positive belief in technological 
optimism. They had a strong awareness of the need for social responsibility in 
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research (awareness scale) and a very strong positive attitude regarding personal 
behaviour to enhance social responsibility in research (judgment scale). The 
results also suggest that scientists had a moderately supportive attitude to GE. 
Their strongest value was self-transcendence and their weakest value was self-
enhancement.  This value structure is congruent with both Study 1 and 2 results 
which found that scientists were generally strongly supportive of the idea that 
science should „do public good.‟  
One potential problem previously noted is that the sample cannot be claimed 
to be representative of all New Zealand scientists (as the comparison with 
Sommer‟s survey showed; see Method section, this chapter), which casts doubt on 
the external validity of the instruments developed. Therefore, a further test of the 
five models and instruments developed using the two-step EFA-CFA process for 
scale development was carried out. Some authors (e.g., Bagozzi & Youjae, 1988; 
Costello & Osborne, 2005; Reise, et al., 2000) have recommended that 
psychometric scales should be tested on independent populations using CFA (note 
that the EFA and CFA subsamples used in the analyses above while being 
independent samples both come from the same underlying population, i.e., CRI 
scientists). If the goodness-of-fit is acceptable in different underlying populations 
then, according to these authors, this strengthens the case for generalisability of 
the scales and models. One easy way to split the sample to represent two different 
underlying populations is to divide it on the basis of gender to represent male 
scientists and female scientists. Therefore, for this analysis, the scientists‟ sample 
was split by gender into two independent samples (male n = 426, female n = 300) 
and for both samples the new instruments were tested for goodness-of-fit using 
CFA. Generally, the research instruments performed well on this additional test. 
For all the new instruments most of the fit indices were as good or nearly as good 
as in the CFA holdout cross-validation sample for both male and female samples 
(the technological optimism scale still performed poorly). The chi-square statistic 
was not usually as good in the male and female samples, nor was χ2/df. However, 
all of the other goodness-of-fit indices were either within the acceptable range or 
as good as the indices for these scales in the CFA holdout sample. Thus, despite 
problems with the sample‟s representativeness, this result helps strengthen the 
case for the generalisability and external validity of the new instruments.  
Another potential problem that can be observed from Table 7.17 is the non-
normality of some of the instruments as indicated by the skew statistics. Note that 
some of the instruments also had mild kurtosis, however, Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1996) claimed that kurtosis is only a problem if sample sizes are less than 200. 
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Tabachnick and Fidell recommended transforming non-normally distributed 
variables “…in all situations unless there is some reason not too” (p. 82). Four of 
the new instruments and two of the existing instruments had skew statistics more 
than twice the standard error of skew. The concern is that non-normality may 
distort (attenuate) correlations between the instruments that comprise the 
nomological network. However, the skew statistics are relatively small and 
examination of the relevant histograms and normal Q-Q plots suggested that the 
instruments were relatively normally distributed. Tabachnick and Fidell noted that 
if the variables are skewed to about the same (moderate) extent, transformation 
may bring only marginal improvements. They also noted that transforming data 
may cause problems with interpretation of the results. Therefore, the decision was 
made to do the nomological network correlations with and without transformation 
and compare the results to determine if transformation was really necessary in the 
current case.   
The six skewed instruments were transformed as per Tabachnick and 
Fidell‟s (1996) recommendations. First, the four negatively skewed instruments 
(judgement, awareness, technological optimism and general attitude to GE) were 
reflected. Because all six instruments were only slightly to moderately skewed, as 
indicated by histograms and normal Q-Q plots, they were transformed using the 
square root function, as advised by Tabachnick and Fidell. Next, skewness 
statistics and plots were generated for the transformed variables. Five instruments 
improved with their skewness being reduced to less than twice their standard error 
of skewness, although little difference was noticed in their normal Q-Q plots. 
However, the self-enhancement value dimension became moderately negatively 
skewed, indicating transformation provided no advantage. The 39 correlations in 
the nomological network were calculated with the four transformed instruments 
and each correlation compared with the corresponding correlations in an 
untransformed nomological network correlation matrix. For 38 of the correlations 
the difference between the transformed and untransformed data was less than .01. 
For the 39th correlation the difference was less than .02. These negligible results 
indicated that transformation made no practical difference for the purposes of the 
current study. Therefore, transformation was considered as introducing 
unnecessary complexity and the data reported in the nomological network analysis 
are all untransformed. 
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Comparison of Scientists’ and Public Attitudes to GE 
As the global attitude to GE instrument was also administered to a sample of 
the New Zealand public (N = 860) at the same time (May 2005) as the scientists‟ 
survey was conducted (Small, 2005a), comparison was possible. As can be seen 
from Table 7.18, the public demonstrated a less positive attitude to GE than 
scientists on all the subscales and the combined general attitude to GE scale.  
Table 7.18.  
General Attitude to GE and Subscales: Public-Science Sample Comparison 
Scale 
Mean  Mean 
difference 
t df Sig.
a Cohen‟s db  
Scientists Public 
Intrinsic 3.55 2.78 .77 12.65 1155 .001 0.74 
Extrinsic 3.18 2.93 .25 4.48 1155 .001 0.27 
Trust 2.92 2.46 .46 8.77 1155 .001 0.51 
Att. to GE 3.22 2.72 .50 9.97 1155 .001 0.59 
Notes. Independent samples t-test, equal variances not assumed. Scientists‟ sample n = 
549, public sample n = 608, cases with missing values (including „don‟t know‟ responses) 
excluded from analysis. Response scale: 1= strongly disagree, 3 = neutral, 5 = strongly 
agree, 6 = don’t know. Coefficient alpha for general attitude to GE instrument was .87 for 
the public sample and .83 for the scientist sample (using 3 subscale means as scale 
variables in both cases). 
a
2-tailed test.  
bCohen‟s d = (science mean – public mean)/ SD Pooled, where SD Pooled = square root 
[(science SD squared + public SD squared)/2]  
Independent samples t-tests (equal variance not assumed: as Levine‟s test 
for equality of variance was significant [p ≤ .001] in all four cases) between the 
public and scientists on the three subscales and the general attitude to GE scale 
showed this difference was significant in all four cases at the p < .001 level (2-
tailed). Cohen‟s d, a measure of the effect size of the mean difference, (which is 
independent of sample size, unlike the t-test), is shown for the four cases in Table 
7.18. For Cohen‟s d statistic, 0.2 is considered a small effect size, 0.5 a medium 
effect size, and > 0.8 is considered a large effect size (Cohen, 1988).  
The mean difference effect size for the intrinsic values scale was the 
greatest, bordering on large at 0.74, indicating that this is a major source of 
difference in attitude to GE for scientists and the public. The smallest effect size 
difference was for the extrinsic belief scale (a small effect size at d = 0.27).  Of 
the three subscales this one was rated the most positive by the public. However, 
the public rated all three subscales negatively (i.e., significantly below the scale 
neutral midpoint of 3): intrinsic value 99% CI [2.66, 2.89]; extrinsic belief 95% 
CI [2.83, 3.00]; trust in responsible authorities 99% CI [2.35, 2.56]. Whereas 
scientists rated intrinsic value, 99% CI [3.44, 3.66], and extrinsic belief 99% CI 
[3.08, 3.28], positively, they rated trust in responsible authorities negatively, 99% 
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CI [2.83, 3.00]. Examination of Table 7.6 (p. 239) shows that, of the three items in 
the trust subscale, scientists were neutral regarding trust in regulators, quite 
positive regarding trust in scientists, but very negative regarding trust in 
companies. Whereas the New Zealand public held a negative general attitude to 
GE 99% CI [2.63, 2.81], scientists held a positive general attitude 99% CI [3.13, 
3.30]. 
Construct Validity: Nomological Network and Scales  
Hypotheses were proposed about the relationships between these five new 
constructs, the Schwartz higher order value dimensions and general attitude to 
genetic engineering. Altogether, 39 directional hypotheses were proposed (these 
hypotheses proposed 20 negative relationships and 19 positive relationships 
between the instruments- see Chapters 3, 4, and 5). Approximate effect sizes were 
predicted for 20 of the 39 hypotheses. These relationships form a nomological 
network which may be used to help infer the construct validity of the new 
instruments.  
Sample size, statistical power and precision of analysis 
All the hypotheses are directional. This means that 1-tailed significance tests 
of the correlations are appropriate.  All correlations in the nomological network, 
except those involving the general attitude to GE scale, had sample sizes between 
723 and 732. Correlations involving the general attitude to GE scale had sample 
sizes between 546 and 549. With a 1-tailed test and sample size of 723, a 
correlation as low as .07 will be significant at the .05 level; correlations larger 
than .12 will be significant at the .001 level. The statistical power to detect a 
significant (p < .05) correlation, as low as .07, is .59, to detect a small effect size 
correlation of .10 statistical power is .85, and to detect a small to medium 
correlation of .20 statistical power is .99.  
Therefore, the current research has a large enough sample size to just meet 
the generally recommended statistical power of .8 to .9 (Aron & Aron, 1999) for a 
small effect size such as correlations of .10 at the Type I error level of alpha 
equals .05. However, even a sample of 723 is less than optimal given that 
statistical power should ideally be .95 (Cohen, 1990). As most of the correlations 
in the current work were expected to be small or medium, this would require a 
sample size of about 1300 (at this number, the Type II error rate, beta, is .05, 
equal to the alpha error rate). With the current sample size the precision of the 
correlation statistic with alpha set at .05 is ± .07 (i.e., 95% confidence interval), 
with alpha set at .01 (i.e. 99% CI) it is ± .10, and with alpha set at .001 it is .12.  
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With 39 statistical tests conducted, the experimentwise (sometimes referred 
to as family wise) Type I error rate is greatly escalated (40 tests would by chance 
alone return 2 correlations significant at the .05 level). One method of correcting 
for Type I error due to multiple hypotheses tests is the Bonferroni procedure 
(Hochberg & Tamhane, 1987). However, the Bonferroni adjustment is 
problematic, as will be shown in the analysis of the nomological network results. 
Nevertheless, because of its popularity amongst the psychological community 
(however, cf. Cohen, 1990 for a critical perspective on the Bonferroni procedure), 
it was assumed to be a valid procedure. With this procedure, a new 
experimentwise alpha level is set by dividing .05 by the number of hypotheses 
being tested (i.e., 39). In the current case this sets a Bonferroni per–test 
significance criterion of .0013. Thus, using the Bonferroni adjustment, only 
correlations in the nomological network that have a p value of .001 or less are 
considered significant. With the current sample size only observed correlations 
greater than .12 can reach this level of significance. Actual p values and 95% 
confidence intervals for all hypotheses tested in the nomological network will be 
reported below, as is advised in the APA Publication Manual 6
th
 Edition 
(American Psychological Association, 2009). 
Correlations between the variables 
Correlations between all variables except the four Schwartz higher order 
value dimensions are bivariate. Schwartz (1992, p. 53) claimed that individuals 
and groups differ in “the ways in which they distribute their importance ratings 
across the rating scale” and that it was “desirable to control statistically for 
differences in scale use… when correlating value priorities with other variables.” 
In the case of correlations with other variables involving the higher order value 
indices, Schwartz (p. 53) recommended: “Analyses using these indexes should 
also be controlled for scale use differences by partialing out each individual‟s 
mean importance rating for the 56 single values.” As previously explained, 37 
single values were used in the current work. Therefore, the mean of these 37 value 
items was calculated for each individual and coded as a new variable in the SPSS 
data file. As recommended by Schwartz, all correlations reported for hypotheses 
involving the higher order value dimensions are partial correlations with this 
mean value controlled for. 
The correlation matrix for the research instruments is presented in Table 
7.19. Each correlation in the matrix is a test of one of the 39 hypotheses. All 
correlations above .06 are significant at p <.05, all correlations .10 and above are 
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significant at p < .01, and all correlations above .12 are significant at p < .001. For 
analysis of the nomological network only correlations .12 and above and which 
therefore meet the Bonferroni adjusted per-test significance criterion of .0013 will 
be considered significant. 
Table 7.19 
Correlations Between the Research Instruments 
  1 2 3 4 5 10 
1 Democratisation       
2 Commercialisation -.15      
3 Awareness .30 -.08     
4 Judgment .31 -.14 .55    
5 Tech optimism -.15 .21 -.19 -.08   
6 Self-transcendencea
 
.29 -.27 .36 .42 -.21
 
-.20 
7 Self-enhancementa
 
-.17 .24 -.26 -.32 .20 .23 
8 Opennessa
 
-.02 -.04 -.20 -.10 .06 .13 
9 Conservationa
 
-.08 .07 .09 -.01 -.04
 
-.12 
10 General Att. to GE -.30 .21 -.40 -.28 .39  
Notes: 1-tailed Pearson correlations. All correlations greater than .06 are significant at p 
≤.05. All correlations .10 and above are significant at p < .01. All correlations greater 
than .12 are significant at p < .001. Missing values pairwise deleted, N ranges from 723 to 
731, except for correlations with general attitude to GE for which n ranges from 546-549 
(cases with „don‟t know‟ responses deleted – see Method section: General Attitude to 
Genetic Engineering).  
a
 Partial correlations as recommended by Schwartz (1992).  
Evidence is provided for construct validity of the instruments and for the 
theory (i.e., the nomological network of relationships) if the hypothesised 
relationships are found to be significant and in the right direction (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955). The greater number of statistically significant hypotheses, in the 
right direction, the greater the confidence in the construct validity of the 
instruments, and the theory relating the constructs. However, note that for 
providing evidence for the nomological network, it is not the size of the 
correlation that is the crucial issue. Rather, even low, effectively non-substantial, 
correlations can provide evidence for support of the network and hence validity of 
the instruments and theory (Smith, 2005a; Westen & Rosenthal, 2003).  
Indeed, the prediction of no relationship between instruments may also 
provide evidence for construct validity by demonstrating the instrument has 
discriminant validity: that is, it does not correlate with instruments that measure 
constructs for which either theory or empirical evidence suggests no relationship 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Smith, 2005a; Westen & Rosenthal, 2003). If from 
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theory (or previous empirical research) one can accurately predict the strength 
(i.e., small, medium, large) of the relationships in the nomological network, then 
the construct validity of both the instruments and the theory is enhanced (Meehl, 
1978, 1990; Smith, 2005a; Westen & Rosenthal, 2003). If precise predictions of 
effect size are hypothesised, these can be compared with the observed 
correlations. For such cases, Westen and Rosenthal proposed a correlation statistic 
to measure construct validity. Their construct validity coefficient is based on 
contrast analysis and indicates “the extent to which the observed pattern of 
correlations in a convergent-discriminant validity matrix matches the theoretically 
predicted pattern of correlations” (Westen & Rosenthal, 2003, p. 608). 
Results of the nomological network hypotheses tests 
Hypothesis 1.  There will be a small to medium negative correlation 
between technological optimism and scientists’ awareness of the need for social 
responsibility in scientific research and development.  The correlation between 
technological optimism and awareness was -.19 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.26, -.12]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 1 was supported at the 
Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. Slight previous empirical evidence suggested a 
small to medium size correlation between these two constructs. The observed 
relationship was small. 
Hypothesis 2. There will be a small to medium negative correlation between 
technological optimism and scientists’ judgments of the importance of specific 
personal behaviours to enhance social responsibility in scientific research and 
development. The correlation between technological optimism and judgment was -
.08 (p = .02), 95% CI [.01, .15]. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
and Hypothesis 2 was not supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001.  
Slight previous empirical evidence suggested a small to medium size correlation 
between these two constructs. The observed relationship was small. This result 
suggests that technological optimism and judgments about socially responsible 
behaviours in research are only very slightly related constructs. 
Hypothesis 3. There will be a large positive correlation between awareness 
of the need for social responsibility in scientific research and judgments of the 
importance of specific personal behaviours to enhance social responsibility in 
scientific research and development. The correlation between awareness and 
judgment was .55 (p < .001, 95% CI [.50, .60]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected and Hypothesis 3 was supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. 
As predicted by conceptual considerations, the correlation was large. 
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Hypothesis 4. There will be a small negative correlation between the higher 
order value dimension, openness to change, and scientists’ awareness of the need 
for social responsibility in scientific research and development. The correlation 
between openness to change and awareness is -.20 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.27, -.13]. 
This result was significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and 
Hypothesis 4 was supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. This result is 
similar in size (i.e., small), but differs from the non-significant results of Fritzche 
and Oz (2007) and Beckmann et al. (1997), reported in Chapter 3, in that it is 
significant. However, both of those studies lacked adequate statistical power to 
detect a small correlation at conventionally acceptable levels. As expected from 
previous empirical research, the correlation was a small effect size. 
Hypothesis 5.  There will be a small negative correlation between the 
higher order value dimension, openness to change, and scientists’ judgments of 
the importance of specific personal behaviours to enhance social responsibility in 
scientific research and development. The correlation between openness to change 
and judgment was -.10 (p = .005), 95% CI [-.17, -.03]. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected and Hypothesis 5 was not supported at the 
Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. This result, although non-significant was 
similar in effect size to the non-significant (.05 level) results of the underpowered  
Fritzche and Oz (2007) and Beckmann et al. (1997) studies reported in Chapter 3. 
As expected from previous empirical research, the correlation was small. 
Hypothesis 6. There will be a positive correlation between the higher order 
value dimension, openness to change, and the construct of technological 
optimism. The correlation between openness to change and technological 
optimism was .06 (p =.05), 95% CI [-.01, .14]. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected and Hypothesis 6 was not supported at the Bonferroni adjusted 
level of .001. No previous empirical evidence was available to make a prediction 
regarding the size of the effect. The relationship between technological optimism 
and openness to change is so small that the constructs appear almost unrelated. 
Hypothesis 7. There will be a small positive correlation between the higher 
order value dimension, conservation, and scientists’ awareness of the need for 
social responsibility in scientific research and development. The correlation 
between conservation and awareness was .09 (p = .01), 95% CI [.02, .16]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and Hypothesis 7 was not 
supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. Recall that the conceptual and 
empirical evidence was mixed regarding the direction of this hypothesis and a 
small correlation was expected (see Chapter 3, p. 78). 
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Hypothesis 8. There will be a small positive correlation between the higher 
order value dimension, conservation, and scientists’ judgments of the importance 
of specific personal behaviours to enhance social responsibility in scientific 
research and development. The correlation between conservation and judgment 
was -.01 (p = .37), 95% CI [-.08, .06]. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected and Hypothesis 8 was not supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of 
.001 (note although tiny, the correlation was not in the predicted direction). Recall 
that the conceptual and empirical evidence was mixed regarding the direction of 
this hypothesis and a small correlation was expected (see Chapter 3, pp. 78-79). 
This result suggests that conservation and judgment regarding social 
responsibility are almost completely unrelated to one another.  
Hypothesis 9. There will be a small positive correlation between the higher 
order value dimension, conservation, and scientists’ attitudes to technological 
optimism. The correlation between conservation and technological optimism was -
.04 (p = .15), 95% CI [-.11, .03].  Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected and Hypothesis 9 was not supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of 
.001 (note that the correlation was not in the predicted direction). However, there 
were conflicting conceptual arguments about this hypothesis and any relationship 
was expected to be small (see Chapter 3, p. 79). This result suggests that 
conservation and technological optimism are almost completely unrelated to one 
another. 
Hypothesis 10. There will be a medium size positive correlation between the 
higher order value dimension, self-transcendence, and scientists’ awareness of 
the need for social responsibility in scientific research and development. The 
correlation between self-transcendence and awareness was .36 (p <.001), 95% CI 
[.29, .42]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 10 was 
supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. As expected from past 
empirical research, this correlation was a medium effect size (see Chapter 3, pp. 
79-80). 
Hypothesis 11. There will be a medium size positive correlation between the 
higher order value dimension, self-transcendence, and scientists’ judgments of the 
importance of specific personal behaviours to enhance social responsibility in 
scientific research and development. The correlation between self-transcendence 
and judgment was .42 (p < .001), 95% CI [.36, .49]. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected and Hypothesis 11 was supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of 
.001. As expected from past empirical research this correlation was a medium 
effect size (see Chapter 3, p. 80). 
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Hypothesis 12. There will be a small to medium size negative correlation 
between the higher order value dimension, self-transcendence, and scientists’ 
belief in technological optimism. The correlation between self-transcendence and 
technological optimism was -.21 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.28, -.14]. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 12 was supported at the Bonferroni 
adjusted level of .001. As expected from past empirical research, the effect size 
was in the small to medium range. 
Hypothesis 13. There will be a small to medium size negative correlation 
between the higher order value dimension, self-enhancement, and scientists’ 
awareness of the need for social responsibility in scientific research and 
development. The correlation between self-enhancement and awareness was -.26 
(p < .001), 95% CI [-.33, -.19].  Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and 
Hypothesis 13 was supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. As 
expected from past empirical research, the effect size was in the small to medium 
range. 
Hypothesis 14. There will be a small to medium size negative correlation 
between the higher order value dimension, self-enhancement, and scientists’ 
judgments of the importance of specific personal behaviours to enhance social 
responsibility in scientific research and development. The correlation between 
self-enhancement and judgment was -.32 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.38, -.25]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 14 was supported at 
the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. As expected from past empirical research, 
the effect size was in the small to medium range. 
Hypothesis 15.  There will be a positive correlation between the higher 
order value dimension, self-enhancement, and the construct of technological 
optimism.  The correlation between self-enhancement and technological optimism 
was .20 (p < .001), 95% CI [.13, .27]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected 
and Hypothesis 15 was supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level .001. No 
empirical evidence was available to make a prediction regarding the size of the 
effect. The observed relationship was a small effect size. 
Hypothesis 16. There will be a positive correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the democratisation of science and their awareness of the 
need for social responsibility in scientific research and development. The 
correlation between favourable attitudes to democratisation and awareness is .30 
(p < .001), 95% CI [.23, .36]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and 
Hypothesis 16 was supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. No 
previous empirical evidence regarding the likely effect size was found; hence no 
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prediction was made regarding the effect size. The observed relationship was a 
medium effect size. 
Hypothesis 17. There will be a positive correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the democratisation of science and their judgments of the 
importance of specific personal behaviours to enhance social responsibility in 
scientific research and development. The correlation between favourable attitudes 
to democratisation and judgment was .31 (p < .001), 95% CI [.24, .37]. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 17 was supported at the 
Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. No previous empirical evidence regarding the 
likely effect size was found; hence no prediction was made regarding the effect 
size. The observed relationship was a medium effect size. 
Hypothesis 18. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the democratisation of science and their belief in 
technological optimism. The correlation between favourable attitudes to 
democratisation and technological optimism was -.15 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.22, -
.08]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 18 was supported 
at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. No previous empirical evidence regarding 
the likely effect size was found; hence no prediction was made regarding the 
effect size. The observed relationship was a small effect size. 
Hypothesis 19. There will be a small negative correlation between 
scientists’ favourable attitude to the democratisation of science and the higher 
order value dimension openness to change. The correlation between favourable 
attitude to democratisation and openness to change was -.02 (p = .31), 95% CI [-
.09, .05]. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and Hypothesis 19 was 
not supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. Recall that there were 
competing conceptual arguments regarding whether this relationship would be 
positive or negative and no empirical data were available to suggest direction or 
size of the relationship (see Chapter 4, p. 104). Therefore, any relationship was 
hypothesised to be small. The observed correlation suggested that attitude to 
democratisation of science and openness to change are not substantively related to 
one another. 
Hypothesis 20. There will be a small negative correlation between 
scientists’ favourable attitude to the democratisation of science and the higher 
order value dimension of conservation. The correlation between favourable 
attitudes to democratisation and conservation is -.08 (p = .02), 95% CI [-.15, -.01]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and Hypothesis 20 was not 
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supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. On conceptual grounds, the 
relationship was expected to be a small effect size. 
Hypothesis 21. There will be a positive correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to democratisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension self-transcendence. The correlation between favourable attitudes to 
democratisation and self-transcendence was .29 (p < .001), 95% CI [.22, .36]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 21 was supported at 
the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. No prediction was made regarding the size 
of the relationship as no empirical evidence was found which suggested a likely 
effect size. The observed correlation represents a medium effect size. 
Hypothesis 22. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to democratisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension of self-enhancement. The correlation between favourable attitudes to 
democratisation and self-enhancement was -.17 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.24, -.10]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 22 was supported at 
the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. No prediction was made regarding the size 
of the relationship as no empirical evidence was found which suggested a likely 
effect size. The observed correlation represents a small effect size. 
Hypothesis 23. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and their awareness of the 
need for social responsibility in scientific research and development. The 
correlation between favourable attitudes to commercialisation and awareness was 
-.08 (p = .01), 95% CI [-.15, -.01]. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected and Hypothesis 23 was not supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of 
.001. No prediction was made regarding the size of the relationship as no 
empirical evidence was found which suggested a likely effect size. The observed 
correlation was a small effect size. 
Hypothesis 24. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and their judgments of the 
importance of specific behaviours to enhance social responsibility in scientific 
research and development. The correlation between favourable attitudes to 
commercialisation and judgment is -.14 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.21, -.07]. Therefore, 
the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 24 was supported at the 
Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. No prediction was made regarding the size of 
the relationship as no empirical evidence was found which suggested a likely 
effect size. The observed correlation was a small effect size. 
  
269 
 
Hypothesis 25. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and a favourable attitude 
to the democratisation of science. The correlation between favourable attitude to 
commercialisation and democratisation is -.15 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.22, -.08]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 25 was supported at 
the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. No prediction was made regarding the size 
of the relationship as no empirical evidence was found which suggested a likely 
effect size. The observed correlation was a small effect size. 
Hypothesis 26. There will be a medium size positive correlation between 
scientists’ favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and their belief 
in technological optimism. The correlation between favourable attitudes to 
commercialisation and technological optimism is .21 (p < .001), 95% CI [.14, 
.28]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 26 was supported 
at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. A medium size relationship was predicted 
from the slight available empirical evidence; the observed correlation was a small 
to medium effect size. 
Hypothesis 27. There will be a small positive correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension of openness to change. The correlation between favourable attitudes to 
commercialisation and openness to change was -.04 (p = .13), 95% CI [-.11, .03]. 
Not only was the result non-significant but the correlation sign was in the wrong 
direction. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected and Hypothesis 27 was not 
supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. However, recall that there was 
no previous empirical evidence found regarding this relationship, that there were 
contradictory conceptual arguments for the direction of the relationship, and that 
any relationship was predicted to be small (see Chapter 4, pp. 108-109). The result 
suggested that the constructs of attitude to commercialisation of science and 
openness to change are not substantively related to one another. 
Hypothesis 28. There will be a small positive correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension of conservation. The correlation between favourable attitudes to 
commercialisation and conservation was .07 (p = .04), 95% CI [.00, .14]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and Hypothesis 28 was not 
supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. Recall that there was no 
previous empirical research found about the relationship between these constructs, 
that there were contradictory conceptual arguments for the direction of the 
relationship, and that any relationship was predicted to be small (see Chapter 4, p. 
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109). The observed correlation is small suggesting that the relationship between 
the constructs is very slight. 
Hypothesis 29. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension self-transcendence. The correlation between favourable attitudes to 
commercialisation and self-transcendence was -.27 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.34, -.20]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 29 was supported at 
the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. No prediction was made concerning the 
effect size of the relationship as no previous empirical research was found 
regarding the relationship between the two constructs. The observed correlation 
was a small to medium effect size. 
Hypothesis 30. There will be a positive correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and the higher order value 
dimension self-enhancement. The correlation between favourable attitudes to 
commercialisation and self-enhancement is .24 (p <.001), 95% CI [.17, .31]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 30 was supported at 
the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. No prediction was made concerning the 
effect size of the relationship as no previous empirical research was found 
regarding the relationship between the two constructs. The observed correlation 
was a small effect size. 
Hypothesis 31. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
awareness of the need for social responsibility in scientific research and 
development and their favourable general moral attitude to genetic engineering. 
The correlation between awareness and general attitude to GE was -.40 (p < .001), 
95% CI [-.47, -.33]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 
31 was supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. As no previous 
empirical research was found which might indicate the strength of the effect size, 
no prediction was made in this respect. The observed correlation was a medium 
effect size. 
Hypothesis 32. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
judgments of the importance of specific personal behaviours to enhance social 
responsibility in scientific research and development and their favourable general 
moral attitude to genetic engineering. The correlation between judgment and 
general attitude to GE was -.28 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.36, -.20]. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 32 was supported at the Bonferroni 
adjusted level of .001. As no previous empirical research was found which might 
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indicate the strength of the effect size, no prediction was made in this respect. The 
observed correlation was a small to medium effect size. 
Hypothesis 33. There will be a positive correlation between scientists’ belief 
in technological optimism and their favourable general moral attitude to genetic 
engineering. The correlation between technological optimism and general attitude 
to GE was .39 (p < .001), 95% CI [.32, .46]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected and Hypothesis 33 was supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. 
As no previous empirical research was found which might indicate the strength of 
the effect size, no prediction was made in this respect. The observed correlation 
was a medium effect size. 
Hypothesis 34. There will be a positive correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science and favourable general 
moral attitude to genetic engineering. The correlation between commercialisation 
and general attitude to GE was .21 (p < .001), 95% CI [.13, .29]. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 34 was supported at the Bonferroni 
adjusted level of .001. As no previous empirical research was found which might 
indicate the strength of the effect size, no prediction was made in this respect. The 
observed correlation was a small to medium effect size. 
Hypothesis 35. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
favourable attitude to the democratisation of science and favourable general 
moral attitude to genetic engineering. The correlation between democratisation 
and general attitude to GE was -.30 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.37, -.22]. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 35 was supported at the Bonferroni 
adjusted level of .001. As no previous empirical research was found which might 
indicate the strength of the effect size, no prediction was made in this respect. The 
observed correlation was a medium effect size. 
Hypothesis 36. There will be a positive correlation between scientists’ 
scores on the higher order value dimension of openness to change and favourable 
general moral attitude to genetic engineering. The correlation between openness 
to change and general attitude to GE was .13 (p < .001), 95% CI [.05, .21]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 36 was supported at 
the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. As no previous empirical research was 
found which might indicate the strength of the effect size, no prediction was made 
in this respect. The observed correlation was a small effect size. 
Hypothesis 37. There will be a negative correlation between scientists’ 
scores on the higher order value dimension of conservation and favourable 
general moral attitude to genetic engineering. The correlation between 
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conservation and general attitude to GE was -.12 (p = .003), 95% CI [-.20, -.04]. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and Hypothesis 37 was not 
supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. As no previous empirical 
research was found which might indicate the strength of the effect size, no 
prediction was made in this respect. The observed correlation was a small effect 
size. 
Hypothesis 38. There will be a small to medium size positive correlation 
between scientists’ scores on the higher order value dimension of self-
enhancement and favourable general moral attitude to genetic engineering. The 
correlation between self-enhancement and general attitude to GE was .23 (p < 
.001), 95% CI [.15, .31]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and 
Hypothesis 38 was supported at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. From the 
slight previous empirical data, a small to medium effect size relationship was 
predicted. The observed correlation was in the small to medium effect size range. 
Hypothesis 39. There will be a small negative correlation between 
scientists’ scores on the higher order value dimension of self-transcendence and 
favourable general moral attitude to genetic engineering. The correlation between 
self-transcendence and general attitude to GE was -.20 (p < .001), 95% CI [-.28, -
.12]. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected and Hypothesis 39 was supported 
at the Bonferroni adjusted level of .001. From the slight previous empirical data, a 
small effect size relationship was predicted. The observed correlation was a small 
effect size. 
Interpreting the results of the nomological network analysis 
Altogether, 27 of the 39 directional hypotheses comprising the nomological 
network were significant at the Bonferroni adjusted level of p < .001, all of these 
significant correlations were in the hypothesised direction. Thirty one of the 
hypotheses were supported at the p < .01 level (in the right direction) and 34 at 
level of p < .05 (in the right direction). With 39 statistical tests conducted, the 
experimentwise Type I error rate when alpha is .05 is expected to produce two 
false positive hypotheses. From the above analysis, a problem with the Bonferroni 
adjustment is immediately apparent, in regard to the nomological network 
analysis. In order to avoid just two false positive hypotheses at the .05 level, the 
Bonferroni adjustment eliminated seven hypotheses (34 - 27 =7) which would 
otherwise have been significant. Assuming that use of the Bonferroni procedure 
did actually eliminate the two real false positives, it also created five false 
negative results in the current analysis. Thus, while the Bonferroni adjustment 
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controls for Type I error, it does so at the expense of increasing Type II error, by 
getting rid of the smaller relationships, some of which are real. This problem with 
the Bonferroni procedure has been alluded to by Cohen (1990) and discussed by 
Silverstein (1986). 
If there is a large sample size this may not be a problem, particularly if the 
aim of the research design is to discover substantive relationships. However, the 
current research is designed to validate a nomological network. In this case, even 
small, non-substantive relationships can provide evidential support for the 
construct validity of the nomological network (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Meehl, 
1978, 1990; Smith, 2005a; Westen & Rosenthal, 2003), particularly if such results 
are suggested by previous empirical research. Application of the Bonferroni 
procedure needs to be accompanied by logical analysis of the statistical meaning 
of results in relation to the research design and the question under analysis. In the 
current nomological network, many of the relationships were hypothesised to be 
small. There were six observed correlations of .07 or less. Recall that for 
correlations this small, with the current sample, statistical power at the .05 level 
was only .59. Therefore, by chance two of these six non-significant relationships 
are likely to be false negatives. Thus, for a nomological network analysis (with 
individual hypothesis alphas set at .05) the two false positives and two false 
negatives effectively cancel each other out. This reasoning suggests that out of the 
39 hypotheses 34 would truly be significant (free of experimentwise multiple test 
error). 
Use of the Bonferroni procedure to eliminate the experimentwise multiple 
test problem means that the current study lacks adequate statistical power to find 
significance for any relationship less than .12. As previously noted, an adequate 
sample size for the nomological network analysis would be about N = 1300, with 
a sample of this size the Bonferroni adjustment would no longer be problematic. 
Use of the Bonferroni adjustment, in the current case, makes for a conservative 
analysis of the nomological network. It also obscures some small but true 
relationships. Of the 12 non-significant relationships (using the Bonferroni 
procedure i.e. p > .001) in the nomological network the only way to determine 
which seven are true and which five are false is to repeat the study with 
independent samples (Simes, 1986), preferably a number of times. 
Of the 39 hypotheses, predictions of the likely effect size, based on previous 
empirical results or theoretical considerations, were made for 20 hypotheses. 
However, the author was not bold enough to predict point estimates on the basis 
of the often slight available empirical evidence, and therefore used Cohen‟s 
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(1988) conventions of small, medium and large. Of these 20 effect size 
predictions, 17 were in the predicted range. Correct prediction of effect size 
(based on previous literature) enhances confidence in the nomological network 
(Meehl, 1978, 1990; Smith, 2005a; Westen & Rosenthal, 2003), confirms 
previous research, and anchors the current research results in the extant theory and 
literature. When there is no extant literature regarding the relationship between 
two constructs, effect size may sometimes be predicted (guessed at) on theoretical 
grounds, but often, as was the case for a number of hypotheses (19) in the current 
work, it is difficult or impossible to specify a likely effect size for the relationship. 
How conclusive are the results of the nomological network analysis? First, 
let us consider prediction of the sign of the correlations. An analogy may be 
drawn between predicting the direction of a correlation and tossing a coin. For 
each correlation or coin toss there are two possibilities, so the chances of any 
single correct prediction are .5 (assuming zero, and non-significant correlation are 
coded as wrongly called coin tosses). Thus, using the stringent Bonferroni 
adjusted data, the nomological network results, if occurring by chance, would be 
like predicting 27 correct independent coin tosses out of 39. Applying the 
binomial theorem, the probability of this occurring by chance is p = .0119
3
, 
providing a moderate degree of confidence for the construct validity of the 
nomological network. (As a comparison, if alpha had been set at .05 instead of the 
Bonferroni adjusted .001, the probability of predicting 34 correct directional 
relations out of 39 would be 1 in 823,000). 
One other rough test may also be applied. This test considers the degree of 
accuracy of the predicted pattern of effect sizes. This is one of Westen and 
Rosenthal‟s (2003) construct validity coefficients. In this case the test is rough, 
because point estimates for the correlations were not specified in the hypotheses. 
Rather the relationships were predicted to be small, small to medium, medium or 
large. Also, due to lack of a good reason for doing so, no predictions were made 
regarding effect size for 19 of the 39 hypotheses. For the purpose of this analysis 
Cohen‟s (1988) standard effect size conventions were used (a small correlation is 
.1, a medium correlation is .3, and a large correlation is .5). A small-to-medium 
correlation was, admittedly somewhat arbitrarily, assigned a value of .25 for this 
analysis. These values are used as the predicted point estimate effect sizes for 
calculating Westen and Rosenthal construct validity coefficient. As only 20 
hypotheses predicted effect size, this analysis only examines about half of the 
nomological network.  
                                                 
3
 I am indebited to Dr. Paul Shortland for calculating this probability. 
  
275 
 
Westen and Rosenthal‟s ralerting-CV validity coefficient is essentially the 
correlation between the predicted effect sizes and the observed effect sizes. Table 
7.20 presents the data required for calculating ralerting-CV.  
Table 7.20 
Predicted and Observed Correlations and Transformations for Calculating Westen and 
Rosenthal’s ralerting-CV 
Hypothesis 
no. 
Predicted 
correlation 
X 
Observed 
correlations 
Y 
Demeaned 
predicted X 
λs 
Zy 
h1 -.25 -.19 -.27 -0.19 
h2 -.25 -.08 -.27 -0.08 
h3 .5 .55 .48 0.62 
h4 -.1 -.2 -.12 -0.20 
h5 -.1 -.1 -.12 -0.10 
h7 .1 .09 .08 0.09 
h8 .1 -.01 .08 -0.01 
h9 .1 -.04 .08 -0.04 
h10 .3 .36 .28 0.38 
h11 .3 .42 .28 0.45 
h12 -.25 -.21 -.27 -0.21 
h13 -.25 -.26 -.27 -0.27 
h14 -.25 -.32 -.27 -0.33 
h19 -.1 -.02 -.12 -0.02 
h20 -.1 -.08 -.12 -0.08 
h26 .3 .21 .28 0.21 
h27 .1 -.04 .08 -0.04 
h28 .1 .07 .08 0.07 
h38 .25 .23 .23 0.23 
h39 -.1 -.2 -.12 -0.20 
M 0.02  0.0  
Notes.  Zy is the Fisher Z transformed observed correlation 
The validity coefficient, ralerting-CV, is the correlation between λs and Zys, 
where λ is the demeaned predicted correlation and Zy is the Fisher Z transformed 
observed correlation.. For the 20 predicted and observed correlations ralerting-CV = 
.93 (p < .001) 95% CI [.83, .97].  Note that Westen and Rosenthal (2003) advised 
using Fisher Z transformations of the observed rs (in order to improve normality), 
and demeaned lambdas of the predicted rs, before calculating the validity 
coefficient. Demeaned lambdas are calculated “by subtracting the mean predicted 
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value from each predicted value so that the sum of the „demeaned‟ predicted 
values is zero” (Westen & Rosenthal, 2003, p. 612). Westen and Rosenthal called 
this coefficient an “„alerting‟ correlation because it is a rough, readily 
interpretable index that can alert the researcher to possible trends of interest” (p. 
610). The ralerting-CV of .93 suggests that the predicted pattern of values provide an 
accurate portrayal of the pattern of correlations found for the 20 hypotheses for 
which effect sizes were predicted. This result suggested good construct validity 
for the half of the nomological network represented by these 20 hypotheses. 
Meehl (1978, 1990) called such predictions of effect sizes to test theories 
„risky tests of theories‟. He claimed that prediction of the expected effect sizes is 
much more informative than traditional nomological network construct validation. 
Discussing this concept, Smith (2005a, p. 399) stated the case as follows “if the 
outcome is close to predictions, one has demonstrated much stronger support for 
one‟s theory than if one had merely confirming a positive relationship between 
two variables”.  
Because the new instruments‟ reliabilities were generally moderate 
(coefficient alphas ranged from .57 to .80) the correlations between them were 
attenuated by the degree of unreliability of each measure. Thus, the true 
correlations between the underlying constructs will actually be higher than the 
observed ones (similar to the use of the Bonferroni adjustment, uncorrected 
instrument unreliability makes the nomological network analysis more 
conservative). Likewise, because some of the instruments have some degree of 
skewness towards their maximum or minimum values, the range of their 
dispersion is restricted at their upper or lower limit and therefore their correlations 
could also be attenuated for this reason. Attenuation of the correlation coefficient 
will be greater when both instruments are skewed. Instruments which 
demonstrated some skewness were commercialisation, awareness, judgment, and 
general attitude to GE. Visual examination of the scatter plots of the various 
instruments graphed against one another suggested that the relationships most 
likely to be attenuated by skewness in the instruments were between 
commercialisation and judgment and awareness and judgment. However, in the 
current case, as noted previously, transformation of the instruments made only 
tiny, insubstantial changes to correlations between the instruments, and was 
therefore, considered unnecessary for the nomological network analysis. 
Therefore, this potential source of correlation attenuation is not an issue in the 
current study. 
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Some of the correlations, although significant, represent relatively small 
effect sizes (i.e., .13 to .25), indicating that the relationships are not strong and 
that only a relatively small percent of the variance of one construct is explained by 
the related construct. However, weak relationships, such as these, are common in 
psychology (Aron & Aron, 1999), and as previously explained, even small 
relationships can provide supportive evidence for the validity of a nomological 
network by demonstrating the instrument has discriminant validity (Campbell & 
Fiske, 1959; Meehl, 1978, 1990; Smith, 2005a; Westen & Rosenthal, 2003). 
There were a few exceptions where correlations were medium or large.  One 
correlation was large (≥ .5) and 8 other correlations were medium (.30 ≤ r <.50) 
and a further 12 were small to medium (.20 ≤ r < .30). Eighteen correlations were 
small (0.0 ≤ r ≤ .20). The large correlation (.55) was between the moral awareness 
instrument and scientists‟ moral judgment instrument. This relationship was 
expected to be strong because they are both measures of social responsibility in 
science and psychologists and philosophers generally consider awareness of an 
ethical issue a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for ethical reasoning 
and judgment to occur.  
As predicted, a medium strength correlation was found between the higher 
order value dimension self-transcendence and judgement (.42) and between self-
transcendence and awareness (.36).  Self-transcendence has previously been found 
to be related to moral behaviour (Crilly, et al., 2008; Fritzsche & Oz, 2007; 
Helkama, et al., 2003; Lan, et al., 2008) and environmental concern (Beckmann, 
et al., 1997; Schultz & Zelezny, 1998, 1999; Stern, et al., 1995). Therefore, the 
current findings are consistent with and confirm previous empirical research. 
A medium sized negative correlation of -.40 was found between awareness 
of social responsibility and favourable attitude to GE, indicating that scientists 
who were more aware of the social and moral responsibilities of science to society 
were more likely to be concerned about the potential impacts of genetic 
engineering and have a conservative or more negative attitude regarding the 
technology. Similarly, judgment of the importance of personal actions designed to 
enhance social responsibility in research was also negatively related (r = -.28) to a 
favourable attitude to GE.  
As predicted, a medium sized negative correlation of -.32 was found 
between self-enhancement and judgment and -.26 between self-enhancement and 
awareness. Self-enhancement has previously been found to be negatively related 
to ethical decision-making (Fritzsche & Oz, 2007), negatively related to moral 
reasoning (Crilly, et al., 2008) and negatively related to moral sensitivity (Myyry 
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& Helkama, 2002). Self-enhancement was positively related to a favourable 
attitude to GE (.23). Previous empirical research has indicated that the value type 
of power (one of the two value types comprising self-enhancement) was 
positively related (r = .29) to favourable attitudes to GE food, while the value type 
of universalism (one of the two value types comprising self-transcendence) was 
negatively (though non-significantly) related (r = -.15) to favourable attitudes to 
GE food (Dreezens, et al., 2005). The lack of a statistically significant relationship 
between universalism and favourable attitude to GE food in the Dreezens et al. 
study is likely due to the study‟s lack of statistical power.  
The current research also asked three questions relevant to this issue.   
1. GE foods products are safe for human consumption (correlation with: 
universalism = -.17, p < .001; with self-transcendence = -.13, p < .001, 1-
tailed tests).   
2. I would feel good about eating food from GE plants (correlation with: 
universalism = -.21 p < .001; with self-transcendence = -.20, p < .001, 1-tailed 
tests).   
3. I would feel good about eating food from GE animals (correlation with: 
universalism = -.22, p < .001; with self-transcendence = -.22, p < .001, 1-
tailed tests).   
Thus, data from the current research not only supports Dreezens et al‟s. 
(2005) significant findings but also suggests that the non-significant negative 
relationship they found between universalism and attitude to GE food is actually a 
real relationship (see Chapter 5 for more details of the Dreezens et al‟s. study). 
Attitude to the democratisation of science had a medium size positive 
correlation with moral awareness (.30) and scientists‟ moral judgment (.31) and 
also with self-transcendence (.29), but a negative medium sized correlation with 
favourable attitude to GE (-.30). Small and Mallon (2006) found in their 
qualitative study that scientists considered some aspects of democratisation and 
commercialisation to be in conceptual opposition and, in a similar vein,  the 
current study found a negative correlation between these two constructs (r = -.15).  
A favourable attitude to the commercialisation of science was negatively 
correlated with moral judgment (r = -.14) and self-transcendence (r = -.27), but 
positively correlated with technological optimism (r = .24) and a favourable 
attitude to GE (r = .21). Technological optimism was positively correlated with a 
favourable attitudes to GE (r = .39) and to commercialisation of science (r = .21).  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter five new psychometric scales measuring aspects related to 
scientists‟ understanding and practice of social responsibility in research have 
been developed. Items for these instruments were derived from the qualitative 
Study 1 (Chapter 6). A two stage EFA – CFA process was used to develop and 
refine the scales and determine their degree of unidimensionality. Coefficient 
alpha was used to determine the scales reliabilities. Four of the new scales 
(democratisation of science, commercialisation of science, moral awareness and 
moral judgment) are unidimensional as indicated by a range of goodness-of-fit 
indices and have reasonable to good reliability. The fifth scale, technological 
optimism performed poorly on six out of seven goodness-of-fit indices (but 
performed adequately on the GFI) and also performed poorly in the reliability 
analysis (α = .57). This instrument must be considered with some caution, and 
future work is needed to improve it. However, it is worth noting that the 
technological optimism scale did perform as theoretically predicted in the 
nomological network. This provides some support that the scale does measure the 
intended construct.  
These new instruments were embedded in a nomological network for 
analysis of construct validity. Two existing instruments were also included in the 
nomological network of constructs. The first was the Schwartz Value Survey 
(consisting of four separate scales), an instrument extensively examined and used 
in extant psychological literature. The second, a relatively new instrument, 
measured general attitude to GE. This instrument was used as a concurrent 
criterion for testing the new instruments. These existing instruments were also 
checked for unidimensionality using CFA on the whole sample. The attitude to 
GE instrument performed very well on four out of seven goodness-of-fit indices. 
However, poor performance on the other three goodness-of-fit indices raised some 
questions regarding the scales unidimensionality. The Schwartz higher order value 
dimensions performed adequately on three out of seven goodness-of-fit indices 
and poorly on the other four. The results of this analysis raised questions 
regarding the unidimensionality of one of the higher order value dimensions (self-
enhancement). Therefore, some caution is required regarding the use of both of 
these existing instruments. However, these scales also performed very much as 
predicted in the nomological network analyses, lending some support to their 
construct validity. 
The nomological network consisted of 39 hypothesised relationships 
between the 10 scales. Two methods of testing the construct validity of the 
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nomological network (and hence the construct validity of the new instruments) 
were used. First, the direction (i.e., the sign) of the correlation between the 39 
hypothesised relationships was predicted and tested at the Bonferroni adjusted 
probability level of .001. Of the 27 significant relationships found, all were in the 
predicted direction. As previously noted, use of the Bonferroni adjustment 
provides a very conservative analysis of the nomological network relationships. 
Overall, this result provides reasonable support for the nomological network, even 
with the reservations expressed regarding the technological optimism, attitude to 
GE and self-enhancement scales. 
The second method of testing the construct validity of the nomological 
network was a concept promoted by Meehl (1978, 1990) called risky tests of 
theories which called for more precise predictions than just the direction of the 
relationship. This test requires that expected effect sizes are predicted for the 
intercorrelations in the nomological network. Comparisons can then be made 
between the hypothesised correlation effect size pattern and the observed pattern 
of correlation effect sizes. While this may be done by qualitatively examining the 
patterns, more recently Western and Rosenthal suggested a quantitative measure 
for the analysis. This involves the correlation of the predicted effect sizes with the 
observed effect sizes of the nomological network relationships. They proposed 
this measure as a construct validity coefficient. An inherent difficulty associated 
with this construct validity coefficient is that it is often difficult to predict the 
likely effect size if theory is poorly developed or there is no previous empirical 
evidence regarding a likely effect size.   
In the current study this was a relatively crude measure of the construct 
validity of the nomological network because effect size predictions could only be 
made for 20 of the 39 hypotheses. Also, the predictions of effect size were not 
point estimates but rather were in terms of the effect size conventions for 
correlations in the behavioural sciences (i.e., small, medium, and large). Of the 20 
effect sizes predicted 17 were clearly in the predicted size range. Westen and 
Rosenthal‟s construct validity coefficient for the 20 hypotheses was ralerting-CV = 
.93. Although this measurement must be cautiously considered given the 
limitations just expressed, nonetheless the results do appear promising for the 
construct validity of the nomological network and the scales used to measure its 
constructs. 
Furthermore, the pattern of intercorrelations amongst the instruments 
suggests they have discriminant and convergent validity. The high degree of 
confirmation of the empirically and conceptually developed theoretical 
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hypotheses implies a high degree of internal consistency in the nomological 
network. The results of the current work are also externally consistent with 
previous empirical findings regarding the same or similar constructs, as the 
number of correctly predicted effect sizes indicated. All things considered, these 
results provide excellent initial support for the proposed nomological network and 
help to infer construct validity to the new instruments.  
Of course, as discussed previously, demonstrating construct validity is an 
ongoing empirical process. Any one experiment or statistical study can only be 
considered as one confirmation (or disconfirmation) instance of the hypotheses or 
theories being proposed or tested. Replication, as noted by a number of scientists 
in Study 1 (Chapter 6), is the key to good science. Further study limitations and 
implications will be considered in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
Modern science and technology are giving humans increasing power and 
control over both nature and human destiny. The power of science and technology 
to impact Gaia is now so great that human use of the gifts of Prometheus pose 
potential existential threats to humanity and much of the rest of life on Earth 
(Bostrum, 2002). Suzuki (2010, p. 2) claimed: “We are so dazzled by our own 
inventiveness that we are blinded to the consequences of technology. We have 
very suddenly become a major planetary force.” We seem to be at a crucial 
crossroad in planetary and evolutionary history. The approaching existential crises 
(e.g., Brown, 2008; Flannery, 2009; Lubchenco, 1998; Meadows et al, 1992; 
Nobel Laureates, 2001; Raven, 2002; Suzuki, 2010; Wackernagel & Rees, 1996), 
rooted in humanity‟s development and use of science and technology (e.g., 
Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008), are real, and currently on an 
imminent path (as briefly catalogued in Chapter 1). Some experts believe that we 
have already passed the point of no return; that tipping points have been reached 
which will eventually see at least half to two-thirds of the planet unfit for human 
habitation (e.g., Lovelock, 2006; Sherwood & Huber, 2010). Others, such as the 
renowned environmentalists David Suzuki (2010) and Tim Flannery (2009) 
believe that, if we act immediately, both locally and globally, we may be able to 
mitigate some of the damage and preserve the bulk of the planet for future 
generations.  
Scientists are the creators and developers of science and technology. The 
role that they have played, and continue to play, in the development of the 
knowledge and capabilities which now enable humanity to create and actualise 
existential risk gives them an extra responsibility to society: to ensure the wise use 
of their discoveries and creations (Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Ziman, 1998, 2001). 
While a „technological fix‟ is by no means assured (Costanza, 1989; Daly, 1996; 
Huesemann, 2001; Krier & Gillette, 1985), it is certain that the problems that 
currently face Gaia will not be solved without science and technology. Scientists 
have an important role in bringing to public attention the nature of the crises and 
in the development of appropriate responses and appropriate sustainable solutions 
and technologies (e.g., Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Lubchenco, 1998; Luppicini, 
2008; Moor, 2005; Ziman, 1998). 
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Given the extraordinary circumstances that face us, and their existential 
quality, immediate global action is imperative (Flannery, 2009; Lovelock, 2006; 
Lubchenco, 1998; Nobel Laureates, 2001, 2007; Suzuki, 2010). Scientists are a 
key link in addressing this problem. They understand science and are in a 
favoured position to understand the implications and consequences of science and 
technology, and their potential application by humans. The application of 
scientific disciplines provides the only source of methodologically sound foresight 
about potential consequences and the future (Jonas, 1985).  
A number of scientists (e.g., Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2001; Cournand, 1977; 
Rotblat, 1999; Russell & Einstein, 1955; Sakharov, 1981; Ziman 1998) and 
philosophers of technology (e.g., Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008; 
Moor, 2005) have addressed the issue of the wider social responsibilities of 
science and scientists. However, as documented in earlier chapters, 1) empirical 
research into scientists‟ attitude to this important issue is almost non-existent 
(Hackett, 2002, McCormick, et al., 2009; Pimple, 2002; Prpic, 1998; Weil, 2002), 
and 2) there is no consensus as to exactly what the wider social responsibilities of 
science to society are (Pimple, 2002; Weil, 2002). Because of scientists‟ role in 
the production of knowledge and technology their attitudes and actions regarding 
scientific social responsibility will be important for addressing the potential 
existential crises  and for scientific foresighting of the social and moral 
implications of emerging Promethean technologies.  
Synthesis of Research Findings and Contribution to Literature 
The contribution of this thesis is to address these two little-researched issues 
through two distinct but interrelated studies. The first study used qualitative 
methodology to explore the concept domain of scientific social responsibility. 
This study helped to address what Pimple (2002, p.189) described as “the 
disturbing gap” regarding the lack of characterisation of this domain, The second 
study, using a quantitative approach, built upon the ontological and 
epistemological elements identified in Study 1 to develop psychometric measures 
for two theoretical constructs of social responsibility and three related constructs: 
attitude to democratisation of science, attitude to commercialisation of science 
and technological optimism. These measures provided insight into the sample 
scientists‟ attitudes, beliefs, and moral judgments regarding science, technology 
and society. Gene technology provided an example of a Promethean science in 
which the more abstract concept of social responsibility could be embedded and 
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respondents‟ attitudes, beliefs, values and latent moral and meta-ethical reasoning 
processes made more contextually concrete and overt. These values, beliefs, and 
reasoning processes were examined through the lens of the ethical theories 
reviewed in Chapter 3. It was found that philosophical moral theories are applied 
by scientists in reflective analysis of their science practice. 
Three primary conceptual themes regarding scientific social responsibility 
emerged from Study 1: doing public good; engagement with society; and 
compliance with laws, regulations, and societal and scientific mores. Each of 
these themes was explicated via a series of sub-themes and illustrated by 
extensive quotes from participants. These themes and sub-themes provide the 
beginnings of a framework for categorising and understanding the domain and the 
elements of scientific social responsibility. Although the framework is 
taxonomical in nature rather than causal, elements from within the domain 
framework are likely to be causally linked to each other. The framework provides 
a source of elements for further exploration and use in causal modelling of aspects 
of scientific social responsibility. 
Such a framework may be useful for a range of purposes. Scientific research 
organisations, looking to improve their social responsibility, may base strategies, 
activities and employee training programmes around elements of the framework. 
Scientists, interested in enhancing social responsibility in their own research 
work, may use the framework as a checklist to guide and help them practise 
socially responsible research. Educational institutes may use the framework as a 
component in the ethics education of scientists in training. Scientific societies may 
use the framework to help with the continuing development of ethical standards 
and for developing recommendations for members‟ practise and behaviour. 
Responsibilities difficult for individuals to implement could be managed and 
implemented by scientific societies. 
Study 1 explored the complexity of scientific social responsibility by 
revealing the conflicting values and beliefs that scientists expressed about science 
and their responsibilities to society, including both their optimism and enthusiasm 
for science and their reservations and concerns about how science is being used. 
Like the technoethicists (e.g., Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Luppicini, 2008), the 
ecologists (e.g., Bradshaw and Bekoff, 2001; Flannery, 2009; Lovelock, 2006; 
Suzuki, 2010), the physicians (e.g., Cournand, 1977; Shine, 1989; Physicians for 
Social Responsibility, n.d.), and the physicists (e.g., Abelson, 1970; Rotblat, 
1999; Sakarov, 1981, Ziman, 2001) reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4,  the scientists 
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in Study 1 expressed concern about the potential for social and ecological harm 
arising from the everyday use of technology (e.g., over-population, resource 
depletion, pollution, social inequity). Like a range of scholars and scientists whose 
views were discussed in the literature review (e.g., Bostrom, 2002; Carter, 1989; 
Katz, 2001; Nobel Laureates, 2001; Preston, 2010; Rees, 2003; Russell & Einstein 
1959; Small and Jollands, 2006) they also expressed concern regarding the 
potential use of new and emerging technologies as weapons, observing the „dual-
use‟ nature of many such technologies (Carter, 1989; Miller & Selgelid, 2007; 
Preston, 2010).  
As noted in the literature review, common to the fields of applied ethics 
most relevant to science and technological development (i.e., environmental 
ethics, bioethics and deep bioethics, and technoethics) are calls for an extended 
ethic of value concerned with the future of humankind, other creatures dependent 
on human power, and the dignity of nature (Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 
1983; Leopold, 2001; Naess, 1973; Potter & Whitehouse 1998)  and an extended 
ethic of responsibility of science to society (e.g., Bulger et al., 2002; Bunge, 1977; 
Jonas, 1985; Ziman 1998, 2001). Interviewees suggested a range of mechanisms 
for enhancing the social responsibility of science. Many of these mechanisms 
echoed ideas proposed by the scholars and scientists reviewed in earlier chapters. 
They included: the need for greater precaution in the development of science and 
technology (e.g., Costanza, 1989; Jonas, 1985; Krier & Gillette, 1985), the need 
for earlier and better engagement between science and society (e.g., Hackett, et 
al., 2008; House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology; Irwin, 
2008; Marris, 2001), the need for an increased focus on social responsibility by 
individual scientists (e.g., Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2001; Cournand, 1977; Jonas, 
1985; Rotblat, 1999; Sakarov, 1981; Ziman, 2001) and the need for scientific 
foresighting  (Jonas 1985; Slaughter, 2007).  
Through the mechanism of focussing on a particular Promethean 
technology, gene technologies, the moral reasoning and the latent meta-ethical 
positions of scientists were unveiled. Evidence was found in Study 1 for 
deontological (Kant, 1998), teleological (Hurstone, 2009), and virtue ethics 
(Aristotle, 1996) approaches to reasoning regarding the issue of scientific social 
responsibility and gene technologies. Attitudes regarding gene technologies also 
revealed latent meta-ethical beliefs of interviewees, including ethical relativism 
(Pojman, 1998a), moral objectivism (Ross, 1998), moral realism (Sayre-McCord, 
2009), moral absolutism (Kant, 1998), moral conventionalism (Pojman, 1998d), 
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and moral subjectivism (Nietzsche, 1998). Although public attitudes to gene 
technology and genetic engineering have received considerable research attention, 
little empirical research has been conducted on scientists‟ attitudes to these 
technologies. This thesis contributes knowledge regarding this issue, both from 
Study 1 and Study 2. Study 2 also contributes a comparison of scientists‟ attitudes 
to GE with those of the New Zealand public. 
From the statements scientists made regarding the domain of social 
responsibility, items were proposed as the content for two instruments to measure 
aspects of scientists‟ attitude to social responsibility. Items congruent with the 
first stage of Rest‟s (1979, 1986) model of moral behaviour (moral awareness) 
were selected for one instrument and items congruent with the second stage of 
Rest‟s model (moral judgment) were selected for the second instrument. The 
primary purpose of Study 2 was to develop these items into psychometrically 
robust instruments suitable for use in future research. 
Validity of the new instruments and the nomological network 
Study 2 administered the potential items for five new instruments to a 
sample of 733 scientists working at six New Zealand Crown Research Institutes. 
Two existing psychometric instruments were also administered in the research 
questionnaire: the Schwartz Values Survey (which incorporates four sub-scales) 
and an instrument to measure attitude to genetic engineering (a sub-field of gene 
technologies). Thirty-nine relationships between the five new instruments, the 
four sub-scales of the Schwartz Values Survey and the attitude to GE instrument 
were proposed on conceptual, theoretical and empirical grounds to form the 
beginnings of a testable nomological network about scientific social responsibility 
and its antecedent and consequent constructs. The relationships between each pair 
of constructs described in the nomological network were defined by hypotheses 
indicating the direction of their correlation and, in about half of the cases, their 
approximate strength (i.e., effect size).  
Each hypothesis tested (with the proviso of the test having adequate 
statistical power) makes a small contribution to knowledge either by 
demonstrating a new relationship (or lack of it) or by being a confirming or 
disconfirming instance of a relationship previously reported in the literature. As 
argued by the scientists in Study 1 (see Chapter 6, pp. 194-195) this is true 
irrespective of whether the results are positive (i.e., significant) or negative (non-
significant). The nomological network was proposed as a test of the construct 
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validity of the new measures and their theoretical relationships. A nomological 
network is an “interlocking system of laws which constitute a theory” (Cronbach 
& Meehl, 1955, p.290). The nomological network constitutes the beginnings of a 
new theory about scientific social responsibility – a further contribution of this 
work. Additionally, as there were no existing measures in the literature for the 
constructs comprising the nomological network, the new measures constitute new 
tools to examine the concept of scientific social responsibility.   
The network, characterised by the relationships between the constructs of 
democratisation of science, commercialisation of science, technological optimism, 
awareness of science‟s responsibility to society, judgment about personally 
responsible behaviour, and personal values, is in its early phase of development. It 
is still ill defined in respect of numerous other potentially relevant constructs 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Smith, 2005a, 2005b). The nomological network, 
proposed in Study 2 to test construct validity of the new instruments, is a small 
sub-set of the themes and sub-themes of the social responsibility domain 
framework developed in Study 1. Study 1 provides a rich resource of themes, sub-
themes and ideas that could be mined for future investigation as measurable 
constructs for the extension of the nomological network and continued analysis of 
its theoretical structure and causal relationships.  
In Study 2, as recommended by various methodological theorists for scale 
development (e.g., Smith et al., 2009; Reise, et al., 2000; Fabrigar, et al., 1999), 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were used to select items which 
formed easily interpretable, unidimensional and reliable measures. Single factor 
scales for four of the new measures showed good to excellent goodness-of-fit on a 
range of appropriate indices (indicating their unidimensionality) and reasonable to 
good reliability, as measured by coefficient alpha. The fifth instrument (which 
measured technological optimism) had a single factor which performed poorly on 
most fit indices but demonstrated acceptable goodness-of-fit on the GFI index; it 
also had a relatively poor coefficient alpha of .57. This instrument represented a 
potential weakness in the nomological network analysis: low reliability attenuates 
correlations and multidimensionality obscures causal relationships. However, the 
correlations between technological optimism and the other constructs in the 
network are not dissimilar to the correlations between the other constructs, and the 
relationships were either in the predicted direction and/or in the predicted effect 
size range. While the technological optimism instrument would clearly benefit 
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from further development in future work, it appears adequate for its current use as 
a construct in the current nomological network (Reise et al., 2000).  
There was a methodological concern about the unidimensionality of the 
self-enhancement higher order value dimension. Concerns were also flagged 
regarding the scale to measure attitude to GE, which performed well on four 
goodness-of-fit indices but not on three others. However, similar to the 
technological optimism instrument, the self-enhancement and the attitude to GE 
scales‟ relationships with other constructs were as theoretically predicted, again 
suggesting that the psychometric properties of these scales, although perhaps not 
ideal, were adequate for current purposes (Reise et al., 2000). 
The results of the hypotheses tests were encouraging; there was a high 
degree of correspondence between both the predicted direction and magnitude of 
the relationships in the nomological network and of the empirically observed 
pattern and size of correlations.  An estimate of the probability of the observed 
accuracy of the hypotheses of the correlations‟ directions occurring by chance was 
made using the binomial theorem: p = .0119. Because of the use of the Bonferroni 
procedure this is a very conservative estimate. Of the 20 hypotheses for which the 
effect size magnitude was predicted, the correlation between the predicted 
correlations and the observed correlations was a very high .93 (Westen & 
Rosenthal 2003), an admittedly rough validity coefficient measure covering only a 
subset of the nomological network (see Chapter 7). Despite some reservations 
about the validity of these latter two indicators, the results, taken as a whole, 
provide good support for the theoretical relationships depicted by the nomological 
network and the construct validity of the instruments. The research instruments 
provide considerable new information about the attitudes of the sample of 
scientists to the related issues of scientific social responsibility, the 
democratisation of science and the commercialisation of science.  
Democratisation of science  
In general, the scientists were in favour of the democratisation of science 
(see Table 7.17), believing that the public had a right to exercise some influence 
over the directions and agendas of science (see Table 7.8, item D2). This result is 
similar to the previously reported conclusion of Sommer (2010, p.24), that New 
Zealand scientists had an inclination for “citizen involvement over strict 
expertise.”  However, echoing the deficit theory of public understanding of 
science (Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Evans and Durant, 1995), they also expressed 
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reservations about the knowledge and ability of the public to understand science 
and its implications (see Table 7.8, item D4). They expressed concern regarding 
the potential of the practice of democratisation of science to impede scientific 
progress (see Table 7.8, item D6). These quantitative results support and reinforce 
the qualitative findings of Small and Mallon (2004, 2006) and Small (2005b) 
reported in Chapter 4. 
Commercialisation of science 
The scientists in the survey were generally apprehensive about the effects of 
the commercialisation of science (see Table 7.17), believing that it retards 
scientific progress, inhibits the production of public good science (Nowotny, et 
al., 2003; Krimsky, 2004), reduces scientific transparency, is detrimental to public 
trust in science and scientists (Eichelbaum, Allan, Fleming & Randerson, 2001; 
Polkinghorne, 2000), impairs the transfer of scientific knowledge, and decreases 
scientific innovation. Again, these quantitative results (see Table 7.10, C1, C2, 
C3, C4, C7, C9) support and confirm the qualitative findings of Small and Mallon 
(2004, 2006) reported in Chapter 4.  
Technological optimism 
Responses to the technological optimism instrument (as it currently stands), 
illustrated a moderate degree of technological optimism (Krier & Gillette, 1985) 
amongst the sample scientists (see Table 7.17). This result is consistent with 
previously reported research (National Science Board, 1977; Rollins, 1996; Ticky, 
2004). However, as previously noted, this scale is psychometrically weak and 
results must be treated as provisional, with further research required to make the 
instrument better and to check the results of analyses in which it was used. Initial 
observations from this scale indicate that scientists‟ concerns about technology 
were primarily centred on the likely consequences of human application of 
technologies, rather than the ability of science to generate appropriate solutions to 
human and environmental problems.  
Social responsibility 
Previously, no instruments were specifically designed to measure scientific 
social responsibility, nor was the construct of scientists‟ social responsibility well 
defined. The contribution of the current thesis has been to make a start at 
addressing both of these gaps in the literature. First, Study 1 developed a 
framework for the domain of scientific social responsibility. Second, Study 2 
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developed sound psychometric measures to investigate this domain. The data 
were obtained through the use of mixed-method, qualitative-quantitative research. 
The research and hypotheses were informed by and based on a detailed literature 
review with reference to, and integration with, normative and applied ethical 
theories from philosophy, psychological theories of moral behaviour and, where 
available, past empirical research.  
Good empirical support was found for the nomological network – indicating 
that it represents the beginnings of a theoretical model of scientific social 
responsibility. The 39 hypotheses comprising the nomological network referenced 
relevant theory and empirical findings (where these were available) as discussed 
and explicated in Chapters 3 and 4. Thus, there was a high level of integration 
with existing theory. For 20 of the hypotheses, past empirical findings led to the 
prediction of approximate effects sizes, Of these 20 hypotheses, 17 were found to 
be in the predicted range, providing strong evidence that the findings of the Study 
2 are consistent with previous empirical research. 
In some cases, relationships (with similar effect sizes in both the existing 
literature and the current work) which were reported as non-significant in 
previous literature (e.g., Beckmann, et al., 1997; Fritzsche and Oz, 2007), were 
shown to be significant in Study 2 (e.g., see hypothesis 4 & 5, p. 265). As 
previously explained, this difference was due to inadequate statistical power in the 
original research. Tight integration with theory and previous empirical research 
helps provide confidence in the data, the new instruments and the theoretical 
model.  
On the basis of Rest‟s (1976, 1983) theory about the psychological 
processes leading to moral behaviour, two instruments were developed to measure 
scientists‟ attitude to social responsibility. One measured respondents‟ awareness 
of the responsibility of science to society (moral awareness). The other measured 
their judgment of the importance of personal actions during the research process 
(moral judgment). Awareness or perception of a moral issue is stage 1 of Rest‟s 
(1979, 1986) theory of the four stages of moral behaviour. Judgment or decision-
making about what the morally correct actions are, when one is aware of a moral 
issue, is stage 2 of Rest‟s theory. 
Moral awareness instrument. As reported in Chapter 7, this eight item 
instrument is unidimensional with respectable CFA goodness-of-fit indices and 
reasonable reliability. This measure is designed to be congruent with the first 
stage of Rest‟s (1979, 1986) model of moral behaviour; all the items in the moral 
  
 
291 
 
awareness instrument are designed to measure to what degree the respondent is 
aware of the responsibility of science to society i.e. are they aware of, and do they 
believe that, science has a moral responsibility to society. The final version of the 
moral awareness instrument is below. 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements (5 point 
Likert scale: 1 = Strongly disagree to 5 = Strongly agree). 
 
1. Science should respect and act within the mores of society. 
2. The science community has a moral obligation to ensure that the products 
of scientific knowledge do not cause harm (e.g., to humans, animals, 
environment). 
3. The science community cannot be held ethically responsible for the uses to 
which scientific discoveries are put. 
4. The more powerful a technology is the more important the evaluation of 
its ethical and social implications becomes. 
5. There are some fields of knowledge so potentially dangerous that they 
should not be researched. 
6. Ethical training should be an integral part of scientific training. 
7. The benefits of science and technology should be distributed throughout 
society in a fair and equitable way. 
8. There is no ethical imperative for science to „do good‟. 
 
The moral awareness instrument indicated that scientists were moderately to 
strongly aware of the responsibility of science to society (see Table 7.17). On the 
basis of responses to a single item, Sommer (2010) made a similar conclusion in 
his study of New Zealand scientists. Very strong agreement was given to the 
propositions that: „the science community has a moral obligation to ensure that the 
products of scientific knowledge do not cause harm to humans, animals or the 
environment.‟ This confirms the finding in Study 1, where all the scientists 
interviewed believed there was a moral imperative to not cause harm. The 
statement: „the more powerful a technology is the more important the evaluation 
of its ethical and social implications becomes‟ also received very strong 
agreement (see Table 7.13 for means and 95% confidence intervals of scale 
items). Thus, the scientists participating in the survey tended to support the 
contentions of the technoethicists (Bunge, 1975; Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 1983; 
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Luppicini, 2008; Moor, 2005) reviewed in Chapter 3. As suggested by participants 
in Study 1, and argued on analytical grounds by Jonas (1985), one important 
social responsibility of scientists is to foresight the social, ecological and moral 
impacts of emerging technologies. 
The statement that „the benefits of science and technology should be 
distributed throughout society in a fair and equitable way‟ also received strong 
support. In contrast, but consistent with the above findings, the negatively worded 
statement „there is no ethical imperative for science to do good‟ received 
significant disagreement from the scientists (see Table 7.13, p. 251). These data 
indicated the sample scientists‟ awareness of moral issues related to science and 
technology and suggested a strong desire to use science and technology for the 
public good. In a similar vein, a study by Fisher, et al., (2005) indicated that one 
of the strongest motivations for going into a science career was an altruistic desire 
to use science for the betterment of society.  This observation is also consistent 
with the finding in the current research that the strongest of the scientists‟ 
Schwartz higher-order value dimensions was self-transcendence (see Table 7.17, 
p. 257). 
However, Study 2 (supporting and triangulating the findings of Study 1) 
also indicated there was ambivalence in scientists‟ attitude towards the 
responsibility of science to society. Although strongly agreeing that „science 
should respect and act within the mores of society‟, somewhat antithetically 
scientists also strongly agreed that „science must sometimes push the boundaries 
of social and ethical acceptability in order to advance knowledge‟ (note that this 
question was a proposed item that did not make it into the final scale).  Similarly, 
even though as noted before, they believed that powerful technologies require 
greater ethical and social evaluation, there was general disagreement that „there 
are some fields of knowledge so potentially dangerous that they should not be 
researched.‟ Additionally, there was positive, though weak, agreement that „the 
science community cannot be held responsible for the uses to which scientific 
discoveries are put.‟ 
These ambivalent attitudes might be interpreted as representing historical 
and current conflicts regarding the reality of the production of scientific 
knowledge in the 21
st
 Century and science‟s moral obligations to society 
(Hagedijk, 2001; Krimsky, 2004; Mirowski & Sent, 2008; Nowotny, et al., 2003; 
Olivieri, 2003; Ziman, 1994). These authors document the transition of science 
from a public good activity with high levels of academic freedom and a strong 
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focus on basic science, in which knowledge was considered a good in itself (i.e., 
knowledge is of intrinsic value), to a commercialised science environment with 
much greater restrictions on academic freedom and a focus on applied science to 
achieve commercial or political goals (i.e., knowledge is of extrinsic value).  
Historically, the chief reward for the contribution of scientific knowledge to 
humanity was fame and honour with a place in the history of science. Such 
attribution of credit has long been a scientific norm. Few scientists would not wish 
to receive some credit for the benefits to society that accrue from their 
discoveries. This helps explain the high importance placed by scientists in Study 1 
on the publication process, authorship issues and citation of the originators of 
ideas and discoveries. However, the flip side of praise and credit is accountability 
and responsibility. But, as history shows, and scientists in Study 1 noted, scientists 
often cannot control how their knowledge is used once it leaves their hands. 
Therefore, with some reason, they are reluctant to be held accountable for 
„misuse‟ of their discoveries and technologies, as indicated by Study 2.  
Scientists are becoming increasingly aware of the detrimental impacts of the 
application of science and technology on society and the environment (e.g., 
Bradshaw & Bekoff, 2001; Lubchenco, 1998; Nobel Laureates, 2001, 2007; 
Physicians for Social Responsibility, n.d.; Russell & Einstein, 1955). Historically, 
positive impacts tended to dominate the science discourse, but the rising 
existential crises are now placing a focus on negative impacts. As the creators of 
technological knowledge, generally scientists do feel some responsibility for its 
impacts. However, there is an asymmetry between the acceptance of credit for the 
production of knowledge used beneficially and the acceptance of accountability 
for production of knowledge used for harm.  
Nonetheless, perhaps because of the historical precedent of academic 
freedom and the historical knowledge that in some important past conflicts 
between science and the culture and mores of the day, science has been proven 
correct (Gribben, 2002; Silver, 1998: Small, 2004a, 2004b), scientists are still 
willing to challenge social and moral convention and to research fields of 
knowledge that have significant potential to be used for harmful ends. To be fair 
to scientists, asymmetry between credit and accountability for the production of 
knowledge may be unavoidable, particularly if, as is often the case, new 
technologies fall into the category of dual-use technologies (Carter, 1989; Miller 
& Selgelid, 2007; Preston, 2010). Nonetheless, it remains true that unless 
someone produced the knowledge in question it could not have been used for 
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harm. Scientists are a part of the causal chain in the production of both benefit and 
harm to Gaia.  
As the impacts of resource depletion and climate change become more 
pronounced, it is likely that scientists will become increasingly aware of the social 
responsibility of science to society. As noted above, scientists were keen to see 
the benefits of science and technology distributed more equitably throughout 
society, and perhaps one of the key issues in respect to equity and scientific social 
responsibility will be that of intergenerational justice and equity (Slaughter, 
2007). Two of the potential crises documented in Chapter 1, resource depletion 
and pollution (climate change is a result of carbon pollution), are clearly issues of 
intergenerational justice and equity. The relationship between scientific social 
responsibility and the concept of intergenerational justice and equity has received 
little specific attention in this thesis. However, it is an area ripe for future research 
and expansion of the scientific social responsibility construct. 
Moral judgment instrument. As reported in Chapter 7, this seven item 
instrument is unidimensional, with respectable CFA goodness-of-fit indices and 
has respectable reliability. The items in this instrument were about the importance 
of personal actions that scientists could take to help ensure science and technology 
are developed and used in a socially responsible manner. This measure is 
designed to be congruent with the second stage of Rest‟s (1979, 1986) model of 
moral behaviour (moral judgment). That is, in order to respond to these questions 
the respondent must have been able to make a decision about whether (and to 
what degree) the described action/behaviour is morally appropriate, and how 
important it is to do it in the situation or context. The finalised moral judgement 
instrument is below. 
 
How important are the following principles to you as a scientist living and 
working within society? (1 = Not at all important, 2 = Of little importance, 3 = 
Moderately important, 4 = Important, 5 = Very important) 
 
1. To evaluate possible benefits against harms when deciding on research 
projects. 
2. To refrain from exaggerating the potential benefits or minimising the 
potential risks associated with research. 
3. To refrain from conducting work in areas that you find morally 
questionable. 
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4. To ensure that approval for research is gained from the appropriate ethical 
authorities. 
5. To ensure that the process and development of research complies with the 
precautionary principle. 
6. To become informed about what society finds acceptable or unacceptable 
in scientific research. 
7. To put the good of society ahead of commercial profit. 
 
The strongest positive responses in the survey were to the items in the moral 
judgement instrument. The moral judgment instrument indicated that the scientists 
in the sample were highly aware of the appropriate moral actions and placed high 
importance on them (see Table 7.17). Particularly important to them was „giving 
the public clear guidance on the reliability and validity of scientific conclusions 
regarding potential benefit and harm‟ and „refraining from exaggerating the 
potential benefits or minimising the potential risks associated with research‟ (see 
Table 7.15 for means and 95% confident intervals of individual items in the 
scale). This is a quantitative confirmation of the importance scientists in Study 1 
placed on these actions.  These actions both imply foresighting social and moral 
implications for society and moral integrity of engagement with the public, two 
sub-themes from the scientific social responsibility framework.  
Also judged highly important were „ensuring that approval for research is 
gained from appropriate ethical authorities‟, and „putting the good of society 
ahead of commercial profit‟. While the latter is consistent with the Study 1 theme 
of „doing good‟, it is clear that it may run into conflict with one of the sub-themes 
of the „compliance‟ theme i.e., „business norms‟.  „Refraining from conducting 
work in areas they considered morally questionable‟ was also rated as highly 
important. This result reflects the importance to scientists of compliance with their 
„personal values‟ (a sub-theme of the compliance theme from Study 1). Several 
scientists in Study 1 expressed strong feelings about the importance of compliance 
with personal values and Study 2 confirms that most CRI scientists also 
considered it important.   
Previous research indicated that values are related to moral behaviour (Bardi 
& Schwartz, 2003; Hitlin, 2003; Schwartz, 2006) and to moral perception and 
moral judgment (Abdolmohammadi & Baker, 2006; Crilly, et al., 2008; Fritzsche 
& Oz, 2007; Helkama, et al., 2003; Lan, et al., 2008; Lan, et al., 2010). Results 
presented in Chapter 7 (and summarised in the next section below) confirmed 
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these previous findings, with Schwartz‟s higher order value dimensions of self-
transcendence and self-enhancement having significant, medium sized 
correlations with the social responsibility instruments, significant small to 
medium correlations with the democratisation instrument, the commercialisation 
instrument and the attitude to GE instrument (see Table 7.19).   
Rated as important, although much less so than the above activities, were 
„becoming informed about what society finds acceptable or unacceptable in 
scientific research‟ and „considering and dialoguing with the public about the 
possible misuses to which knowledge gained from their research could be put‟. 
These two aspects of engagement with the public are slightly different from the 
ones in the above paragraph, in that they involve scientists taking advice from the 
public rather than giving the public advice. „Informing society‟ and „becoming 
informed‟ were two of the sub-themes of the engagement theme of the social 
responsibility framework developed in Study 1. The lesser importance placed on 
„becoming informed‟ is consistent with findings regarding scientists‟ attitudes  to 
democratisation of science and their tendency to believe the deficit theory of 
public understanding of science as indicated by both Studies 1 and 2, and 
consistent with the literature (Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Evans and Durant, 1995).  
Relationships between the research constructs.  
The two social responsibility instruments were strongly correlated as 
predicted (r = .55), a large effect size as defined by Cohen‟s (1988) conventions 
for the behavioural sciences. As expected, these two instruments showed similar 
patterns of intercorrelations with the other instruments in that their relationships 
with other constructs were the same sign. However, as was also expected, the 
strength of the relationships of the two social responsibility instruments varied 
with other constructs, demonstrating discriminant validity (see Table 7.19, p. 263) 
and non-redundancy between the two social responsibility instruments. Social 
responsibility, as measured by these two instruments, was positively correlated 
with favourable attitudes to the democratisation of science and the value of self-
transcendence (medium effect sizes). In contrast, social responsibility was 
negatively correlated with the value of self-enhancement and negatively correlated 
with favourable attitudes to genetic engineering (medium effect sizes). 
Additionally, there were small negative correlations between social responsibility 
and a favourable attitude to commercialisation of science and belief in 
technological optimism.  
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The empirical relationships between the ten constructs measured in Study 2 
are highly congruent with the theoretical relationships defined in the proposed 
nomological network. This gives support to the construct validity of the five new 
scales (and also to the five existing scales). It also tells us something new about 
„how the world is‟ by relating new constructs to existing theory and giving initial 
evidence as to the sizes of the relationships. However, as previously noted, this is 
only a beginning in the understanding of these constructs and in defining and 
measuring their theoretical and empirical structures.  
In statistically based sciences (i.e., reliant on the null hypothesis or 
correlation analysis), single studies can rarely suffice (Cohen, 1990). Numerous 
quantitative studies of the relationship between two constructs (preferable using 
different methodologies in order to avoid method error) are required in order to 
accurately determine mean effect size and their dispersion parameters, as results 
from individual studies tend to fall along a normal distribution. Meta-analysis is 
statistical technique developed to integrate a series of such single studies and 
determine precise effect sizes and confidence intervals of relationships (Hunter 
and Schmidt, 1990). Without the benefit of and hindsight from numerous studies 
(or very large sample sizes), it is impossible to tell from an individual study, 
where along the distribution of effect sizes the study‟s results lie. 
Scientists’ attitude to genetic engineering.  
Scientists were generally in favour of the Promethean technology of genetic 
engineering (see Table 7.17), despite their concern that it may have negative 
impacts on humans, animals and the environment (see Table 7.6 for means and 
95% confidence intervals of individual items in the attitude to GE scale). They 
believed moderately strongly that GE will help to cure the world‟s major diseases, 
and were weakly positive about GE helping to solve the world‟s food problems. 
Given the relatively successful history of recent scientific medicine and the proof 
in principle of many gene technologies (see Chapter 2), their faith in the medical 
application of GE appears warranted. Their ambivalence over the benefits of gene 
technology to feed the world also has a clear basis in history. The current 
quandary of starvation in some parts of the globe and enormous waste and 
gluttony in others, suggests that, at least up until the present time, food 
distribution rather than scarcity has been the problem (however, with 
exponentially increasing population, declining water and soil availability, and 
declining oil production, true food scarcity will soon be a reality). In the 20
th
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century the only real constraint to the abolition of hunger was lack of human will 
to do so (Lappe, et al., 1998). If past behaviour is a good predictor of future 
behaviour, even if GE technology could increase food production to keep up with 
population growth, it is no guarantee that humans will choose to use the 
technology to end hunger or inequity.  
The scientists were moderately strongly in agreement that GE fitted with 
their cultural, spiritual, and moral beliefs and principles. They also moderately 
strongly believed that it was acceptable to genetically engineer animals for human 
benefit. However, they strongly distrusted private companies and corporations 
regarding GE technology. While scientists expressed optimism about the promise 
of gene science and technology and asserted its moral validity, their concerns 
were centred on how humans, particularly within the auspices of corporations, 
will apply them and the potential negative consequences for humans, animals and 
the environment. Also, although they were in favour of using gene technologies 
on humans for therapeutic purposes, they were strongly opposed to its use for 
human enhancement. Scientists appeared to question humanity‟s ability to wisely 
use the Promethean technology of GE. They also appeared concerned about the 
societal impacts of laissez-faire market ideology on the likely applications of GE 
technologies. 
Comparison of scientists’ and public attitudes to GE.  
Because the practises and behaviours that are considered socially and 
morally responsible are at least partly a function of public opinion and acceptance 
(moral conventionalism), the relationship between scientists‟ and the public‟s 
attitudes to controversial science issues is an important source of information 
regarding scientific social responsibility (see Table 7.18). In the case of GE, the 
public were optimistic about the medical benefits of GE (although less so than 
scientists), and shared scientists‟ ambivalence about the application of GE to food 
production. However, the public were more concerned about potential negative 
impacts on humans, animals and the environment than scientists, and they were 
more distrusting of the scientific and regulatory authorities responsible for the 
development and control of the technology. However, scientists‟ and the public 
both held similar levels of distrust in private companies and corporations 
regarding GE. The public were less in agreement than scientists that gene 
technology fitted with their cultural, spiritual and moral values and beliefs.   
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The Interface Between Science, Technology and Society  
There are important implications to be derived from this comparison 
between scientists‟ and public attitudes to the Promethean science of gene 
technology.  The gaps between public attitudes and the attitudes of scientists to 
GE (and other controversial technologies) show the broad general areas that 
scientists, regulators and companies developing GE products must address if they 
are to fulfil their social and moral obligations to society. These are the issues of 
public concern, to gain and maintain public trust, scientists must address them. If 
scientists want a licence from the public to continue research and technological 
development in areas of controversial or Promethean science, they must 
demonstrate that they are seriously researching, or otherwise addressing, the 
public‟s concerns (Marris, 2001; Marris, et al., 2002).  
The social responsibility framework developed in Chapter 6 provides a 
mechanism and checklist for scientists to engage with society and to understand 
and address public concerns. If science and scientists cannot offer solid 
reassurance to the public that their concerns are being taken seriously and that 
public good is being protected, then the public have a right to withdraw support 
from the science in question. If public attitudes are overwhelmingly against 
particular scientific research or applications, then it behoves scientists to present 
an adequate case to justify their line of inquiry, and if they cannot, they should 
consider ceasing research or prohibiting certain applications. While it is not the 
case that the public will always be right regarding such issues (it is also not the 
case that scientists will always be right), as members of society, scientists have a 
responsibility to at least consider and respect the zeitgeist of public morality. 
Indeed, in Study 2 scientists strongly agreed that „science should respect and act 
within the mores of society‟ (see item D3, Table 7.8, p. 243). 
Likewise, regulators must engage with the public and demonstrate that 
adequate precaution is built into legislation and regulation. Regulators must take 
technical advice from scientists and they must pay heed to public values. Because 
the public and scientists expressed strong distrust and concern about how 
companies will use GE technology, a most important component of social 
responsibility regarding the development of gene technologies is the role of 
regulators in controlling the behaviour of companies developing and marketing 
these technologies. This component increases in importance as science and 
technology increase in power and effect. Scientists may also have a moral role as 
corporate watchdogs, alerting the public and the appropriate authorities to 
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unacceptable behaviour by their employing companies. Scientists‟ moral 
obligations should prioritise society and public good over their obligations to 
employers. Data from Study 2 showed that scientists strongly agreed that it is 
more important „to put the good of society ahead of commercial profit‟ (see item 
J10, Table 7.15, p. 254). 
The coming 21
st
 Century Promethean technologies have the potential to be 
used to create existential catastrophes (as well as much public good). As argued in 
the first three chapters, such technologies are far too powerful to be left to the 
vagaries of market forces which have helped create the present social and moral 
inequities described in Chapter 1, with technologies far less powerful than the 
Promethean one currently emerging. The crises indentified in Chapter 1, that 
currently present existential threats to Gaia, are immensely compounded by 
laissez-faire market approaches to technological development and consumerist 
economic ideologies (Hall, 2004; Hall & Klitgaard, 2006). The path and 
consequences of uncontrolled technological development have been clear to many 
in the science community for the past four to five decades (Daly, 1977, 1996; 
Erhlich, et al., 1999; Huesemann, 2001; Jonas, 1985; Laurance, 2001; Leakey & 
Lewin, 1996; Leopold, 1949; Lubchenco, 1998; Marris, 2001; Marris, et al., 2002; 
Meadows, et al., 1972; Naess, 1973; Potter, 1971; Russell & Einstein, 1955; 
Serageldin, 2002; Tainter, 1988).  
If action had been taken three decades ago, before the planet reached 
overshoot (the point at which human appropriation of resources exceeded the 
planet‟s productive renewal capacity), the approaching crises may have been 
relatively easy to avert (Meadows, et al., 1972; Wackernage & Rees, 1996). Now, 
it is unclear whether it is too late to reverse trends and avert existential tipping 
points (Lovelock, 2006; Sherwood and Huber, 2010). However, it is clear that the 
best we can hope for, even if immediate global action is taken, is to mitigate some 
of the more serious consequences and prepare for a vastly different future 
(Flannery, 2009; Suzuki, 2010). The public should be asking whether scientists 
have done enough to warn them of the looming crises – this could be considered 
an area in which science and scientists have not lived up to their moral 
responsibility to society. It might be argued that scientists have failed to stand up 
to politicians and the market economy, letting them produce and implement 
policies, laws and commercial practices which are hastening the crises. Scientists 
have failed to convince politicians, business people and the general public of the 
need and urgency for a change to sustainable lifestyles. They are also failing to 
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strongly alert the public to politically ineffectual responses to these crises and 
politicians‟ refusal to follow evidence based advice when it it clashes with their 
ideology. 
Although scientists have played an important part in bringing to public and 
government notice the impacts that human use of technology is having on Gaia, 
they have tended to be very conservative about their pronouncements to society. 
As discussed by participants in Study 1, their scientific training encourages them 
to be sceptical and to want high levels of certainty before they bring issues and 
problems to public attention. They tend to couch the statements they do make with 
reservations and discussions of their uncertainty. Indeed, they consider doing so a 
major scientific social responsibility: in Study 2, scientists very strongly agreed 
that it was important „to give the public clear guidance on the reliability and 
validity of scientific conclusions regarding potential benefits and risks‟ (see item 
J3, Table 7.15, p. 254). However, as several scientists in Study 1 noted, dwelling 
on the issue of uncertainty by scientists may tend to confuse the public, giving 
them the impression that there is greater uncertainty, less consensus and even 
legitimate scientific disagreement regarding issues about which the science is 
actually relatively clear.  
This problem is compounded when „junk science‟ (false science designed to 
obfuscate the public on important scientific issues) is added to the mix. Junk 
science is designed to increase public uncertainty and scepticism of mainstream 
science‟s discoveries about human technologically driven impacts on Gaia (Agin, 
2006; Erhlich, et al., 1999). It is well documented that companies and political 
groups, for whom the current consumerist ideologies provide financial lifeblood, 
make deliberate efforts to spread false science (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). As 
evidenced by the historians of science, Oreskes and Conway, a handful of ultra 
right wing scientists and organisations have played a consistent and 
disproportionate role in challenging scientific consensus on a range of issues from 
the dangers of tobacco, the effects of acid rain, the hole in the ozone layer and 
anthropogenic global warming.  
According to Oreskes and Conway (2010), the tactics used by these 
„renegade‟ scientists are to discredit real science, and spread false information to 
create public confusion and doubt. They named three individual scientists (and 
several organisations that the trio have been involved with) who have been 
particularly influential in the deliberate obfuscation of public health and public 
good issues over the past four decades. As stated by one of the interviewees in 
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Study 1, and evidenced by the scientists who worked for tobacco companies 
promoting junk science and denigrating legitimate research, “[some] scientists 
will do ethically irresponsible things for the sake of money” (R12, see Chapter 6, 
p. 208). 
Another perspective may also be taken on the gap in attitudes between 
scientists and the public to controversial science issues. In the past, public 
attitudes to new technologies have often been apprehensive for both deontological 
and teleological reasons (Mills & Williams, 1986). Well-known examples include 
pasteurised milk, oral contraceptives, heart transplants, in vitro fertilisation, 
microwave ovens and nuclear power stations.  
To some extent scientists are at the „crest of the wave‟ in understanding 
nature and applying its principles to satisfy human needs and desires. At least for 
some controversial technologies, public thought and attitudes may lag behind 
those of scientists. Perhaps by examining the gap between scientists‟ and the 
public‟s attitudes we can gain understanding of how public attitudes are likely to 
change over time. However, it is always possible that public attitudes may harden 
against a particular line of science (e.g., if a significant national or global 
technological disaster were to occur creating an associated negative availability 
heuristic [see Tverski & Kahneman, 1974]). In which case, either scientists shift 
their practices to meet public expectations or the gap between science and society 
(attitudes, values, beliefs and trust) will increase. 
An important application of studies such as the current one is to provide 
information for the development of policy. Providing an indication of scientists‟ 
attitudes regarding social responsibility may help to determine whether or not it is 
necessary to develop policies that regulate or control scientific research and 
technological development, the extent to which these activities should be 
controlled and regulated and the extent to which scientists and science companies 
should have freedom to operate. Research such as the analysis of scientists‟ 
attitudes to social responsibility may also be useful for formulating general policy 
regarding science governance. Whereas, comparison of scientists‟ and public 
attitudes to specific technologies may help to inform policy regarding 
controversial technologies (such as GE).  
Scientists are clearly one stakeholder group whose values, beliefs and, 
attitudes need to be taken into account when forming science and technology 
policy. However, because of the power and ubiquity of technological impacts, 
there are a multitude of publics and other stakeholder groups who also have a 
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legitimate say. Similar sorts of techniques and research methods as used in this 
thesis could be used with other stakeholders to determine their attitudes, beliefs 
and values regarding scientific social responsibility and a range of different 
Promethean technologies. 
Post-normal science (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993; Ravetz, 2006) is the 
concept of using extended peer communities, qualitity oriented reference systems, 
and consideration of extended facts, for decision and policy making, when the 
issues are urgent, stakes are high, values contested and facts uncertain. From this 
theoretical background of post-normal science post-normal sustainability 
technologies have evolved. These include a range of processes and tools for 
facilitating deliberative events with extended stakeholder groups for developing 
policy (Frame and Brown, 2007) and assessing the risk of emerging technologies 
(Kastenhofer, 2011). In such processes, public and stakeholders determine the 
relative importance of impacted values, scientists/experts provide the relative 
likelihood of factual events, and decision-makers provide the relative preference 
for the various outlined alternatives (Fowler & Allison, 2008).  
The post-normal science approach treats deliberative events as 
environments of mutual learning for public/stakeholders, experts/scientists and 
decision-makers/policy people, developing awareness of the “others” perspectives 
and knowledge. According to Rowe and Frewer (2005), proposed benefits of 
deliberative engagement events for science and technology policy making include 
more satisfactory decisions (through the inclusion of lay knowledge and values), 
greater trust in decision-makers (due to attention being paid to public concerns) 
and enhancement of public and institutional knowledge (through mutual learning) 
(Rowe and Frewer, 2005).  
However, little is known about how successful such events are in achieving 
these proposed benefits, as evaluation of their effectiveness has been rare (Rowe 
and Frewer, 2005). Currently, evaluation frameworks are being developed to 
assess the success of deliberative processes and events (e.g., Rowe, Horlick-Jones, 
Walls, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2008). However, an evaluation of the 2003 UK: GM 
Nation? debate indicated deliberative engagement is not without its own issues. 
Problems with deliberative events may include: lack of inclusiveness (the 
unengaged choose not to participate), lack of representativeness (those who do 
engage and participate tend not to be demographically representative of the 
population and to have different beliefs and attitudes to the issue profiles than the 
general public), upfront cost and time requirements are high (although it is argued 
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that the process may mitigate the cost of expensive public opposition by being 
seen to address the public‟s concerns), and appropriate resources need to be 
provided that illustrate (in a readily comprehensible form) complex scientific 
scenarios (Horlick-Jones, Walls, Rowe, Pidgeon, Poortinga, & O‟Riordan, 2006). 
One might also question the degree of mandate that participants have to represent 
the various interested stakeholder groups. It also seems likely that only event 
participants will experience the mutual learning, and they will be but a fraction of 
the population. A similar consideration may also be true about the issue of trust. 
Empirical ethics approaches (Borry, et al., 2005; Musschenga, 2005;  
Molewijk, et al., 2004; Small, 2007b; van der Scheer & Widdershoven 2004), 
which have a focus on the use of social science methodologies (both qualitative 
and quantitative) and normative ethical analysis for assessing public and 
stakeholder attitudes, beliefs and values, may be able to complement the post-
normal sustainability technologies used in policy development. Such approaches 
may help to rectify the problem of lack of representativeness and lack of mandate.  
Policy can offer scientists guidelines on what is acceptable to the public and 
what is not. However, as noted by participants in Study 1, policy generally 
follows behind controversy. The issues that are emerging will be perceived by 
scientists and concerned and interested members of the public before policy or 
regulation is developed, often while the science and technology are still in their 
developmental phase.  As advocated by a number of scientists in Study 1, it 
should be a moral responsibility of scientists to foresight the implications of their 
technological developments and make this knowledge transparently available to 
both the public and policy makers so that the debate or dialogue can be taken to  
public fora (Bunge, 1977; Jonas, 1985).  
Where division, dissention and controversy exist, fair and equitable 
processes need to be put into practice to reach policy decisions that take in to 
account multiple values perspectives and the likely consequences of the particular 
science and technology. This needs to be based on a consideration of what the 
benefits and harms are likely to be, the intensity of benefits and harms, knowledge 
of who benefits and who will be harmed, and the degree of justice and individual 
autonomy associated with the technology and various policy options.  
Consideration of such issues is important to the development of fair and 
appropriate policy. Post-normal sustainability tools such as the Ethical Matrix 
(Mepham, 1996, 2001), the Ethical Valence Matrix (Small & Fisher, 2005), and 
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the KerBabel Deliberation Matrix (O‟Connor, 2004) can help with this type of 
analysis and decision process.  
Study Strengths, Limitations and Future Research  
The primary strengths of the current studies lie in an explication of the 
under-explored domain of scientists‟ wider social responsibility to society and the 
development of four psychometrically sound instruments to measure aspects of, 
and constructs related to, scientific social responsibility. Other study strengths 
include the convergence and triangulation of results from the qualitative and 
quantitative studies, the reasonably successful prediction of multiple hypotheses 
comprising the nomological network, the embedding of the research constructs 
and theoretical model in current psychological and philosophical theory and 
convergence of research results with previous similar empirical studies. The 
findings appear internally consistent and credible as well as externally valid 
through location in a „larger‟ meta-level ontological network. Taken together 
these strengths provide evidence and confidence that the data obtained and 
instruments developed are credible and valid. 
Nonetheless, there are numerous limitations to both Study 1 and 2. Most of 
these limitations are due to methodological issues. Some limitations, such as 
uncertainty regarding the psychometric properties of the technological optimism 
scale, the self-enhancement scale, and the attitude to GE scale, have previously 
been discussed and addressed. Others, such as the inherent subjectivity of the 
research process used in Study 1, and the statistical uncertainty associated with 
single quantitative studies, such as conducted in Study 2, have been alluded to in 
Chapters 5 and 6 and Chapters 7 and 8 respectively, and will be discussed further 
below. However, limitations to a study provide opportunities for future work to 
address them. Therefore, in the discussion below, limitations are discussed along 
with ideas for potential future research in the domain. 
One limitation in the study design was the absence of control for social 
desirability responding, which is a known scale moderator (Paulhus, 1981). It is 
likely that the issue of scientific social responsibility invites socially desirable 
responding. However, despite the potential for the data to be distorted by this 
phenomenon, and the availability of scales to measure it, a social desirability scale 
was not used in the current study. Therefore, a further topic for research and 
future study is the relationship between the new research scales and social 
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desirability responding scales such as the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).   
Another study limitation is that it only considered attitudes (awareness and 
judgment) to social responsibility rather than the actual behaviour of scientists. An 
attitude has been defined as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by 
evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour” (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, p. 1). Since the 1930s when Allport claimed that attitudes directly 
influence behaviour, and LaPiere, asserted that attitudes only weakly predict 
behaviour, psychologists have debated the degree of influence attitudes exert on 
behaviour (Johnson & Boynton, 2010). The relationship between attitude to 
scientific social responsibility and scientists‟ behavioural compliance with 
socially responsible practice could be an area for future research.  
The theory of reasoned action which underlies Rest‟s theory of moral 
behaviour (used in the current work) is a deliberative rational model of behaviour. 
However, some researchers have claimed that much behaviour is spontaneous 
rather than deliberative (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Greene 
& Haidt, 2002; Schwartz, 2000). Emotion may affect both conscious attitudes, 
and hence rational, deliberative behaviour (Damasio, 1994), and spontaneous 
behaviour, including unconscious or habitual behaviour (Greene & Haidt, 2002). 
This suggests another area for future study regarding scientific social 
responsibility: the influence and impact of emotion. Although the philosophical 
theory of emotivism (Hume, 1957) was briefly discussed in Chapter 3, as were 
psychological theories of moral behaviour involving emotion (Greene & Haidt, 
2002; Greene, et al., 2004; Greene, et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001; Haidt, et al., 1993), 
emotion was not one of the variables studied in this thesis. However, in more 
recent, as yet unpublished work, I have collected data to investigate the influence 
of emotion on attitudes to GE and behavioural intentions regarding GE products. 
Similar data could be collected and related to attitudes to scientific social 
responsibility, behavioural intentions and socially responsible behaviour directly – 
particularly as it relates to the development and application of specific 
Promethean technologies. 
The next methodological issue to address is the subjective nature of Study 1. 
The author was the sole analyst of the qualitative data in Study 1, except for the 
previously published work on the democratisation and commercialisation of 
science, which benefitted from the experience and insight of my co-author 
Professor Mary Mallon. With two of us analysing the data, a crude estimate of 
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inter-analyst reliability and validity, regarding the themes and sub-themes 
developed from the data, was arrived at by separate generation of sub-themes and 
themes followed by discussion and resolution of differences. Divergences in 
selection of text fragments, themes, sub-themes and interpretation were able to be 
discussed and consensus found. In the original work presented in Chapter 6, with 
the author as sole analyst, this was not the case. This represents a potential threat 
to the validity of Study 1. Personal bias and intellectual fallibility are inherently 
built in to the design and implementation of Study 1.  
The two primary controls to these internal limitations to Study 1 (other than 
adherence to best practise principles of qualitative research) are awareness of 
potential biases and fallibilities and the anchoring of themes and constructs in 
existing research and theory (see Chapters 5 and 6 for discussion of these issues). 
There were also two primary external controls. The first was subjecting the 
research to the scrutiny of other researchers and experts in the field (i.e., peer-
review – perhaps somewhat ironic given the empirical evidence presented 
previously on the unfortunately lack of validity of the peer review process - see 
Chapter 6). Nonetheless, I have deliberately noted throughout this thesis where I 
have published data, information, and conjectures contained in this thesis. This is 
designed to achieve two functions: 1) to anchor original elements of this thesis in 
published research literature and 2) to show evidence that at least some of the 
thesis constructs and ideas have been submitted to peer-review and published in 
academic journals. However, this thesis has been deliberately oriented to the 
presentation of previously unpublished work that was conducted solely by me.  
The second external control to researcher bias and fallibility regarding 
Study 1 is triangulation of findings with Study 2, which used a different 
methodological approach. The results of the quantitative research support the 
qualitative research results in a number of ways. First, attitudes reported in the 
qualitative interviews towards democratisation of science, commercialisation of 
science, social responsibility and genetic engineering were supported in the 
quantitative study for the CRI sample of scientists. Second, relationships 
suggested between constructs or themes emergent in Study 1, such as the 
relationship between democratisation of science and commercialisation of science, 
and between democratisation and social responsibility and commercialisation and 
social responsibility were supported in Study 2. Third, the items derived from 
themes and sub-themes in Study 1 were able to be constructed into 
unidimensional and reliable instruments that formed predictable relationships in a 
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nomological network of the topic area in Study 2. If the data from Study 1 which 
fed into Study 2 had no empirical grounding, the results of Study 2 would also 
highly likely be inconsistent with reality (the rubbish in, rubbish out principle). 
However, the results of Study 2 make reasonable sense and confirmed the 
theoretical relationships predicted between the constructs. This increases 
confidence that the scales are measuring the constructs they were designed to 
measure. 
Despite the highly subjective nature of Study 1, these internal and external 
controls provide some reasons for confidence in the validity and credibility of 
Study 1. Of course, as discussed above regarding quantitative studies and also by 
participants in Study 1, replication is the key to increasing confidence in scientific 
results.  With regard to Study 1, replication could be performed in multiple ways. 
One way is for other scientists to independently analyse the field data from the 
current study – the interview recordings and transcripts. Using this method inter-
judge reliability could be analysed and personal bias and fallibility reduced (new 
sub-themes may also arise for development from different analysts). This 
procedure is more scientifically rigorous and preferable to the method used in 
Study 1 of the current work (it is also still possible to do this now or at some 
future time). Another way is to replicate the study with a different sample from 
the same population and with samples from different populations of scientists 
(conducted by either the current researcher and/or by other researchers).  
Samples from different populations of scientists, for example, university 
scientists, industry scientists, scientists in other countries, scientists working with 
different technologies (i.e., nanotechnology, information technology etc.) rather 
than gene technology, as in the Study 1 sample, could help test the generalisability 
of the themes and sub-themes to the population of scientists. Other qualitative 
methods such as behavioural observation, journal entries by scientists, analysis of 
past behaviour of scientists regarding controversial technologies, analysis of 
scientists‟ publications, analysis of the activities and documents of scientific 
associations, could be used to collect data about and examine scientists‟ attitudes 
to social responsibility. Using different methods may provide new insights or 
triangulate and confirm old ones.  
An issue that lies between Study 1 and Study 2 has to do with the nature of 
the samples in the two studies. In Study 1, two thirds of the scientists interviewed 
were genetic engineers. The remaining third came from other scientific disciplines 
(e.g., soil science, entomology, ecology, economics, animal genetics, and 
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evolutionary biology). However, these latter scientists had all conducted some 
research on the impacts of GE through their own disciplinary lens. Therefore, the 
Study 1 sample was quite strongly loaded with scientists who were either genetic 
engineers or had some association with genetic engineering. Study 2, on the other 
hand, was composed of a much wider range of scientific disciplines, which while 
containing a number of genetic engineers, was mostly composed of scientists from 
other disciplines. Given that the outputs of Study 1 were used as inputs to Study 2, 
the different sample compositions might be considered a weakness and it might be 
questioned as to why the sample in Study 1 did not include a wider range of 
scientific disciplines.  
However, these differences might also be considered a strength. It was 
expected that, because of their experience with GE, the highly politicised nature 
of GE research and products, and the frequent media exposure in New Zealand, 
the Study 1 sample would be particularly sensitised to the issue of scientific social 
responsibility and, consequently, would be able to provide a particularly rich and 
robust source of data regarding the issue. In effect, because of their enhanced 
exposure to issues of scientific social responsibility, the Study 1 sample might be 
viewed as subject matter experts. Thus, it was expected that the Study 1 sample 
would be particularly suitable for obtaining appropriate data and information for 
category development and elucidating the construct of scientific social 
responsibility. Indeed, the Study 1 sample was purposively choosen for this 
particular attribute. Study 2 simply expanded the scientific disciplinary range to 
ensure that the data and psychometric instruments would be more generalisable to 
scientists from a wider range of disciplines. 
Some limitations to Study 2 have already been raised and discussed. They 
included: weaknesses in the technological optimism scale, the self-enhancement 
scale and the attitude to GE scale; lack of statistical power to fully analyse the 
nomological network due to insufficient sample size; lack of representativeness of 
the sample to be able to confidently generalise results to the population of New 
Zealand scientists, and the fact that any individual quantitative statistical study is 
subject to the vagaries of chance. Just as replication of Study 1 would help to 
alleviate the threats to its validity, replication of the quantitative Study 2, using 
similarly diverse samples, as suggested in the paragraph above regarding further 
qualitative research, could increase confidence in (or test) Study 2 results and the 
construct validity of the new instruments. It could also help generalise (or test the 
generalisability) of the theoretical relationships between the research constructs 
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(and any future additions to the nomological network). Multiple studies of this 
nature could then be used in meta-analyses to strengthen statistical power while 
avoiding Type 1 errors at low alpha values, narrowing the confidence intervals 
around the mean relationship effect sizes and enabling identification of 
moderating and mediating variables.  
Another way of enhancing the credibility of the construct validity of the 
new instruments and nomological network would be to use Campbell and Fiske‟s 
(1959) Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix (MTMM) approach. This approach could 
be conducted with the new instruments and constructs to confirm or determine 
convergent and discriminant validity. This would involve using and comparing in 
the MTMM Matrix different methodological approaches (see p. 310 for some 
examples, in addition, experimental and quasi-experimental designs could also be 
used) to studying the issues and a range of constructs some of which are believed 
to be related (e.g., for scientific social responsibility construct: moral 
development, moral behaviour, world views, etc.) and some of which are believed 
to be unrelated (e.g., work stress, job satisfaction, etc.) to the constructs of 
interest. The use of different methods helps to overcome method variance, while 
using related and non-related constructs as criterion variables enables divergent 
and convergent validity to be established. 
Consideration of study limitations has led to the above suggestions for a 
range of future studies designed to test and strengthen the reliability, validity, and 
credibility of the new scales and the current nomological network and to expand 
the network‟s structure. These future research suggestions are the bare outline of a 
systematic program to check the veracity of the current work‟s results and 
interpretations and, if confirmed, to build upon them, empirically and 
theoretically. The instruments developed in this study provide preliminary tools 
for examining the construct of scientists‟ broader responsibilities to society. These 
instruments could be further used in several ways in future research.  
They could be used to track scientists‟ attitudes over time, or to compare the 
attitudes of different scientific groups. For example, do scientists who work in the 
commercial sector have different attitudes to social responsibility than scientists 
who work in the government sector or the academic sector? The CRI scientists in 
the current sample had a relatively negative attitude to the commercialisation of 
science – perhaps those who work for commercial organisations or private 
companies might have a more positive perspective. The situation in which 
academic scientists are embedded has traditionally been quite different from both 
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CRI and commercial science – are these differences in circumstances 
accompanied by different attitudes to scientific social responsibility? Perhaps 
scientists with different sets of values are more suited to working in different 
employment environments. The scientists in the CRI sample were strongly 
oriented to the value of self-transcendence. Perhaps scientist working in a 
commercial environment might be more oriented to the value of self-
enhancement. Does working in a particular environment influence scientists‟ 
values and attitudes to social responsibility or, conversely, do their values and 
attitude to social responsibility influence the environment that they choose to 
work in? These questions could be addressed in future research with the help of 
the newly developed instruments. 
Another question for possible future research is: do scientists from different 
disciplines have different attitudes to social responsibility? It was noted in 
Chapters 3 and 4 that physicists, physicians and ecologist have been in the lead 
amongst scientists in their recognition and discussion of the responsibilities of 
science to society. Prpic (1998) and Sommer‟s (2010) work (reported in Chapter 
4) also suggested differences in attitude to social responsibility amongst different 
disciplines. Perhaps the nature of knowledge in some disciplines is such that 
practitioners are more immediately confronted with some of the potential or actual 
negative effects of science and technology. It might be that scientists working in 
such disciplines may be more sensitised to science‟s responsibility to society. The 
scales developed in the current work may be useful to examine this question 
systematically. 
As noted in Chapter 7, the scientists‟ sample was over-representative of 
female scientists in comparison to their proportion in the New Zealand scientists‟ 
and CRI scientists‟ populations. Although purely speculation, it might be that the 
topic of social responsibility struck a stronger cord with female scientists than 
male scientists, thus provoking a greater response on their part. If this was the 
case, then female scientists may have different attitudes to social responsibility 
than their male counterparts. There is some previous empirical support for this 
hypothesis. Sommer‟s (2010) study (reported in Chapter 4) found differences 
between male and female scientists‟ responses to statements about scientific social 
responsibility. In a review of the ethical decision-making literature O‟Fallon and 
Butterfield (2005) reported that the issue of gender was mixed with regard to 
ethical awareness and judgement. Although 23 studies reported no significant 
gender differences, 16 studies “found that woman behave more ethically than 
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men, at least in certain situations” (p.377). Similarly, Small, Parminter and Fisher 
(2005), in their study of New Zealand public attitudes to GE, found that females 
were significantly more opposed to GE than males. In the current study, females 
scored significantly higher on both social responsibility scales than did males. 
Conclusions 
Several scholars have promoted the need for an increased ethic of social 
responsibility amongst scientists (Jonas, 1985; Lenk, 1983; Lubchenco, 1998; 
Luppicini, 2008; Russell & Einstein, 1955; Sakharov, 1981; Ziman, 1998, 2001). 
Perhaps cognizant of their responsibility, numerous groups of scientists have 
delivered warnings to the public and governments regarding potential crises and 
the actions that society needs to take to avert them (Nobel Laureates, 2001, 2007; 
Physicians for Social Responsibility, n.d.; Rockström, et al., 2009; Russell & 
Einstein, 1955; The World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987; 
Union of Concerned Scientists, 1992). What more can scientists do to enhance 
their moral responsibility to society, to ensure that science is used for the greater 
good of all and that the crises facing Gaia are meaningfully addressed? Raising 
the level of awareness of moral responsibility for scientists and science students 
through education programs is one start. Sherwin (2001) contended that moral 
perception or sensitivity, somewhat like aesthetic perception, is a type of skill that 
can be trained and honed. Empirical work by psychologists supports Sherwin‟s 
contention (Bebeau, et al., 1995). Study 1 developed a framework for scientific 
social responsibility. Study 2 developed scales to measure levels of moral 
awareness and judgment. These products from this thesis may be useful tools in 
the moral education of students and scientists. 
Scientists could more proactively orient their research to address the crises 
facing Gaia. As Lubchenko (1998, pp. 491-497) stated in the excerpt at the end of 
Chapter 1 “It is time for a re-examination of the agendas and definitions of the 
„grand problems‟ in various scientific disciplines.” Because of human activity, 
sustainable survival is the „grand problem‟ that faces all life on Gaia. As the 
problem is urgent, so too must be the response. There is clearly a grand agenda 
awaiting science - to optimise future outcomes of science and technology the 
many disciplines of science must contribute to this agenda. It might be that, to 
enact this agenda for the good of Gaia, scientists have to become a political force. 
Although governments claim the need for evidence-based policy, they often 
only use it when it suits their particular needs, or if it does not conflict with their 
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current ideological agendas. A recent example was the English Government 
regarding their refusal to accept advice from their chief scientific advisor on 
drugs, Professor David Nutt. Indeed, rather than listening to the scientific 
evidence, they sacked him from the position because the science did not support 
their desired policies and ideological beliefs (Nutt, 2009). However, far more 
serious, in the USA, was the Bush government‟s interference and distortion of 
climate science research (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2004; Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2007). A report produced by the US Council on Foreign 
Relations documents extensive political interference in scientific reports:  
White House officials and political appointees in the agencies censored 
congressional testimony on the causes and impacts of global warming, 
controlled media access to government climate scientists, and edited federal 
scientific reports to inject unwarranted uncertainty into discussions of 
climate change and to minimize the threat to the environment and the 
economy. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, Para. 4) 
While in the case of Professor Nutt the consequences are limited to 
increasing rather than minimising harm for a few million people, in the case of the 
Bush government‟s interference, the issue is of existential importance to the entire 
population of the planet. Even when scientists do take their social responsibility 
seriously, attempting to create an informed public and giving science based advice 
to governments, the politicisation of science (the distortion of science for political 
ends) can thwart their efforts.  
What can scientists do when politicians and governments chose to ignore 
scientific facts and advice – especially when the consequences could mean 
disaster for Gaia? Perhaps in such cases scientists need to become more politically 
active. They need to stand up as a unified group and forcefully inform the public 
about the level of political interference in science and resulting inadequacies of 
policy making. Perhaps even, they need to get angry regarding the political abuses 
of the knowledge which they have generated. Scientists need to make it absolutely 
clear to the public that deliberate political distortion of scientific knowledge is 
leading to poor policy and bad outcomes for all humans and for the rest of the 
planet‟s inhabitants.  
Scientists, for the good of the planet, need to become a political force. In a 
previous paper (Small & Jollands, 2006), my co-author and I argued that life has 
two competing evolutionary strategies for survival: competitive, hawkish 
behaviour and cooperative dovish behaviour. We argued for the radical thesis that 
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those who seek personal political power and prestige are, for the most part, the 
very people whose evolutionary derived hawkish tendencies and self-enhancing 
values preclude them from acting for the greater good of all. In affluent, 
technically advanced cultures, this is an unfortunate weakness of the current 
process of representative democratic governance. Perhaps humans have now 
become such a potent force of nature that governance should not be entrusted to 
hawks who hunger for political power.  
A new more inclusive and participative democratic political process may be 
required. Perhaps some emerging information/communication technology may 
provide a better forum for participative democracy. Or, somewhat antithetically, 
perhaps it is time to seriously reconsider Plato‟s (2006) concept of „philosopher 
kings‟ or, in our technological age, perhaps they could be „scientist guardians‟. 
While such a concept would not sit well with modern society, there is certainly a 
case to be made for an increase in scientific political activism.  
However, as several scientists in Study 1 argued, scientists sometimes find it 
difficult to advocate for particular causes; it seems to conflict with their traditional 
Mertonian belief of scientific objectivity. Nonetheless, the consequences of 
human use of technology have reached such a level of potential existential threat 
that a number of leading scientist have overcome this reservation, foresighting 
future scenarios and advocating for Gaia and future generations of humans (e.g., 
Diamond, 2005; Flannery, 2009, Hansen, 2007; Hansen, et al., 2008; Lovelock, 
1979, 2006; Potter & Whitehouse, 1998; Raven, 2002; Smil, 2008, Suzuki, 2010).  
We live in an age of scientific miracles and wonders. However, the laissez-
faire use and application of 20
th
 century technologies have brought our planet to 
the brink of crises regarding providing a sustainable environment for the support 
of human and many other species of life. Given the far greater power and reach of 
emerging 21
st
 century Promethean technologies it is clear that a new form of 
governance is required for science and technology and it application and use by 
society. The scientists who participated in Study 1 asserted the need for foresight 
in regard to Promethean technological development and governance. The 
scientific method provides the best-known process for foresight. In the Greek 
myth, Prometheus gave fire and the technological arts to humanity, but perhaps 
the true gift was the foresight that this knowledge and skill entails. It is no 
coincidence that the name Prometheus means forethought. In regard to the role of 
foresight in the development of our species, David Suzuki had this to say 
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Drawing from our experience and knowledge, we dreamed of our place in 
the world and imagined the future into being. By inventing a future, we 
could look ahead and see where dangers and opportunities lay and recognise 
that our actions would have consequences in that future. Foresight gave us a 
leg up and brought us into a position of dominance. (Suzuki, 2010, p. 11) 
Humans are now in such a position of dominance that all of Gaia depends 
on our foresight. Science and technology now give humans the power to create 
not just the short-term future, but to create consequences that extend into the far 
distant future and affect all life on earth. In the past, only the gods had such power 
over nature. Technology has given humans awesome power over space, time, 
matter, energy, life and consciousness, and it behoves an equal degree of 
responsibility. More than ever before, our powerful technologies require foresight 
and responsibility in their governance. In the myth, Prometheus had a brother, 
Epimetheus, who despite the warnings of Prometheus, foolishly accepted Zeus‟ 
gift of Pandora. From Pandora‟s jar were released the spites that plague 
humankind. We must take care not to make the same mistake. 
The name Epimetheus means afterthought or hindsight. Because the 
problems that face us are existential in nature, hindsight, awareness after the 
event, is a fatal option (Bostrom, 2002). Nonetheless, hindsight and foresight are 
opposite sides of the same coin, without hindsight there can be no foresight. 
Hindsight allows us to see and understand what has been, this is how science 
begins. It is only through our understanding of what has been that we are able to 
see what is to come. Humans now have 10,000 years of scientific and 
technological hindsight as a basis for forethought and foresight. The work of 
scholars such as Tainter (1988) and Diamond (2005) gives us hindsight into the 
rise and demise of once great civilisations. The parallels to our current situation 
are clear. The wisdom inherent in hindsight is its translation into foresight. 
Scientists have a key role to play in the wise use of humanity‟s godlike 
technological power: it is time for them to stand up for the future. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 6.1. Letter requesting permission to interview scientists 
 
Date 
CEO 
Address 
 
Dear CEO 
 
Request for assistance with FRST funded and Doctoral research 
 
I seek the assistance of your organisation as part of our FRST ethics 
research programme. Considerable research has been conducted with the general 
public into their attitudes and values regarding science and technology and in 
particular gene technology. However, little research has been conducted with 
members of the science community to examine their values and attitudes 
regarding these issues. This FRST project, which is also part of my PhD research 
with the Psychology and Philosophy departments at Waikato University (under 
the supervision of Prof. Micheal O‟Driscoll and Dr Liezl Van Zyl), seeks to 
examine these questions in the science community. 
 
I have already interviewed a number of scientists in AgResearch. I now 
need to expand the research into two other organisations. Professor Mary Mallon 
(of Massey University) and I are seeking permission to conduct interviews with 
members of the Biology Department at Massey as one of the two further 
organisations. I am approaching you to seek permission to work with your 
organisation as the third organisation.  
 
I would like to conduct personal interviews with approximately ten of your 
science staff. In particular, I want to interview scientists working in the area of 
gene technology. The personal interviews would take approximately 1-2 hours 
each and I would like to conduct them on the interviewees “home territory”. The 
interviews are unstructured narrative interviews based around themes of ethics 
and social responsibility in scientific research (see attached interview schedule). 
Aggregated results would be made available to your organisation.  
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Because this research will be used as part of my doctoral thesis, and to 
ensure and guarantee confidentiality regarding what could be controversial issues, 
the research has been designed and will be undertaken in compliance with the 
University of Waikato Psychology Department Ethics Review for Human 
Research protocol. Among the main principles of this approach are: 
 informed consent; 
 privacy and confidentiality; 
 socially and culturally responsive research goals; and 
 the prevention of exploitation of researcher-participant relationships. 
 
The project design has been submitted to and approved by the Waikato 
University Psychology Department Ethics Committee.  
 
I am interested in the diversity of beliefs and attitudes that scientists hold 
regarding ethics and social responsibility – particularly in relation to powerful 
modern technologies. I believe that this sort of approach has the potential to help 
to (1) understand how scientists see their role in society, (2) understand scientists‟ 
attitudes and values regarding their ethical responsibilities to society.  
 
I seek your permission to approach appropriate participants and undertake 
the interviews. Please contact me if there are any further details that you would 
like clarified. I look forward to any comments you may have. If you feel that it is 
necessary, I would be very willing to come and meet you or a representative of 
your organisation and discuss my research proposal and any requirements that you 
may have. 
 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Bruce Small 
Social Research Unit 
AgResearch Ltd 
Ruakura Research Centre 
East St, Private Bag 3123 
Hamilton, New Zealand. 
  
Phone 64 7 838 5216 
email  bruce.small@agresearch.co.nz 
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Appendix 6.2: Narrative Interview Guide 
Narrative interviews will be interactive and guided by questions requiring open 
ended answers. Interviews will be taped (with the consent of interviewees) and 
transcribed for analysis. Anonymity and confidentiality of individual responses is 
guaranteed. Only aggregated data or anonymous will be published.  
 
Broad theme areas of questions to be covered in interview are: 
1. Scientists’ attitudes to ethics and social responsibility in scientific 
research 
a. What are a scientist‟s (the science communities) ethical responsibilities 
regarding her/his research? 
b. What does being social responsibility in scientific research mean to 
you? 
2. Democratisation of science 
a. What should be the public‟s role in the setting of scientific research 
agendas? Why? How?  
3. Commercialisation of science 
a. What do you think/feel about the increasing commercialisation of 
science? 
b. How does commercialisation impact on ethics and social responsibility 
of scientists and scientific research? 
4. Ethics and social responsibility in gene technology research 
a. What are the main ethical issues associated with gene technology 
research? 
5. Demographic questions 
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Appendix 6.3. Participant Consent Form 
 
University of Waikato 
Psychology Department 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
Research project: Scientists views on ethics and social responsibility in 
scientific research 
Name of Researcher: Bruce Small 
Name of Supervisors (if applicable): Prof. Michael O’Driscoll, Liezl Van Zyl 
 
I have received an information sheet about this research project or the researcher 
has explained the study to me. I have had the chance to ask any questions and 
discuss my participation with other people. Any questions have been answered to 
my satisfaction. 
 
I agree to participate in this research project and I understand that I may withdraw 
at any time. If I have any concerns about this project, I may contact the convenor 
of the Research and Ethics Committee. 
 
Participant‟s Name: ______________________  
 
Signature:_____________________ 
 
Date:______________________ 
Participant / Researchers Copy 
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Appendix 7.1. Scientists’ Survey Instrument 
 
Attitudes to Ethics and Social Responsibility in Science
4,5 
In the questions that follow, you are presented with a statement. You are being 
asked to indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with each statement by 
indicating whether you: 1 = Strongly disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neither agree nor 
disagree (Neutral), 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly agree.  
 
The democratisation of science  
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements.  
(Disagree/Agree - 5 point Likert scale) 
 
D1 The science community has a duty to consult and dialogue with the public 
regarding the directions of science 
 
D2 The public has a right to influence the amount of funding that is directed to 
different areas of research 
 
D3 Science should respect and act within the mores of society 
 
D4® The public lack the necessary scientific literacy to properly participate in 
setting the scientific research agenda  
 
D5® Public participation in setting the science research agenda should be 
limited to issues regarding culture, spirituality and ethics  
 
D6® Giving the public a significant role in setting the science agenda will 
impede scientific progress  
  
                                                 
4
 This word document shows the questions that were transcribed into a web-based survey using 
SurveyPro software. Only questions used in the current work are included. 
5
 Items marked with ® are reverse worded to scale direction 
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The commercialisation of science  
(Disagree/Agree - 5 point Likert scale) 
 
C1 Has had a positive effect on scientific progress 
 
C2® Inhibits the production of public good science  
 
C3 Increases transparency and public participation in science  
 
C4® Reduces public trust in science and scientists  
 
C5® Promotes the profit imperative at the expense of the precautionary 
principle  
 
C6® Increases the probability of ethical misconduct by scientists  
 
C7 Enhances the free flow of scientific knowledge 
 
C8® Has been detrimental to scientists‟ working conditions  
 
C9 Increases scientific innovation 
 
Science, society and ethics (moral awareness) 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements 
(Disagree/Agree - 5 point Likert scale). 
 
A1® Science must sometimes push the boundaries of social and ethical 
acceptability in order to advance knowledge  
 
A2 The science community has a moral obligation to ensure that the products 
of scientific knowledge do not cause harm (e.g., to humans, animals, 
environment) 
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A3® The science community cannot be held ethically responsible for the uses to 
which scientific discoveries are put  
 
A4 The more powerful a technology is the more important the evaluation of its 
ethical and social implications becomes 
 
A5 The more powerful a technology is the more important and relevant the 
precautionary principle becomes 
 
A6 There are some fields of knowledge that are so potentially dangerous that 
they should not be researched 
 
A7® Science is the value free pursuit of true knowledge  
 
A8 Ethical training should be an integral part of scientific training 
 
A9 The benefits of science and technology should be distributed throughout 
society in a fair and equitable way 
 
A10® There is no ethical imperative for science to "do good"  
 
Scientists’ moral responsibilities to society (moral judgment)  
How important are the following principles to you as a scientist living and 
working within society? (1 = Not at all important, 2 = Of little importance, 3 = 
Moderately important, 4 = Important, 5 = Very important) 
 
J1 To evaluate possible benefits against possible harms when deciding on 
research projects 
 
J2 To refrain from exaggerating the potential benefits or minimising the 
potential risks associated with research 
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J3 To give the public clear guidance on the reliability and validity of 
scientific conclusions regarding potential benefits and risks 
 
J4 To refrain from conducting work in areas that you find morally 
questionable 
 
J5 To ensure that approval for research is gained from the appropriate ethical 
authorities 
 
J6 To ensure that the process and development of research complies with the 
precautionary principle 
 
J7 To become informed about what society finds acceptable or unacceptable 
in scientific research 
 
J8 To consider, and dialogue with the public about, the possible misuses to 
which knowledge gained from your research could be put 
 
J9 To participate in public debate and dialogue over contentious scientific 
issues 
 
J10 To put the good of society ahead of commercial profit      
 
Technological optimism/pessimism  
(Disagree/agree - 5 point Likert scale) 
 
T1 The human use of the products of science and technology will help bring 
about a utopian society by the end of the 21
st
 century 
 
T2® The human use of the products of science and technology will most likely 
cause the collapse of modern civilisation before the end of the 21st century  
 
T3® Science and technology will not be able to solve ecological problems such 
as overpopulation, resource depletion and environmental degradation   
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T4 Science and technology will enable continuous sustainable economic 
growth long into the future  
 
T5 The future can take care of itself – we should not be concerned about 
trying to protect the future, it is more important that we try to provide the 
highest possible standards of living for current humans    
 
Attitudes to gene technologies  
Genetically Engineered Food (GF) 
(Disagree/agree - 5 point Likert scale, 6 = Don‟t Know)  
 
GF1 Genetically engineered food products are safe for human consumption 
 
GF2 I would feel good about eating food from genetically engineered plants  
 
GF3 I would feel good about eating food from genetically engineered animals  
 
 Genetic Engineering  - Intrinsic (deontological)  moral values (GI) 
 (Disagree/agree - 5 point Likert scale, 6 = Don‟t Know) 
 
GI1 Using genetic engineering technology fits with my cultural and spiritual 
beliefs 
 
GI2 Using genetic engineering technology fits with my basic moral principles 
 
GI3 It is acceptable to genetically engineer animals (e.g., cows, sheep) for 
human benefit 
 
Genetic Engineering – Extrinsic (teleological) beliefs about moral outcomes 
(GE)  (Disagree/agree - 5 point Likert scale, 6 = Don‟t Know) 
 
GE1 Genetic engineering technology will help cure the world‟s major diseases 
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GE2 Genetic engineering technology will help solve the world‟s food problems 
 
GE3 Genetically engineered products are environmentally friendly 
 
Trust In Responsible Authorities Regarding Genetic Engineering (GT) 
(Disagree/agree - 5 point Likert scale, 6 = Don‟t Know) 
 
GT1 I trust what the regulatory authorities say about genetic engineering 
technology 
 
GT2 I trust what scientists say about genetic engineering technology 
 
GT3 I trust what companies say about genetic engineering technology 
 
Schwartz values survey 
(Short version: following Schultz & Zelezny, 1998, 1999; Stern, Dietz, & 
Guagnano, 1998)  
The following is a list of ideas that are possible guiding principles in life, and 
mean different things to different people. Please rate how you as an individual 
feel about each idea (-1 = Opposed to my values, 0 = Not important, 2 = 
Important, 4 = Very Important, 5 = Of supreme importance) 
 
1. Helpful, working for the welfare of others 
 
2. Social power; control over others, dominance 
 
3. Successful, achieving goals 
 
4. Creativity, uniqueness, imagination 
 
5. Daring, seeking adventure, risk 
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6. Pleasure, gratification of desires 
 
7. Devout, holding to religious faith and belief 
 
8. Politeness, courtesy, good manners 
 
9. Clean, neat, tidy 
 
10. Protecting the environment, preserving nature 
 
11. Honest, genuine, sincere 
 
12. Authority, the right to lead or command 
 
13. Capable, competent, effective, efficient 
 
14. Curious, interested in everything, exploring 
 
15. A varied life, filled with challenges, novelty & change 
 
16. Enjoying life, enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc. 
 
17. Respect for tradition, preservation of time-honoured customs 
 
18. Honouring parents & elders, showing respect 
 
19. National security, protection of my nation from enemies 
 
20. Forgiving, willing to pardon others 
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21. Wealth, material possessions, money 
 
22. Ambitious, hardworking, aspiring 
 
23. Freedom, freedom of action and thought 
 
24. An exciting life, stimulating experience 
 
25. Humble, modest, self-effacing 
 
26. Obedient, dutiful, meeting obligations 
 
27. Social order, stability of society 
 
28. Unity with nature, fitting into nature 
 
29. Loyal, faithful to my friends 
 
30. Preserving my public image protecting my „face‟ 
 
31. Influential, having an impact on people & events 
 
32. Choosing own goals, selecting own purpose 
 
33. Moderate, avoiding extremes of feeling and action 
 
34. Self-discipline, self-restraint, resistance to temptations  
 
35. Family security, safety for loved ones 
 
36. Social justice, correcting injustice, care for the weak 
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37. A world at peace, free of war and conflict 
 
Demographic questions  
 
1. Age ___________ 
 
2. Gender:  1= female, 2=male 
 
3. What is your Employing organisation 
1. AgR 
2. HortR 
3. Crop & Food 
4. Landcare 
5. ESR 
 
4. What is your highest academic qualification and what subject was it in? 
1. Certificate or diploma 
2. Batchelor‟s degree 
2. Master‟s degree 
3. Doctorate 
4. Other,  
5. Please specify _____________________ 
 
6. Subject of highest degree _______________________ 
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7. Ethnicity 
1. NZ European 
2. Maori 
3. Pacific Islander 
4. Asian 
5. Other,  
8. Pease specify _______________________ 
 
9. Religion 
1. No religion 
2. Christian 
3. Buddhist 
4. Muslim 
5. Hindu 
6. Jewish 
7. Other,  
10. Please specify ________________________ 
 
11. Which of the following science areas most closely describes your current 
main scientific research work and interests (please choose only one): 
1. Animal science 
2. Chemistry 
3. Computer science 
4. Ecology or environmental science 
5. Economics 
6. Engineering 
7. Entomology 
8. Food science 
9. Health science  
10. Mathematics/statistics 
11. Microbiology or molecular biology 
12. Physics 
13. Plant sciences 
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14. Social sciences 
15. Other,  
12. Please specify __________________ 
 
13. In regard to management, which best describes your current role in your 
employing organisation 
1. Member of senior management team 
2. Middle manager  
3. Line manager 
4. No managerial responsibility 
 
14. In regard to science seniority, which best describes your current role in 
your employing organisation 
1. Senior scientist 
2. Scientist 
3. Science technician 
4. Other, 
15. Please specify _______________ 
 
16. If you are interested in participating in a further survey seeking scientists 
opinions and attitudes to issues of ethics and social responsibility and 
towards new technologies please enter your email address:  
 
________________________________________ 
Please do not enter you email address if you wish to remain anonymous to the 
researcher. 
 
You have the option of not responding to the survey by closing the web browser. 
Otherwise, please click Send to submit your responses. Clicking on send and 
submitting your responses will be considered as confirmation of your informed 
consent to participate in this research. 
 
Thank you for your time and assistance 
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Appendix 7.2. Letter requesting permission to conduct survey  
 
Dr (CEO) 
CEO  
(Organisation) 
 
Dear (CEO), 
 
Study of scientists’ ethical beliefs regarding research and their attitudes 
towards GE 
 
As part of an AgResearch FRST funded NSOF programme and my PhD 
studies, I am investigating 1) scientists‟ attitudes to ethics and social responsibility 
in scientific research and 2) scientists‟ moral attitudes to genetic engineering. 
Further details of the study are below. I am hoping to conduct the survey in 
several CRIs by means of a web-based survey. I write to seek your permission to 
allow and assist me to survey the scientists in your organisation. If you give 
permission for your organisation to participate I would require your assistance to 
send an email to all scientists in your company containing a hotlink to the survey 
web-site and inviting them to participate. I am hoping to conduct the survey at the 
end of May /beginning of June 05. 
 
Participation would be on an individual voluntary basis and privacy and 
confidentiality are guaranteed. After data analysis the results of the study will 
(with permission) be presented to participating organisations in seminars. A one to 
two page summary of results will be forwarded to the organisations for 
forwarding on to participants. Results will also be presented at academic and 
scientific conferences and articles will be submitted to peer reviewed journals. 
Articles submitted to journals will also be forwarded to participating 
organisations. Permission is sought to identify participating organisations in my 
PhD thesis. 
 
I have designed and will undertake the survey using the University of 
Waikato Psychology Department Ethics Review for Human Research protocol. 
Among the main principles of this approach are: 
 informed consent; 
 privacy and confidentiality; 
 socially and culturally responsive research goals; and 
 the prevention of exploitation of researcher-participant relationships. 
 
Approval for the project has been obtained from the Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee.  
My PhD supervisors are Prof Michael O‟Driscoll, of the Psychology 
Department and Dr Liezl Van Zyl of the Philosophy department of Waikato 
University. They may be contacted at Waikato University (ph. 07 856 2889, 
Private Bag 3105, Hamilton) for further information. 
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Science, ethics and society  
The issue of ethics and social responsibility in scientific research is going to 
continue to increase in importance in the eyes of the public and is strongly related 
to public trust and confidence in science and the science community. 
Consequently, this issue will have an increasing impact on both science and 
members of the scientific community. Scientists' awareness of the issues, attitudes 
towards them, and the scientific community‟s responses will be crucial to the 
building and maintenance of a healthy and productive relationship between 
science and society. 
 
The issues that will be investigated regarding scientists‟ attitudes to ethics 
and social responsibility in research include attitudes to: 
 Democratisation of science (public participation in setting the science agenda) 
 Commercialisation of science 
 The ethical relationship between science and society 
 Scientists‟ moral responsibilities to society 
 Scientists‟ value motivations for science careers  
 Technological optimism/pessimism 
 
Scientists’ attitudes to Genetic Engineering 
Much research has been conducted regarding the public's attitudes and 
beliefs about GE. I have previously conducted two surveys into public perceptions 
of GE in New Zealand (at a two year interval) and am conducting a third in the 
series in May '05. Repeating the same questions at regular intervals enables the 
measurement and tracking of changes in public attitude. I also intend to compare 
scientists‟ attitudes to GE with public attitudes from the latest public survey.  
  
Little research has been conducted looking at what scientists think about 
GE. Scientists have a "knowledge advantage" over the public - those working in 
the area of GE have detailed knowledge of the molecular processes involved 
while scientists working in other fields have an understanding of the scientific 
process - how knowledge is discovered, what counts as evidence, research 
methodology, and an understanding of probability. This should, in theory, give 
them a better understanding of the risks and potentials associated with the 
technology. What do they believe? How does GE fit with their values and moral 
perceptions? Their story needs to be told and compared to that of the public. 
 
The issues that will be investigated regarding scientists‟ attitudes to GE 
include: 
 Intrinsic moral values regarding GE 
 Extrinsic beliefs about the moral outcomes of GE 
 Trust in authorities responsible for the development, regulation, marketing, 
and commentating on GE 
 
The research will also investigate the relationship between personal values 
structures (as measured by the Schwartz Value Survey) and scientists‟ attitudes to 
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ethics and social responsibility in research and scientists‟ attitudes to genetic 
engineering. 
 
Your support for this project will be greatly appreciated.  
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Bruce Small 
Social Scientist, AgResearch. 
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Appendix 7.3. Canvassing email to potential survey participants 
 
Science, Society, Ethics and GE Survey 
 
Dear scientist, research associate or science technician (i.e., all 
persons with a tertiary science qualification, otherwise please ignore), 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in an online survey investigating 
scientists‟ values and attitudes to social responsibility in research in general and to 
genetic engineering in particular. This questionnaire is being sent to scientists in 
six CRIs including organisations that conduct GE research and those that do not. 
The data regarding scientists‟ attitudes to GE will be compared with matched 
questions included in a survey of the New Zealand public‟s attitudes to GE.  
 
The study is part of my PhD research and is funded by FRST through a 
NSOF (Non-Specific Output Fund) grant from my employer AgResearch. My 
PhD is being conducted through Waikato University and my supervisors are Prof. 
Michael O‟Driscoll of the Psychology Department and Dr Liezl Van Zyl of the 
Philosophy Department. The project has been approved by the Waikato 
University Psychology Research Ethics Committee. If you require further 
information please contact either myself, my supervisors or the Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
The survey will take approximately 20-25 minutes. To go to the survey 
please click on the URL link below. Before doing so please read the notes about 
informed consent and confidentiality below. Note that after completion of the 
survey submitting your responses will be understood as informed consent. The 
last day for participation in the survey is Friday June 17
th
.  
 
Thank you for your help. 
 
URL:  http://www.agresearch.co.nz/attitudes     
 
(If the hotlink does not work, please copy the URL address and paste into 
your web browsers address line)  
 
Informed consent  
You have the right to choose not to respond to the survey or any individual 
questions. You may exit the survey at any time, without sending your responses, 
by closing the web browser. However, a good response rate helps to increase the 
external validity of survey data and results. At the end of the survey you may 
submit your responses by clicking the “Send Answers” button. Submitting will be 
understood as informed consent. 
 
  
  
 
383 
 
Privacy and confidentiality 
Your privacy and confidentiality are assured. Due to the data collection 
method, even the researcher will be unable to identify individual participants – 
unless the participant specifically chooses to include identity or contact details. 
Only aggregated data will be published. A 1-2 page summary of results will be 
sent to participating organisations for dissemination on their intranets. With 
permission, results will be presented in seminars in the participating organisations. 
Result will also be presented at academic conferences. Papers submitted to 
journals will also be forwarded to participating CRIs. 
 
 
 
 
Bruce Small 
bruce.small@agresearch.co.nz 
ph. (07) 838 5216 
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Appendix 7.4. Question item normality statistics 
Table A7.4.1. 
Normality Statistics for Proposed Instrument Items (Table continued next page) 
Item 
No. 
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov Statistic
a
 
 
Skewness
b 
Kurtosis
c 
Statistic Std. Error  Statistic Std. Error 
Democratisation Items 
D1 .31  -.98 .09 1.18 .18 
D2 .26  -.24 .09 -.83 .18 
D3 .30  -.86 .09 .88 .18 
D4 .29  -.55 .09 -.33 .18 
D5 .24  .16 .09 -.91 .18 
D6 .24  -.34 .09 -.63 .18 
Commercialisation Items 
C1 .21  .11 .09 -.85 .18 
C2 .28  -.52 .09 -.46 .18 
C3 .26  .29 .09 -.97 .18 
C4 .27  -.39 .09 -.74 .18 
C5 .30  -.67 .09 .25 .18 
C6 .25  -.32 .09 -.80 .18 
C7 .29  .99 .09 .19 .18 
C8 .21  -.19 .09 -.72 .18 
C9 .18  .02 .09 -.73 .18 
Technological Optimism Items 
T1 .22  .62 .09 -.16 .18 
T2 .25  .70 .09 .13 .18 
T3 .23  .13 .09 -1.05 .18 
T4 .21  -.34 .09 -.69 .18 
T5 .34  1.97 .09 4.34 .18 
Awareness Items 
A1 .37  -1.12 .09 1.33 .18 
A2 .27  -1.23 .09 1.53 .18 
A3 .24  -.22 .09 -.93 .18 
A4 .30  -.90 .09 1.12 .18 
A5 .29  -.83 .09 .93 .18 
A6 .25  .41 .09 -.73 .18 
A7 .22  -.12 .09 -.98 .18 
A8 .30  -.69 .09 .60 .18 
A9 .30  -.75 .09 .63 .18 
A10 .24  .32 .09 -.62 .18 
Note. Pairwise deletion of missing cases, n ranges from 723 to 732 for individual items. 
a
 All Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics are significant at the .001 level indicating rejection 
of normality. 
b
 Bolded skewness statistics are more than twice their std error indicating rejection of 
normality. 
c
 Bolded kurtosis statistics are more than twice their std error indicating rejection of 
normality. 
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Table A7.4.1 continued 
Item 
No. 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Statistic
a 
 
Skewness
b
 Kurtosis
c 
Statistic Std. Error  Statistic Std. Error 
Judgment Items 
J1 .31  -.76 .09 .99 .18 
J2 .26  -.94 .09 1.24 .18 
J3 .26  -.81 .09 .95 .18 
J4 .25  -.84 .09 .37 .18 
J5 .24  -1.06 .09 .95 .18 
J6 .29  -.70 .09 .62 .18 
J7 .23  -.24 .09 -.28 .18 
J8 .24  -.34 .09 -.34 .18 
J9 .23  -.37 .09 -.34 .18 
J10 .25  -.91 .09 .71 .18 
Note. Pairwise deletion of missing cases, n ranges from 723 to 732 for individual items. 
a
 All Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics are significant at the .001 level indicating rejection 
of normality. 
b
 Bolded skewness statistics are more than twice their std error indicating rejection of 
normality. 
c
 Bolded kurtosis statistics are more than twice their std error indicating rejection of 
normality. 
 
 
 
